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FOREWORD
Well-managed income from extractive resources 
presents tremendous opportunities for supporting 
sustainable and inclusive development –particularly 
for low- and middle-income countries whose 
economies rely heavily on natural resources. In 
addition to generating government revenues, 
extractive projects can create jobs, build 
infrastructure and transfer technologies. 
Yet natural resource extraction and use is not always 
done wisely, bringing a host of problems. As this 
report by the International Resource Panel shows, 
extractive operations can cause extensive and 
lasting damage.
Aside from such environmental disasters, resource 
rich nations face other issues when trying to 
use wealth from their natural resources to drive 
sustainable development. Volatility in commodity 
prices, limited national capacities, weak links to the 
rest of the economy, corruption and social unrest all 
undermine the transformative potential of extractive 
activities. 
This report shows that good governance is key 
to managing environmental and social impacts, 
and unlocking the sector’s potential as a catalyst 
of sustainable growth and development. Many 
of today’s wealthiest countries were built on the 
back of natural resources. A modern example of a 
developing country making wise use of resources 
can be seen in Botswana, which has deployed 
its diamond deposits to promote broad-based 
development. 
Significant efforts have been made to develop 
instruments to address governance gaps in the 
extractive sector. But we need broader and more 
collaborative governance for the industry to become 
an enabler of sustainable development. This report 
sets out principles and policy options that can help 
consolidate existing instruments, strike fairer deals, 
promote an equal share of benefits and ensure the 
protection of nature and people’s lives.
I encourage everyone involved in the extractive 
sector to read this report, apply its recommendations 
and become part of the movement to create a better 
future for everyone.
Joyce Msuya 
Deputy Executive Director 
UN Environment Programme 
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PREFACE
Extraction of mineral resources has risen markedly 
in recent decades and will continue to grow to 
serve the needs of a growing, more affluent and 
increasingly urban population. Greater resource 
efficiency and circularity need to be prioritized 
around the globe to reduce demand for virgin 
materials, as current trends of resource extraction 
and processing cause environmental impacts that 
would exceed the planetary boundaries (GRO 2019). 
Especially high-income countries must strive for 
absolute decoupling of virgin resource use from 
economic growth. Developing countries need to 
relatively decouple growth from resource use, but 
will continue to grow demand for virgin resources to 
develop their basic infrastructure. Therefore, despite 
decoupling, resource extraction will continue to 
grow until necessary infrastructures are in place and 
resource circularity is effective globally. The global 
transition towards clean energy production will 
accentuate this pattern as renewable energy sources 
require much greater amounts of metals, both of 
the common and rare types, than energy production 
from fossil fuels.
The future demand outlook for metals and minerals 
presents notable opportunities for countries 
endowed with these resources to harness their 
extractive wealth to advance economic development 
and human well-being. Nonetheless, for a majority 
of resource-rich developing countries, mining, oil or 
gas exploitation has not translated into broad-based 
economic, human and social development. This is 
partly owing to the ‘enclave’ nature of the extractive 
industry, with few links to the local economy, in most 
of the developing world. Moreover, the industry is 
disruptive and can lead to severe environmental 
degradation and disruption of social fabric, in some 
cases, even unleashing political dynamics that 
result in the deterioration of governance and serious 
conflicts.
In response, mining companies have in the past two 
decades increasingly sought to secure acceptance 
of their activities by local communities and other 
stakeholders, build public trust and prevent social 
conflict. Such attempts to earn a ‘Social License 
to Operate’ are important in recognizing the need 
for mining companies to bear responsibility for the 
negative social implications of their practices, and 
have resulted in an explosion of soft regulation 
aimed at addressing the adverse consequences of 
mining. Notwithstanding, the agenda of the social 
license framework depicts industry’s pragmatic, 
minimum response to business risk arising from 
public opposition and social conflict. In addition, the 
report’s review of close to 90 existing international 
instruments governing the mining sector concludes 
that they tend to present piecemeal efforts and, 
importantly, often fail to be implemented at the 
national level.
The report thereby calls for moving beyond the 
established paradigm of the ‘Social License to 
Operate’, towards a new governance reference 
point that enables public, private and other relevant 
actors in the extractive sector to make decisions 
compatible with the 2030 Agenda’s vision of 
sustainable development. The new governance 
framework put forward in the report is referred to as 
the ‘Sustainable Development License to Operate’ 
which extends the Social License to Operate in 
several important ways. It is relevant to all actors 
in the extractive sector, and its implementation is a 
shared responsibility by ‘host’ and ‘home’ countries 
along the extractive value chain. Importantly, it 
addresses a broader subject matter integrating 
all pillars – people, planet, prosperity, peace and 
partnership – of sustainable development, and sets 
out principles, policy options and good practices 
for enhancing the extractive sector’s contribution 
to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. 
At national level, the International Resource 
Panel suggests that countries adopt a Strategic 
Development Plan with proposed actions by different 
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stakeholders pertaining both to the mining sector 
as well as other sectors impacted by or impacting 
on mining, and mapped against the Sustainable 
Development Goals. The Plan could entail a mining 
law enshrining the principles of consultation, 
transparency and reporting, recognising the rights 
of local populations, and setting performance 
standards. It should also facilitate the creation of 
three core public institutions – an Environment 
Directorate, a Mining Directorate and a Geological 
Survey – to promote and regulate the development 
of mines and metals industries. 
At the international level, the Panel discusses the 
creation of an International Minerals Agency, or the 
signing of an international agreement, to, inter alia, 
coordinate and share data on economic geology, 
mineral demand needs, and promote transparency 
on impacts and benefits. It is hoped that the UN 
Environment Assembly, the Intergovernmental 
Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable 
Development, and wider ongoing UN processes 
focused on reviewing progress towards the 2030 
Agenda for Sustainable Development could 
serve as fora for negotiating an international 
consensus regarding the specific policy options 
and programmes for the implementation of the new 
global governance framework for the extractive 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
THE MINERAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE 
TODAY: THE IMPERATIVE FOR CHANGE
There is a growing recognition that the extractive 
sector, if well-managed, can play a positive role in 
promoting broad-based development and structural 
transformation of economies. In the context of the 
current global development agenda, the sector has 
direct links to a large number of the 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) - specifically those 
relating to poverty eradication, decent work and 
economic growth, clean water and sanitation, 
life on land, sustainable and affordable energy, 
climate action, industry and infrastructure, as well 
as peace and justice. Mining generates significant 
revenue streams through taxes, royalties and 
dividends for governments to invest in economic 
and social development (Goal 1). Mining can help 
drive economic development and diversification 
through direct and indirect economic benefits, the 
development of new technologies and by spurring 
the construction of new infrastructure for transport, 
communications, water and energy (Goal 9). It 
can alter the lives of local communities, offering 
opportunities for jobs and training, while contributing 
to economic and social inequities if not appropriately 
managed (Goal 8). Moreover, mining requires access 
to land and water, which gives rise to significant 
and wide-ranging landscape impacts that must 
be managed responsibly (Goals 6 and 15). Mining 
activities are also energy- and emissions-intensive 
in terms of the production and downstream uses 
of mining products (Goals 7 and 13). Finally, mining 
can contribute to peaceful societies by avoiding and 
remedying company-community conflict, respecting 
human rights (including those of indigenous 
peoples) and by supporting the representative 
decision-making of citizens and communities in 
extractives development (Goal 16) (ibid). 
Many of today’s wealthiest and most powerful 
countries were built on the back of significant natural 
resource endowments and, in some cases, their 
economies are still largely based on the exploitation 
of extractive resources. Even among developing 
countries, this path to prosperity is being repeated 
in countries such as Botswana that have judiciously 
used diamond resources to promote broad-based 
development. Indeed, if managed prudently, mineral 
wealth presents enormous opportunities for 
advancing sustainable development -particularly in 
low-income countries.
In addition to generating vast amounts of 
government revenue through taxes, royalties and 
other levies, extractive projects can also yield 
benefits by, inter alia, fostering the emergence of 
competitive small and medium-scale enterprises 
that supply goods and services to the industry; 
opening up access to modern infrastructure 
and leveraging it to support a wider range of 
development objectives and boost productivity 
in other sectors; and facilitating the transfer of 
technologies and know-how, thus strengthening 
local human capital formation (which is the key to 
structural transformation). 
However, mineral resources have attributes that 
make them difficult to manage and, for most 
resource-rich developing countries, mining, 
oil or gas exploitation has not translated into 
economic, human and social development. The 
extractive industry in most of the developing 
world is an enclave with few linkages to the local 
economy, which means missed opportunities to 
explore multiplier effects and deliver sustainable 
development by stimulating the larger economy and 
thus driving economic transformation. Moreover, the 
extractive industry is disruptive and can generate 
long-lasting and negative environmental, social, 
economic, cultural and political impacts, some of 
7 
which lead to severe environmental degradation and 
disruption of the social fabric, while others unleash 
political dynamics that can compromise governance 
and bring about serious conflicts. 
Realizing the full potential of the mining sector as 
a catalyst for growth and development is therefore 
fraught with many challenges in mineral-rich 
developing countries. These include: the unevenly 
distributed and finite nature of mineral deposits; the 
volatility of commodity prices that have exposed 
developing countries to external shocks triggering 
macro-economic instability; the difficulties of 
managing large and volatile inflows of foreign 
capital; information asymmetries and technical 
complexities of large-scale projects that leave 
ill-equipped national administrations vulnerable 
to large multinational companies; conflicting 
stakeholder interests and lack of consensus between 
different stakeholders on what constitutes mineral-
derived value and benefits. All of this potentially 
leads to social conflict; lack of accountability, 
transparency and risk of corruption; as well as 
geopolitical and global power asymmetries.
Furthermore, many mineral resources are traded in 
commodity exchanges dominated by a few locations 
in the developed world and a few trading houses 
- essentially creating a monopoly of sorts. These 
trading hubs largely coordinate and govern the value 
chain. They mediate between mineral production 
and manufacturing processes, and therefore have 
significant leverage in determining commodity 
pricing and how the value created is shared between 
the various actors. As a result of their role, they tend 
to capture significant rents. 
It has long been recognized that governance is key 
for mitigating the adverse impacts and enhancing 
the positive economic, social and environmental 
outcomes of mining. There is already a plethora 
of domestic, regional and international legal and 
regulatory frameworks, as well as formal and 
informal initiatives and instruments (including at 
company level), which are all aimed at improving 
governance of the extractive industry for increased 
economic prosperity and environmental protection. 
These include many commendable examples such 
as the Africa Mining Vision, the United Nations 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI), 
the Dodd-Frank Act, the Global Reporting Initiative 
(GRI), the Model Mining Development Agreement, 
the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance, 
the Natural Resource Charter, the development of 
indicators to measure resource governance and the 
wider work of the International Council on Mining 
and Metals (ICMM). 
More specifically, and in order to manage the 
challenges in the sector and mitigate conflicts 
at project level, many mining companies have 
traditionally sought to obtain a “Social License to 
Operate (SLO)”, in other words, the acceptance or 
approval of extractive operations by those local 
community stakeholders who are affected by 
them and those stakeholders who can affect their 
profitability. In essence, the SLO came about as a 
process aimed at managing risk of conflict at the 
local level and reputational damage at the national 
and international levels. Today, mining companies 
consider community acceptance to be as crucial 
as the formal licenses and permits granted by 
governments.
The fundamental critique of the SLO framework 
is that it was developed as industry’s pragmatic 
response to business risk. Its agenda is limited 
to accommodating community demands to 
the minimum extent necessary to avoid public 
opposition and social conflict, and the associated 
costs of reputational damage and operations 
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
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delays or disruptions. It has been opportunistically 
used to serve the particular objectives and goals of 
companies, activists and governments. In essence, 
SLO defines the minimum of what a mining project 
can get away with in a particular location. 
In general, most of the existing policy frameworks 
and instruments governing the mining sector 
represent piecemeal efforts and, importantly, 
often fail to be implemented at the national level. 
This means that existing governance approaches 
and instruments have not succeeded in bringing 
about a transition away from the ‘extractivist’ and 
anthropocentric model prevalent in the developing 
world, whereby the extractive sector is an enclave 
with few linkages to the local economy.
The adoption of the SDGs signalled the need to 
move beyond the concept of the ‘social license 
to operate’, which dominated the development 
discourse in the extractive industry throughout 
the end of 1990s and mid-2000s. The need for a 
new governance reference point arose from the 
limitations, inadequacy or even obsolescence 
of existing governance instruments (given their 
sectorial and one-dimensional nature) and from the 
necessity to translate the complex array of post-
2015 global commitments into a manageable set of 
requirements to be used by decision makers involved 
in extractive sector governance.   
In response to these new imperatives set by the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, there 
needs to be a shift towards a new multi-level, 
holistic, integrated and multi-stakeholder governance 
framework composed of formal and informal 
arrangements. The framework should encompass 
governance institutions and mechanisms that 
act at the international, regional, national, local 
and project levels, and that are implemented by a 
range of actors.  Such a framework would improve 
understanding of how mining activities should be 
regulated and how resource rents could be used 
to improve economic and human development, at 
the same time as safeguarding the availability of 
resources and protecting the natural environment for 
current and future generations. In doing so, the new 
framework needs a systemic integrated approach 
to account for complex inter-linkages and trade-
offs between different natural resources, economic 
sectors, eco-systems and development priorities and 
outcomes.
Such new global governance architecture needs to 
serve ongoing economic development, structural 
transformation and economic diversification in 
resource-exporting countries. It should address not 
only resource security, but also resource efficiency 
and decoupling of resource use - as well as the 
environmental impacts from economic growth. To 
achieve this, sustainable development approaches 
would need to be based on new metrics where 
success is measured against a quadruple bottom-
line: on the strength of economic outcomes, sound 
environmental management, the respect of social 
values and aspirations and adherence to the highest 
standards of governance and transparency. 
The new framework is the ‘Sustainable Development 
Licence to Operate’ (SDLO). The SDLO builds on the 
Social Licence to Operate (SLO). It is also designed 
to improve the net societal benefits of mining, and 
is not necessarily meant to function as a licence in 
the compulsory or regulatory sense. However, the 
proposed SDLO extends the SLO concept in several 
important ways. It addresses a broader subject 
matter covering the nexus of all environmental, 
social and economic concerns that fall within the 
remit of the SDGs and related targets; it is relevant to 
all actors in the extractive sector across the public, 
private and civil society sectors; its implementation 
is a shared responsibility across nations and 
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different actors along the minerals value chain; and 
it sets out not only minimum standards of practice 
but also a set of internally consistent principles, 
policy options and good practices for enhancing 
the extractive sector’s contribution to achieving 
the SDGs. The figure below illustrates the key 
components of the SDLO and associated possible 
implementation actions.
COMPLEX ISSUES, INTRICATE DYNAMICS 
AND MANY OPPORTUNITIES FOR ACTION
Security of Supply
Extractive resources will continue to play a central 
role in driving the global economy despite moves 
to decouple economies and increase recycling. 
Demand will be largely driven by emerging 
economies as populations and incomes are growing 
Private sectorPublic sectorThird sector
Based on the SDGs and Targets, plus 
compatible priorities, obligations 
and standards at local, national and
international scale.
Coordinated and cooperative action
 to enhance the contribution of the
extractive sector to sustainable development: (see Chapters 10,11)
national policy visions and reviews, development and review of 
specialised standards, international agreements and dialogue for mining
sustainability, benchmarking of spending and investment, local


















 Transporters & consumers
1
2
COMMON REFERENCE POINT FOR ALL ACT
ORS
Principles (core and detailed) 
for sustainable development
of mining: see Chapter 10.6.  
Policy options for sustainable
development of mining: see
Appendix 10.1.
3 Best practices concerning
the above: see Appendix 10.1.
Source: Pedro et al. (2017)
KEY COMPONENTS OF THE SDLO AND ILLUSTRATIVE IMPLEMENTATION ACTIONS
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to form a global middle class that is increasingly 
living in cities. These trends are going to drive 
demand for infrastructure and durable goods: the 
key drivers of demand for minerals. As much as 
the recent commodity boom has waned, demand 
for minerals is solid and securing supply remains a 
major concern going forward. 
New supply challenges are emerging. The global 
transition towards carbon-clean energy production 
technologies will be an important driver of the 
demand for minerals and metals. Energy production 
from renewable energy sources requires much 
higher amounts of metals than energy production 
from fossil fuels (in terms of the common and rare 
types). As the fourth industrial revolution unfolds 
- underpinned by information and communication 
technologies - demand for new materials is rising 
(thereby creating new challenges of securing 
supply). 
Artisanal and small-scale mining 
Export minerals and large-scale mining receive more 
attention due to their more direct macroeconomic 
benefits and concerns over security of supply. 
However, other extractive activities (especially 
the artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) and 
development minerals sectors) are an important 
form of livelihood for many marginalized poor 
people. ASM in particular has increasingly become 
a source of income for many disadvantaged 
households. Recent years have seen an 
unprecedented and widespread shift from agrarian 
to informal mineral extractive economies. In 2016, 
the IIED estimated the number of people supported 
by ASM-related activities to be 100 million to 150 
million and growing.
 Policymakers equating the expansion of large-
scale mining with ‘development’ have established 
an extractive model that favours large corporate 
operators over the ASM sector. Indeed, ASMs 
are seen as illegal or operate in the margins of 
legality having little security of tenure. Attention 
is increasingly focused on the environmental 
degradation caused by ASM. This activity needs 
to be recognized as a distinct sector that requires 
a totally different approach from a policy and 
governance perspective. Many of the approaches 
previously taken with ASM treated it as a subset of 
large-scale formal mining and did not consider its 
very specific issues.
Moreover, context-specific legal and policy 
frameworks for ASM are required, and the 
importance of ASM must be reflected in 
international, regional, national and local agendas, 
policies and plans. The private sector and other 
stakeholders are urged to implement transparent 
practices across the supply chains and support 
ASM integration into local, national, regional and 
international supply chains. Governments are called 
upon to create the necessary business-operating 
environment to accelerate these transitions. The 
introduction of appropriate technologies, as well 
as the use of gender-focused instruments, are 
considered important factors in improving ASM.
Development minerals
Development minerals are those that are mined, 
processed, manufactured and used domestically 
in industries such as construction, manufacturing 
and agriculture. While they are generally low value 
(compared to export minerals), these minerals are 
crucial for the domestic economy. They also employ 
many people and especially women. However, since 
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they are not usually traded and are informally mined 
and consumed locally (where they are produced), 
they are not usually given attention by policymakers.
Development mineral issues tend to be subsumed 
under export minerals. However, there are several 
factors that make development minerals different 
from export minerals. While export mineral value 
chains are highly globalized, development mineral 
value chains are generally local. Export minerals 
are traded in global commodity markets that 
tend to be very volatile. Industrial minerals and 
construction materials are typically not subject 
to price volatility and are less exposed to external 
shocks. Development minerals are well integrated 
into the local economy as they supply key raw 
materials for construction and other local industries. 
Export minerals are very unevenly distributed and 
thus produced by a few countries. In contrast, 
development minerals are much more abundant and 
widely distri¬buted. 
These differences mean that a distinct governance 
framework is needed for development minerals. 
However, the lack of attention for this sector has 
given rise to unsustainable mining practices. For 
example, uncontrolled sand extraction is already 
having environmental and economic consequences. 
Some of the strategic policy directions needed 
include: (i) policy and legal recognition  of its 
unique contribution to local, domestic and regional 
economies and the potential for structural 
transformation of developing nations (the sector 
is excluded from many mining acts);  (ii) the need 
for concerted action from all stakeholders to 
overcome the environmental, social, labour and other 
challenges facing the sector; (iii) formalization; (iv) 
extension services (by government and by mining 
associations); (v) geological data inventories; 
(vi) access to finance (especially micro-finance), 
trade fairs and technology exhibitions; and (vii) 
simple occupational health and safety (OHS) and 
environmental standards as part of licensing.
Impacts of mineral extraction on environment and 
livelihoods
Mineral extraction involves disturbing the 
environment, and this can disrupt major biodiversity 
services and associated livelihoods. The frequently 
severe and enduring impacts of mining activities 
on the natural environment have been widely 
reported. For instance, surface mining often cuts 
back forest and other vegetation cover, removes 
topsoil and introduces heavy machinery (which can 
be particularly damaging in fragile environments).  
Habitat removal can lead to population declines 
in a number of species.  This can in turn alter the 
structure and function of ecosystems, thereby 
affecting the provision of a range of ecosystem 
services (with potential negative impact for female 
users), including water regulation, pest control, 
pollination, food provision and protection from 
storms, floods and coastal erosion. Chemicals and 
other harmful substances used to process ores 
can enter waterways and the natural environment 
when not managed appropriately. There is often an 
extensive amount of mine waste that can be toxic 
in nature, posing a significant risk when storage 
facilities fail to contain the waste. 
The trend to¬wards mining lower-grade ores 
increases the potential impacts of extractive 
activities. Mining lower-grade ores will lead to larger 
amounts of waste and higher ener¬gy and water 
demands. These demands increase exponentially 
with declining ore grades. As easily accessible 
reserves become de¬pleted, exploration is moving 
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
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into more remote and often fragile areas. Deep-sea 
mining is one example of a new and challenging 
frontier for mineral extraction, especially with respect 
to its impacts.
Making sense in a crowded space
Efforts to improve governance have resulted in 
the launch of a plethora of instruments. However, 
these have not been able to rise to the challenges 
involved. The failure to use countries’ resource 
wealth to generate sustainable growth could be seen 
as the central challenge facing current governance 
systems. This is being amplified by new additional 
challenges. Centralized power in the form of 
national government is being dissipated upwards, 
downwards and horizontally. New information 
and communication technologies are leading to 
increased pressure from informed citizens for 
a greater say in decisions. The importance of 
extractive corporations from emerging countries in 
the global marketplace is growing. As global power 
has shifted from G8 to G20, the diversity of G20 
nations implies a less homogenous approach to 
issues of natural resource governance. 
Some of the challenges with existing instruments 
include:
• As instruments tend to respond to a particular 
challenge, many tend to be sectorial and narrow; 
• Risk management and security of supply still 
inform many of the instruments;
• Compliance is expensive. Many instruments tend 
to be voluntary, which results in low compliance; 
• The piecemeal and narrow focus, plus a lack of 
coordination with other stakeholders, can lead to 
unintended consequences; and 
• They undermine the regulatory role of 
governments by claiming that voluntary self-
regulation is more effective.
THE CASE FOR A NEW GOVERNANCE 
FRAMEWORK  
Towards greater and shared value and benefits
The SDLO is based on an unequivocal recognition of 
planetary boundaries and the need to align the value 
and benefits to all stakeholders in host and home 
countries while delivering a fair share of benefits to 
everyone. This should support broad development 
objectives including poverty reduction, economic 
diversification and structural transformation without 
harming the environment and disrupting the social 
fabric of impacted communities. 
A holistic and integrated governance framework 
for the extractive industry should cover the entire 
value chain of the extractive sector, that is, from 
licensing of mineral terrains, geological mapping, 
mineral exploration, mine development, mining, 
mineral processing and refining, ore transportation, 
manufacturing of end-use products, to recycling and 
mine closure.
Translating mineral wealth into lasting economic 
and social gains requires a broad range of policies 
to transform mineral resources extraction from an 
enclave industry by linking it with the wider economy 
through local content and value addition, among 
other routes (see below). 
How a country benefits from resource extraction 
crucially depends on the policies adopted throughout 
the entire policy value chain for extractive resources 
and on the decisions taken by several key actors 
in the sector. This is shown in the figure below. 
For governments, the key challenge here is having 
the right institutions and capacity to manage the 
extractive sectors well and invest the resource rents 
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However, decision-making in the extractive sector 
is a complex global, national, regional and local 
architecture of relationships among individuals and 
institutions. Although there is no perfect system 
of governance, there can nonetheless be an effort 
to align different interests while respecting the 
objective limits im¬po¬sed by the physical world and 
the need for justice and equity that guarantee the an 
ongoing con¬sensus. 
An important feature of the extractive sector is the 
influential role played by transnational corporations 
(TNCs), including State-owned enterprises from 
other countries. Each of these actors pursues 
a different set of interests. The divergence in 
expectations between stakeholders has been a key 
driver of conflict in the extractive industry. Thus, the 
operationalization of the SDLO framework requires 
careful consideration of the views and expectations 
of all the key actors, as well as a recognition 
of spatial boundaries, power relationships and 
normative frameworks.  These all play out in the 
mineral value chain. Increasing consumer demand 
for sustainable products is moving governance 
challenges to the customer level and to the full 
product life cycle (disposal/recycling level). What 
happens after a resource is extracted, processed 
and transformed into a product, used and finally 
disposed are therefore now legitimate governance 
concerns. 
In establishing a new governance framework for 
mining, it is essential to understand the sector within 
the broader context of a national economy (and its 
development objectives and strategies). This means 
managing the potential impacts of mineral resource 
extraction on other parts of the economy (such as 
on the artisanal and small-scale mining sector), as 
well as maximizing linkages between the mining 
sector and other parts of the economy (including 
through job creation, local procurement of goods 
and services, downstream use of mined goods and 
shared infrastructure). This will require a long-term 
comprehensive, holistic strategy that goes beyond 
industry regulation to also include investment in 
education and training, as well as other policies for 
creating an enabling environment.
In the case of low-income resource-rich countries, 
governance strategies need to focus on breaking 
away from the enclave nature and extractivist 
model of the mining sector. Countries need to 
build forward and backward linkages with other 
socioeconomic sectors, build infrastructure and 
capacity for greater value addition along the value 
chain and promote regional partnerships and 
integration. A range of structural reforms and 
industrial policies need to be implemented to help 
achieve structural transformation and economic 
diversification. Developed countries and the global 
community need to afford developing countries 
sufficient policy space to do so, including through 
reform of the international trade and investment 
regime that constrains the use of the full range 
of policy instruments to achieve resource-based 
industrialization at the local level.
STEPS TO OPERATIONALIZING THE SDLO 
Principles and policy options
The SDLO provides guidance on how to enhance 
the extractive sector’s contribution to sustainable 
development through a set of principles and policy 
options, anchored in a clear and explicit recognition 
of planetary boundaries and the need to decouple 
natural resource use, environmental and social 
impacts from economic growth in a projected 
scenario of increased resource intensity up to 
2050. An important element of the SDLO is the 
recognition that mining activities can impact men 
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and women in a different manner. Special attention 
should be paid to the role of women in artisanal and 
small-scale mining, their growing representation 
in large-scale mining employment and the adverse 
environmental and social impacts of mining that 
can disproportionately affect women. A gender-
lens therefore needs to be adopted in governing the 
mining sector in order to maximize its development 
contribution, whilst also promoting female 
empowerment and gender equality that are central 
to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals. A 
similar need for differentiated analysis and policies 
may also arise with respect to other marginalized 
groups such as indigenous peoples.
Overall, the essential principles for the 
operationalization of the SDLO are:
• SDLO is not a substitute for laws and regulations 
but makes a strong case for ensuring that the 
policies, laws and regulations in the extractive 
sector respond to shared visions and are fully 
aligned with national development plans and 
aspirations in a coherent manner. It seeks 
to standardize contracting laws through a 
generalized legislative framework that includes 
standardized forms. It argues for the use of 
competitive bidding processes in licensing mineral 
terrains, where relevant. 
• As extractive industries place large demands on 
natural resources (such as land and water) and 
lead to pollution and environmental destruction, 
there is a need for a systems-thinking approach 
that accounts for the nexus between resources 
so as to steer policy efforts towards integrated 
natural resource management along the 
extractive value chain. Government policies 
need to incorporate environmental protection 
from the outset, with strategic environmental 
impact assessments, integrated spatial planning/
landscape planning and natural capital accounting 
being crucial elements. 
• The SDLO framework seeks to integrate local, 
national and international governance issues. 
At the local level, there is a need to move away 
from charity-driven corporate social responsibility 
activities to implement inclusive business models 
in which local communities participate in decision-
making, their rights are protected and they benefit 
from extractive activities. 
At the national level, host governments have a critical 
role to play, including: 
 ○ the award of exploration and ownership 
rights; 
 ○ devising concession agreements that ensure 
companies operate responsibly; 
 ○ mainstreaming strategic environmental 
assessments; 
 ○ domesticating natural capital accounting; 
 ○ adequately incorporating social and 
environmental assessments in national and 
local development plans; 
 ○ designing effective fiscal regimes; 
 ○ ensuring transparency and accountability; 
and 
 ○ channelling extractive rents into national and 
local public investment. 
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Home countries also have a key role to play by:
 ○ improving regulation of the activities of 
trans-national corporations (TNCs); making 
international investment laws fairer; 
 ○ tackling illicit financial flows; 
 ○ combating commodity price volatility; and 
 ○ ensuring a fair deal for host countries 
(through, inter alia, international 
transparency and accountability initiatives 
and the regulation of tax havens). 
At the international level, policy action is needed 
to set global standards in a number of areas of 
the extractive sector – in the form of rules and 
regulations, voluntary instruments and reporting 
obligations. These include: 
 ○ coordination of policies and instruments and 
agreement on international standards (for 
example, on transparency and global codes 
of conduct); 
 ○ influencing incentives and behaviour; 
 ○ technology transfer; and 
 ○ financial regulation (including to regulate 
the financialization of commodities and to 
curtail illicit financial flows).
• All groups of stakeholders should participate in 
decision-making through, inter alia, information 
exchange, media campaigns and collaboration 
with institutions such as those with oversight 
roles. Industry should engage in collaborative 
social dialogue on each extractive project by 
formulating an agenda that balances its own 
commercial needs with societal expectations.
• In order to implement laws and policies governing 
the extractive sector, transparency is a necessary 
but not sufficient prerequisite. Information on 
contracts and licenses, social and environmental 
impacts assessments, royalties, tax payments, 
revenues and expenditures should be easily 
accessible. Civil society organizations, labour 
unions, researchers and other stakeholders 
can also play an important role in analysing 
data, reporting on findings and thus demanding 
accountability across all levels. 
OPERATIONALIZING THE SDLO
The SDLO should not be considered as a new 
instrument but rather a framework that: articulates 
governance issues across the whole extractive 
value chain, provides a means of organizing existing 
governance instruments and assigns responsibilities 
to various parties. The SDLO framework seeks to 
create a more coherent governance landscape 
by advocating a concerted consolidation of 
existing relevant instruments, ensuring sustainable 
development is the overriding objective, as well as 
pointing to areas where new instruments might be 
needed and how a particular instrument will interact 
with others. 
The SDLO is a partnership of the key stakeholders 
in the extractive value chain to ensure mining is 
carried out sustainably while meeting the twin 
goals of sustainable development for exporting 
countries and security of supply for importing 
countries. Importantly, it is essential to recognize 
that there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution, and very 
different policy solutions may apply to countries 
with differing industry characteristics, challenges 
or stages of economic development. Differentiated 
governance approaches are needed, for instance, 
in countries where standards and guidelines can be 
easily implemented, compared with others with a 
significant artisanal and small-scale mining sector, 
17 
or those with high levels of corruption, or that are 
affected by conflict and war. Governance strategies 
thus need to be tailored to a particular country’s 
socioeconomic, geopolitical, historical and cultural 
background. 
The operationalization of the SDLO can be pursued 
through the following three pathways that are not 
mutually exclusive: 
i. a global international agreement that 
commits countries to a governance 
framework much like the SDGs commit 
countries to sustainable development; 
ii. a global platform for continued dialogue and 
advocacy on cross-cutting issues; and 
iii. regional platforms to engage host and home 
regions to reconcile issues of sustainable 
development and security of supply through 
regional PACTs such as the Africa Mining 
Vision and the EU Raw Materials Initiative.
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In mineral exploitation, “brownfield exploration” designates exploration in areas near already known 
mineral deposits and/or exploration for lateral/ in-depth extensions of known deposits.
Construction 
minerals
Typical construction minerals are aggregates (sand, gravel and crushed natural stone), various 
brick clays, gypsum and natural ornamental or dimension stone
Dutch Disease
The expression “Dutch disease” describes the various negative impacts on the Dutch economy 
(inflation, rising value of the local currency (hampering exports) and surging labour costs) that 
arose as a consequence of the discovery and the rapid development of the Dutch Groningen 
gas fields in the early 1960s. The expression was coined by the United Kingdom journal “The 
Economist”.
Extractivism
Activities that remove large quantities of natural resources that are not processed in the countries 
where they are extracted (or where they are processed only to a limited degree), especially for 
export. The extractivist mode of accumulation refers to the exploitation of raw materials needed 
primarily to fuel the development and growth of industrialized and emerging nations. It typically 
generates few benefits for the countries where extraction takes place, due to the resulting limited 
demand for domestic labour, goods and services; lack of value addition and linkages to the rest of 
the economy; depletion of finite resources; environmental destruction; and incentives for ‘rent-
seeking’ behaviour that undermine effective and democratic governance.
Exploration
All the activities related to the search for new mineral deposits and the related development 
activities up to the completed feasibility study.
Feasibility study
A feasibility study is a comprehensive technical and economic study of the selected development 
option for a mineral project that includes appropriately detailed assessments of applicable 
modifying factors, together with any other relevant operational factors and detailed financial 
analysis that are necessary to demonstrate, at the time of reporting, that extraction is reasonably 
justified (economically mineable). The results of the study may reasonably serve as the basis for a 
final decision by a proponent or financial institution to proceed with, or finance, the development of 
the project. The confidence level of the study will be higher than that of a pre-feasibility study.
Geological 
stocks
Potential, so far undiscovered, mineral concentrations contained in the upper part (Between 
the surface and +/- 3 km depth) that, pending successful exploration, will supply future needs 
(especially for metals). Tentative evaluations of geological stocks have been performed for some 
metals, such as copper.
Greenfield 
exploration
In mineral exploitation, “greenfield exploration” designates exploration in areas with no known 
mineral deposits
Home country
This is used to refer to the country wherein the mining company is registered. It is important to 
note that, with the emergence of the global value chain for minerals and metals, the distinction 
between home and host country can be blurred.
Host country
This is used to designate the country where the minerals and metals are exploited. The caveat 
noted above for home country also applies here.
Metallurgy
The science and art of separating metals and metallic minerals from their ores by mechanical 
and chemical processes; the preparation of metalliferous materials from raw ore (United States 
Bureau of Mines). Note: biological processes such as bacterial leaching may also be used to 
recover metals from certain ores. In this report, the use of the term includes closely related refining 
activities needed to purify the raw metal obtained from the metallurgical process, in order to meet 
required metal purity standards.
Metals
In most cases, an opaque, lustrous, elemental substance that is a good conductor of heat and 
electricity. It is also malleable and ductile, possesses high melting and boiling points, and tends 
to form positive ions in chemical compounds (United States Bureau of Mines). For the sake of 
simplicity, in this report the expression “metals” includes the metalloids, as these mostly occur 




A geological concentration of minerals of proven economic value.
Mineral 
reserve
A mineral reserve is the economically mineable part of a mineral resource. It includes diluting 
materials and allowances for losses, which may occur when the material is mined or extracted 
and is defined by studies at pre-feasibility or feasibility level that include application of modifying 
factors. Such studies demonstrate that, at the time of reporting, extraction could reasonably be 
justified. The public disclosure of a mineral reserve must be demonstrated by a pre-feasibility study 
or feasibility study.
Glossary
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Mining
The science, technique and business of mineral discovery and exploitation. Strictly speaking, 
the word denotes underground work aimed at the severance and treatment of ore or associated 
rock. Practically, it includes opencast work, quarrying, alluvial dredging and combined operations, 
including surface and underground attack and ore treatment (United States Bureau of Mines).
Ore
An assemblage of minerals from which at least one economically valuable substance, most 
frequently a metal (copper, gallium, gold, iron or zinc), can be extracted further to chemical and/
or physical processing of the ore (see the terms “ore processing” and “metallurgy”. Typically, an ore 
comprises several minerals (“ore minerals”) of which only one, or a few, have an economic value. All 








found in the 
literature)
Especially for the production of metals, ore processing tends to be a specific combination of 
biological and/or chemical and/or physical processes needed to separate the economically 
valuable ore minerals from the other, valueless minerals present in the ore. This separation results 
in the production of a concentrate of economic minerals and ore-processing waste that will have to 
be disposed in the form of tailings (in specifically engineered reservoirs called tailing ponds). In the 
case of construction materials, such as sand and gravel, processing is frequently limited to some 
crushing, sorting and washing operations.
Pre-feasibility 
study
A pre-feasibility study is a comprehensive study of a range of options for the technical and 
economic viability of a mineral project that has advanced to a stage where a preferred mining 
method (for underground mining) or the pit configuration (for an open pit) has been established 
and an effective method of mineral processing has been determined. It includes a financial 
analysis based on reasonable assumptions on the modifying factors and the evaluation of any 
other relevant factors that are sufficient for a qualified person, acting reasonably, to determine if 
all or part of the mineral resource may be converted to a mineral reserve at the time of reporting. A 
pre-feasibility study is at a lower confidence level than a feasibility study.
Refining
The purification of crude metallic products (United States Bureau of Mines). This activity is closely 
related to metallurgy, and aims to remove residual impurities contained in metallic melts and to 
meet market specifications on maximum allowed impurities.
Resource curse Negative relationship described by several authors between resource abundance and poor 
economic and/or environmental and/or social performance.
Resource 
nationalism
Resource nationalism can take multiple forms. Resource nationalism can be defined as anti-
competitive behaviour by individual nations, designed to restrict the international supply of a 
natural resource, for instance to maximize the value-added generated on their territories. It can 
also be politically driven to exert control over the supply chains depending on specific minerals 
and metals through financial control of key producing countries, generally in order to develop a 
competitive advantage or geopolitical leverage. Resource nationalism is frequently expressed by 
tariff and non-tariff barriers restricting the free trade of minerals or metals. Resource nationalism is 
likely to have a greater effect on global terms of trade when a natural resource is only produced in 
a few countries. In these markets, countries can affect global prices for raw materials and have the 
most to gain from resource nationalism. In these cases, there is potential for the main producers 
(companies or countries) to act together to manipulate global prices.
Sovereign 
wealth fund
Resource revenue that is sequestered in a special fund by mineral-rich countries. These special-
purpose financial vehicles aim to help ensure proper management of resource revenues. SWFs can 
have a number of components that may include: a stabilization fund, which captures in excess a 
pre-determined commodity price (used to project flows for budget purposes) and releases these 
funds to support the budget when the price falls below the predetermined price; a development 
fund that captures a portion of the resources flows and puts them in a fund to focus on long-term 
projects such as infrastructure; and a heritage fund, which captures the resources and saves them 
for future generations. These funds are long- term investments to be drawn by future generations.
Third sector Civil society, research institutions, local communities, NGOs, concerned citizens, consumers, 




ACET African Center for Economic Transformation
ACP African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
AFP-JIJI Joint Activities Of The French “Agence France-Press” And The Japanese “JIJI” Press Agencies
AGAM An Initiative for Good Governance
AKVG Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines
ALBA Ahafo Local Business Association
ALP Newmont Ghana’s Ahafo Linkages Program
AMD Acid Mine Drainage
AMV Africa Mining Vision
APR Annual Performance Report
ARM Alliance for Responsible Mining 
ASGM Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining
ASI Aluminium Stewardship Initiative
ASM Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining
ASX Australian Security Exchange
AUC African Union Comission
AZE Alliance Zero Extinction
BANANA Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anything
BBOP The Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP)
BEPS Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
BGS British Geological Survey
BIG-E Batumi Initiative on Green Economy
BITs Bilateral Investment Treaties
BMBF German Federal Ministry of Education and Research
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, People’s Republic of China and South Africa - Grouping Of States
CAPEX Capital Expenditure
CASM Communities and Small-Scale Mining
CBD Convention on Biological Diversity
CCCMC China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals Importers and Exporters 
CCSI Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
CCUWL Convention Concerning the Use of White Lead in Painting
CERCLA United States Comprehensive Environmental Responsibility Compensation and Liability Act
CFGS Conflict-Free Gold Standard
CFLs Compact Fluorescent Lamps
CFSI-CFS Conflict Free Sourcing Initiative-Conflict Free Smelter
Chinese DD Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains
CIL Coal India Limited
CMVs Country mining Visions
Acronyms
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Acronym Meaning
CMA Canada Mining Association
 CMN Commonwealth Mining Network
COCHILCO Chilean Copper Commission
CONNEX Strenghtening Assistance for Complex Contract Negotiations (Connex Initiative)
COP Conference of the Parties
CRAFT Code of Risk-mitigation for ASM Engaging in Formal Trade
CRAMRA Convention on The Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
CRIRSCO Committee for Mineral Reserves International Reporting Standards
CSIRO  Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (Australia)
CSO Civil Society Organization
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
CSS Country-Specific Sector
 CTC Certified Trading Chains
CWA Compact With Africa
DAC Development Assistance Committee Of The OECD
 DI Devonshire Initiative
DDI Diamond Development Initiative
DDS Diamond Development Standards
DFID Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
DoE United States Department of Energy
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DVC Downstream Value Chain 
ECLAC United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
EGRC Expert Group on Resource Classification
EHS Environmental Health and Safety
EIAs Environmental Impact Assessment
EICC Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition
EITI Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
EICC-ESWG EICC-Environmental Sustainability Working Group
EIP European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials 
E-LCA Environmental Life Cycle Assessment
EMP Environmental Management Plan
EO Equitable Origin
EPs Equator Principles
ETP SMR European Technology Platform on Sustainable Mineral Resources
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPASL Sierra Leone's Environmental Protection Agency
EPIFIs Equator Principles Financial Institutions
EPRP European Partnership for Responsible Minerals
ERA European Research Area
ERA-MIN Research And Innovation Programme on Raw Materials to Foster Circular Economy




EVC Extractive Value Chain
Fairmined Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM)-Fairmined Standard
Fairtrade Fairtrade Gold and Precious Metals
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FET Fair and Equitable Treatment
FIASMEC Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining and Exploration Companies
FORAM Towards a World Forum on Raw Materials
FPIC Free, Prior and Informed Consent
FRP Framework for Responsible Mining
FST Future Sustainable Technologies
FTAs Free Trade Agreements
GBAI The Global Battery Alliance Initiative
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEF Global Environment Facility
GEF-GOLD Global Opportunities for the Long-term Development of the Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining 
Sector
GHG Greenhouse Gases
GMI Green Mining Initiative (GMI)
Green Lead The Green Lead Initiative
GRI Global Reporting Initiative
GRO Global Resources Outlook 
GSRM Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments
HDI Human Development Index
HEI Health in the Extractive Industries
HIE High-Income Economies
HRD Human Resources Development
HREE Heavy Rare Earth Elements
IC Integrated Circuits
ICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
ICGLR-RINR ICGLR – Regional Initiative Against The Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources
ICMC International Cyanide Management Code for the Manufacture, Transport, and Use of Cyanide in 
the Production of Gold
ICMM International Council on Mining and Metals
ICT Information Communications Technology
IFC International Finance Corporation
IFC-GPHJCEI IFC – ‘A Strategic Approach to Early Stakeholder Engagement – A Good Practice Handbook for 
Junior Companies in the Extractive Industries’
IFC-PS IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability
IFFs Illicit Financial Flows
IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards for Extractive Sector
IGF-MPF Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development /Mining 
Policy Framework
IGO Intergovernmental Organization
IIAS International Investment Agreements
IIED International Institute of Environment and Development
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Acronym Meaning
ILO International Labour Organization
ILO169 ILO169 - Indigenous and Tribal People Convention 1989
ILO176 International Labour Organisation Convention on Mine Safety and Health (1995)
ILOSTAT United Nations Labour Organisation Department of Statistics
IoT Internet of Things
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IR Infrared
IRA Indigenous Rights in the Arctic 
IRCI Integrated Resource Corridors Initiative
IRMA Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance
IRP International Resource Panel
ISA International Seabed Authority
ISDS Investor-State Dispute Settlement
ISO International Standard Organisation
iTSCi The International Tin Research Institute (ITRI) Tin Supply Chan Initiative
IUCN International Union for Conservation of Nature
IWM International Women in Mining
JEMSE Jujuy Energía Minería Sociedad del Estado
LBMA-RGG London Bullion Market Association - Responsible Gold Guidance
LCA Life Cycle Assessment
LCI Life-Cycle Inventory
LCSA Life Cycle Sustainability Assessment
LED Light Emitting Diode
LIE Low-Income Economies
LMIE Lower-Middle-Income Economies
LREE Light Rare Earth Elements
LPRM Local Procurement Reporting Mechanism
LSM Large Scale Mining
MCM Minamata Convention on Mercury
MCP Mine Closure Plan
MDAs Mineral Development Agreements
MEAs Multilateral Environmental Agreements
MIDAS Managing Impacts Of Deep Sea Resource Exploitation Project
MInGov Mining Investment and Governance Review
MMSD Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Project
MNCs Multinational Corporations
MoM Ministry of Mining
MOOC Massive Open Online Courses
MPEPAT Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Atlantic Treaty
MPF Mining Policy Framework
MVM Mineral Value Management
NBSAPs National Biodiversity Strategies and Action Plans
NEEI Non-Energy Extractive Industry
NGO Non-Governmental Organisation
NIMBY Not in My Backyard Movement
NOAMI National Orphaned/Abandoned Mines Initiative
NRC National Resource Charter
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Acronym Meaning
NRG Natural Resource Governance
NRGI Natural Resource Governance Institute
NRRI Natural Resources Risk Index
ODA Official Developmnet Assiastance
OECD Organisation for economic Co-operation and Development
OECD –DD OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chain Management of Minerals for 
Conflict Affected and High-Risk Areas
OECD-Global Forum Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes
OEMs Original Equipment Manufacturers
OfD Oil for Development
OHS Occupational Health and Safety
PACE Protected Areas and Critical Ecosystems
PDAC e3Plus Prospectors And Developers Association of Canada
PES Payment for Ecosystem Services
PGM Platinum Group Metals
PIDA Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa
PMP Post-Mining Plan
PPA-RMT Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade
PSILCA Product Social Impact Life Cycle Assessment
PVC Policy Value Chain
PWYP Publish What You Pay
R&D Research and Development
RCI Responsible Cobalt Initiative
RDMI Responsible Mineral Development Initiative
REEs Rare Earth Elements
RJC Responsible Jewellery Council
RFID Radio frequency identification devices
RMC Responsible Mining of Cobalt
RMDI Responsible Mineral Development Initiative
RMF-RMI Responsible Mining Foundation - Responsible Mining Index
RMI EU Raw Materias Initiative
RRMI Responsible Raw Materials Initiative
RRT Resource Rent Tax
RS Australian Steel Stewardship Forum/ Steel Stewardship Council Ltd
SAM Sustainable Artisanal Mining Project
SCS Sustainability Certification Schemes
SDGs Sustainable Development Goals
SDLO Sustainable Development Licence to Operate
SEEA UN System of Environmental-Economic Accounting
SETAC Society of Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry
SfH Solutions for Hope initiative
SIA Social Impact Assessment
S-LCA Social - Life Cycle Assessment
SLO Social Licence to Operate
SMED Smart Mineral Enterprise Development
SMEs Small and Medium Sized Enterprises
SMMRP World Bank Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources Project
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Acronym Meaning
SWFs Sovereign Wealth Funds
SWIA Sector-Wide Impact Assesment
TAI The Access Initiative
Tg Teragram 
TMFs Tailings Management Facilities
TNCs Trans-national Corporations
TQEM Total Quality Environmental Management
TQM Total Quality Management
TSF Tailing Storage Facilities
TSM Towards Sustainable Mining
TSX Toronto Stock Exchange
UMIE Upper-middle-income Economies
UN United Nations
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UN-DESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNDP-SEMESHD Sustainable and Equitable Management of the Extractive Sector for Human Development
UNECA United Nations Economic Commision for Africa
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNEP-WCMC UNEP World Conservation Monitoring Centre 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNGIWG United Nations Geographic Information Working Group
UNFC United Nations Framework Classification for Resources
UNFCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UNGC United Nations Global Compact
UNGP United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNSDSN United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network
UNU-WIDER United Nations University World Institute For Development Economics Research
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USGS National Minerals Information Center
USGS United States Geological Survey
VPs Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights Guidelines
WEF World Economic Forum
WLED White light emitting diodes
WHO World Health Organization
WSSD World Summit on Sustainable Development
XTL Synthetic Liquid Fuels
WTO World Trade Organization
WWF World Wide Fund for Nature
3TG Tin, Tantalum, Tungsten and Gold 
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Natural resources2  are an important foundation 
for economic development, as economies rely on 
raw materials and ecosystems services.  Therefore, 
the sustainable development of any nation and of 
the world as a whole depends on the sustainable 
exploitation of natural resources.3 Minerals are 
particularly crucial natural resources as they form 
the basis for industrialization - the epitome of 
economic development.
The fact that minerals and metals provide raw 
materials that underpin economic activity4 means 
that there will be a sustained demand for minerals 
and metals in the foreseeable future, although 
progress towards a circular economy could reduce 
the pressure on primary production, with some 
limitations, such as those relating to the recycling of 
some metals and minerals (Reuter et al., 2013). Even 
though demand will follow economic cycles, with the 
associated booms and slow-downs, the long-term 
picture is one of increased demand as economies 
grow, and particularly as developing economies 
catch up concomitantly with developed countries in 
their resource-use patterns. 
1  The terms ‘extractive’ and ‘mining’ are used 
interchangeably. The focus of this report is on minerals and 
metals.
2  Natural resources refer to substances and materials 
(renewable and non-renewable) that occur in nature and 
can be exploited for economic well-being such as the sun, 
plants, animals, soil, wind, air and water, metals, coal, oil, 
gas and minerals.
3  The concept of sustainability can be traced to the 
Brundtland Report, “Our Common Future”,‘ which defined 
the concept as: “…to ensure that [development] meets the 
needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs.’ (World 
Commission on Environment and Development, 1987).
4  The value of a particular resource is inherently economic, 
social and technological in nature. Metals are used in urban 
infrastructure, electronics, military hardware, transport, 
energy production, transmission and storage; minerals are 
used in cement, ceramics, bricks, aggregates and so on.
INTRODUCTION
As resource exploitation involves disturbing and 
damaging the natural environment, people may lose 
services obtained from their natural surroundings. 
Exploitation may also generate huge revenues 
and profits, which may accrue to those unaffected 
by the adverse impacts of resource exploitation. 
Thus, resource extraction has winners and losers, 
thereby setting the stage for conflict.5 This situation 
is further aggravated by the lack of transparency 
of some companies and a widespread asymmetry 
of knowledge among mining project stakeholders, 
which may lead to wealth not being equally shared 
among them.  Figure 1.1 depicts the array of 
stakeholders involved. 
Natural resources abundance has costs and benefits 
to the country. Which side of the equation prevails is 
not a given. On the one hand, the wealth generated 
can be parlayed to mitigate impacts of exploitation 
and also to transform national economies (leading 
to sustained well-being).  This is the story of some 
of the most advanced countries such as Australia, 
Canada, many member states of the European 
Union, Norway or the United States of America. This 
story of mineral extraction-driven transformation 
has more recently been repeated in Brazil, Chile 
and South Africa. On the other hand, some of the 
countries that have the lowest levels of development 
are also countries with abundant resources. This 
reflects the well documented “natural resource 
curse” phenomenon.6
5   From a human rights perspective, trade-offs ‘must never 
result in a deprivation of the ability of people to enjoy the 
essential content of their human rights’ (De Schutter, 2011).
6  See Sachs & Warner, 1997; Auty, 2001; and Van der 
Ploeg, 2011.
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Resource-rich countries have tended to perform 
much worse than non-resource-rich countries on 
many development metrics (Sachs & Warner, 1997; 
Karl, 1997; Ross, 1999).7  The Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) is the poster child of this scenario.  A 
crucial challenge is the fact that extractive resource 
wealth unleashes new political dynamics as various 
actors seek to control the resource, which largely 
explains the prevalence of conflicts8 in resource-rich 
countries.  Even under the aegis of well-meaning 
governments, economies can become overwhelmed 
by sudden windfalls from extractive resources flows. 
This can cause serious macroeconomic challenges, 
especially when there are capacity deficits in the 
administration. 
7 Indeed, data from the Natural Resource Governance 
Index (NRGI) shows that less than 20 per cent of 
the countries studied have satisfactory standards of 
transparency and accountability. In the rest of the countries, 
the public lacks fundamental information about the oil, gas 
and mining sector. Even countries with generally satisfactory 
standards exhibit weaknesses in some dimensions. 
8 The conflict over the Panguna Copper mine, one of 
the world’s richest such mines, led to a civil war that killed 
as many as 20,000 people. The conflict escalated after 
landowners protested about environmental damage from 
the mine and the lack of economic benefit to the local 
people (Adamo, 2018).
Another common challenge is the so-called “Dutch 
Disease”, whereby inflows of resource revenues 
cause high inflation and appreciation of the domestic 
currency, leading to reallocation of resources from 
sectors such as agriculture and manufacturing 
to the resource sector and a rise in input costs, 
which consequently harm the competitiveness of 
the country’s tradable sectors. The ‘resource curse’ 
concept has been critiqued by other authors (Davis, 
2011; Stevens et al., 2015). Davis, for instance, 
argues that slower growth observed in resource-rich 
countries ‘may simply reflect a resource drag’. This 
is a situation whereby a drag on measured growth 
of per capita economic output is introduced by an 
‘optimally managed per capita resource production 
that does not grow substantially over time’. Stevens 
et al (2015) argue that the phenomenon has been 
over-simplified and that the conclusions are driven 
by many factors beyond the control of exporting 
countries (such as investment cycles, colonial 
perspectives and so on).
Extractive resource wealth can thus engender 
dynamics that can create a virtuous cycle of growth 
or a vicious cycle of misery and poverty at the 
other extreme. Governance is the crucial factor 
that determines which cycle dominates.  Good 
governance (Box 1.1) means that natural capital 
can be converted into human, social and physical 
Source: Christmann (2017).
Figure 1.1. Generalized representation of mining projects stakeholders
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capital, without undermining other forms of natural 
capital such as that provided by biodiversity.  Equally, 
it can engender positive spillovers and multiplier 
effects that can guarantee high and sustained living 
standards. Poor governance manifests itself by the 
fact that natural resource revenues can be looted for 
personal benefit and/or wasted in poorly executed 
projects and resource allocation with severe 
environmental consequences. 
Box 1.1. Governance defined
A broad understanding of governance is “the sum 
of laws, norms, policies and institutions that define, 
constitute, and mediate trans-border relations between 
states, cultures, citizens, intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations, and the market. It 
embraces the totality of institutions, policies, rules, 
practices, norms, procedures and initiatives by which 
states and their citizens (indeed humanity as a whole) 
try to bring more predictability, stability, and order to 
their responses to transnational challenges – such 
as climate change and environmental degradation, 
nuclear proliferation, and terrorism – which go beyond 
the capacity of a single nation state to solve.” (United 
Nations Intellectual History Project, 2009).
The above-mentioned situation is, however, more 
nuanced. Of particular concern is the fact that 
extractive resources are finite and therefore, once 
exploited, they will cease to be available again. 
Countries therefore only have a limited window of 
opportunity to convert extractive resource wealth 
into sustainable development. This is particularly 
important for people that bear the brunt of resource 
exploitation and also for future generations for whom 
the resources will no longer be available. 
For countries that depend on importing extractive 
resources, the “resource curse” can translate into 
supply uncertainties. The latter also arise from the 
fact that endowments of mineral resources have 
an uneven geographical distribution, with a handful 
of countries controlling some specific resources. 
This concern is addressed through markets and 
geopolitics (in the form of free trade, economic 
diplomacy, power relations, new discoveries and 
through resource efficiency to reduce overall 
dependency (UNEP, 2016a)). Beyond security of 
supply, companies from importing countries also 
have to worry about reputational risks that arise 
from dealing with exporting countries perceived as 
corrupt and where their activities may be associated 
with negative environmental and social impacts. In 
the case of resource-rich countries, the key concern 
is whether they can convert natural capital into high 
and sustained living standards and development. The 
two sets of concerns are different sides of the same 
coin, since unfettered supply of mineral resources is 
crucial for both pathways.
Gender inequality also poses a fundamental 
challenge in mining communities. Women play a 
very limited leadership role in the formal mining 
sector globally and, in most mining countries, women 
are still a minority in the mining industry. However, 
their number as a proportion of the overall mining 
workforce continues to rise, and it is expected to 
increase even further as the global mining industry 
tackles an ongoing skills shortage. In the past, mining 
was male-dominated work because physical stamina 
and endurance were key job requirements. Currently, 
technology is greatly facilitating the entry of women 
into the mining industry. This is because mines 
are now at the cutting edge of modern technology, 
and there is much less emphasis on physical 
muscles and far more on numeracy, literacy and 
specialist skills. Mining technology is thus an access 
opportunity paving the way for women in mining 
countries to play increasingly important roles in the 
mining industry, occupying positions of power and 
authority at all levels even in some African mining 
countries such as Zambia where women are found 
working as directors, managers, lawyers, engineers, 
laboratory technicians, truck drivers, control-room 
operatives and blast-supervisors (WIM, n.d.).  Global 
feminist activist organizations such as International 
Women in Mining (IWIN) continue to encourage 
the formation of women’s mining cooperatives, 
associations and networks to encourage women’s 
participation, stimulate bargaining power, 
improve work conditions and promote economic 
independence in mining countries. 
With informal ASM (see Chapter 3), however, gender 
inequities still emerge as a deepening socioeconomic 
challenge in mining countries and there remain 
unequal opportunities between men and women. 
Africa continues to have the highest proportion of 
women artisanal miners and they make up about 
50 percent of the artisanal mining workforce there, 
compared to the world average of 30 percent (IGF, 
2018:1).  Very few women are represented in the 
ASM management or technical mining operations. 
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Indeed, for many women, involvement in informal 
mining is still limited to more traditional activities 
including “digging, rock crushing, grinding, panning, 
washing, and sieving” and for other women, artisanal 
mining “is mostly clustered in support services—
water haulers for mine sites, labourers, and suppliers 
of goods and services around the mining sites, 
including the sex trade” (Eshun, 2016:1).  There are 
also mining associated challenges in countries such 
as Ghana, where agriculture production is highly 
gendered. This is the combined result of decreasing 
productivity of mainly female subsistence farming 
and the environmental degradation that comes with 
artisanal mining. 
Addressing these challenges requires effective 
governance of the whole mineral value chain 
(upstream and downstream). Indeed, as shown in a 
recent report by UNU-WIDER, the ‘resource curse’ is 
not a destiny but mineral wealth can be a blessing 
(Ericsson & Olöf, 2017). Using data for 1996-2014 
(a period that saw a significant rise in demand for 
natural resources – the so-called super-cycle), the 
authors show that mineral-rich countries experienced 
a 70% improvement in the Human Development 
Index (HDI) over non-mining countries. They also 
show that mining countries exhibited relative 
improvements in governance indicators. This is 
evidence of the key importance of good governance 
in unlocking the benefit of mineral wealth. It 
underscores the need to strengthen governance of 
natural resources, which is the main premise for 
developing this assessment report. 
The search for effective natural resource governance 
models has seen a plethora of initiatives launched 
at national and international levels. A mapping of 
the various governance instruments relating to the 
mining sector has identified in excess of 80 such 
initiatives (mainly international and regional). These 
range from comprehensive policy frameworks 
to platforms for dialogue; from legally binding 
initiatives backed by United Nations sanctions and 
national laws to voluntary initiatives; and from single 
stakeholder-led to multi-stakeholder platforms that 
bring together many types of stakeholders. Initiatives 
range from those that are very site-specific to those 
that are global in coverage. 
Many initiatives tend to cover a specific set of issues 
like the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme 
(KPCS), which is narrowly focused on conflict 
diamonds. Also, several initiatives are motivated 
by risk-management concerns mainly relating to 
securing supply or managing reputational risks. Only 
13 per cent of the initiatives in question addressed 
broad sustainable development issues. 
The review of the various initiatives paints a mixed 
picture. Some of the challenges faced by ongoing 
initiatives include the appearance of unintended 
consequences, such as conflict-prevention initiatives 
increasing poverty, job losses and incidence of 
violence; lack of buy-in; lack of compliance (due 
to lack of sanctioning mechanisms); self-serving 
interpretation of the initiative’s scope of application, 
which is prevalent with corporate social responsibility 
initiatives; uneven focus on critical issues; lack of a 
theory of change; and a proliferation of standards 
creating fatigue across stakeholders.
Even though useful lessons have been learnt and 
progress made, the “resource curse” is still a reality 
for some people living in extractive resource-rich 
countries. Unlocking the potential of extractive 
resource wealth to contribute towards inclusive 
and sustainable development requires significant 
gaps at all levels of natural resource governance 
to be addressed. Attention must be directed to 
core elements of an effective natural resource 
governance framework, which include strong public 
institutions, fair redistribution of revenues, a shared 
notion of value, transparency measures, information 
and knowledge sharing and a stable security 
environment.
The new global agenda for development, the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), has given 
a new impetus for leveraging extractive resource 
wealth to deliver improved livelihoods. A report 
mapping mining to the SDGs (UNSDSN, CCSI, UNDP 
and WEF, 2015) makes a strong case for linkages 
between the sector and the SDGs. It argues that, 
since mining is a global industry and is often located 
in remote and less-developed areas (including many 
indigenous lands and territories), when managed 
appropriately it can create jobs, develop skills usable 
in other sectors of the economy, spur innovation 
and bring investment and infrastructure at a game-
changing scale over long periods of time. The desire 
for mining to contribute to sustainable development 
resulted in various approaches being adopted in 
different regions . In Africa, a continental strategy 
has been developed under the Africa Mining Vision 
(AU, 2009). In Latin America, countries are pursuing 
different strategies (Box 1.2).
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Box 1.2. Leveraging mining for industrialization: African and Latin American approaches
Africa Mining Vision (AMV) (African Union, 2009)
The vision calls for:
• A knowledge-driven African mining sector that catalyses and contributes to the broad-based growth 
and development of, while being fully integrated into, a single African market through:
 ○ Downstream linkages into mineral beneficiation and manufacturing;
 ○ Upstream linkages into mining capital goods, consumables and services industries;
 ○ Side stream linkages into infrastructure (power, logistics, communications and water) and skills 
and technology development (HRD and R&D);
 ○ Mutually beneficial partnerships between the State, the private sector, civil society, local 
communities and other stakeholders; and
 ○ A comprehensive knowledge of its mineral endowment.
• A sustainable and well-governed mining sector that effectively garners and deploys resource rents and 
that is safe, healthy, gender and ethnically inclusive, environmentally friendly, socially responsible and 
appreciated by surrounding communities;
• A mining sector that has become a key component of a diversified, vibrant and globally competitive 
industrializing African economy;
• A mining sector that has helped establish a competitive African infrastructure platform, through the 
maximization of its propulsive local and regional economic linkages;
• A mining sector that optimizes and husbands Africa’s finite mineral resource endowments and 
that is diversified, incorporating both high-value metals and lower-value industrial minerals at both 
commercial and small-scale levels;
• A mining sector that harnesses the potential of artisanal and small-scale mining to stimulate local/
national entrepreneurship, improve livelihoods and advance integrated rural social and economic 
development; and
• A mining sector that is a major player in vibrant and competitive national, continental and international 
capital and commodity markets.
The implementation of the AMV has received mixed results. Out of the 54 countries in Africa, 24 are at 
various stages of the implementation of the AMV (Oxfam, 2017). Notable progress has been observed 
in Chad, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi and Sierra Leone. In Ghana, for example, a new mining 
policy has been promulgated as part of the implementation of the country’s mining vision. This has 
also involved the enactment of laws on local content and local participation. The slow pace of AMV 
implementation has been attributed to the lack of political will, its top-down approach and lack of focus 
on marginalized people; as well as a lack of awareness (ActionAid, 2017; Compaoré, 2017).
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Latin America 
Bastida (2018) points out that there is no regional initiative analogous to the Africa Mining Vision, although the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) has called upon countries 
to develop a common vision on natural resources.9  The different countries are pursuing strategies similar to 
those being promoted by AMV. Some examples include:
• In Chile, in 2014 the Commission for Mining and Development (a multi-stakeholder group set up within 
the National Innovation and Competitiveness Council) issued the report ‘Mining: A Platform for the Future 
in Chile’, which sets the Strategic Agenda for the sector up to 2035. The report outlines a vision for the 
development of a ‘virtuous, inclusive and sustainable’ sector, which aims to place mining at the core of 
developmental efforts.
• In Colombia, in February 2014 the Mining and Energy Planning Unit released the report ‘Mining Scenarios 
for Colombia 2032’, which identified a set of long-term strategies for the mining sector based on scenario 
planning. The report has informed the preparation of the ambitious ‘National Development Plan 2018-2025’, 
• In Peru, a report ‘Towards a Vision for Mining in Peru in 2030’ was developed in 2016. The Vision emphasizes 
the need to adopt actions to enhance the economic contribution of mining and to ensure alignment with the 
SDGs and territorial development priorities.
• Argentina: The province of Jujuy, home to large reserves of lithium, has established guidelines on mining 
promotion and towards industrialization and added-value policies in its provincial constitution. Further, 
in 2011, the province established the Jujuy Energía y Minería Sociedad del Estado (JEMSE), a provincial 
state-owned company. In 2017, JEMSE and the Italian FIB (Seri Group) installed an assembly plant and 
then produced lithium-ion cells for public transportation. Also, Jujuy National University has entered into a 
partnership with the national oil company and the National Research Council to install the first lithium-ion cell 
factory in the country. 
• Bolivia (Plurinational State of): The 2009 constitution mandates adding value to and industrializing minerals. 
To implement the constitutional mandate, the Government has invested in four pilot plants to produce lithium 
carbonate and assembly batteries in Potosi. To start up production at an industrial scale, the Government 
commissioned the design of an industrial plant for potassium chlorate. 
Conventional natural resource-related challenges 
are being exacerbated by new developments. These 
include a changing governance landscape where the 
centralized power of national governments is being 
devolved downwards to local levels, upwards to the 
international levels and horizontally to regional levels.9 
At the same time, the rise of new powers (BRICS10  in 
particular)11 is shifting global geopolitics. 
9 The fact that mineral value chains are global means 
that governance is further complicated by many actors 
involved including host States, home States, multinational 
corporations, civil society organizations and other 
stakeholders. This is further discussed in Chapter 9.
10 BRICS stands a grouping of five emerging economies: 
Brazil, Russian Federation, India, People’s Republic of China 
and South Africa.
11 This was a key recommendation of the 2014 document 
Another challenge relates to the increased 
financialization of natural resources, so that 
commodity prices are no longer solely determined 
by fundamentals of demand and supply but by the 
risk appetite of investors. Moreover, international 
investment laws have been criticized for leaning 
towards favouring investors rather than the public 
interest, while illicit financial flows (IFFs), including 
taxation base erosion, are draining revenues 
derived from the extraction of resources (Pun, 
2017). Consumers and institutional investors are 
also increasingly concerned with the impact of 
their purchasing decisions and the quality of their 
‘Compacts for Equality: Towards a Sustainable Future’. 
Furthermore, in May 2016 ECLAC published the report 
‘Towards a New Governance of Natural Resources in Latin 
America and the Caribbean’.
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portfolios, respectively. A further challenge relates 
to the impacts of climate change on extractive 
operations, as well as on supply and demand 
dynamics. Other challenges relate to technological 
innovations that are changing the face of the 
extractive sector, as well as the need to rethink the 
role of artisanal and small-scale mining as bona fide 
(legitimate) activities.
In addressing these governance challenges, it is 
crucial to devise innovative ways to govern mineral 
resources effectively. As we embark on the SDGs 
path, it is important to revisit the issue of designing 
effective governance systems. This will be a 
monumental task if history is to guide us. Indeed, 
Lockwood et al. (2010) maintain that the natural 
resource governance problem belongs to a class 
of complex policy problems, the so-called “Wicked 
Problems”, which are ‘characterized by complexity 
and contestation originating from multiple problem 
causes, divergent problem perspectives and solution 
strategies and fragmented institutional settings 
that, in order to be remedied, require institutional 
adaptation and innovation’. 
The development of a new governance framework 
is crucial. Pedro et al. (2017) call for a ‘new multi-
level, holistic and integrated governance framework 
applicable to governments, companies and the 
broader range stakeholders in the extractive industry’. 
This framework will be anchored in the quadruple 
bottom-line where development is measured on 
economic grounds, environmental and social 
imperatives as well as observance of highest 
governance and transparency standards. A central 
guiding principle is that these resources should be 
available for all generations (current and future) or, in 
other words, ‘it is not your world alone’.
1.1. Chapter synopsis
This report seeks to point the way towards a new 
governance landscape. It consists of three parts. 
Part one (Chapters 2 – 5) summarizes the current 
state of the mining industry.  Chapters 6 – 9 
constitute the second part, which explores the 
present mineral resource governance architecture. 
The final part (Chapters 10 – 12) articulates the 
pathway to improved mineral resource governance 
for sustainable development. 
Chapter 2 explores the role of the minerals and 
metals industry in the global economy, with a focus 
on the evolution of the industry and the role of the 
emerging circular economy. It will profile the mining 
and metals industry throughout its value chain. 
Chapter 3 looks at the evolution of artisanal and 
small-scale mining (ASM) and implications for 
resource governance.  It illustrates how this sector 
differs from large-scale mining, particularly by 
looking at the distinctive issues affecting ASM. It also 
highlights the evolving thinking on ASM, including a 
review of specific legal and regulatory programmes 
to better manage the sector, as well as steps taken to 
increase collaboration between ASM and large-scale 
operators.
Chapter 4 examines the future trends in the 
extractive sector, using 2050 as the time horizon. 
It explores drivers of both demand and supply, 
and implications for commodity price formation. 
Assessing the impact of an increasing population, 
rapid urbanization and expanding middle class 
(especially in developing countries) on global 
resource use is particularly significant. The chapter 
features a review of scenario projections of future 
needs for mineral resources, and an analysis of how 
they could be extracted and used. It also explores 
emerging governance issues that need to be 
anticipated.
Chapter 5 examines the potential social and 
environmental impacts of mining. It analyses 
environmental impacts and concerns arising, for 
example, from pollution, water depletion, land 
degradation, climate change and biodiversity loss. 
The focus of the social impact analysis includes, 
at the macro-level, tensions and other disruptions 
brought about by the scramble for resources and 
over-dependency on resource rents. 
Chapter 6 focuses on the challenges of governing the 
sector. It includes a review of the political factors that 
tend to weaken resource governance. It shows how 
the sector can increase inequalities and potential 
capture by different interest groups, which is an 
important factor underpinning these challenges. 
Importantly, the chapter makes a case for how 
crucial it is to strengthen mining governance. It seeks 
to improve the understanding of how the mining 
sector can aid the achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, and of the need for a governance 
architecture that will facilitate the transition towards 
sustainable development. 
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Chapter 7 reviews the current governance 
architecture. The chapter maps out the key 
governance instruments and stakeholders in the 
extractive industry. 
Chapter 8 provides an assessment of the level of 
effectiveness and impact of existing initiatives and 
other instruments governing the extractive industry. 
This chapter identifies governance gaps and 
limitations and points to some building blocks for a 
more robust governance framework. 
Chapter 9 explores the prerequisites for an effective 
governance framework. It highlights the key elements 
and actors of a holistic framework. The chapter 
presents seven prerequisites that are crucial for an 
effective governance framework (holistic framework, 
decoupling economic growth from environmental 
and social impacts, respect of human rights, greater 
home country engagement, responsible business 
practices, balance between security of supply (global 
north) and sustainable development aspirations 
(global south) and the need for data, information and 
knowledge).
Chapter 10 develops the proposal for a Sustainable 
Development Licence to Operate (SDLO) framework. 
The chapter places the SDLO centre-stage from an 
aspirational angle, but also with practical illustrations 
of what should be done to secure such a licence 
(which is not intended to function as a licence in 
the regulatory sense). The illustrations include 
realistic, clear and specific policy options to improve 
governance of the extractive industry, as opposed to 
merely generic recommendations. The elements of 
the new governance framework are described. These 
are intended to help set global standards for what is 
acceptable, for instance, in terms of rent extraction, 
getting a fair deal and share of profits, profit 
repatriation, transparency, accountability, expenditure 
issues, local content and value addition, investing in 
the future and support for sustainable development 
objectives. 
Chapter 11 examines the implications of the 
SDLO framework developed in Chapter 10 for 
policymaking at the local, national, regional and 
international levels. The framework is intended as 
a guide for policymakers at these levels to create a 
new generation of mining policies and development 
strategies that can help deliver the Sustainable 
Development Goals. The chapter gives particular 
consideration to opportunities for consolidation of 
policy instruments, expansion of their coverage and 
scope in line with the adoption of the SDGs and for 
enhancements in their application through greater 
synergies and coordination among key actors and 
practitioners. 
Chapter 12 summarizes the findings of the report 
and concludes.
A summary of the report is available on our website, 
as well as factsheets with the main conclusions of 
the report, in all six official UN languages.
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Truck at Chuquicamata, world’s biggest open pit copper mine. Photo: Reisegraf © Getty images
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Miner holds coal. Photo: Parilov © Shutterstock
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Quarry view of mine, Brazil. Photo: Udo Matiello © Getty images
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2 MINING IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
2.0. Introduction
Minerals and metals underpin national economies 
and provide crucial raw materials for industrial 
activities. Minerals and metals are inputs required 
by almost every imaginable sector of the global 
economy. Without minerals and metals there would 
be no modern agriculture; means of transportation 
in the form of aircrafts, cars, ships and trains; 
energy production and distribution (including 
from renewable energy sources); information and 
communication technologies; military defence; 
roads and other infrastructure; satellites; or even 
modern medicine. Minerals and metals are essential 
to human life. They are the starting point of many 
industrial supply chains and, as such, are assets 
of strategic importance to many downstream 
industries that simply would not exist without them. 
This chapter describes the global minerals and 
metals industry, providing an introduction to the 
structure of the industry and its role in economies.
The minerals and metals industry encompasses a 
myriad of very diverse operations, from very small 
and informal - frequently illegal - artisanal mines 
producing small quantities of mostly low-volume 
and high-value minerals (such as gold, precious 
and semi-precious minerals or columbo-tantalite) 
to very large, highly mechanized and optimized 
operations where hundreds of thousands of metric 
tonnes of ore are extracted every day. What all 
have in common is the extraction of a mineral raw 
material and its transformation into one or several 
marketable products, thanks to the application of a 
physical and/or chemical and/or biological process. 
This marketable product can be a mineral, which is 
directly used for its intrinsic physical or chemical 
properties such as colour, hardness (or softness), 
the capacity to adsorb certain liquids, resistance to 
heat and/or corrosion and conductivity of electric 
current. It may also be a metal that needs extracting 
from its carrier mineral, named “ore mineral”, through 
a metallurgical process of diverse degrees of 
complexity.
Large companies with a market value of billions of 
US dollars operating very large-scale mines play 
the leading role in minerals and metals production, 
except in the production of some construction 
minerals (sand and gravel, dimension stone and 
clay) where SMEs play the major role. In 2012, 
the International Council on Mines and Metals, 
(ICMM) estimated that there were about 50 such 
global companies - each with an asset base of over 
109 billion US$ (ICMM, 2012). Table 2.1 provides 
an insight into the role of large companies in the 
production of iron ore, copper ore and refined 
nickel. It is impossible to provide detailed statistics 
on the world production of minerals and metals 
by company, as production data related to some 
major companies is unavailable from free-of-charge 
sources (especially firms in two major mining 
countries: The People’s Republic of China and 
the Russian Federation). The dominance of large 
companies, mostly transnationals, can be explained 
by:
• The capital intensity of mining or metallurgical 
operations (it may take over US$10 billion to 
commission a new large-scale mining operation 
with its associated facilities including a processing 
plant, a smelter/refining facility, railroads and a 
deep-sea harbour to export the production);
• The technological, technical and managerial 
complexity of such large-scale operations;
• The risk management capacities (see Box 2.2 for 
a short overview of the multiple risk factors mining 
activities are exposed to), part of the managerial 
capacities, needed to prevent and/or mitigate 
the multiple risks to which mining ventures are 
exposed.  At the other end of the range of asset 
value of individual companies were over 2,000 
junior companies, each with an average asset 
value of US$5 million or less listed either on the 
Toronto (TSX) or the Sidney (ASX) stock markets.
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Table 2.1. Top producers of iron and copper ore and of refined nickel metal, compiled from various sources 
Iron ore production  
(Mt bulk iron ore)
Copper Ore production  
(kt copper contained)
Refined Nickel production  
(kt NI)
Year 2016 2014
Producer 1 Vale 349 Codelco 1827 Vale 275
Producer 2 Rio Tinto 271 Freeport 
McMoran
1696 Norils Nickel 274
Producer 3 BHP Billiton 227 Glencore 1288 BHP Billiton 243
Producer 4 Fortescue metal 
Group
181 BHP Billiton 1113 Jinchuan Group 128
Producer 5 Anglo American 58 Southern Copper 500 Glencore 101
Producer 6 Arcelor Mittal 55 KGHM 677 Sumitomo 
Metals & Mining
75
Producer 7 National Mineral 
Development 
Corporation
35 Rio Tinto 523 Anglo American 65
Producer 8 Cliff Natural 
Resources
28 First Quantum 494 Eramet 55
Producer 9 Evraz 20 Antofagasta 477 Queensland 
Nickel
34
Producer 10 Atlas Iron 15 Vale 453 Sherrit 
International
31







Share of World 
Mine production
53% 47% 64%
Note: These lists are only indicative as production data of some important companies is not available from free-of-charge 
sources. Source:  Company Reports (2014,2016); http//www.miming.com/top 10-copper-mining companies-2016; http://
www.thebalance.com/the-10-biggest-nickel-producers-2014-2339732.
Of these, about 1,200 were listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange at the end of 2018.12 They play an 
essential role in high-risk grassroots exploration, 
with many selling their assets to larger companies 
in the event of success. But only a few exploration 
projects will ever lead to the discovery of a deposit 
that can be mined at a profit, and there are even 
fewer discoveries of top-tier deposits (giant 
deposits with, in the case of copper, 5 Mt or more 
copper in the indicated or measured resource). 
12 https://www.tsx.com/resource/en/101, accessed on 
Dec. 31, 2018.
According to Schodde (2017), about 40 to 120 
deposits of any size were discovered every year 
between 1955 and 2010 but only 20 to 50 per year 
belong to the “major” or “giant” classes (the two 
top tier categories) that have a real impact on the 
supplies needed by the global economy. More 
recent discoveries are not yet fully documented, as 
it may take years between initial discovery and the 
formal publication of a resource calculation.
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2.1. Minerals and metals value chain13  
There are several stages in the process between 
finding minerals in the ground and finding minerals 
in a product. For example, the production of metals 
meeting the purity requirements demanded by the 
market is a process involving several stages as 
follows (Figure. 2.1):14  
• The creation of framework conditions that enable 
investment in the development of sustainable 
minerals and metals production, as well as in the 
development of activities that foster resource 
efficiency and the development of the circular 
economy. These framework conditions include:
 ○ Formal strategies and policies related to 
minerals and metals (see the comparative 
analysis of the raw materials strategies of 
the G-20 countries by Hilpert et al. (2013) 
for examples of such national policies and 
strategies), 
 ○ Mining and environmental laws, as well as 
other related legal conditions (such as labour 
or tax laws);
 ○ Issuing of permits and licensing procedures 
applied under these laws to mineral 
exploration and, separately, to mining 
activities;
 ○ Commitment to the SDGs and translating 
them into policies, law and practice.
• Governance, based on adherence to the SDGs and 
to the principles of transparency and accountability, 
is an essential component to the framework 
conditions (as detailed in this report).
• Public acquisition and dissemination, as a common 
good, of data and knowledge documenting the 
existence of geological resources that may be 
of economic interest. This and the framework 
conditions imply the existence and proper 
functioning of dedicated public institutions such as 
an environmental agency, a minerals and metals 
directorate and a geological survey with adequate 
experience, staff and material resources.15 These 
13 The mineral value chain refers to the processes by which 
value is added from exploration to consumption.
14 The processes are well known and fairly standard, 




institutions are needed to adequately enforce the 
above-mentioned policy and legal frameworks.
• Mineral exploration, which can be partly public 
(early stage exploration to attract investment in 
later stage exploration) and partly private. This 
stage aims at identifying mineral concentrations 
that are sufficiently attractive to justify the effort 
needed to classify them up to the point of a first 
resource estimate (based on at least an indicated 
resource level).16
• Mining project planning and development: this 
stage may comprise several steps, resulting in a 
definitive feasibility study. Each step will assess 
(with increasing certainty):
 ○ The resources and reserves, 
 ○ The best processes to mine the resource and 
turn it into one or several products, 
 ○ The environmental and social impacts, 
as well as any necessary prevention / 
remediation strategies; the production rate 
and the expected mine life; 
 ○ The capital expenditure needed to launch 
actual mining operations, the related 
operating costs and a cash-flow analysis over 
the expected mine life in order to calculate 
the Net Present Value of the project and its 
Internal Rate of Return - two key parameters 
needed to evaluate the economic viability of 
the project. 
More details on the contents of these assessments 
can be found, for instance, on Queen’s University 
MineWiki (Canada) and in the reports produced by 
mining projects that publicly publish their activities 
under regulatory obligations  or on a voluntary 
basis.17 The latter are accessible for free via an online 
web portal with a geographic navigation interface: 
http://intel.rscmme.com/#.  Figure 2.2 provides an 
overview of the main stages of mining projects, from 
early acquisition of geological data to mine closure.
• Mining is the extraction of the ore from open-pit 
or underground mines mostly by means of drilling 
and blasting, and loading of the ore onto trucks and 
16 “Indicated resource” is used here according to the 
meaning defined by the Committee for Mineral Reserves 
International Reporting Standards (CRIRSCO).
17 As detailed by the Committee for Mineral Reserves 
International Reporting Standards (CRIRSCO), see http://
www.crirsco.com/national.asp.
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hauling it to the processing plant that may often be 
located in close vicinity to the mine.
• Processing of the ore to recover the economically 
valuable ore minerals as a concentrate. Ore 
processing commonly involves several stages 
starting with crushing and comminution, to 
grinding the ore to a size smaller than the grain of 
the metal-bearing mineral(s) to be recovered. 
• These are then separated from the other 
economically non-recoverable minerals forming 
the ore. This separation may involve more or 
less complex physical and chemical operations. 
Economically non-recoverable minerals form a 
large share of the total waste generated by the 
minerals and metals industry. 
• Extraction of the metal(s) from the ore concentrate, 
frequently followed by a stage of refining (needed 
to remove most of the remaining impurities from 
the metal produced) in order to meet the specific 
purity requirements imposed by the different 
markets of the metals. 
• Metals are then used as raw materials for the 
manufacture of various products. An important 
observation to make is that these products are now 





Exploration Development Mining Ore  processing 
Metallurgy / 
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( dismantling ,  crushing , 
separation …) 
RECYCLING Production waste 
Framework  
conditions 
Secondary recycling Primary recycling 
Source: Authors’ illustration.
The stages of a minerals and metals industry 
dependent value chain18 are shown in Figure 2.1.  
Green lines at the bottom represent recycling; the 
dotted line representing primary recycling from 
production waste; and the continuous line depicting 
secondary recycling from end-of-life products. These 
activities take place at a global scale and they are 
therefore intermediated by trade (See Box 2.1 and 
Figure 2.6 for the copper example).
Figure 2.1 is simplified, to make it readable and 
understandable. It should be emphasized that each 
of the depicted stages may involve very different 
actors, as the know-how and competitiveness factors 
differ at each stage. Examples of vertical integration 
(where the same company does everything from 
exploration to the production of an end product) are 
extremely rare and limited to cases where the end 
product has the characteristics of a semi-product 
(for instance a rail made from a specific steel) than 
of a highly complex system such as a car, airplane 
or smartphone. It also cannot reflect the diversity 
of the geography involved at each stage, which also 
depends on the mineral or metal concerned. 
18 Only exploration, mine development, mining, ore 
processing, metallurgical / refining and metal purification 
activities represent the core activities of the minerals and 
metals industry. In some cases, the production of some 
semi-products such as bars, coils, plates, rails, rods and wire 
come under the activities of the industry.
Figure 2.1. Schematic representation of a minerals or metals-dependent value chain
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The case of copper, presented earlier and in Figure 
2.6, showed the geographic complexity of copper 
flows. It also highlights the crucial role of trade. 
Trading houses and specialized metals exchanges, 
such as the London or Shanghai Metal Exchanges, 
play a key role in linking the minerals and metals 
industry and the industrial users that will transform 
them into goods further downstream of the myriad 
of existing industrial value chains (either as end-use 
products or for integration into sub-systems and 
systems). Exchanges are specialized in trading a 
limited number of metals (aluminium, cobalt, copper, 
gold, molybdenum, lead, nickel, tin and zinc plus 
some categories of steel). Trading houses trade 
in metals that are not managed by the specialized 
exchanges, especially in the trade of minor metals. 
These mostly rare metals do not have generally 
acknowledged prices. Therefore, trading houses, 
through speculative moves, can have a strong impact 
on the pricing of the minerals and metals they are 
trading and reap high benefits from their activities.
Box 2.1. Trading hubs in the minerals or metals value chain
Traders play key roles in the minerals value chain, including the sourcing of commodities from producers, 
transport and storage. Many trading firms also enter into supply contracts with producing countries and 
may even make a pre-payment for future supply, an arrangement that is popular in some poor developing 
countries as pre-payments can be seen as loans. This underscores the power that traders can have in 
certain value chains, especially in relation with rarer metals.
Though commodity traders provide crucial services, research shows that the trade of commodities is also 
associated with risks including illicit financial flows, environmental damage, human rights violations and 
lost opportunities for poor countries in which the (often finite) commodities are extracted (Burcher et al., 
2015). Furthermore, the fact that many of the governance challenges around extractive resources arise 
from lack of transparency means that traders can do much to increase transparency of resource flows.  
Significant efforts continue to be directed at increasing transparency, for instance through instruments as 
part of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).  This highlights the crucial role of traders in 
improving the governance of minerals or metals-dependent value chains.
Commodity Hubs
Trading houses tend to be located in certain regions mainly due to geography, historical legacies, 
communication infrastructure and also proximity to financial centres. The key global commodity centers 
for extractive resources are in the United Kingdom (London), United States (New York) and Switzerland 
(Buergi Bonanomi et al., 2015). Switzerland is by far the most important centre for commodity trading. 
One third of the total volume of globally traded oil products and two thirds of the international trade in 
base metals takes place in Switzerland (Buergi Bonanomi et al., 2015). Much of this trading involves 
traders buying commodities from abroad and selling to clients who are also abroad, meaning that much 
of the physical product never touches Swiss soil. Switzerland is also a prominent trading hub for precious 
metals. However, unlike oil and the other metals, they often trade in them physically. Indeed, it is estimated 
that 70 % of worldwide gold is refined in Switzerland (Buergi Bonanomi et al., 2015). Due to this unique 
position, the Swiss government can play a significant role in creating greater transparency through 
rules on disclosure. Lannen et al. (2016a, 2016b) argue that the Swiss gov¬ernment could facilitate the 
collection and release of much better disaggregated data on the commodities trade. This would enable 
improved oversight (see chapter 9 for more discussion on home countries’ responsibility).
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Source: Constructed by authors using information from Canada’s Queen University’s Mine Design Project Wiki
Figure 2.2. Main stages of industrial-scale mining project
2.2. Mineral economics19 
The minerals and metals industry value chain has 
special characteristics that make it unique compared 
with other sectors of the economy. These features 
include:
• The finite nature of minerals.
• With the possible exception of the production 
of sand and gravel or dimension stone, the 
production of minerals and metals frequently 
implies technically complex operations that require 
significant expertise and particular equipment. Due 
to the highly specialized nature of each stage, there 
tend to be many highly specialized players involved 
in the mining and/or metallurgical / refining parts 
of minerals or metals dependent value chain. Such 
players work mostly in one or two stages of the 
supply chain and need to better understand the 
19 This section is largely a summary of material available 
from Canada’s Queen University’s Mine Design Project Wiki. 
(http://minewiki.engineering.queensu.ca/mediawiki/index.
php/Design_topics_available#The_stages_of_mine_design).
complete supply chain and its controlling factors, 
especially the likely future supply and demand 
trends in order to make their investment decisions. 
• The location of mining and related ore-processing 
activities is strictly controlled by geology. A mine 
can only be developed where there are mineral 
concentrations of economic value. The locations 
of these concentrations are limited to specific 
areas where the appropriate geology exists. These 
areas are sometimes in very remote locations. 
The implication is that capital and expertise have 
to be exported to the locations to facilitate the 
exploitation of the reserves. As a result, Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) often plays a crucial role in 
the sector. 
• With the exception of ASM (the subject of Chapter 
3), the minerals and metals industry value chain 
involves significant capital investment. This is 
particularly important for the mining, processing 
and metallurgical activities. The development of 
mines20 is costly and lengthy (see Figure 2.2). 
20  A mine development project may include additional 
facilities  such an ore processing plant, a smelter a refinery, 
a powerplant as well as the development of transport 
infrastructure such as roads, railway lines and/or ports
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The capital intensity is compounded by the fact 
that much risky investment is required to start a 
new industrial-scale mine. Raising risk capital is 
therefore extremely important (see next section).
• The global nature of most supply chains, except 
in the case of construction minerals such as sand 
and gravel which are mostly produced and used 
at the national level. In the case of other minerals 
and in the cases of mines and their related 
processing plants, smelters and refineries and the 
manufacturing steps in building complex systems 
can all be located in different countries, depending 
on their respective comparative advantages. The 
copper example (Figure 2.6) is an illustration of the 
geographic complexity of global supply chains.
Figure 2.2 shows the main stages of a mining 
project. Stages where public authorities have the 
leading role are shown with a yellow background, and 
stages where industrial operators (either public or 
private) have a leading role are shown with a green 
background. The transition between the two types 
of leadership is blurred as it depends on national/
regional policies and the availability of the required 
capabilities for implementation. The figures in red 
represent the order of magnitude estimates of the 
possible investment required at each stage of the 
development of an industrial-scale mining project.
The capital-intensive and risky nature of mine 
development means that the underlying economics 
of a mining project are critical. The 2017 annual 
survey of the mining industry (PWC, 2017) showed 
that the average annual return on capital employed of 
the world 40 top mining companies varied between 2 
and 14 per cent per year during the 2012-2016 period, 
making it one of the worst performances among all 
industrial sectors with the returns being very weak 
in view of the risks incurred by the investors (see 
Box 2.2). This section highlights some of the critical 
elements that mining companies consider in deciding 
whether to go ahead and make capital investments at 
the various stages of a mine development.
Capital investment begins with investment into 
mineral exploration to identify the existence of one 
or several minerals in concentrations that may be of 
economic interest. Large-scale mineral exploration 
requires investment of millions of dollars to perform 
complementary field investigations including 
satellite imagery interpretations, geological mapping, 
geochemical and rock sampling, geophysical 
surveying (air- and or heliborne, as well on the ground 
and in drill-hole methods), drilling, trenching, multi-
element analyses of the samples and mineralogical 
and petrographic studies. If successful, this early 
stage of exploration will lead to a first calculation of 
the measure and inferred resources of the deposits. 
The mineral exploration phase of a mine project 
ends with the preparation of a feasibility study, 
assuming the project was not halted earlier if deemed 
unprofitable. It might take 10 years or more, and tens 
of millions of United States dollars to reach the stage 
of a completed feasibility study. This investment may 
be completely lost if the conclusions of that feasibility 
study are negative.
If the conclusions are positive, the next step would 
be to secure the initial capital (CAPEX) needed to 
build the mine and its related facilities. This can 
involve huge investments than can run into billions 
of US dollars in the case of large-scale industrial 
mines, including facilities such as processing plants, 
a smelter and/or a refinery, a railway line and even 
a port. Large-scale iron ore or copper ore mines are 
among the costliest projects. CAPEX also has to 
include the costs of any mine closure performance 
bonds or of other environmental performance bonds 
that are required by the authorities of some countries 
as an (imperfect) insurance against environmental 
externalities that may arise as a consequence of the 
mine’s operation or following its closure. 
Project financing is sourced through borrowing or 
equity: a mix of both being the most common. Buyers 
who have a strategic interest in the future production 
of the mine are playing an increasingly important role 
in project financing as they may enter into take-off 
agreements, providing capital against the guarantee 
of the exclusive delivery of a certain amount of the 
production over a given number of years. 
Many projects never go beyond stage 2 shown in 
Figure 2.2 (resource evaluation). Out of the 3,821 
public reports on ongoing exploration and mine 
development projects worldwide reported in 2017 
by RSC Mining and Mineral Exploration (http://intel.
rscmme.com/)21, 3,310 related to early exploration 
results (stage 2 in Figure 2.2) but only 63 were 
feasibility studies.  
21 These are only projects that published information 
related to their projects according one of the existing 
national reporting standards (see p. 4 and section 8.1.2).
58
 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
Box 2.2. A summary of risk factors specific to the minerals and metals industry
• In investing in the sector, investors have to cope with multiple risks that are typical of mining projects 
and minerals and metals markets. These include, in no particular order:
• Inadequate evaluation of mineable reserves;
• Insufficient assessment of risk factors in the preparation of feasibility studies;
• Political and regulatory/ fiscal uncertainty; 
• Imposition of export restrictions on minerals by government for conservation or to promote local 
processing;
• Corruption; 
• Lack of sufficient capacities/skills to effectively and efficiently manage minerals and metals related 
activities;
• Opposition by local populations and other stakeholder groups such as the NIMBY (“Not in my 
backyard”) or BANANA (“Build absolutely nothing anywhere near anything”) movements; 
• Technological shifts rapidly changing the demand for certain minerals and metals; 
• Mineral and metal price volatility; 
• Geotechnical (ground stability) and environmental hazards (such as landslides, earthquakes, mechanic 
activity, extreme climate events and accidental or chronic pollution);
• Resource nationalism restricting access to minerals (Korinek & Kim, 2013); 
• Negative market sentiment and risk aversion;
• Consumer boycotts;
• Global economic meltdown; 
• Supply-chain manipulation as a tool to ensure market and/or geopolitical dominance; and
• Reputational issues related to potential environmental degradation, biodiversity loss and negative social 
impacts.
Proactive risk management is therefore essential in managing modern industrial-scale minerals and 
metals activities. The topic of mining risks and their management has been the subject of much attention 
in the literature (for instance, Henberger, 2005; Chinbat, 2011; Vanek et al., 2013; Willis Towers Watson, 
2017; EY, 2017; Stedman & Green, 2018; and Mining Journal, 2018). While metal and mineral pricing risks 
can be covered to a certain extent through hedging techniques (Adam et al., 2014; Carter et al., 2017), 
most of the other risks may only be addressed by other insurance systems, at an extra cost.  Given the 
risky nature of developing mines, it is hard to motivate investors if a potential 20 to 30 per cent Return on 
Investment (ROI) is not well demonstrated by a solid feasibility study. 
2.3. Industry players
Although there are many medium-sized mining 
companies, most of the global production is 
down to large and highly capitalized Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) or State-Owned / Controlled 
enterprises (SOE), many of them having operations 
spanning several countries. The MNCs and 
SOEs have the capacity to mobilize the scale of 
investments and attract the level of skills needed to 
develop large and complex mines. For this reason, 
the industry tends to also be highly concentrated with 
a few MNCs and SOEs controlling a large portion 
of global production and trade (Table 2.1). Various 
online sources publish annual rankings of the world 
mining companies on the basis of their market 
value.22  




Furthermore, due to the need to raise significant 
capital, many mining companies tend to be listed 
in the major stock exchanges23  in developed 
countries or are State Owned Enterprise (SOEs) 
in other parts of the world.24  Due to the different 
ownership structure, the two types of companies 
exhibit very divergent risk appetites and tend to 
operate in varying environments, with SOEs likely 
to operate in apparently more risky environments. 
SOEs that may not be solely driven by profit motives 
may invest in environments that could be perceived 
as risky by public-listed companies (that are largely 
driven by profit), for instance, in developing countries. 
Chinese SOEs, for example, play an important role in 
Africa’s mining industry (Chintu & Williamson, 2013; 
World Bank Group’s Oil, Gas, and Mining Unit, 2011), 
including in countries where governance issues may 
deter many other investors.
The industry has been consolidating, such that a few 
large MNCs almost have the monopoly. The result 
is that they are able to dictate terms of engagement 
with governments in developing countries (that may 
not have the required negotiating capacity) and even 
in developed countries. 
2.4. Mineral production
As pointed out earlier, minerals are crucial to 
economies and thus production data are critical for 
planning.  To facilitate data analysis, it is common 
to segment data according to the nature of the 
minerals that are extracted. There is no international 
consensus on this segmentation. One approach 
is to group minerals into three groups: metals, 
non-metallic and mineral fuels.  This is the approach 
used in the 2016 report by the International Resource 
Panel on global material flows (UNEP, 2016a). The 
classification of the World Mining Data, an annual 
statistical compendium on the global minerals and 
metals industry (Reichl et al., 2017), distinguishes 
between four groups (Table 2.2).  
23 Metals (aluminium, cobalt, copper, molybdenum, 
nickel and zinc), for instance, are listed on the London and 
Shanghai Metals Exchange.
24 The data on the relative shares between private and SOE 
are hard to determine because private companies listed 
on stock exchanges have disclosure requirements while 
SOEs do not, and tend not to share this information. For this 
reason, most of the ranking of top mining companies tend 
to only include publicly listed companies. See www.mining.
com.
Construction minerals 
Construction minerals are all the mineral raw 
materials used in construction or infrastructure 
development. Although cement is not a naturally 
occurring mineral raw material, but the result of a 
chemical reaction generally involving limestone and 
clay, it is included in the list shown in Table 2.2 owing 
to its particularly important role as a construction 
material. With the exception of cement production, 
the processing of construction minerals is limited to 
crushing, grinding, sorting and washing operations.
Industrial minerals 
These are all the minerals that are not used as a 
source of metals but rather for their intrinsic physical 
and/or chemical properties. Industrial minerals 
are extracted and processed to meet specific 
client specifications, such as granulometry, purity, 
whiteness, hardness and melting temperature 
requirements. The processing of industrial minerals 
generally requires slightly more complex operations 
than construction materials, as the valuable minerals 
must be separated from other minerals present in 
the deposit. Phosphate rock needs to be processed 
through more complex operations involving physical 
and chemical processing by sulphuric acid leaching 
to turn the phosphate rock into phosphoric acid, 
which is a key input in the production of fertilizers. 
The same industrial mineral can have different 
markets, each with its own specifications to be 
met by the producer. Quality requirements can be 
stringent as, for instance, industrial sand purity 
requirements for the production of float glass, 
or the purity of talcum used in cosmetics or of 
pure micronized limestone used as a filler for the 
production of white paper.
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Table 2.2. Minerals and metals industry segmentation
Industry 
segment




Sand, gravel, crushed rock, dimension stone (such as 
limestone, granite, syenite, marble), slate, lime, gypsum, 
clay (undifferentiated), cement
Industrial minerals
Asbestos, baryte, bentonite, boron minerals, bromine, 
diamond (industrial), diatomite, dolomite, feldspar, 
fluorspar, garnet, graphite, gypsum and anhydrite, helium, 
ilmenite, iodine, kaolin (china-clay), kyanite, lime, limestone, 
magnesia, magnesite, mica, nepheline syenite, olivine, 
perlite, phosphates (incl. guano), potash, quartz, salt, 
special clays, silica sand, sillimanite, soda ash, sodium 
sulfate, spinel, spodumene, sulfur, talc (incl. steatite and 
pyrophyllite), titanium oxides (rutile, anatase), vermiculite, 
wollastonite, zeolites, zircon
Iron and ferro-alloy 
metals
Iron, chromium, cobalt, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, 
niobium, tantalum, titanium, tungsten, vanadium
Metals
Non-ferrous metals Aluminium (and bauxite, its ore), antimony, arsenic, 
bismuth, cadmium, copper, gallium, germanium, lead, 




Gold, platinum-group metals (iridium, osmium, palladium, 
platinum, rhodium, ruthenium), silver, gemstone diamonds, 
other precious and semi-precious minerals
Mineral fuels
Steam coal (incl. anthracite and sub-bituminous coal), 
coking coal, lignite, natural gas, crude petroleum, oil sands, 
oil shales, thorium, uranium
Source: adapted from Reichl et al. (2017).
Metal bearing minerals (often called ore minerals) 
They contain one or several metals, mostly contained 
in sulphides, oxides, carbonates and silicates. 
They are part of a group of minerals called “ores”, 
comprising one or several valueless minerals in 
addition to the metal bearing mineral(s). In the case 
where several metals are present in the ore, only 
some may be recovered due to economic or technical 
reasons. 
Quite frequently, the ore comprises one main 
economically recoverable metal-bearing mineral, 
such as chalcopyrite (copper ore), galena (lead ore) 
or sphalerite (zinc ore), which can contain several 
other metalliferous components as minute impurities 
or as partial replacements of the main metal in the 
crystal lattice. In such a case, the main metal, whose 
recovery determines the economic viability of the 
mining and related processing and metallurgical/ 
refining operations, is frequently referred to as a 
carrier metal (Reuter et al., 2013), while the other 
recovered metals are known as by-products. Some 
examples of by-product metals are indium, silver, 
gold, cadmium, germanium, and gallium, to name 
but a few. In some cases, the economic value of a 
by-product is such that its recovery could generate 
sufficient income to ensure the operation’s viability. 
In this case, it becomes a co-product. Cobalt, due 
to its high current value, is a typical co-product of 
copper mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo. 
Ore minerals can be subdivided into sub-segments, 
characterized by different downstream markets:
• Ferrous metals – Iron, chromium, vanadium, 
manganese; 
• Base metals – copper, nickel, lead, zinc, tin, cobalt, 
molybdenum;
• Specialty metals – niobium, tantalum, titanium, 
tungsten, aluminium, magnesium, antimony, 
61 
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arsenic, bismuth, cadmium, gallium, germanium, 
lithium, mercury, rare earths (or lanthnide) 
elements, rhenium, selenium, tellurium, zirconium; 
and
• Precious metals (gold, silver, and platinum group 
metals, diamonds).25
Mineral fuels 
These are mainly used for supply of energy. They 
include petroleum, coal, natural gas, oil shales and tar 
sand. Metals used to develop nuclear energy are also 
classified as mineral fuels. They include uranium and 
thorium.
The main uses of all these minerals are detailed 
in several reports such as the annual Mineral 
Commodity Summaries published by USGS26, the 
European Commission’s reports on raw materials 
critical to the EU economy (latest edition: European 
Commission, 2017a and 2017b), or in Schulz et al. 
(2017).
2.5. Production statistics
In 2016, the various segments of the industry 
extracted at least 65 billion tonnes of minerals and 
metal contained in ores, including mineral fuels and 
cement. Table 2.3 shows a minimum estimate of the 
values of most minerals produced that year, in million 
nominal United States dollars, based on data from 
Reichl et al (2018) - covering a wide range of minerals 
and metals; Van Oss (2019) - cement data based 
on US average pricing; and the Kimberly Process 
(2017)- gem quality diamond data. No production 
or value data is available for many widely-produced 
construction minerals (sand, aggregates, dimension 
stone, lime, and clays used for construction). This 
estimate is given for the individual total production 
of top-20 producing countries. On this basis, the total 
value of the minerals and metals produced globally 
in 2016 can be estimated to be, at least, 3394 billion 
nominal USD, including mineral fuels and at least 
1207 billion USD if mineral fuels are excluded from 
the calculation. In addition to the above-mentioned 
limitations, it needs to be noted that not every 
mineral or metal production is statistically recorded 
25 Diamonds are a mineral but similar in value and 
appreciation to gold due to use in jewelry, although on a 
volume basis the majority of mined diamonds are used in 
industrial applications.
26  Available here: https://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/
pubs/mcs/.
or sometimes existing statistics may be inaccurate 
as reporting standards, capacities to report and 
transparency vary from country to country. Data 
related to the rarer metals, especially when they are 
by-products, may be limited, incomplete or simply 
unavailable.
In the case of construction materials, this is likely 
to be due to the existence of numerous small- to 
medium-size companies in many countries, with 
very loosely regulated operations. In the case of rarer 
metals that can only be recovered as by-products 
during the metallurgical processing of a concentrate 
of ore of a “main” or “carrier” metal such as copper, 
gold, lead or zinc, the recorded world production 
is frequently tiny (less than 200,000 tons per year) 
and their trade is largely in the hands of traders with 
related confidentiality agreements. As rare metals 
are highly strategic inputs for many high-technology 
industries, including the defence sector, there is 
a risk that published data can be manipulated as 
part of broader market manipulation strategies. 
Black markets of rare metals and minerals have 
been reported (see, for instance, United Nations 
Security Council, 2001; Sutherland, 2011; Fitzpatrick 
et al., 2015; Global Witness, 2015; and Amnesty 
International, 2016).
Construction minerals 
The production of construction minerals is the only 
segment of the minerals and metals industry that is 
present in every country to supply local construction 
and infrastructure projects. The operators are mainly 
small scale but there are also very large multinational 
groups, especially in cement production. With the 
exception of cement, much of the production in this 
segment –with dimension stone and common clays 
(used for brickmaking) for instance – is not recorded 
and therefore data on value of total production are 
not available. A rough estimate is that 45 billion 
tonnes of construction materials are produced 
annually. In 2016, on the basis of the average US 
price for cement published by the USGS (111 $/ t, 
(United States Geological Survey (USGS) (2017)), 
the global cement production is valued at about 460 
billion nominal nominal United States dollars. The 
key construction materials (by value) are aggregate, 
cement and lime.
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On the basis of the data published by Reichl et al. 
(2018), the value of the 2016 global production of 
industrial minerals was estimated at around 88 
billion nominal US dollars. In 2016, industrial mineral 
production was recorded in 151 countries (out of 
163 countries covered) demonstrating that industrial 
mineral production is geographically wide-spread. 
By value, the key industrial materials are bauxite, 
gypsum and salt.
Metals  
In 2016, the total global value of mine production 
of metals reported by Reichl et al (2018) was about 
US$647 billion, calculated on the basis of the metals 
value contained in mined ores. This segment is the 
second largest of the global mining and metals 
industry, well behind mineral fuels. The key metals 
(by value) are iron, copper, gold, manganese and 
chromium.
Mineral fuels 
The production of mineral fuels is by far the most 
important segment of the global minerals and metals 
industry covered in Table 2.3. In 2016, the value of 
its products is estimated at about US$2,187 billion, 
which is about 64 % of the total value of all minerals, 
metals and fossil fuels extracted worldwide in 2016.
2.6. Production distribution
The production of non-energy minerals and metals is 
highly concentrated, with 10 countries accounting for 
almost 70 % of the global non-energy mineral, metals 
and mineral fuels production in 2016. In terms of 
individual countries, the People’s Republic of China is 
by far the world’s largest producer of minerals, metals 
and mineral fuels. In 2016, in value, it produced about 
37 % of total minerals and metals (without mineral 
fuels) and about 58 % of cement produced world-
wide. The dominance is more apparent when looked 
at a more granular level. In 2016, it produced 54 % of 
aluminium, 38 % of cobalt, 38 % of primary copper, 50 
% of primary lead, 50 per cent of raw steel and 47 % 
of primary and secondary zinc produced worldwide 
(Reichl et al., 2018).
The global distribution of mines is shown in Figure 
2.3, based on the number of mines located in each 
50 km x 50 km grid according to data provided by 
SNL.27 It is estimated that there are over 30,000 
mines around the world, of which over a third are 
categorized as ‘active’.28 ‘‘Hotspots’ of activity can be 
seen along the west coast of the Americas, Eastern 
Canada, Western and South-eastern Africa, Australia 
and South-east Asia. 
While mining activities are geographically widespread, 
the amount of land used up by mining activities, 
current and past, is rather small when compared to 
other human footprints, such as agriculture. In the 
United States, a National Research Council study 
(1996) quotes an estimate stating that, between 1930 
and 1980, only 0.25 % of the total land area of the 
United States was used for surface mining and the 
disposal of waste from surface mines, underground 
mines and beneficiation facilities. In comparison, 
in 2007, 51 % of the country’s land was used for 
agriculture. In the European Union, current and past 
mining sites are part of the “Artificial land” category of 
the land cover census published by Eurostat. In 2015, 
artificial land, of which mining is only a small part, 
represented 4.4 % of the EU land cover, as compared 
to 21.5 % for croplands.
Figure 2.4 shows that most of the production is 
derived from upper or upper middle-income countries 
(90 % of the total).  However, it does not reflect the 
values of production of several mineral commodities: 
sand and gravel and cement in aorticular. From 
2013 through 2017, according to World Mining data 
(Reichl and Schatz, 2019) only about 10 % of the total 
estimated produced minerals, metals and mineral 
fuels orginitaed from lower middle-income countries, 
especially India, Indonesia and Nigeria due to their 
relatively high mineral fuel production. Low-income 
countries produced only about 2 % of this global 
value. The role of low-income and lower medium-
income countries would slightly increase, up to about 





27 Global Mining Data from SNL Metals and Mining’s Metals 
Economics Group.  Data extracted 24 April 2018.
28 Defined as currently being explored, developed or 
mined. 
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Treamap diagram of the relative share of the world non-energy minerals and metals production, 2016, by value in current $ US, 
of the 20 largest minerals and metals producing countries; Alltogether the production value of these countries represented 73% 
of the world production. Source:
The bigger picture reveals the modest current role 
of low income and lower-middle income countries 
as sources of minerals, metals and mineral fuels for 
the global economy. However, the total figures mask 
the strategic importance of the supplies of some 
minerals from these lesser developed countries. 
This is particularly the case for cobalt, an essential 
resource for the production of lithium ion batteries. 
In 2016, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 
a low-income country, produced 65 per cent of the 
world cobalt mine production (Darton Commodities, 
2017). The same year, the DRC and Rwanda were 
the main sources (68 per cent of the global mine 
production) of tantalum (USGS, 2017). Tantalum 
is a very rare metal, which is essential in modern 
electronics, for the production of high-performance 
micro capacitors found in smartphones, or for 
the production of superalloys, essential to the 
manufacturing of modern fuel-efficient jet engines 
(MSP-REFRAM, 2017). The large high-grade copper 
resources of DRC and Zambia could become of 
major significance for the global economy. 
The limited contribution of lower income countries 
does not reflect a lack of geological potential. To 
the contrary, it is a combination of several factors 
including political instability, political and legal 
uncertainty, lack of transparency, corruption, lack 
of geological data, poor transport and/or energy 
infrastructure that deter investments in mineral 
exploration and mine development.
The probability of discovering more minerals is 
significant, as large parts of the earth’s crust have not 
been explored. In general, there is a good correlation 
Figure 2.4. Brekdown of the value of 2016 global production, by income group of the producing countries
Total Low-Income countries Total Upper-middle Income countries
Total Lower-middle Income countries Total High-Income countries
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between land area and mineral endowments.29 
Therefore, the regional differences in the value of 
global mineral exploration expenditures are more 
a reflection of exploration efforts as opposed to 
endowment. For example, Ericsson & Olöf (2017) 
show in Figure 2.5 that exploration expenditure 
in Canada and the United States, which together 
account for 21 per cent of total global exploration 
expenditure, is far more than could be expected from 
their shares of production (12 per cent) and land 
mass (12 per cent). Indeed, Australia, Canada and the 
United States together account for one third of the 
total global exploration expenditure. Africa, with about 
20% of the global land mass area, only attracted 
about 14 per cent of total global mineral exploration 
expenditure. Latin America accounts for 12 per cent 
of land mass and attracted more than 20 per cent of 
global exploration expenditure.
29 https://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/2007/1294/reports/paper9.
pdf, accessed on 30 March 2018.
2.7. Global trade in minerals 
As pointed out above, the initial stages of the 
mineral and metals supply chains up to mining 
and ore processing do not tend to be located in 
the same place as where minerals and metals are 
used in manufacturing processes. Metallurgy may 
also have its distinct geography, as it depends very 
much on available infrastructure, skills and energy 
prices. Mining can only take place where geological 
conditions make it possible for economically 
recoverable mineral concentrations to exist. Not every 
country is geologically well endowed, and none can 
economically produce all the diversity of minerals and 
metals required by current manufacturing processes. 
For this reason, minerals and metals are widely 
traded, especially thanks to the mid-twentieth-century 
development of efficient seaborne bulk transport 
connecting mineral producing countries to countries 
carrying out metallurgy/refining, then to where 
downstream manufacturing processes take place 
and finally to the consumer (see the copper flows 
example (Figure 2.6). 
Due to their frequently low value per ton, construction 
materials are rarely traded globally, but regional 
trade appears well developed, as not every country 
has some of the geological resources needed by its 
economy. In Europe, for instance, the Netherlands 
and parts of Belgium have very limited resources of 
the kind of coarse aggregate needed for concrete 
production. As a result, large quantities of crushed 
rocks are imported from Norway, where geological 
and topographical conditions make their production 
very competitive and loading of ships easy (Van der 
Meulen et al., 2003). Cement is also traded regionally 
as not every country has the geological resources 
(especially limestone) and/or the energy resources 
necessary for its production.
The complexity of minerals and metals-related supply 
chains is demonstrated by the case of copper, as it is 
one of the relatively few metals for which sufficient 
data are available and reliable to facilitate a global 
trade flow analysis. Figure 2.6, taking copper as an 
example, illustrates the complexity of supply chains 
due to the different geographies of mining, smelting/
refining and manufacturing. 
The upper part illustrates the copper flows in copper 
concentrates traded from copper mining countries 
to countries where the metallurgical extraction and 
refining of copper actually takes place. The lower 
part describes the trade flows of copper included in 
finished products such as cars, computers, electric 
appliances, smartphones, windmills and many more. 
These are predominantly, and by far, manufactured 
in China and sold to the world markets, with Europe 
playing a much lesser role.  The size of the arrows 
is proportional to the tonnage traded. While copper 
concentrates mainly flow from Latin America 
(with Norther America and Europe being of lesser 
importance) to Asia and, to some extent to Europe, 
it shows the absolute prevalence of China as the 
world’s manufacturing hub.
Documenting such trade flows is of major 
importance to understanding, from an end-user 
perspective, where environmental footprints related 
to mineral and metal consumption actually take 
place and what could be the related governance 
and/or geopolitical issues. In a globalized economy, 
environmental and social footprints frequently occur 
far away from where consumer goods are actually 
marketed, and consumer goods end-users remain 
poorly informed about the environmental and social 
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Source: adapted from Tercero Espinoza et al. (2016).
2.8. The importance of mining to 
economies 
The data in Figure 2.5 show that lower middle-income 
and low-income countries play only a relatively minor 
role, with some exceptions, in supplying minerals, 
metals and mineral fuels to the global economy. 
However, mining and related activities are crucial to 
the economies of these countries. Some are highly 
dependent on the resources derived from mineral 
wealth. To calculate the contribution of mining to 
economy, Ericsson & Olöf (2017) have used the 
following indicators to develop a mining contribution 
to economy index: 
• Exports of minerals including coal as a share of 
total merchandise exports; 
• Total production value at mine stage of metallic 
minerals, industrial minerals and coal, expressed as 
a percentage of GDP; 
• Mineral rents as a percentage of GDP; and 
• Exploration expenditure. 
It should be noted that, since their index uses 
exploration expenditure, it is somewhat forward 
looking as it also captures the prospect of continued 
dominance of minerals in the economy.  Using the 
above criteria, an index was developed and countries 
were ranked on the score in the index. Of the top 
Figure 2.6. Global copper trade
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50 mining dependent countries, there are only four 
high-income economies (HIE), but 16 upper-middle-
income economies (UMIE), 18 lower-middle-income 
economies (LMIE) and 12 low-income economies 
(LIE). Table 2.4 shows 25 of the countries mapped.
As Ericsson & Olöf’s (2017) index does not include oil 
and gas, countries like Saudi Arabia and Nigeria that 
are heavily dependent on oil do not feature. If these 
were included, many lower income countries would 
feature in the top 50.  The index thus serves as useful 
confirmation that, for many poor countries, minerals 
are indeed critical. 
However, many major exporters in the low-income 
and lower middle-income bracket suffer from poor 
governance that limits the contribution that minerals 
and metals production could make to sustainable 
development.  However, as pointed out in chapter 
1, governance reforms are taking place.  These can 
help convert the resource curse into a blessing. 
With appropriate governance and an enabling policy 
and business environment, mining could play a 
transformational role for low-income mineral rich 
countries, as it has done for high-income resource 
rich countries in the past.  Improving governance 
along the mineral or metals dependent value chain is 
thus a key element in ensuring that the industry can 
contribute towards meeting countries’ sustainable 
development objectives.
Figure 2.7. Mining contribution (direct jobs only) as a percentage of total employment
Even with good governance, one key challenge of the 
minerals and metals industry in developing countries 
is the frequent enclave nature of mining activities, 
conditioned by the geology-controlled location of 
mineral concentrations. Another challenge in these 
countries is, with some exceptions, the insufficient 
role of the mines and metals industry in their broad-
based development. While mining or metallurgical 
operations are not large-scale employers, their 
development creates indirect jobs in other sectors 
of the economy, for instance in the services, 
transport and maintenance sectors. It also provides 
development nuclei in remote regions, where there 
might be limited economic options. 
As Figure 2.7 shows, mining’s contribution to direct 
employment ranges from 0.1 to 4.5 per cent of 
total employment for the 25 top mineral dependent 
countries.  For example, mining contributes 8.8 per 
cent of Guinea’s GDP (Table 2.4) but about 1.1 per 
cent of total employment (direct employment only). 
Studies show that an average of three jobs are 
created in other sectors of the economy, such as 
equipment or service providers, for each job created 
in the mines and metals industry (Maxwell Stamp 
and The World Gold Council, 2015. The potential 
for indirect job creation depends largely on local 
conditions, such as the existence of a well-trained, 
diversified workforce and local suppliers of the 
relevant goods and services to the mines and metals 
industry.
Source: ILOSTAT data (2015).  http: www.ilo.org/ilostat,  (Countries in top 25 for which data is available).
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Table 2.4. Mineral contribution for top 25 mineral export dependent countries 
Rank Country Income  
Group
Export Value  
(% of total exports)
Production value 
(% of GDP)
1 DRC LI 80.9 14.7
2 Chile HI 57.0 9.5
3 Australia HI 56.7 11.9
4 Mongolia UMI 80.4 16.7
5 Papua New Guinea LMI 37.9 14
6 Zambia LMI 75.1 7.6
7 Peru UMI 53.8 5.8
8 Burkina Faso LI 49.6 6.0
9 Mali LI 65.7 5.3
10 Guyana LMI 61.2 10.5
11 South Africa UMI 38.2 7.1
12 Botswana UMI 91.3 12.8
13 Guinea LI 52.1 8.8
14 Mauritania LMI 58.1 10.2
15 Eritrea LI 38.6 9.0
16 Namibia UMI 50.3 6.9
17 Ghana LMI 23.0 4.1
18 Lao PDR LMI 36.5 3.3
19 Sierra Leone LI 93.6 14.9
20 Uzbekistan LMI 30.5 3.1
21 Suriname UMI 33.8 6.0
22 Tanzania LI 38.1 1.5
23 Kazakhstan UMI 10.0 4.2
24 Liberia LI 39.3 11.3
25 Central African Rep. LI 39.1 N/A
Source: Ericsson & Olöf (2017).
(HI = High Income, UMI: Upper Middle-Income, LMI: Lower Middle-Income, LI: Low-Income groups -  
as defined by the World Bank).
The World Gold Council (2015) provides an 
assessment of the economic value created and 
distributed in gold mining. The survey is based on 
2013 data from 16 companies, all members of the 
World Gold Council, representing a production of 732 
t of gold (24% of the 3039 t world gold production 
in 2013). The total operational expenditure of the 
reporting companies was 47.3 billion nominal US 
dollars, of which an average of 79 per cent was spent 
in the 16 countries hosting the mining activities 
covered by the survey (Figure 2.8). The report 
provides data on the economic value created and 
distributed in gold mining in each of the 16 countries, 
which include several low-income nations.
Figure 2.9, derived from the same source, provides 
a detailed breakdown of the average total in-country 
payments, showing that about two thirds of the 
in-country payments go to suppliers of goods and 
services to the mines and their related facilities.   
On a country basis, the in-country payments vary 
between 47 per cent (Mauritania) and 100 per cent 
(Finland). This is due to the variable national capacity 
to supply mining industries with the wide range 
of skilled human resources, services and goods 
required by the industry. The same can be said for 
capital expenditure. Equipment needed for mining, 
ore processing and/or metallurgical plants is mostly 
provided by a limited number of suppliers from 
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developed countries. Modern equipment needed 
to ensure resource-efficient and economically 
competitive operations tends to be technologically 
complex. There are only few suppliers providing 
specific equipment such as haulage trucks, loaders or 
drilling rigs and machines. These companies have the 
capacity to provide very rapid worldwide assistance 
to their clients. 
Therefore, one way to make the minerals and 
metals industry contribute more to broad-based 
development is through creating opportunities for 
increased local content and local participation, 
especially in the provision of goods and services. This 
is because, in many mining operations, procurement 
in the form of operating and capital expenditures 
constitutes between 50 and 65% of the production 
value of mining (ICMM, 2015).  Having more local 
companies provide services to mining companies 
not only creates jobs but also helps develop new 
skills such as machinery and electrical maintenance, 
welding and plumbing that can be transferred to other 
sectors of the economy.  To be effective, this requires 
the scaling up of domestic suppliers’ capacity, 
capabilities and competitiveness through national 
suppliers’ development programmes (ACET, 2017). 
Broad-based development also largely depends on 
having the right conditions for developing competitive 
industries that will turn minerals and metals in a 
wider range of added value goods and services. 
These are issues that should be key considerations 
in thinking about a more inclusive governance 
framework. 
Figure 2.10 shows the year 2012 in terms of the value 
added and the direct employment in the EU mining 
industry, the downstream manufacturing of basic 
metals and then the industries depending on minerals 
and metals - with huge multiplier effects (Vidal-Legaz 
et al., 2016). These reflect the current outcome of 
more than 250 years of industrial history on the 
European continent. The rapid development of several 
Asian countries shows that modern management 
and efficient technologies can shorten the time 
needed to reach comparable multiplier effects. 
Nevertheless, a few decades may still be needed to 
achieve such development levels (and the progress 







[...] one way to make 
the minerals and metals 
industry contribute 
more to broad-based 
development is through 
creating opportunities 
for increased local 
content and local 
participation, especially 
in the provision of 
goods and services
Stockpiles at Sundown. Photo: mabus13 © Getty images 
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Total in-country payments Payments to providers of capital
Other out-of-country payments
Figure 2.8. Breakdown of the economic value created and distributed by gold mining companies, in nominal $US million as 
percentages
Figure 2.9. Detailed breakdown of the in-country payments made by the gold mining companies in nominal million 
US$ 






Royalties and land-use Income and other taxes Employee taxes
Other payments Wages/ Salaries Community investments
Payments to suppliers
Source: Authors using data from World Gold Council (2015).
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Figure 2.10. Value added and number of jobs associated with metals (mining, basic manufacture and downstream 
sectors) in the European Union in 2012
Source: Vidal-Legaz et al. (2016).
2.9. Development minerals
There is a classification that categorizes construction 
and industrial minerals as development minerals 
(Franks, 2020). These minerals are not usually traded 
but are crucial for the domestic economy. Franks 
et al. (2016) define development minerals as those 
that are mined, processed, manufactured and used 
domestically in industries such as construction, 
manufacturing and agriculture (Figure 2.9). The 
Development minerals sector is comprised of four 
branches: 
• Construction materials: These are minerals used 
by the construction industry, for example in road 
making, in concrete in-house construction and 
as railway ballast, the largest component being 
‘aggregates’ used on their own or in concrete, 
mortar, roadstone or asphalt.
• Dimension stones: These are natural rocks 
quarried for the purpose of cutting and (or) shaping 
to a specific size. The main rock types used for 
dimension stone are granite, limestone and marble.
• Industrial minerals: These are commodities, single 
or group, whose physical or chemical properties, 
and not their metallic, energetic or gem properties 
are the main basis for industrial purposes. 
Examples of these minerals are given in Table 2.2. 
• Semi-precious stones: These are mineral crystals 
or rocks that are generally cut and polished to 
make jewellery. Examples include quartz, amethyst, 
garnet, aquamarine, opal and pearl. Semi-precious 
stones range in value. Some stones may not be of 
high enough value to export or facet and instead 
may service local markets, especially in the vicinity 
of the tourism industry.
Though the export of traded minerals receives much 
more attention, development minerals (industrial 
and construction minerals) are a far larger sector. In 
terms of the importance of the development minerals 
sector, six country-level studies to generate data 
and three countrywide censuses commissioned by 
ACP-EU Development Minerals Programme30 provide 
interesting insights. For example, the Uganda study 
revealed that, of the 390,000people employed in the 
development minerals sector workforce, 44 per cent 
are women.
However, outside the male dominated clay-brick 
sector, women make up 69 per cent of the workforce 
for all other commodities. The study also found that, 
if the ASM segment of development minerals were 
integrated within official statistics, Uganda’s GDP 
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2.7. Global trade in minerals
The study for Jamaica (Lewis et al, 2017) found 
that the level of wages in the sector is 20-25 per 
cent higher than the minimum wage. Development 
minerals are also vital for the construction of housing, 
road building, agriculture (fertilizers) and a range of 
processing industries on the island (such as paint 
manufacture, cement, plaster and fertilizer).
Nonetheless, this sector straddling the formal and 
informal sectors is neglected. It does not create the 
huge pollution and conflict challenges of traditional 
ASM with its focus on high value minerals. It does not 
generate huge export revenues, and is not critical for 
the function of global manufacturing supply chains. 
Its importance is not well documented. Studies on 
minerals or metals tend to be focused on ASM in 
terms of high-value minerals /metals (such as gold, 
diamonds, and tin, tantalum and tungsten (3Ts)) or 
on the formal sector in relation to globally traded 
minerals or metals. Development mineral issues 
tend to be subsumed under export minerals. There 
are several factors that make development minerals 
different from export minerals. These include:
• While export mineral value chains are highly 
globalized, development mineral value chains are 
highly localized (though in certain cases there may 
be regional value chains) 
• Export minerals are traded in global commodity 
markets that tend to be very volatile with boom 
and bust cycles that can create macroeconomic 
challenges in countries that trade in them. 
Industrial minerals and construction materials are 
typically not subject to price volatility and are less 
exposed to external shocks.
• Export mineral value chains tend to be enclaves 
with weak linkages to other economic sectors. 
Development minerals are well integrated into local 
economy, as barriers to entry are lower and they 
supply key raw materials for construction and other 
local industries.
• The highly specialized and capitalized nature of 
export minerals means that this sector lends itself 
to technological advances, especially automation. 
This can have disruptive impacts on job creation 
and local procurement of goods and services. This 
does not apply to development minerals, which are 
unlikely to be disrupted by automation due to their 
low value.
• Export minerals are very unevenly distributed and 
therefore produced by a handful of countries. 
They are also much more finite.  In contrast, 
development minerals are more abundant and 
widely distributed. 
• Due to uneven distribution and the resulting need 
for them to be traded, export minerals raise issues 
of supply security as disruption at either the 
supply source or the trading can disrupt economic 
activities at a global level. This can therefore 
give rise to geopolitical considerations. The 
high dependence of many countries on exports 
revenues and domestic resources means that 
they may become key issues within local politics. 
Therefore, export minerals are likely to raise 
political issues, while development minerals do not.
These differences mean that a distinct governance 
framework is needed for development minerals. 
Lack of attention to this sector has given rise to 
unsustainable mining practices, with uncontrolled 
sand extraction already having environmental and 
economic consequences (see Box 2.3). The ACP-EU 
programme31  on development minerals seeks to 
provide much needed support to this sector, which 
is frequently neglected in national development 
strategies and policies. Some of the strategic policy 
directions advocated by the programme include: 
i. recognition of the sector in policy and law  
(it is excluded from many mining acts); 
ii. formalization; 
iii. extension services (by government and by 
mining associations); 
iv. geological data inventories; 
v. access to finance (especially micro-finance), 
trade fairs, and technology exhibitions; and
vi. simple occupational health and safety (OHS) 
and environmental standards as part of 
licensing.  
31 Programme website: http://www.developmentminerals.
org/index.php/en/.
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Box 2.3. Towards sustainable sand extraction
Sand and gravel are mined worldwide and account for the largest volume of solid materials extracted 
globally, mainly for construction.  Rising demand has seen a huge surge in extraction in recent years. 
Sands are now being extracted at a much faster pace than their renewal rate. For example, building and 
land-reclamation projects exhausted marine sand resources in Dubai, and the country now imports its 
sand.
This extraction is having a major impact on rivers, deltas and coastal areas, and has affected the 
provision, protection and regulation of ecosystem services. Dredging and extraction of aggregates 
destroys organisms, habitats and ecosystems, and deeply affects the composition of biodiversity. The 
extraction of aggregates in rivers has led to severe damage to river basins, in particular lowering of 
the river bed and therefore water tables. This has increased the incidence and severity of droughts, as 
tributaries of major rivers dry up when sand extraction reaches certain thresholds. Sand extraction has 
also increased river pollution. Marine mining has resulted in beach erosion. In Morocco, for example, 
sand extraction has transformed a large beach between Safi and Essaouira into a rocky landscape.  
This is despite the fact that beaches are crucial in protecting land, especially given rising sea levels. 
The environmental impacts of sand extraction have economic consequences. Tourism may be affected 
through beach erosion, while fishing is impacted through destruction of benthic fauna. Agriculture could 
be affected through loss of agricultural land from river erosion and, as mentioned above, the lowering of 
the water table.
Actions
A two-pronged approach has been proposed to reduce sand extraction (UNEP, 2014):
• Strengthen governance and regulation of sand extraction.  
Large-scale mining, quarrying and reclamation activities should only be authorized once sound scientific 
assessment shows there would be limited impact on the environment. Extraction should reflect the true 
cost of mining. Sand extraction should be properly taxed, so that other options become economically 
viable.
• Reducing consumption of sand. 
One way is to optimize the use of existing buildings and infrastructure. Recycled building and quarry dust 
material can be a substitute for sand. Concrete rubble should be recycled to avoid using aggregates, at 
least for low-quality uses. Another way is the replacement of sand by up to 40% of incinerator ash, as 
this results in higher compressive strength than with regular cement mortars. Some desert sand can be 
used, if mixed with other material. There are also alternatives for house building, including wood, straw 
and recycled material. However, the current building industry is geared toward concrete know-how and 
equipment. Training of architects and engineers, new laws and regulations and positive incentives are 
needed to initiate a shift for lowering our dependency on sand. Renewable and recycled materials need to 
be targeted for building houses and roads.
In the context of demographic growth coupled with rapid urbanization, many developing countries will find 
it hard to reduce their construction minerals consumption. This is because alternatives such as the use of 
wood or other biomaterials are limited to avoid further deforestation (which is already a major issue in a 
number of developing countries).
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2.10. Conclusion  
Minerals and metals are important inputs to 
industry and manufacturing for more advanced 
developed countries, as well as being key sources 
of development funding for many resource-rich 
developing countries. Every country needs minerals 
and metals for a number of purposes, even if they 
are mainly hidden in imported goods. Therefore, the 
unfettered supply of minerals and metals is a key 
concern for all.
In addition, finding and exploiting minerals and metals 
is very risky, capital intensive and requires highly 
specialized skills.  Multinational companies and large 
State-owned enterprises tend to be the dominant 
players. For many countries, exploitation of mineral 
resources is dependent on FDI from these players. 
At the same time, protecting their investments is a 
crucial consideration for investors. For this reason, 
international investment treaties designed to protect 
investors from expropriation have been developed 
for countries to sign up to. Given the stakes involved 
–the need for unfettered trade in minerals and metals 
and to protect FDI – governments are invariably 
concerned with and involved in the governance of 
minerals and metals dependent value chains (with 
geopolitics playing an important role).
For mineral-rich developing countries, aligning 
companies’ mining investment decisions with their 
long-term development aspirations is a key step 
to creating shared value through the extractive 
sector. At country level, greater linkages between the 
minerals and metals industries and other sectors of 
the economy should be systematically developed, 
adding local content and local participation. This 
offers a credible path to achieving development 
goals. In this context, governance is essential to 
achieve the SDGs, providing long-term benefits to 
society without harming the environment upon 
which society depends. Enhancing governance 
will also help to improve the business environment 
needed to attract investment in downstream 
added-value manufacturing, while a number of 
additional conditions need to be fulfilled to achieve 
broad-based development (such as access to 
know-how, intellectual property, competitively priced 
energy, water, transport infrastructure and a skilled 
workforce). 
The development minerals sector is the forgotten 
middle of the minerals and metals industry 
landscape. These minerals are widely distributed 
and generally require modest investment. They are 
largely mined by small and medium-scale local 
producers (SMEs).  Consequently, they do not relate 
to geopolitics like export minerals or generate the 
conflict dynamics of ASM (the subject of the next 
chapter). Data on production are patchy, and the role 
of development minerals in the economy therefore 
tends to be overlooked. The result is that they do 
not get the needed attention of policymakers and 
development partners. In countries with no significant 
metallic ore deposits, it is the biggest sector in the 
minerals industry in terms of economic contribution. 
Special attention is needed to fully harness this 
sector, including the need for its own specialized 
governance framework. The focus of this report is on 
export minerals, and this specialized framework will 
therefore not be addressed herein.
The next chapter examines the artisanal and small-
scale (ASM) mining sector. This is the other end of 
the mining landscape, where entry and exit are open 
to almost anyone as the capital required is minimal 
(in some instances, only a pick axe may be required).  
As a result, ASM is characterized by very different 
dynamics, and thus merits some dedicated analysis. 
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Site of Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in Tamiougou, Burkina Faso. Photo: Ollivier Girard for Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) © Flickr
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3  ARTISANAL  AND SMALL-SCALE MINING
3.0. Introduction
Chapter 2 referred to formal, industrial or large-
scale mining (and also touched on the development 
mineral sector (see section 2.6), which is defined 
as primarily medium-scale mining). This chapter 
focuses on the other end of the spectrum of 
extractive industries, which is characterized by 
low technology and informality, while being mainly 
carried out largely by individuals and small groups. 
We call it the informal, artisanal and small-scale 
mining. The acronym ASM is widely used to refer 
to this type of mining practices, and will be used 
throughout this chapter. 
Historically, before the advent of industrial mining, 
all extractive practices were artisanal in nature. In 
some locations, the history of artisanal mining goes 
back to pre-colonial times. Several areas of Africa, 
for example, were the sources of gold traded by the 
Arabs (Dondeyne & Ndunguru, 2014; Werthmann, 
2007) and diamond mining was exclusively carried 
out in India (Lahiri-Dutt & Roy Chowdhury, 2018). 
In resource-rich developing countries, some 
communities still carry on their traditional mining 
practices. The kind of mining that flourished during 
the ‘gold rushes’ that took place in the New World 
during the nineteenth century, was artisanal in 
nature. The gold rushes involved individualized, 
highly mobile artisanal gold miners, and created 
what is known as ‘frontier democracy’ (Bryceson, 
2018). Although some aspects of production and 
labour arrangements in ASM sometimes resemble 
gold-rush mining, it would be wrong to equate 
contemporary mineral rushes with those of the past 
because today’s miners operate in different political, 
economic and legal contexts. Although the frontier 
democracy model (self-regulation) might have 
worked in the past, such governance is unlikely to 
be effective in today’s more complex sociopolitical 
environment. ASM therefore requires a governance 
structure that will protect the environment and the 
communities involved, and that is bottom-up rather 
than top-down. 
Today’s ASM is driven by a complex set of factors 
closely related to local, national and global 
contexts. Experts have shown that, throughout the 
mineralized tracts of the global south, thousands 
of peasants are moving out of agriculture-related 
livelihoods to take up extractive industries to make 
a living out of mineral resource extraction (Lahiri-
Dutt, 2018a). The reasons for this mass exodus 
from agriculture are complex, and the process has 
far-reaching implications for the governance of 
extractive industries. Lahiri-Dutt (2018b) identifies 
six overlapping drivers among the compelling 
factors forcing this unprecedented and widespread 
shift from agrarian to informal mineral extractive 
economies. The first is the unsustainability and low 
productivity of the agricultural sector caused by a 
number of forces. This is the ‘agricultural poverty’ 
thesis that focuses on the ‘push’ factor. Secondly, 
economic reforms carried out in developing 
countries have primarily aimed to liberalize land 
markets and to help Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). 
This is ‘the structural reform’ factor that has led to 
a mushrooming of foreign investments in extractive 
industries, drawing the attention of the poor to 
extraction as a viable and attractive livelihood option. 
Third, and not unrelated to second, are the initiatives 
that States undertake to earn revenue incomes from 
mineral extraction. This is the ‘rentier State’ factor, in 
which the State primarily attempts to earn incomes 
through rent and incentivizes informal mining to 
avoid taxation. Fourth, again not unrelated, is the 
fact that policymakers equate development with the 
expansion of extractive industries, thereby creating 
an extractive model that favours large corporatized 
operators while leaving out local communities 
to claim part of the minerals. This is the ‘mining 
for development’ factor. Fifth, environmental 
degradation at the local level and uncertainties 
of precipitation and temperatures have enhanced 
the vulnerabilities of people and encouraged 
them to take up extractive livelihoods. This is the 
‘environmental refugees’ factor. Lastly, globally rising 
commodity prices have incentivized not only the 
large-scale corporations but also the rural poor to 
earn additional cash incomes or supplement their 
existing incomes through seasonal mining. This is 
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the ‘pull’ factor that has also been responsible for the 
mushrooming of informal, artisanal and small-scale 
mining in recent decades.
3.1. Nomenclature
The acronym ASM is widely used to collectively 
describe a wide range of mining practices, processes 
and activities. These extractive practices can vary 
from individuals panning for gold or digging for 
precious stones along riverbanks or in the tailings 
of large-scale operations, to relatively large and 
organized operations using heavy machinery such 
as excavators and drilling machines (Buxton, 2013; 
Collins & Lawson, 2014; Hinton, 2006; Veiga, Maxson 
& Hylander, 2006; ECA, 2002). ASM can involve 
the extraction of high-value gemstones, minerals 
and fuels to low-value construction materials 
including various stones, gravel and even sand. 
ASM is generally distinguished from large-scale or 
industrial mining in the literature by its relatively 
low levels of capital investment, mechanization/
technology and production/recovery of minerals; high 
degree of labour intensity; exploitation of marginal 
deposits; informality and haphazard nature; and 
poor occupational health, safety and environmental 
safeguards (Adler Miserendino et al., 2013; Buxton, 
2013; Chaparro Ávila, 2003; Collins & Lawson, 2014; 
Hentschel, Hruschka, & M., 2002; Hinton, 2006; 
Mutemeri, Walker, Coulson & Watson, 2016, ECA, 
2002). 
ASM can be loosely classified into the following 
categories (ECA, 2002; ICMM, 2009; Villegas, 
Weinberg, Levin & Hund, 2012), based on drivers that 
tend to overlap on the ground:
• Traditional or Permanent: ASM that occurs year 
round and is frequently the primary economic 
activity of a community. This type of ASM may 
have occurred for generations in an area and forms 
part of traditional livelihoods. 
• Seasonal: ASM that complements or alternates 
with other seasonal livelihoods, such as agriculture 
or the rearing of livestock, or results from seasonal 
migration. Seasonal ASM may overlap with 
permanent ASM (for instance, students may join 
permanent ASM sites during holidays). 
• Rush/Influx: ASM that involves opportunistic 
in-migration or an influx of miners to a recently 
discovered deposit. This type of mining has been 
seen in Brazil and is common in Madagascar. 
• Shock/push: ASM resulting from unexpected 
events such as drought, economic collapse, 
commodity price fluctuations, conflict or 
retrenchment from other industries or sectors 
(such as large-scale mining). 
• Permanent co-habitation: ASM that takes place 
in areas connected with large- or medium-scale 
mining, such as miners working in abandoned 
areas, in tailings dams or downstream of the larger 
operations.
3.1.1. ASM regulation   
Each country seems to understand ASM and to 
define it according to different criteria in their 
legislation. These criteria can include the volume 
of production, the amount of capital invested, the 
number of individuals employed, the size of the 
concession or depth of the mine and/or the level 
of sophistication of the equipment or degree of 
mechanization used (ECA, 2002; Andrew, 2003, p. 
122; ILO, 1999, p. 3). While most countries distinguish 
between large-scale mining and ASM in legislation, 
fewer draw a distinction between ‘artisanal’ and 
‘small-scale’ mining (Bugnosen, 2003). In India, 
minerals on land belong to the states (which are 
entitled to the royalties on their extraction). Minerals 
are classified into ‘major’ and ‘minor’, based on 
their economic importance. Most minor minerals, 
including marble and granite are mined or quarried 
in the ASM sector, and the rules for minor mineral 
concessions are issued by the individual state 
governments. The current law does not provide for 
any separate dispensation for minerals or small 
deposits generally mined in the ASM sector, though 
the National Mineral Policy 200832  does recognize 
the need for a separate approach for managing small 
deposits.    
32 https://mines.gov.in/writereaddata/Content/88753b05_
NMP2008[1].pdf:“Efforts will be made to promote small 
scale mining of small deposits in a scientific and efficient 
manner while safeguarding vital environmental and 
ecological imperatives. […]  Where small deposits are not 
susceptible to viable mining a cluster approach will be 
adopted by granting the deposits together as a single lease 
within a geographically defined boundary. Efforts would be 
made to grant such mineral concessions to consortia of 
small-scale miners so that such clusters of small deposits 
will enable them to reap the benefits of economies of scale.” 
(Government of India, Ministry of Mines (2008). National 
Mineral Policy (For non-fuel and non-coal minerals)
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Many countries have legal provisions to allow ASM 
for nationals only and to limit the trading of minerals 
produced by ASM to national boundaries (ECA, 2002; 
Mutemeri et al., 2016), although foreign partnership 
or investment is frequently allowed (ILO, 1999, p. 3). 
Permits and licences for ASM are provided in smaller 
areas than for large-scale mining (or in specifically 
designated areas) and are of shorter duration. 
They may be (provisionally) renewable but tend 
not to be transferrable. Permits/licences for ASM 
generally have some restrictions on the use of heavy 
machinery and explosives, but have less stringent 
environmental, health and safety requirements than 
for large-scale mines (Mutemeri et al., 2016). 
However, legislation often lags behind reality. Most 
of these definitions are changing on the ground 
because of difficulties in their application. For 
example, there have recently been discussions 
in Ghana about amending legislation to create a 
‘medium-scale’ category of mining to represent 
the increasing mechanization of ASM (Hilson & 
Hilson, 2015). Similarly, Verbrugge and Besmanos 
(2016, p. 137) argue that the legal definition of ASM 
in the Philippines no longer represents practice 
on the ground, where many ASM operations 
“boast a significant degree of capitalization and 
mechanization”. 
3.1.2. Material extracted by ASM
A wide range of materials is extracted by ASM. 
Generally, these are divided into high-value or 
low-value minerals and, for convenience, can be 
further classified into the following categories 
(Chaparro Ávila, 2003, p. 22; ECA 2002; Economic 
Commission for Africa, 2011; Hinton, 2006, pp. 11-12; 
Villegas et al., 2012): 
• Precious metals (such as gold, silver and platinum); 
• Base metals (ferrous such as iron, and non-ferrous 
such as copper, lead, nickel and zinc, but also 
there are a range of others such as bauxite 
(for aluminium), tin, molybdenum, cobalt and 
manganese among others); 
• High-value minerals (such as cassiterite/tin, coltan/
tantalum, and wolframite/tungsten also known as 
3Ts); 
• Precious gemstones (such as diamonds, sapphires 
and rubies); 
• Semi-precious stones (such as aquamarine, 
tourmaline and amethyst); and
• Low value, industrial and construction minerals 
(such as clay, coal, feldspar, fluorspar, granite-
like rock,33  gravel, gypsum, kaolin, limestone, 
sandstone, marble, quartz, sand and talc) 
3.2. ASM and the economy
The Artisanal and Small-scale Mining in Protected 
Areas and Critical Ecosystems (ASM-PACE) project34  
estimates that ASM produces approximately 10 
per cent of the word’s gold, 15-20 per cent of its 
diamonds, 20 to 25 per cent of its tin and tantalum 
and 80 per cent of coloured gemstones (Villegas et 
al., 2012; World Bank, 2012). Other estimates provide 
higher figures for the amount of gold produced 
globally by ASM to 20 - 30 per cent (Seccatore, Veiga, 
Origliasso, Marin, & De Tomi, 2014; Sippl & Selin, 
2012). ASM thus makes a significant contribution to 
economies to some economies, for example in 2014, 
ASM accounted for about 12 per cent of Ghana’s 
merchandise exports (McQuilken & Hilson, 2016).
Perhaps where ASM has a bigger impact on the 
economy is in the provision of non-farm livelihoods. 
No accurate estimate can ever be given for such 
a disparate, diverse and widely scattered activity. 
Figures vary dramatically depending on definition 
and minerals considered. Many estimates primarily 
focus on precious metals and minerals, leaving 
aside industrial commodities including coal, stones 
and sand. An estimated 40.5 million people were 
directly engaged in ASM in 2017, up from 30 million 
in 2014, 13 million in 1999 and 6 million in 1993. 
That compares with only 7 million people working in 
industrial mining in 2013 (IGF, 2017). ASM activities 
occur across most regions in the world, as shown in 
Figure 3.1. 
33 ‘Granite’ is used to refer to hard stone that may be 
crushed for aggregate or used for armouring, dimension 
stone and so on.   Most rock used in this way is not granite, 
which has a precise petrographic definition (a medium to 
coarse grained, silica-rich igneous rock).  But basalt, syenite 
or other types of igneous rock are used more commonly 
used, as the key feature is rock that is hard-wearing (like 
roadstone) and available locally.
34 ASM-PACE is a joint initiative by the international 
conservation organization (WWF) and specialist 
development consultancy firm, Levin Sources that 
seeks to identify workable, sustainable solutions that 
constructively navigate the conservation and development 
trade-off presented by ASM in protected areas and critical 
ecosystems.
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Many academics and international donors agree that 
ASM is a poverty-driven activity, even if developing 
country policymakers are not fully convinced (Gamu, 
Le Billon, & Spiegel, 2015; Hilson & Banchirigah, 2009; 
Hilson & Garforth, 2012; Maclin et al., 2017).  In many 
countries, ASM “is predominantly a highly important 
and deeply rooted livelihood improvement activity” 
and “not a mere survival strategy to which people 
turn to, in times of distress or conflict” (Geenen, 
2013, pp. 208–209, cited in Maclin et al. 2017). It is 
also increasingly being described as an activity with 
the potential for “wealth creation” (ECA, 2002; Fisher, 
Mwaipopo, Mutagwaba, Nyange & Yaron, 2009; 
Hilson & Hilson, 2015, p. 6; Verbrugge, 2016, p. 113).
According to Hilson & McQuilken (2014), it was not 
until the late 1990s that donor support for ASM in 
sub-Saharan Africa had a livelihood dimension. With 
this recognition came several programmes focusing 
on “alternative livelihoods”.  It is acknowledged 
that incomes earned through ASM can be difficult 
to quantify, as they cannot be isolated from the 
household’s other income-generating activities 
(Heemskerk, 2005, pp. 84-85). A number of authors 
discuss the poverty traps that exist in ASM (Childs, 
2008; Hilson, 2012).  
Hilson has been a strong advocate of understanding 
the links between ASM and smallholder farming, 
going as far as to say the two activities are 
“inseparable” (Hilson, 2016a). His works (Hilson, 2011, 
2016a; Hilson, 2016b; Hilson & Garforth, 2012; Hilson 
& Van Bockstael, 2012; Okoh & Hilson, 2011) and that 
of other authors (for example, Cartier & Bürge, 2011; 
Maconachie & Binns, 2007; Maconachie et al., 2006, 
examining Sierra Leone) have consistently argued 
that ASM complements and supports agriculture by 
providing income in the off-season for the purchase 
of fertilizers and other agricultural inputs.  However, 
this complementarity is being broken (see Box 3.1). 
This box shows that ASM dynamics are changing as 
itinerant entrepreneurs displace farmer-miners. 
Perhaps where ASM 
has a bigger impact on 
the economy is in the 
provision of non-farm 
livelihoods
 
Source: Dorner et al. (2012) cited in IGF (2017).
Figure 3.1. Distribution of ASM activities by % of population involved
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Box 3.1. Agriculture and ASM
Agriculture and ASM are key means of improving rural livelihoods.  They tend to coexist in the same 
space, competing at times and sometimes complementing each other. To understand how this complex 
relationship is evolving, ACET conducted a study of three countries: Burkina Faso, Ghana and Sierra Leone. 
The study found that, after smallholder agriculture, ASM is the second main source of employment. About 
one million people are directly engaged in ASM in Ghana, 300,000 in Sierra Leone and about 200,000 in 
Burkina Faso. 
The ACET study (ACET, 2017) found an overwhelmingly negative impact of ASM activities on smallholder 
agriculture. These include: 
• Growing imbalance in the power relations between the itinerant ASM entrepreneurs/workers on the one 
hand and settled smallholder farmers on the other; 
• Growing overvaluation of assets in resource-rich rural communities, which increases the vulnerability of 
rural households and undermines efforts to reduce poverty; 
• Growing threat to food security, reduction in available arable land and consequent reduction in food- and 
cash-crop production; and
• Environmental and health risks associated with unregulated ASM activities.
Can ASM be a sustainable tool for poverty reduction in resource-rich communities? 
The non-renewable characteristic of minerals inherently defines the itinerant nature of ASM livelihoods. 
The shifts from one location to another, once the reserves are exhausted, can potentially damage the 
environment and destroy farmlands, ultimately undermining food security and cash incomes. The 
ACET study again shows that post-mining communities virtually become ghost towns and devastated 
farmlands feature huge, mosquito-infested and chemically polluted pools, with dried-up streams.
This study offers three key strategies for mitigating the negative impact of ASM on the livelihoods of rural 
communities: 
• Strengthening institutional capacity to plug the loopholes in regulatory responses;
• Strict enforcement of the already well-articulated policies and regulations; and
• Addressing the longstanding challenges facing smallholder agriculture (such as low productivity and 
inadequate financial, logistical and technical support).
Land Use 
The study also revealed that the lack of an effective regulatory response to land use is partly responsible 
for the indiscriminate incursions into cash-crop farmlands by ASM operators. None of the countries 
studied has a comprehensive geological mapping and land use plan to identify areas of mineral reserve 
potentials and guide the utilization of land resources for other purposes. This is critical for the mutual 
coexistence of the two sectors and the promotion of sustainable growth and development of the rural 
communities. ASM is already wreaking significant damage on agricultural lands, and the only way to 
reverse this sad trend is through rigorous land use management interventions, and proper demarcation of 
areas for cash and food crops and those reserved for ASM activities.
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Employment
With regard to employment, if ASM is seen as a major pathway to rural job creation and thus improvement 
in the livelihood of mineral-rich communities, then this emerging trend can be regarded as a manifestation 
of market failure, requiring State intervention. For example, the regulations will have to focus on restricting 
the use of heavy earth-moving and dredging equipment in artisanal mining sites. In this regard, Ghana can 
learn from both Sierra Leone and Burkina Faso, which have clear regulatory distinctions between artisanal 
mining and small-scale mining.
Regulations
New regulations will be extremely difficult to enforce and unlikely to achieve intended outcomes in the 
countries concerned (particularly in Ghana, where there appears to be signs of regulatory capture). More 
traction could be gained by focusing on enforcing existing regulations than introducing new ones. Thus, 
effective regulatory responses would be to support artisanal miners (the workers) with resources and 
training to engage in their trade effectively, and strict enforcement of licensing. The current institutional 
arrangements that empower regional and district leadership structures need to be strengthened, along 
with coordination among key stakeholders. In particular, the capacity of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) needs to be built up at regional and district levels. Overcoming regulatory capture requires 
political will to dismantle the patronage structures that prevent effective implementation of rules and 
regulations. In Ghana, the change is beginning to occur with the moratorium that was imposed on ASM in 
order to address the root cause.
Source: ACET, 2017
3.3. The Drivers of ASM
3.3.1. Rural distress and agrarian crisis driver
The rural economy in most countries is suffering; 
smallholder agriculture throughout these countries 
has stagnated, pushing large numbers of previously 
rural, farm-based communities into non-farm jobs 
(Lahiri-Dutt, 2014).  This process can be traced 
to the structural adjustment programmes of the 
1980s. Several authors have argued that structural 
adjustment programmes (SAPs) implemented across 
sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1970s, 1980s and 
1990s fuelled the expansion of ASM (ECA, 2002; 
Banchirigah, 2006; Hayes, 2008; Hilson, 2010; Hilson 
& McQuilken, 2014; Hilson & Potter, 2005; Spiegel, 
2009, 2012b).  Scholars argue that ASM absorbed 
people who were retrenched through the privatization 
of State-owned enterprises – including large-scale 
mines and crop parastatals. ASM also engaged 
people as a result of the reduction of the public 
sector workforce (ECA, 2002; Banchirigah, 2006; 
Hayes, 2008, pp. 37-38; Hilson & McQuilken, 2014; 
Spiegel, 2009). Finally, ASM provided an alternative 
or supplemental source of income for farmers 
struggling due to agricultural reforms – including 
the “reductions in export crop taxes, the devaluation 
of local currencies, and the removal of subsidies on 
vital crop inputs” – that made smallholder farming 
unfeasible (Banchirigah & Hilson, 2010, p. 160; Hilson, 
2010, p. 297). 
More recent challenges have further compounded 
the rural distress driver. For example, Kamete (2008, 
2012) finds that the shock of the post-2000 economic 
crisis in Zimbabwe - which resulted in complete 
devaluation of the local currency, hyperinflation and 
extremely high levels of unemployment and poverty 
- led to a new artisanal gold rush and the growth of 
informal mining settlements. Teschner (2014, p. 140) 
finds that the March 2012 coup d’état in Mali, which 
led to the State’s withdrawal of financial support 
from the commune governments and social services, 
resulted in ASM becoming “a critical rural industry not 
only supplying much needed income to rural people, 
but also informally funding social institutions from 
the bottom up during a time of national crisis”. These 
are just two of many examples of ‘shock’ or ‘push’ 
ASM. One can see that both forces operate, which 
is why Verbrugge (2016) argues that ASM is both a 
product and catalyst of rural transformation.
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3.3.2. Mining sector reform driver
According to Hilson et al. (2016, p. 233), between 
1988-2012 the World Bank contributed US$1.4 billion 
to mining sector reforms, which included a series of 
technical support loans focused on legislative and 
fiscal reforms and institutional strengthening. By 
1995, this support had resulted in 35 of sub-Saharan 
Africa’s countries revising their mining codes, which 
increased large-scale private investment in mineral 
exploration and extraction. However, this reform 
also resulted in large tracts of mineralised land 
being granted as exploration/mining concessions to 
foreign multinationals in many countries (including 
Ghana and Tanzania), which has resulted in lack 
of availability of viable land for legal ASM activities 
and has encouraged informality in the sector (Fold, 
Jønsson, & Yankson, 2014; Hilson et al., 2016).  In 
Mongolia, Lahiri-Dutt & Dondov (2016) have described 
the links between the liberalization of the Mongolian 
economy, expansion of the informal sector in the 
urban context and mushrooming of ASM in rural 
areas.
3.3.3. Commodity prices driver
Participation in ASM tends to fluctuate with 
commodity prices (Eftimie et al., 2012). China’s 
unprecedented economic growth has helped raise 
commodity prices, creating incentives for many 
rural peoples to diversify their livelihood activities 
into extractive activities. The rapid rise of gold prices 
since 200035  has seen a marked increase in artisanal 
mining in Ghana (ACET, 2017). It has been suggested 
that ASM can be viable at a smaller production level 
than large-scale mining for certain kinds of minerals 
(Marin et al., 2016; Hayes, 2008, p. 37).
3.4. Characteristics and issues
3.4.1. Data
Lack of reliable data about the scale and scope of 
ASM production is a key challenge for government 
authorities and other key stakeholders seeking 
to develop effective policies and management 
programmes (Banchirigah, 2008; Collins & Lawson, 
35 The price of gold rose from US$255.95 per ounce in 
2001 to US$1,746 per ounce in 2012, a 582 per cent rise. 
See trends in gold price on the World Gold Council website, 
https://www.gold.org/data/gold-price.
2014; Cook & Healy, 2012). Figures on the number 
of artisanal miners and their production vary 
dramatically, as most governments do not have 
reliable data on ASM. There are a range of obstacles 
to collecting data on ASM, including the fact that 
few miners are willing to honestly disclose figures 
on their production levels/earnings/investments to 
researchers or government officials, and only few 
maintain adequate records (Heemskerk, 2005; Marin, 
Seccatore, De Tomi, & Veiga, 2016). In addition, 
ASM populations are often mobile/transient and 
may be linked to illegal activities, which makes it 
harder for researchers to gain access (Heemskerk, 
2005). Production levels are also hugely variable and 
dependent on context, making it difficult to generalize 
(Heemskerk, 2005).36 
Many ASM activities occur 
on global commons of 
forested lands in critical 
ecosystems that were 
not previously used [...] 
Attention is now focused 
on the environmental 
degradation caused by ASM 
3.4.2. Environmental degradation and safety
Many ASM activities occur on global commons of 
forested lands in critical ecosystems that were not 
previously used (Duřan et al., 2013). Attention is now 
focused on the environmental degradation caused 
by ASM. These impacts range from deforestation 
(Hirons, 2011), biodiversity loss (Butler, 2006) and 
36 Three useful guides for collecting baseline data and 
conducting research on ASM communities include: 
Estimating Mercury Use And Documenting Practices In 
Artisanal And Small-Scale Gold Mining (ASGM)  (O’ Neil 
& Telmer, 2017) produced by UN Environment; the rapid 
assessment toolkit “Gender Dimensions of Artisanal and 
Small-Scale Mining” (Eftimie et al., 2012) produced by the 
World Bank; and the “Methodological Toolkit for Baseline 
Assessments and Response Strategies to Artisanal 
and Small-Scale Mining in Protected Areas and Critical 
Ecosystems” (Hinton & Hollestelle, 2012) produced by 
the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and Estelle Levin 
Limited.
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soil and water pollution, to extreme dust and air 
pollution.  Other impacts include changes in river 
regimes, surface or underground fires (in the case 
of coal mining) and frequent landslides in areas of 
steep gradient.  Noise pollution is also a problem. For 
example, in areas of bulky industrial or construction 
material mining, the crushers create extreme levels 
of noise and dust. These environmental impacts 
can be short or long term in nature. A number of 
non-governmental organizations are now working in 
this area, although their scope varies. For instance, 
the Global Environment Facility (GEF) focuses 
on preventing the use of mercury in gold mining 
(see Box 3.2), while the primary objective of the 
Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining in Protected Areas 
and Critical Ecosystems (ASM-PACE) Programme 
is to characterize protected areas and sensitive 
ecosystems. However, since ASM-based livelihoods 
are risky, health and safety issues are now being 
more closely linked to the environmental issues 
surrounding ASM (Smith et al., 2016). In the near 
future, closer attention will be paid to the longer-
term and wider impacts of ASM, particularly those 
contributing to climate change (and more specifically 
the impact of ASM on forest degradation). 
3.4.3. Use of technologies
 ASM remains low-tech, irrespective of efforts to 
introduce appropriate technologies. This is partly due 
to laws that define similar forms of mining as low 
technology and family-oriented affairs (such as the 
‘People’s mining’ of Indonesia). So far, interventions 
such as capacity building and technology transfer 
programmes implemented by intergovernmental 
organizations and multilateral lending agencies 
have focused on environmentally friendly mining 
processing methods, particularly reducing mercury 
use and pollution in relation to gold mining (ECA, 
2002; Aryee et al., 2003; Collins & Lawson, 2014; 
Hinton, Veiga, & Veiga, 2003; Sippl & Selin, 2012). 
Some examples include:
• The Artisanal Gold Council has been providing 
training and introducing mercury-free processing 
methods in several countries in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America.
• The IGoli process, developed by Mintek, has been 
piloted in a number of countries (ECA, 2002; 
Mintek, 2011).
• The use of metal detectors has proven to be 
problematic in alleviating the drudgery of miners’ 
labour, due to the restrictions imposed by individual 
countries regarding the use of technology in ASM.
The IGF (2017) points out that, while technical 
alternatives exist, they are not always applicable 
due to geological, socioeconomic, cultural and other 
site-specific factors. One barrier to adopting cleaner 
technologies for ASM mining communities is cost 
effectiveness. ASM operators are also usually risk-
averse and will not change their practices until the 
benefits have been clearly demonstrated to them. 
Indeed, some researchers have argued that poor 
understanding of the make-up and dynamics of 
ASM communities has led to the design of many 
inappropriate technologies and support services 
(Hilson & Potter, 2003; Banchirigah, 2008). Setting 
up technical advisory services in existing State 
institutions (such as Geological Surveys, national 
universities and vocational training institutions) is 
seen as the optimal way to provide support (Fold et 
al., 2014). 
3.4.4. Criminality and illegality
Hruschka (2013) explains that the distinction 
between “illegal ASM” and “informal ASM” is 
nebulous, and the two are often erroneously 
conflated. ASM cannot be deemed “illegal” if 
legislation does not exist to regulate ASM or to 
specifically prohibit it either outright or in specific 
areas, such as in proximity to waterways or in 
biodiversity hotspots. It is also problematic to refer to 
ASM as “illegal” if the regulatory and administrative 
procedures supporting the legislation are not 
effectively implemented to enable formalization. For 
this reason, some authors prefer to use the term 
“extralegal” to refer to ASM activities (Labonne, 2014; 
Siegel & Veiga, 2009). 
All the same, illegality is a serious challenge in ASM. 
In Ghana, estimates of foreign miners are in the 
range of 50,000, all of whom are illegal miners as the 
law restricts ASM to nationals.  Ghana is currently 
grappling with the challenge of illegal mining, as ASM 
there has attracted international criminal networks 
from all over the world (Aido, 2016; Crawford et al., 
2015; Hirons, 2013). 
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Box 3.2. Minamata Convention & Artisanal and Small-scale Gold Mining (ASGM)37
In 2017, a new multilateral environmental agreement entered into force with provisions specifically 
targeted to the artisanal and small-scale gold mining (ASGM) sector. The Minamata Convention on 
Mercury aims to protect human health and the environment from mercury pollution. ASGM is the largest 
global source of such pollution, and reducing and eliminating mercury is an important part of the treaty 
(O’ Neil & Telmer, 2017).  It is worth mentioning that lessons learnt from the Sustainable Artisanal Mining 
(SAM) Project (http://sam.mn/) and the Better Gold Initiative provided crucial input in the negotiation 
process that led to the Minamata Convention.
The Convention states that each party that determines that ASGM using mercury is “more than 
insignificant” on its territory must develop and implement a national action plan. The national action plan 
approach was chosen because negotiators recognized that the particular characteristics of ASGM – its 
informality, local and regional variability and importance for development – make a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach unlikely to succeed.  Furthermore, although the Convention is focused on mercury pollution, 
the provisions on ASGM are designed to promote a multidimensional strategy that takes into account 
social, economic, governance and public health factors. The Convention stipulates required actions and 
components of each national action plan, which include:
• National objectives and reduction targets;
• Actions to eliminate the worst ASGM practices (such as whole ore amalgamation);
• Steps to facilitate formalization or regulation of ASM;
• Baseline estimates of mercury use and practices employed;
• Strategies for promoting reduction of mercury releases;
• Strategies for managing trade in mercury;
• Strategies to involve stakeholders in the development and implementation of the plan;
• A public health strategy;
• Strategies to protect vulnerable populations; and
• Strategies for providing information to miners and their communities.
The development of ASGM national action plans is a significant undertaking that will bring together 
ministries and other stakeholders and shape country policy on ASM for years to come. As of mid-2018, 32 
countries have started work on national action plans with financial support from the Global Environment 
Facility. The Global Mercury Partnership of UN Environment is supporting many of these countries 
by developing tools and methodologies (such as the ASGM Baseline Estimates toolkit) and providing 
technical assistance and opportunities to share information and lessons learned. 
37 http://mercuryconvention.org
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3.4.5. Migration 
Literature shows that migration into ASM areas 
can be seasonal and temporary in nature, as well 
as more permanent (leading to the quick growth of 
semi-urban or even urban settlements that lack basic 
amenities). ASM settlements are characterized by 
lack of access to essential facilities such as health 
care, water and sanitation. Unemployment and 
alcoholism compound these problems. A tradition 
of significant female migrant workers exists in all 
mining communities, yet labour focuses on male 
waged workers rather than women. This is due to 
the impact of migrant labour, which builds on male 
worker exploitation while obscuring the role of 
women and children (Parpart, 1986). Artisanal mining 
often leads to conflicts with the local population (in 
the case of Mongolia, for example, conflicts between 
herders and the miners are not uncommon). These 
conflicts can flare into armed confrontation (Endicott, 
2012: 144; Maconachie et al., 2006; Nyame & Grant, 
2014). Moreover, issues like drug use and prostitution 
are often found in ASM hotspots (Huggins, Buss, & 
Rutherford, 2017; Fold et al., 2014; Banchirigah, 2008; 
Maclin, Kelly, Perks, Vinck, & Pham, 2017). Gender-
based violence is less frequently discussed, and often 
takes the form of sexual and physical harassment 
from the male dominated labour force. There are also 
residency problems for the female migrant workforce 
providing support services to male migrant miners. 
3.4.6. Access rights/land tenure
ASM often involves elaborate informal or customary 
property systems, which are often not taken into 
account in policymaking (Spiegel & Veiga, 2010). 
Verbrugge et al. (2015) analyse the complex 
relationships between ASM and surface land 
tenure arrangements in the southern Philippines, 
the eastern DRC and Liberia. They argue that the 
interactions between ASM (largely informal) and 
surface land claimants are not underscored by 
antagonism but rather negotiations for mutually 
beneficial arrangements. This point is echoed by 
O’Faircheallaigh & Corbett (2016, p. 966) in the case 
of the Philippines, whereby local governments tend 
to be in favour of ASM. The reason is because “local 
politicians and business people are often involved 
in the sector and value its employment and other 
economic benefits”. 
In Ghana and many other African countries, traditional 
authorities (such as chiefs) still assert authority and 
control over rural lands.  However, customary land 
tenure practices frequently clash with formal land 
rights and licensing procedures (Banchirigah, 2008; 
Dube et al., 2016; Hilson & Yakovleva, 2007; Nyame 
& Blocher, 2010). Conflict often results from one of 
these two scenarios: either traditional authorities 
give permission for ASM operators to work on lands 
without legal/official permits or licences, or the 
government provides licences for miners to work on 
tracts of lands without the permission of traditional 
authorities (Dube et al., 2016). Hirons (2013) argues 
that integrating traditional sources of authority into 
decentralization reforms is essential if they are to 
have any substantive impact on ASM governance in 
Ghana.
Mitchell (2016) examines the consequences of 
overlapping land tenure in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
found that lack of secure land tenure offers little 
incentive to miners to formalize their activities, 
build their businesses and infrastructure or 
undertake environmentally responsible practices. 
He also revealed that ASM licences are typically 
of short duration, and renewal is not guaranteed. 
This discourages ASM operators from investing 
in their operations or responsibly managing the 
land. The USAID Property Rights and Artisanal 
Diamond Development (PRADD) project in Liberia 
aimed to address weak property rights that lead 
to conflicts, while creating positive incentives for 
ASM operators to practice good stewardship of land 
(USAID, 2013). Similarly, Verbrugge & Besmanos 
(2016) evaluate a policy programme in the southern 
Philippines (Minahang Bayanihan) geared towards 
the recognition of mineral property rights and labour 
rights.
Women face different participation challenges as a 
result of the lack of access to, use of and control over 
resource-rich land and other productive resources, 
licences, finance and geological data. Due to the 
traditional and patriarchal legal constraints on 
owning or inheriting land and mineral rights, many 
women end up operating in an unregistered way, 
thereby increasing their vulnerability in the current 
global efforts at formalization (which itself features 
stringent requirements that many women are 
unable to fulfil) (IGF, 2018). The lack of access and 
control over land restricts women from accessing an 
important determinant of mining business success: 
finance (IGF, 2018). In some cultures, such as in 
Sierra Leone, Botswana and Lesotho, even when a 
woman is the family head and owner of land, the 
89 
Characteristics and issues
formal laws of the nation constrain the woman from 
accessing loans by requiring consent/approval from 
a spouse or father (ibid.). This typically encourages 
vulnerable women into undesired relationships 
with male miners purely to survive. In Madagascar, 
for instance, temporary marriages typically known 
as “gold marriages” or “vadin saffira” (sapphire 
marriages) are common (Bryceson, Jønsson, & 
Verbrugge 2014; Lawson, 2016). Since such sexual 
relationships in return for material goods have no 
legal status in relation to land or property rights, it 
further deepens the vulnerability of women, making 
them more susceptible to exploitation. Also related 
to lack of property rights are the lack of access to 
mineralized lands and lack of geological information 
and analysis, which represent other key barriers 
for ASM operators (observed by O’Faircheallaigh & 
Corbett, 2016).
Women face different 
participation challenges 
as a result of the lack 
of access to, use of and 
control over resource-rich 
land and other productive 
resources, licences, finance 
and geological data
3.4.7. Conflicts with large-scale mining
Conflict between ASM and large-scale mining 
is an area of increasing concern and attention. 
ASM often occurs on large-scale mining leases; 
in fact, the presence of ASM frequently provides 
a geological indicator or “target selection criteria” 
for large-scale exploration activities (Aubynn, 2009; 
ICMM, 2009, p. 16). In some countries, government 
policies promoting large-scale mining have created a 
situation whereby very large tracts of land are under 
concession of large-scale mining companies. Often, 
ASM existed prior to the arrival of the large-scale 
company. Cases have been reported where large-
scale companies have been offered land once the 
ASM licence (which is typically of short duration) 
expires. Other times, the presence of the large-scale 
company instigates an influx of miners either to work 
on the outskirts of the concession or in the tailings of 
large-scale mines. In Mozambique, the government’s 
inability to control artisanal miners is said to be 
a factor that has discouraged foreign mining 
investment (Dondeyne & Ndunguru, 2014). 
From the perspective of large-scale mining 
companies, ASM poses potential financial liabilities 
and reputational risks, given its “illegal” nature, poor 
health and safety practices, use of child labour and 
environmental impacts that may be mistakenly 
attributed to the large-scale company’s activities 
(ICMM, 2009). In addition, ASM can cause damage 
to a large-scale company’s assets, either directly 
through vandalism and other acts of resistance by 
miners, high-grading and other forms of encroaching 
on large-scale activities. Military-type tactics of 
eviction of artisanal and small-scale miners are 
frequently used. Around the world, security forces 
employed by either companies or governments to 
protect large-scale mining assets have been accused 
of human rights abuses against artisanal and small-
scale miners, including gender-based violence and 
sexual assault. 
There are a number of papers investigating the 
relationship between ASM and large-scale mining 
(see, for instance, Aubynn, 2009; CASM, 2009; Hilson 
& Yakovleva, 2007; ICMM, 2009; IIED, 2015; Smith, 
Smith, John, & Teschner, 2017; Teschner, 2013). 
Almost all of these papers emphasize trust as a key 
factor (and barrier) in managing this relationship. 
Legacy issues and the role of the government are 
also vital. For example, Smith et al. (2017) discuss a 
case in the Guianas where a company relinquished a 
section of their concession to a national government 
to be set aside for ASM (but reserved for miners 
belonging to traditional landowners of the concession 
and surrounding land). In this case, the researchers 
found a number of barriers to this move, including 
lack of communication between the company and 
small-scale miners; lack of trust on the part of small-
scale miners towards both the company and the 
government (based in large part on previous evictions 
and treatment); and disagreement on the roles to be 
played by the different actors. 
In addition, Teschner (2013) compared the 
experiences of two large-scale mines in Ghana 
(Tarkwa and Damang) owned by the same company 
(Gold Fields) in dealing with ASM, and found that 
“early mining decisions established legacies which 
have persisted to this day; one relationship based on 
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trust and the other shadowed by broken promises 
and resentment”. The government’s involvement (or 
lack thereof) was also a key factor in each mine’s 
relationship with artisanal and small-scale miners. 
The authors recommend that large-scale companies 
plan their relationship with artisanal and small-scale 
miners early on in the project-development phase and 
establish agreements that are adhered to throughout 
the life of the mine. They also argue that consultation 
with ASM leaders is crucial.  
It is obvious that there is a potential for large-scale 
mining companies to provide capacity building or 
mentorship to artisanal and small-scale operators, 
particularly in the areas of environment, health and 
safety and marketing. However, risk factors include 
“illegality” and the possibility of encouraging an influx 
of miners (Verbrugge, 2017).
3.4.8. ASM and conflict
The fact that ASM largely focuses on high value 
minerals that are easy to extract means that criminal 
networks are attracted to having control of such 
sites in order to capture and control the resources 
themselves. This could occur in two ways. First, 
it might involve capturing State power and, by 
extension, controlling the sites. Second, it could 
entail capturing the site directly and engaging the 
State for control.  High-value minerals may be used 
to finance this kind of conflict and are known as 
conflict minerals. Diamonds have also fuelled deadly 
conflicts, which was the reason for setting up the 
Kimberley Process to ensure that diamonds in the 
Aluminium is recycled by hand in Ambatolampy, Madagascar. Photo: Dennisvdw © Getty images
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market are not fuelling conflict.38 In recent years, tin, 
tantalum, tungsten and gold (3TG) have been the key 
focus due to conflicts they have been fuelling in the 
Great Lakes region.  Cobalt is also becoming a source 
of concern as demand rises (Faber et al., 2017). 
Consumer pressure to guarantee that products are 
free of ‘conflict minerals’ has led to the establishment 
of a number of schemes around due diligence and 
certification (See Chapter 7). 
3.4.9. Child labour
One of the major challenges of ASM is child labour.  
Poverty is the main reason why children work in the 
mining sector (Faber et al., 2017).  The International 
Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that there 
are more than one million children working in 
ASM.  However, Schipper et al. (2015) argue that 
the actual number is likely to be higher, as ASM 
has been growing steadily since 2006 (when this 
estimate was made).  Child labour can constitute a 
significant part of the labour force. For instance, 20 
per cent of all miners in Mali and 30-50 per cent of 
gold miners in Burkina Faso are children (Schipper 
et al. 2015). This is physically dangerous because 
of the heavy and awkward loads, the strenuous 
work, the unstable underground structures, heavy 
tools and equipment, the toxic and often explosive 
chemicals and the exposure to extremes of heat 
and cold. ILO (undated) also points out that mining 
often takes place in remote areas where the law, 
schools and social services are non-existent; where 
family and community support may not exist; and 
where conditions foster alcohol abuse, drugs and 
prostitution. These conditions expose children to 
psychological and other harm. 
Donors and environmental agencies consider child 
labour in the mining sector as the worst form of child 
labour that needs to be outlawed (O’ Driscoll, 2017). 
This remains a contentious issue, however, as there 
are those who argue that not working will drive these 
already poor families into further poverty. These 
proponents argue that it is participation in these 
activities that enables some children to go to school 
38 The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) was 
established in 2000 by United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution 55/56 to prevent “conflict diamonds” from 
entering the mainstream rough diamond market. Diamonds 
were fueling conflicts in Sierra Leone, Liberia and Angola
(O’ Driscoll, 2017), and that a ban may harm the 
children (Faber et al., 2017). Nevertheless, there have 
been efforts to prohibit child labour in ASM, mainly 
by means of certification schemes that guarantee 
supply chains to be free of child labour. Some of 
these responsible mining initiatives include Fairtrade, 
Fairmined, OECD and the Responsible Jewellery 
Council (O’ Driscoll, 2017).
3.5. Supporting ASM
ASM has not traditionally been on the radar of 
development partners.  Hilson (2016b, p. 551) 
argues that, while donors in sub-Saharan Africa 
in the 1970s had rural development programmes 
focused on ‘Integrated Rural Development’ to 
improve prospects for smallholder farmers, these 
programmes were largely symbolic as the main 
focus was on “large-scale, export-led growth” and 
“big projects such as dams, oil pipelines, mines and 
forestry”. They also overlooked the role of ASM in 
rural development. While there was a shift towards 
livelihood diversification in the 1980s, ASM was 
considered “independent of agriculture and other rural 
development concerns” (Hilson, 2016b, p. 551).
The United Nations report entitled “Small-Scale 
Mining in the Developing Countries” (UN, 1972), marks 
the beginning of a series of concerted efforts by 
development partners focused on capacity building 
and technology transfer programmes to encourage 
efficient and environmentally friendly mining and 
processing methods (including mercury reduction) 
(Aryee, Ntibery, & Atorkui, 2003; Collins & Lawson, 
2014; Sippl & Selin, 2012).  However, these initial 
efforts were not very successful.
According to Sippl & Selin (2012, p. 21), in the 
1970s and 1980s international capacity building 
and technology transfer programmes tended to be 
“characterized by experts from northern industrialized 
countries spending short periods of time in southern 
developing country communities to conduct training 
and introduce new ideas and systems, then going 
back home again with few continuing connections 
or commitments”. Many of these activities failed to 
have real impacts because they were short term in 
nature and failed to take into account local contexts 
(ECA, 2002). Furthermore, in the mid-1990s, funds 
from the World Bank and other international sources 
were used to purchase equipment that was either 
not suitable for small-scale miners or that small-
scale miners did not know how to use, because this 
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Table 3.1. Approaches for dealing with ASM 





Towards integration of technical, 
environmental, legal, social and 
economic issues
1990s Special attention on legalisation  of ASM sectors
Mid to late 
1990s
Relation between large mining 
companies and ASM 
Gender and child labour issues
2010s Community-related issues and sustainable livelihoods
Post 2010 Ethnographic details on life-worlds  and formalization
Source: Adapted from (Hentschel et al. (2002), p. 9).
 
Collins & Lawson (2014) provide a compendium 
of approaches to working with ASM based on a 
comprehensive literature review on how international 
donors, national and sub-national governments, civil 
society, universities, ASM associations and other 
stakeholders have tried to support and regulate ASM. 
This compendium provides the following categories 
of approaches to working with ASM:  
equipment was not accompanied by appropriate 
awareness-raising and training programmes. Other 
equipment provided more recently has been received 
positively, but it is unlikely to be affordable for miners 
to retain and maintain (Aryee et al., 2003). 
Another focus of support has been alternative 
livelihood schemes that sought to discourage ASM. 
Large-scale mining projects also frequently invest 
in alternative livelihood programmes in an effort 
to curb illegal mining on or near their concessions 
(Aryee et al., 2003). According to Hilson and 
Banchirigah (2009), in sub-Saharan Africa alternative 
livelihoods programmes have mainly been agrarian-
based. However, they question the viability of such 
programmes and whether they actually slowed the 
growth of ASM, arguing that ASM itself is, in fact, the 
alternative livelihood for farming (which has become 
unviable due to structural adjustment and the global 
economy). Tschakert’s (2009) study of ASM miners in 
Ghana corroborates these observations on alternative 
livelihoods. 
According to Hentschel et al. (2002, p. 9, cited in 
Collins & Lawson, 2014), the approaches used 
by the international development community to 
deal with ASM have evolved along with increased 
understanding of the issues involved. These 
approaches can be summarized as follows (table 
3.1):  
Worker in a small-scale gold mine in Camarines, Philippines. Photo: Minette Rimando © ILO / Creative Commons Attribution‐




 ○ National and local data on ASM
 ○ Knowledge sharing
 ○ Local-level community consultation, dialogue and participation
• Regularization and formalization of ASM
 ○ Putting legislation in place
 ○ Enforcement
 ○ Incentives and strategies for overcoming obstacles to formalization
 ○ Cooperatives and associations
• Training / capacity building programmes
 ○ Technical support and assistance
 ○ Assistance centres
• Strategies focused on mercury
 ○ Minamata Convention on Mercury
 ○ Centralized processing centres
 ○ Mercury retorts
 ○ Clean/no-mercury technologies
• Financial assistance
• Fair trade, standards and certification initiatives
• Beneficiation of resources
• Intersection of ASM with large-scale mining
• Geological information and demarcating areas for ASM
• Relocation to demarcated areas
• Technology transfer
• Land rights/securing tenure for miners
• Reclamation of lands mined by small-scale miners
• Gender-focused strategies
 ○ Research into female miners
 ○ Gender sensitive access to microcredit
• Alternative livelihoods approaches / livelihood diversification
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Hilson and McQuilken (2014) provide an analysis of 
the support that the international community has 
provided to ASM in sub-Saharan Africa over the last 
four decades, reflecting on why ASM still occupies 
a “peripheral position” (p. 104). However, there have 
been some encouraging outcomes from more recent 
support programmes indicating that some of the 
lessons are being learnt. Examples of these include: 
• From 2000-2011, the World Bank hosted CASM 
(Communities and Small-Scale Mining) to serve as 
a global initiative/dialogue on ASM to coordinate 
knowledge sharing. CASM was sponsored by a 
number of international organizations including the 
International Labour Organization (ILO), the United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (UN-DESA), Conservation International and 
the United Kingdom’s Department for International 
Development (DFID) (World Bank, 2003, p. 10). 
More recently, various projects focused on 
ASM have been run through the World Bank’s 
Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources 
Project (SMMRP). 
• The UN Seminar on Artisanal and Small-scale 
Mining in Africa: Identifying Best Practices 
and Building the Sustainable Livelihoods of 
Communities held in 2002 adopted the “Yaoundé 
Vision on ASM”, which recognized the poverty-
driven nature of the activity as well as its poverty-
reduction potential (ECA, 2002: 92-101). It called 
for greater alignment and integration of ASM in 
rural development plans. This vision document 
detailed a series of policy objectives to deliver 
sustainable reductions in poverty and to help 
improve livelihoods in African ASM communities 
by 2015. Though the “Yaoundé Vision on ASM” 
was acknowledged as a policy document that has 
mobilized practitioners and politicians globally, 
the degree to which its implementation has led 
to improvements for miners and communities 
remains contested.
• In July 2015, the ACP-EU Development Minerals 
Programme was launched. The programme largely 
aims to develop the capacity of mineral institutions 
and the small-scale private sector, operating in 
low-value minerals in ACP countries. 
• Similarly, in October 2016, the Global Environment 
Facility approved the development of the 
programme Global Opportunities for the Long-term 
Development of the Artisanal and Small-Scale 
Gold Mining Sector (GEF-GOLD) – see Box 3.3. 
The programme, led by UN Environment and jointly 
implemented with Conservation International, 
UNDP and UNIDO, built on the experience of the 
participating agencies, and is composed of four 
main components: 1) formalization of the sector, 
2) access to finance and to global gold markets 
for ASM communities, 3) reduction of mercury use 
and 4) a knowledge management and information 
exchange mechanism (see Box 3.3).
• In 2002, the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Africa (ECA) produced a Compendium on 
Best Practices in Small-scale Mining in Africa, 
which was one of the first attempts to document 
good practices in mining policy and legislation; 
promotion of clean and efficient technology; 
minerals marketing and access to credit and 
finance; environmental management, health and 
safety; capacity building and technical assistance 
programmes; as well as addressing gender and 
child labour in the ASM sector across several 
jurisdictions on the continent, (ECA, 2002).
• In 2018, 547 delegates, representing 72 nations 
assembled in Livingstone, Zambia between 11-13 
September, for the International Conference on 
Artisanal and Small-scale Mining and Quarrying to 
chart a vision for sustainable development.  The 
conference was convened by the African Caribbean 
and Pacific Group of States, European Union, 
United Nations Development Programme, and 
The Government of Zambia, with the support of 
The World Bank, The African Union, Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
International Conference on the Great Lakes 
Region, The Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, 
Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development, 
and German Development Cooperation. An historic 
outcome of the conference was the adoption of the 
‘Mosi-oa-Tunya Declaration,’ the first declaration 
of its kind since the Yaoundé Declaration in 2002 
(Franks et al., 2020).
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Box 3.3. GEF GOLD Programme  
The GEF-GOLD programme (GEF, 2016) is a US$45 million investment from the Global Environment 
Facility, which was approved in 2016 as the first major intervention under the Minamata Convention on 
Mercury to address the artisanal and small-scale gold mining sector, which is the largest user and emitter 
of mercury to the environment. The programme is composed of a suite of eight projects that will address:
• Formalization of the sector. The Convention recognizes that formalization is the first step towards 
implementing sustainable solutions and it requires that each party for which ASGM mercury use is “more 
than insignificant” to develop a strategy for formalization of the sector (among other measures).
• Improving access to finance and the international gold market. The programme will educate investors on 
the potential of the sector and enable miners to apply for funding to procure the necessary equipment, 
which will ensure more efficient and cleaner gold extraction (mercury free). At the same time, the 
project will work on the gold value chain to ensure more direct access (and therefore more income) to 
international gold markets with a growing appetite for responsible ASM gold.
• Technology transfer to demonstrate the applicability of non-mercury gold extraction methods that are 
more efficient and lead to reduced impacts on the environment.
• Knowledge creation and management. The Programme will collect and curate existing information on 
the sector and assist participating countries in identifying the best options based on their particular 
conditions. This component will also collect information and lessons learned from the implementation 
in the eight countries and build up the database of experiences. Finally, this component will produce and 
disseminate information material to educate the public at large including gold consumers. Use of new 
communication tools will provide interactive material. 
3.6. Upgrading ASM to better deliver on the 
SDGs
Much has been – and is being – done to improve 
governance of ASM and enhance its contribution 
towards achieving the Sustainable Developoment 
Goals (SDGs). A number of initiatives have been 
proposed. These include broader processes and 
approaches (such as formalization), as well as 
individual initiatives (Weldegiorgis, 2016). Some of 
these are discussed below.
3.6.1. Increased focus on innovation
ECA argued for adequate allocation of funding 
to local centres of innovation and adaptation of 
technology, as well as the dissemination of tested 
models of equipment hiring, pay-back or hire-to-pay 
schemes. It further noted that the success of any 
programme to develop ASM depended on the quality 
of baseline studies aimed at identifying user needs 
and profiling these at a disaggregated level (ECA, 
2011).
3.6.2. Bottom-up approach
Experts are increasingly advocating bottom-
up approaches that directly engage miners 
themselves (Salo et al., 2016). The need for a better 
understanding of the context-specific and nuanced 
characteristics of the practices and the people 
involved (including organizational structures and 
labour hierarchies) is also frequently highlighted 
(see, for example, ECA, 2011: 80-84; Hilson, 2009). 
According to Childs (2008, p. 204, citing ILO 1999), 
many of the approaches used with ASM in the past 
treated it as a subset of large-scale formal mining 
and did not take into account its very specific 
problems (Verbrugge & Besmanos, 2016). Some of 
the more promising approaches are briefly discussed 
below. 
3.6.3. Formalization 
While formalization is not a silver bullet, there is 
generally a consensus that it forms the cornerstone 
of effective management of the sector. Much 
of the literature on ASM points to formalization 
96
 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
as a key strategy for regulation, increasing the 
sustainability of activities, creating benefits for 
communities and minimizing negative impacts 
(ECA, 2002; Banchirigah, 2008; Collins & Lawson, 
2014; Dube et al., 2016; Lowe, 2005; Maconachie & 
Hilson, 2011; Salo et al., 2016; Siegel & Veiga, 2009; 
Smith et al., 2017; Spiegel, 2015b; Verbrugge & 
Besmanos, 2016). Formalization refers not only to 
the presence of legislation, but also to “the activation 
and enforcement of it by authorities and the extent 
of their success” (Hilson, Hilson, & Pardie, 2007, 
pp. 276-277).  A recent programme (Passport to 
Markets) supported by the European Partnership 
for Responsible Minerals (EPRM) has enabled a 
partnership between the Alliance for Responsible 
Mining (ARM) and RESOLVE to produce a Code of 
Risk-mitigation for ASM engaging in Formal Trade 
(CRAFT). CRAFT seeks to assist buyers to apply due 
diligence in the sector and create a gateway into the 
formal market for artisanal and small-scale miners 
(see www.craftmines.org).
The UN Environment Global Mercury Partnership 
analyses several formalization efforts in its report 
Analysis of formalization approaches in the artisanal 
and small-scale gold mining sector (UN Environment, 
2012). Many countries formalized their ASM sector in 
the last few years (see Box 3.4 below). More recently, 
there has been a re-focus on formalization through 
organizations such as the International Institute 
of Environment and Development (IIED) and the 
Minamata Convention on Mercury, which requires 
that countries where ASM is “more than insignificant” 
develop a National Action Plan containing, inter alia, 
steps to facilitate the formalization or regulation of 
the sector (see Box 3.2).
An analysis of the institutional frameworks 
governing ASM in Zimbabwe undertaken by Dube 
et al. (2016) identified some common barriers to 
miners’ formalization including “high registration and 
compliance fees; limited knowledge of the formal 
institutional frameworks; limited access to the 
Gold miners of the Kédougou region, Senegal Photo: Carsten ten Brink © Flickr / Creative Commons Attribution‐
NonCommercial‐NoDerivs 3.0 IGO License.
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formal market and opaque nature of a registration 
process that often breeds corruption” (Dube et al., 
2016, p. 1091). These barriers are common in many 
countries.
This study also highlights a key point raised by 
Spiegel (2015b, p. 544) about formalisation policies 
being potentially misused by elites to “consolidate 
power rather than to distribute ‘development’ 
opportunities” (Verbrugge & Besmanos, 2016; 
Banchirigah, 2008; Maconachie & Hilson, 2011; 
Salo et al., 2016; Siegel & Veiga, 2009; Smith et al., 
2017). Collins and Lawson’s (2014) compendium 
of approaches to working with ASM provides the 
following table (table 3.2), outlining key obstacles to 
formalization and potential strategies or incentives 
to encourage formalization. 
Box 3.4. Formalization of ASM - The Sustainable Artisanal Mining (SAM) Project
Although Mongolia is traditionally a pastoralist society, artisanal mining is now one of the key sectors of 
the economy. Unofficial estimates suggest that the number of people involved in ASM is close to 100,000 
(one third women and two thirds men). This is the equivalent to about 25 per cent of the rural workforce 
(400,000 people) who depend indirectly on this activity. The shift towards ASM was triggered by three 
disasters that hit herders between 1999 and 2002, in which about 11 million animals were lost. Artisanal 
and small-scale mining (ASM) suddenly became the only alternative source of livelihood. Many people 
were lured into ASM when gold prices entered an upward trend in 2003.
As ASM grew in size and impact, and developed outside the control of the government, it increasingly 
became a political issue. ASM was considered to be responsible for serious environmental impacts, 
tax evasion, illicit minerals trade, dire safety conditions and paltry social welfare. These were legitimate 
‘concerns and vested interests created a popular narrative in which ASM was considered an undesirable 
aspect of Mongolia’s mining scene and artisanal miners were frequently subjected to discrimination and 
human rights violations’.
The Sustainable Artisanal Mining Project (SAM) sought to rectify this and make artisanal mining a 
motor for sustainable rural development under an integrated sustainable resource management by the 
Government of Mongolia. It aimed to achieve this goal by supporting the establishment of a transparent 
and straightforward legal system; formalization of institutional structures and organization within ASM; 
enhancing skills development and transfer of know-how; and establishment of a knowledge base for 
integrated natural resource management and rural development.
SAM has had a significant impact. Thousands of miners are working formally via local ASM organizations 
and are registered for social and health insurance. Best practice examples of environmental reclamation, 
occupational safety and increased local development contributions emerged. The ASM Federation 
increasingly became a strong and effective advocate for miners’ rights. An ASM Unit is now established 
within the Ministry of Mining (MoM), and there are strong commitments to ASM in ministries responsible 
for labour, social protection and health. Crucially, the public and political perception of ASM has improved 
considerably. 
Ultimately, the SAM Project seeks to transform Mongolia into an international knowledge hub for ASM 
best practices. It has already had an impact in improving governance of the sector. The Better Gold 
Initiative, a global certification standard for artisanal gold (see Chapter 7), was built on the expertise 
gained from the SAM Project. The knowledge from both the SAM project and the Better Gold Initiative 
were a crucial input into the negotiation process that led to the Minamata Convention (a Multilateral 
Environment Agreement (MEA) of UN Environment).
Source: SDC (2017). http://sam.mn/sustainable-artisanal-mining-project/
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Table 3.2. Obstacles and incentives (strategies) for formalization
Obstacles Incentives/strategies to encourage formalization
Miners feel there is little difference 
between being legal and illegal
• Linking technical support and capacity building activities to 
formalization.
• Linking access to credit to formalization.
• Government purchasing commodities at a higher price than informal 
markets.
Miners’ lack of knowledge of legal 
requirements
• Capacity building / awareness programmes.
• Communicating more regularly and effectively with miners.
Traditional and cultural practices, such 
as operating individually without seeking 
permits; or chieftaincy systems
• Baseline information to understand target community.
• Increasing local participation, including traditional authorities, in 
initiatives linked to formalization. 
• Working closely with local organizations and communities.
Licensing fees are too high for miners • Reducing costs in licensing, royalties, taxes and fees – see, for 
example, the comparative study undertaken by USAID (2010), which 
assessed how legalization of artisanal diamond miners can be 
promoted through reducing the costs of licensing, royalties, taxes and 
fees.
Miners’ fear of having to pay taxes, 
royalties and fees, if legalized
• Tax incentives.
• Incentives that provide direct access to markets paying higher prices 
for commodities than the informal market.
• Capacity building and training programmes linked to formalization.
Complex and bureaucratic process to 
formalize
• Simplifying licensing procedures.
• Providing decentralized support to miners in the formalization process.
Miners have to travel to large centres to 
apply for licence
• Decentralizing licensing procedures to regions where mining is taking 
place.
Miners have to re-apply for licences every 
two to three years, making it difficult and 
costly for miners to maintain legal status
• Increasing licence expiration period.
• Reducing bureaucratic procedures for licence reapplication.
Free access to most convenient buying 
agents (including non-licenced) as 
informal enterprises
• Government purchasing commodities at a higher price than informal 
markets.
• Access to markets that pay higher prices for commodities than the 
informal market such as the Oro Verde and Fairtrade initiatives.
Mobility of small-scale and artisanal 
miners: informality helps to maintain 




Limited access to mining concessions for 
small-scale and artisanal miners
• Demarcation of areas for ASM.
Rare visits and inspections of ASM mines • Decentralization of offices to mining areas.
• Decentralizing monitoring responsibilities.
• Up-skilling miners to monitor health, safety and environmental 
practices.
Limited danger of sanctions combined 
with the ease of evading law enforcement
• Transparency measures for ASM.
Providing incentives requires a level of 
capacity from government that might not 
exist
• Capacity building for government.
• Public-private partnerships.
• Increased advocacy to encourage resources and attention to be 
directed at ASM.
Source: Adapted mainly from Hentschel et al. (2002), Spiegel (2012a) and Veiga et al. (2006), and also citing Andrew (2003); 
Hilson and Maponga (2004); Maconachie and Hilson (2011); Peru Support Group (2012); Spiegel (2012a), USAID (2010) and 
Veiga et al. (2006).
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3.6.4. Formation of associations and cooperatives 
(self-regulation)
Mutemeri et al. (2016, p. 657) argue that ASM policy 
must emphasize ‘“building the capacity of existing 
forms of association, organisations, co-operatives 
and governance, thus by building on existing forms 
of self-regulation”. They point to ASM associations 
and cooperatives as structures that “lend themselves 
to self-regulation”, and cited Tanzania as an example 
where regional miners associations have managed 
to exert influence over small-scale miners to operate 
responsibly (Mutemeri et al., 2016, citing Mwaipopo 
et al., 2004). 
In some countries, such as Ghana, the formation of 
cooperatives has been useful for organizing miners 
so that they can self-govern and advocate for their 
interests, particularly in terms of negotiating with 
large-scale mining companies. 
3.6.5. Decentralization
While many donor projects focus on different 
aspects of formalization for ASM, they often prioritize 
national-level governance structures and by-pass 
local governance structures (Spiegel, 2012a; Spiegel 
& Veiga, 2010). For example, many conferences on 
ASM focus on the role of national governments in 
relation to ASM and do not include local government 
actors (Spiegel, 2012a). Spiegel (2015a) has 
argued that the policy shift disempowering local 
government officials from regulating artisanal 
mining in their districts resulted in an alienation of 
the authorities from the miners and a free-for-all 
approach from individuals and corporations who 
have permits from national mining headquarters. 
As such, artisanal miners continue to be blamed for 
economic and environmental problems and face 
coercive control tactics without any measures to 
facilitate compliance. This institutional failure has 
been the major factor exacerbating economic and 
environmental problems, and ironically, legitimizing 
further coercive control tactics (Mabhena, 2012; 
Spiegel, 2015a; Spiegel, 2015b).
Decentralization of licensing processes and 
regulation of ASM to local levels of government is 
seen as a (theoretically) effective way of facilitating 
formalization of ASM and managing its impacts. 
However, decentralization policies have failed on 
the ground in a number of jurisdictions (examples 
include Ghana and Zimbabwe), due to their ineffective 
implementation (Hirons, 2013; Spiegel, 2015b). 
O’Faircheallaigh & Corbett (2016) map the key 
features of policy and regulatory responses to ASM 
around the world using a heuristic model with two 
key variables: geographical scope (that is, national 
or regional/local) and the extent to which policy 
and regulation is coerced or incentive-based (for 
example, military crackdowns versus encouraging 
the formation of associations/cooperatives through 
training and finance). The authors propose that 
“regulation must be heavily focused at the local 
or regional level if it is to be effective, because 
it is at these levels  that knowledge exist on the 
realities that ASM miners face on the ground, and 
where capacity may exist to actually apply policy 
and regulation in remote areas where ASM often 
occurs” (O’Faircheallaigh & Corbett, 2016, p. 967). 
At the same time, they acknolwedge that some 
central coordination is important. They discuss 
new legislation introduced by the Autonomous 
Bougainville Government in Papua New Guinea in 
2015 as a potentially effective model, as this model 
combines local regulation (including recognition 
of the right of customary landowners to negotiate 
terms with ASM operators) and capacity building with 
central coordination. 
3.6.6. Certification and Fair Trade
A number of certification and fair-trade schemes 
have been developed for ASM. Hilson et al. (2016) 
describe 14 ethical mineral schemes and standards, 
of which at least five target ASM. These are: the 
Better Gold Initiative (BGI), Fairtrade Gold, Fairmined 
Gold, Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi) and 
Diamond Development Standards (DDS). McQuilken 
(2016) also reviews four ethical gold schemes: the 
Conflict-Free Gold Standard (CFGS); the Better Gold 
Initiative (BGI); Fairtrade Gold; and the Fairmined 
Gold Standard. He provides an overview of these 
standards and an analysis of their strengths and 
weaknesses. He found that these schemes face 
enforcement challenges and are reliant on inputs 
from ‘Western’ organizations (McQuilken, 2016). The 
schemes also tend to be top-down initiatives that 
do not encourage the agency of miners but rather 
depend on Western consumers. 
According to Hilson et al. (2016, p. 241), many 
ethical and fair-trade schemes have been “shaped 
by discourses on security, conflict minerals and civil 
war” and the “main priority for most is to supply 
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commodities that can be traced to the source”. 
Schemes and interventions specifically aimed at 
‘conflict minerals’ and cutting their links to armed 
groups include (Cuvelier, Vlassenroot, & Olin, 2014; 
Hilson et al., 2016; Spiegel, 2015a):
• The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) 
– established in 2002 by the United Nations 
General Assembly; 
• The 2010 United States Dodd-Frank Act – 
legislation focused on the ‘conflict minerals’ 
cassiterite (tin), columbite-tantalite (tantalum), gold 
and wolframite (tungsten); 
• The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected 
and High-Risk Areas (adopted in 2011); and 
• The Regional Initiative Against the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources of the 
International Conference on the Great Lakes 
Region (ICGLR). 
The KPCS is said to have influenced many ethical and 
fair-trade schemes (Hilson et al., 2016). According 
to Cuvelier et al. (2014, p. 341), “these interventions 
often tend to rely on unsupported assumptions 
regarding how natural resources are linked to the 
motivations of combatants and the dynamics of 
conflict, and rarely consider the populations in 
conflict-affected regions, who play an integral role in 
these dynamics”. 
Spiegel (2015a, p. 266) analyses the discourse 
around the KPCS in the context of Zimbabwe’s 
Marange fields, and concludes that “attention to 
conflict-free diamonds which are of great use to 
corporate interests in protecting the image of a global 
commodity chain, provided no benefit to populations 
in Zimbabwe who were marginalized and oppressed 
in the process”. Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Act has 
been criticized for inducing hardship on informal 
Congolese miners and for causing the collapse 
of local economies (Hilson et al., 2016; Radley & 
Vogel, 2015; Raghavan, 2014; Vogel & Radley, 2014; 
Wolfe, 2015) to “ease the consciences of Western 
consumers” (Ben Radley, cited in Wolfe, 2015). 
Hilson et al. (2016) argue that many ethical mineral 
schemes and standards claim to target poor and 
marginalized miners, but tend to work with already 
established and well-networked miners because 
they are the ones capable of meeting the stringent 
requirements required to supply minerals that can 
be tracked along the supply chain. Because they 
work within the same institutional structures that 
tend to marginalize ASM operators, rather than 
working to challenge them, such schemes are prone 
to “elite capture” (McQuilken, 2016, p. 194). They 
tend to target those miners “regarded as being ‘low 
hanging fruit’ or easy to access” (McQuilken, 2016, 
p. 190), leaving the majority of operators incapable 
of accessing certification schemes for the same 
reasons they cannot formalize their operations 
(such as long, costly and bureaucratic licensing 
procedures and the lack of availability of mineralised 
lands). In a review of ASM conflict-free mineral 
certification schemes targeted for EU market access, 
Eslava (2018) notes that ‘most often ASM and the 
certification of its activities is considered solely from 
an economic perspective and does not consider 
the local social and cultural dynamics that underpin 
the activity, leading to the design of sub-optimal 
incentives for certification’. Eslava (2018) argues that 
the ‘ASM sector should be supported to comply with 
conflict-free and responsible mining and sourcing 
schemes and that EU upstream actors, especially 
SMEs, should be supported in their attempts to 
engage with and improve the situation in the ASM 
sector’. 
Hilson (2008) also argues that, because gold derived 
from ASM in sub-Saharan Africa is an important 
source of foreign exchange for national governments, 
fair trade for ASM cannot follow the same model as it 
does for other commodities such as coffee, tea and 
cocoa (which focuses on connecting ASM producers 
with Western retailers). It should be adapted, he 
argues, to focus on national governments as the end 
consumer. Similarly, Adler Miserendino et al. (2013) 
question the ability of consumer-based pressure to 
address the impacts of ASM due to its tendency to 
be driven by the need for immediate profits.39 See 
also chapter 7 for an assessment of governance 
instruments.
39 Other relevant research on the theme includes Childs 
(2014a), Childs (2008), Childs (2014b) and Imparato (2010).
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3.6.7. Capital and finance (including 
microfinance)
Spiegel (2012b) examines the roles of microfinance 
services to engage economically vulnerable mining 
groups and assess its constraints. He found that, 
like fair trade schemes, microfinance programmes 
risk being elite captured and limited if they do not 
tackle the “structural inequities” and “institutional 
ambiguities” that limit “mineral marketing, resource 
ownership rights and licensing opportunities for the 
poor” (Spiegel, 2012b, p. 507). 
Additional risks include non-repayment of loans 
and improper use of credit (that may exacerbate 
rather than reduce safety and environmental risks). 
Donors could look beyond the standard model of 
microfinance that treats it as “merely a commercial 
loan product” (Spiegel, 2012b, p. 488) to address 
broader concerns in rural communities, such as 
lack of literacy and business development skills 
and health issues, by working alongside other 
social development programmes. This requires 
targeted local needs assessment and consideration 
of alternative models, support to labour groups to 
develop lending and savings programmes (including 
micro-savings), public subsidies for credit and 
government-supported equipment loans as an 
alternative to cash. 
Small grants and equipment leasing schemes have 
been set up in countries such as Tanzania (Fold et al., 
2014; World Bank, 2009), through the World Bank’s 
Sustainable Management of Mineral Resources 
Project (SMMRP). Commenting on this, Spiegel 
(2015b) notes that: “the government’s ASM-sector 
microfinance programme became profiled at a 
UNIDO conference in 2005 as one of the most 
proactive examples of how acquisition of a small-
scale miners’ licence could lead to benefits such 
as credit access.” The above-mentioned actions to 
upgrade or improve the governance of ASM will have 
to be carried out within a country-specific context. 
The implication is that political economy issues will 
need to be addressed. Box 3.5 briefly addresses 
some key considerations.
Box 3.5. The political economy of ASM
While ASM supports the livelihoods of many 
poor rural people, the story is more complex. 
As pointed out earlier, supply chains of ASM 
are global with many actors including local 
traders, city-based financiers, government elites 
(including military) and even global criminal 
networks. Mawowa (2013) argues that just 
associating ASM with informality and casting 
it as a survival strategy for the poor is clearly 
inadequate in the Zimbabwean context, as senior 
civil servants, politicians and military figures play 
a critical role in ASM.
The fact that there are many actors, some with 
significant influence, means that actions to 
upgrade and ‘clean up’ artisanal supply chains 
must consider the political economy that is 
driving decisions by miners, buyers, traders and 
other key stakeholders. IGF (n.d.) points out that 
understanding the financial flows is critical to 
capture who the winners and losers are within 
existing systems, and who is most likely to 
oppose reform efforts. Mapping ASM’s complex 
relationships and interactions is vital for effective 
policy formulation, which balances the interests 
of governments, economic actors involved in 
ASM and affected communities. 
3.7. Gender in ASM 
Artisanal, informal and small-scale mining is a highly 
gendered activity, both in terms of growing numbers 
of women joining this work, and in the deepening 
gendered nature of the tasks involved. Discussions 
fail to adequately highlight women’s productive 
roles or specify the gendered impacts of the mining 
industry (IGF, 2018). Women’s contributions to the 
mining sector remain invisible mainly because 
the literature on mining has historically focused, 
to a large extent, on digging practices - putting 
emphasis on the miner and excluding women who 
are mostly engaged in non-digging activities such 
as crashing, sluicing, washing, panning, sieving, 
sorting, transporting, mercury-gold amalgamation, 
amalgam decomposition, cleaning and food vending 
(IGF, 2018). Women in ASM perform some of these 
processing activities at home while attending to 
domestic chores, thus their involvement in mining 
sites is limited, contributing to their invisibility (Eftimie 
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et al., 2012). However, what is crucial to a gender 
perspective is an appreciation and understanding of 
ASM-based livelihoods that support women’s primary 
reproductive roles: ensuring household food security, 
as well as caring for and nurturing the children (Lahiri-
Dutt, 2012). 
Compared to formal, industrial and larger-scale 
mining, many more women are involved in ASM. 
Moreover, in ASM communities throughout the world, 
women and men have different social roles, rights 
and opportunities, and will be affected in different 
ways by any major change in the environment. They 
also play different roles in production and labour 
organizations. Women and men are also at different 
levels when it comes to having access to land and 
non-land inputs such as extension services (Lahiri-
Dutt, 2008).  Lahiri-Dutt (2015) notes that, compared 
to large-scale formal extractive industries, women’s 
labour contributions to ASM are larger and increasing. 
A recent survey conducted by SDC (2013) found that 
an average of about 71 per cent of artisanal miners 
were male and the average age of the miners was 
around 37 years. The proportion of women involved 
varies across continents and for the type of minerals.  
For instance, the figure is 10-50 per cent in Asia; 
10-30 per cent in Latin America; and 40-100 per cent 
in Africa (Hinton, 2003; Eftimie et al., 2012). In some 
countries, women make up the majority of the ASM 
labour force (for example, up to 74 per cent in Guinea, 
and 50 per cent in Madagascar, Mali and Zimbabwe 
(Yakovleva, 2007)). However, because women do 
not own the land, they are generally not the owners 
of ASM operations. This means women’s labour is 
used in ASM for surplus accumulation. In the range 
of tasks in ASM such as digging, panning, processing, 
transportation and related chores, the percentage of 
women involved can vary from as low as 10 per cent 
to as high as 50 per cent.
Women are more heavily represented in lower value 
industrial mineral sectors, with the proportion rising 
to over 75 per cent in salt mining (Lahiri-Dutt, 2007). 
Women tend to have different work from men (such 
as hauling or washing ore) and are generally paid 
less; even where women perform similar tasks, they 
tend to have lower salaries (Eftimie et al., 2012). 
In a country like Mongolia, women’s participation 
in ASM is generally higher than in the large-scale 
mining sector. Mongolia is also no exception to the 
gender segregation of tasks in ASM. For activities 
such as digging, panning, processing, transportation 
and related chores, the percentage of women can 
vary from 10 per cent to 30 per cent depending on 
the context (Purevjav, 2011). In general, studies 
of women’s involvement in ASM reinforce the 
conclusion that globalized gender inequality exists in 
ASM (see also Tallichet et al., 2003, Bashwira et al., 
2014, Huesca, 2013, Rustad, Østby, & Nordås, 2016).
Compared to formal, 
industrial and larger-scale 
mining, many more women 
are involved in ASM [...] 
Women are more heavily 
represented in lower value 
industrial mineral sectors, 
with the proportion rising 
to over 75 per cent in salt 
mining. 
Hinton et al. (2003: 13) suggest that ‘the key factors 
in determining gender roles and the status of women 
in ASM include women’s and men’s access to and 
control of resources; their ability to attain knowledge 
of resources, their decision-making capacity or 
political power; and beliefs or attitudes that support 
or impede the transformation of gender roles’. In 
attempting to address gender inequalities in ASM, for 
instance, Kenya’s draft Mining Policy’s commitment to 
gender mainstreaming aimed to ensure that women 
were represented, including within associations and 
cooperatives (Huggins et al., 2017). 
The World Bank (2015, drawing on Collins & Lawson, 
2014; Hinton et al., 2003; Tallichet et al., 2003) has 
identified the following “best practice examples of 
gendered ASM assistance strategies”: 
• Developing systems to formalize and regulate ASM 
activities, particularly those involving women.
• Developing incentives to increase participation in 
the formal sector (such as financial assistance and 
capacity building programmes).
• Encouraging the formation of women’s mining 
cooperatives, associations and networks to 
improve women’s participation, bargaining power, 
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work conditions and economic independence. 
• Gender-sensitive financial support, such as 
microcredit. 
• Gender-sensitive training and capacity building 
in technical areas (such as minerals processing); 
health and safety; financial literacy; legal capacity; 
bookkeeping/accounting; marketing and 
managerial skills. 
• Beneficiation (value-adding) strategies targeting 
women (such as lapidary and jewellery making). 
• Mining site support services (such as childcare 
services). 
• Alternative livelihood programmes. 
Additional potential, positive gender-focused 
governance instruments include initiatives that 
integrate women and gender considerations in the 
development of ASM legislation; policies and support 
for women to acquire mineral titles/licences and 
understanding of the legislative environment of ASM; 
and further studies and programmes focusing on 
gendered health and safety issues in ASM (Collins 
& Lawson, 2014; Hinton et al., 2003; Tallichet et al., 
2003).  
3.8. Conclusion
Artisanal, informal and small-scale mining is located 
at the other end of the spectrum of extractive 
practices, yet by itself presents a diversity that 
makes it difficult to offer a one-size-fits-all ‘solution’ 
(Lahiri-Dutt, 2016). As compared to larger-scale, 
formal and industrialized mining - in terms of 
the diverse extractive practices, processes and 
regimes - many more people are involved in ASM 
and deriving livelihoods from it. However, ASM also 
poses serious environmental, social and regulatory 
challenges. These include serious environmental 
damage, exploitative labour relations and conflicts. 
In some countries, such externalities can threaten 
other livelihoods such as agriculture, forestry or 
grazing. As ASM minerals tend to be traded and 
some are crucial to certain globally important sectors 
(especially electronics), with consumers demanding 
that minerals do not fuel conflicts, their governance 
has also become a major global concern. In some 
regions, the criminalization of ASM has compounded 
the governance problem. There are examples 
of initiatives adopted by some governments to 
innovatively deal with these challenges. 
Globally, attention is now focused on finding ways to 
formalize ASM for better regulation and governance. 
However, the fact is that much of ASM is part of 
the informal economies of the countries where it 
occurs (Lahiri-Dutt, 2004). The independent exercise 
of agency may reflect a typical principal-agent 
problem given the myriad of actors involved (for 
example, governments with offices located far away 
from mining operations; powerful well-placed ASM 
entrepreneurs; savvy middlemen; and a poverty-
driven workforce) all driven by different interests and 
motivations. Given the sheer size of ASM in terms of 
commodities produced (and traded), and numbers of 
people involved, more investment needs to be made 
to improve ASM profiling and the targeting of support 
programmes. Governance of ASM will therefore need 
to be embedded in extractive policy instruments. 
Macro-level initiatives aim to link ASM to global 
supply chains through the implementation of 
systems that can guarantee responsible sourcing 
(such as the OECD Due Diligence Guidance system). 
The development of certification systems that 
can guarantee sustainable practices in return for 
a premium in prices received by the ASM miners 
might also become popular in future (see chapter 
7). However, the conceptualization and design of 
certification schemes may need to be reviewed to 
reduce unintended impacts on poverty and gender, 
which can render such schemes ineffective as tools 
in breaking the links between mineral resource 
dependence, poverty, environmental degradation and 
conflict. 
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7. Current governance 
architecture
Aerial image of coal ash disposal into landfills, South Africa. Photo: Jassen Todorov © Getty images
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4 TRENDS IN THE EXTRACTIVE SECTOR TOWARDS 2050 
4.0. Introduction
Minerals and metals are the fundamental building 
blocks of civilization. Along with energy, they 
form an essential foundation upon which modern 
economies and living standards are based 
(USGS, 2015).40  It follows that population growth 
and affluence translate into higher demand for 
minerals and metals.  In addition to a growing 
global population and rising incomes that will fuel 
demand, technological progress is rapidly changing 
the demand patterns for raw materials. As a result, 
metals that were hardly in demand a few years ago, 
such as indium, are now critical as they are used 
in smart phones with touch screens (which have 
become ubiquitous). Therefore, new technologies 
are creating fresh vulnerabilities in economic 
systems (European Commission, 2014).
Minerals and metals markets have always been 
marked by supply and demand imbalances, as it 
takes years for industry to react to sudden demand 
increases or supply disruptions. The continuous 
interactions between demand and supply are 
governed by complex feedback mechanisms 
(Wellmer & Dalheimer, 2012; Wellmer & Hagelücken, 
2015). External shocks such as geopolitical tensions 
(oil shocks of the 1970s, rare earth crisis of 2010-
11), social tensions (such as strikes in major mines 
and/or smelters) or natural catastrophes (droughts, 
floods, landslides or earthquakes impacting 
production facilities) can have major impacts on the 
supply of minerals and metals. On the demand side, 
the rapid economic emergence of highly populated 
countries and the development of the global 
middle class have major impacts as well. The rapid 
economic development of China, a phenomenon 
unprecedented in recorded history by its speed and 
magnitude (due to the size of its population), led to 
significant price hikes of many minerals since 2002. 
40 Examples of minerals used in common applications 
include iron to produce steel; aluminium used in the energy, 
infrastructure and transport sectors; copper used in the 
energy sector and plumbing; and phosphorus and potash 
used for the production of fertilizers.
Technological shifts can impact both sides of the 
demand and supply balance. Some rare metals may 
have just one specific industrial use, and demand for 
them can rapidly dwindle due to a technology shift. 
Examples of this include europium and terbium, 
two very scarce rare earth metals that were in high 
demand in the first part of the decade from 2010 
due to their use for the production of phosphor 
powder needed to produce compact fluorescent 
lamps (CFLs) (which were a very successful energy-
efficient lighting technology at the time). At the time 
of print, some years later, even more energy efficient 
LEDs have widely replaced CFLs. LEDs require no, or 
little, europium and terbium.
[...] the rapid economic 
emergence of highly 
populated countries 
and the development 
of the global middle 
class have major 
impacts [...] The rapid 
economic development 
of China, a phenomenon 
unprecedented in recorded 
history by its speed 
and magnitude led to 
significant price hikes of 
many minerals since 2002.
The relative inelasticity of minerals and metals 
production can also lead to the development 
of overcapacities. In periods of high demand, 
investors invest in new mines and smelters that 
may lead to major overcapacities when, years later, 
their production starts. Demand may have fallen 
by that time, for instance due to an economic 
slowdown. The overcapacity issue is one of the 
nagging problems of several global minerals and 
metals industries, such as the aluminium industry 
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(Aluminium Association, European Aluminium, 
Aluminium Association of Canada, Japan Aluminium 
Association, 2018) and the steel industry (McKinsey & 
Company, 2018). Overcapacities depress the minerals 
and metals sector.
Metal prices reflect changes in the supply and 
demand balance, and also reflect market anticipation. 
Rapid changes in the factors impacting on demand 
or supply lead to price volatility, which can be 
exacerbated by speculation. Speculation on many 
minerals and metals is facilitated by the existence 
of unregulated financial instruments (many of 
them being internet-based) that make it possible to 
speculate on the future pricing of many minerals and 
metals.  At the same time, some of these instruments 
(such as future markets) are extremely useful to 
industrial players to hedge their production, ensuring 
their value against future price hikes or decreases. 
Hedging techniques in this case contribute to better 
price stability. 
As the complexity and sophistication of products is 
growing, leading to a corresponding increase in the 
number of materials used in their production, the 
material supply chains needed are also becoming 
increasingly complex. For instance, the supply chain 
of the CdTe solar cell has 617 nodes and 999 links 
(Nuss et al., 2016). This is making economic systems 
highly vulnerable to supply chain challenges and 
disruptions. 
The fact that mineral resources are finite and that 
growth can eventually outstrip supply41  has been 
an issue of concern for some time. The well-
known Limits to Growth study by the Club of Rome 
(Meadows, 1972) forecasted a global crisis by 
around 2000 for several metals (for instance, copper 
reserves were to be exhausted in 2008). Mudd 
(2010), after a thorough analysis of the Australian 
industry, points to environmental factors (energy 
and water use, waste generation) and costs as 
potentially important issues for the future of mining 
in Australia. A comparable observation has been 
made for the Chilean copper industry by the Chilean 
41 For example, if demand of indium continues at its 
current pace, according to some estimates, supply may run 
out in around 10 years. China, which produces around 90 
per cent of the world’s rare earth metals, estimates that its 
mines might run dry in just 15-20 years (Nuwer, 2014).
Copper Commission (COCHILCO, 2017), whereby 
in 2027 the copper production of Chile may only be 
about 2% above its 2016 level, due to environmental 
constraints. Chile is the world’s largest producer 
of copper ore (28% of the 2016 world production). 
However, the debate on what constitutes finite 
resources is more nuanced. Some have argued that 
economic mineral resources are not a stationary, 
solitary figure, but rather a function of prevailing 
economic, technological, social and environmental 
constraints. Indeed, this debate is best exemplified 
by the famous bet between the biologist Paul 
Ehrlich, who predicted the exhaustion of materials 
in the face of a projected population explosion42 
and the economist Julian Simon, who argued that 
growing population was not a catastrophic problem 
as higher demand would lead to higher prices and 
there would be an incentive to find more materials 
or alternatives (and that prices would thus remain 
low). The economist won the bet.43 This example 
illustrates the challenges of framing the debate of 
the future availability of natural resources where 
people take extreme positions, one side warning of a 
certain catastrophe, and the other having undue faith 
in economics and technology (Kestenbaum, 2014). 
A more appropriate way of looking at this is offered 
by Mudd (2010), who argues that although it may be 
possible to find new mineral deposits in the future 
with improved technology or favourable economics 
facilitating the processing of higher cost resources - it 
is the environmental cost that will, in the medium to 
longer term, determine the real availability of metals 
and minerals. On this basis, it is possible to claim 
that the ‘Limits to Growth’ approach is both right and 
wrong – wrong in the sense that economic mineral 
resources commonly continue to increase over time, 
but right in the fact that the production of minerals 
42 He wrote this in a best-selling book in 1968 titled The 
Population Bomb.
43 They bet on what would happen to the price of five 
metals — copper, chromium, nickel, tin and tungsten — 
over a decade. These were metals essential for all kinds 
of everyday things such as electronics, cars and buildings, 
and thus likely to become scarcer as a growing population 
would increase demand. This would be reflected in rising 
prices. However, if the economist was right, the markets 
and human ingenuity would mean that the prices would stay 
the same or even go down. It turned out that, between 1980 
and 1990, the world population grew by 800 million people. 
However, prices for the five metals went down by an average 
of 50 per cent. Therefore, Julian Simon won the bet.
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and metals is becoming increasingly costly from an 
environmental perspective.
This chapter will explore the key drivers shaping the 
future supply and demand of minerals and metals.  It 
will examine some of the initiatives aimed at securing 
future supply, so as to gain insight into how various 
stakeholders are looking at the issue. The chapter will 
also explore the key megatrends that will impact on 
demand and supply of minerals and metals. 
4.1. Review of supply/demand and criticality 
assessments
Given the crucial role of minerals and metals in 
underpinning economies, security of supply has 
always been a major concern for many governments 
(especially in industrialized countries where industries 
rely heavily on minerals and/or metals sourced 
elsewhere).  Minerals and metals are of strategic 
importance to any economy and, since 2008, several 
countries and research institutions have engaged in 
the assessment of criticality factors that, from their 
particular perspective, may impact on supplies and/
or on prices of minerals and metals. 
For instance, the EU can only satisfy a very limited 
part (or none) of its needs for 27 critical minerals 
and metals from within its borders (EC, 2017). For 14 
countries, their dependence on imports from beyond 
their borders is higher than 90%. The United States 
Geological Survey (USGS) also observes that the 
changing patterns in net import reliance of nonfuel 
mineral commodities over the past 60 years are a 
clear indication that the United States has become 
increasingly dependent on other countries to supply 
non-fuel mineral commodities that are important 
for ensuring its economic well-being and national 
security (USGS, 2015). The result has been numerous 
calls in recent years to better assess elemental 
resources and to determine which of them are 
“critical,” the aim being to minimize further disruptions 
to global and national technologies and economies 
(Graedel et al., 2015a and 2015b). A similar drive 
exists in other countries and regions, for instance, in 
the European Union (European Commission 2017a 
and 2017b; Vidal- Legaz, 2016). 
Therefore, analysing security of supply by assessing 
the risk (or “criticality”) factors that could impact 
supply is a regular exercise conducted by national 
agencies and other stakeholders of countries and 
regions dependent on minerals and/or metals 
imports. Researchers recognize that criticality 
does not just depend on geological abundance. 
Other important factors include the potential for 
substitution, the degree to which ore deposits are 
geopolitically concentrated, the state of the mining 
technology, regulatory oversight, geopolitical 
initiatives, regional instabilities and economic 
policies.
The intimate link between minerals and metals 
extraction (and use) and the health of the 
environment, as well as social needs, has created an 
impetus for improving our understanding of future 
minerals and metals demand and thus for devising 
better strategies to mitigate the environmental 
impact of resource extraction and use. A key global 
concern is to ensure appropriate levels of supply, 
while reducing the negative en¬vironmental footprints 
of mineral extraction and use (UNEP, 2013). 
While much progress has been made in developing 
criticality assessment methodologies (Graedel & 
Reck, 2016), there is a need to develop more foresight 
in criticality assessments. This requires analysis, 
for instance, of the various trends identified in this 
chapter, such as demography, the development of 
the global middle-class, urbanization, geopolitical 
risks, possible evolution of mineral/metal-dependent 
technologies, potential increase minerals and metals 
recycling rates and eventual substitutions of rare 
minerals and metals in their main uses (Graedel et al., 
2013).
The following section discusses a number of 
initiatives to determine the future availability of 
resources.
4.1.1. World Economic Forum: Future Availability of 
Resources (WEF, 2014)
The World Economic Forum has conducted a number 
of studies to understand the future availability 
of resources. The aim is mainly to inform the 
development of strategies for mining companies and 
policies for policymakers, with the aim of ensuring 
future global security of supply of minerals and 
metals. 
According to WEF, both public and private sectors 
tend to have incomplete and sometimes conflicting 
perceptions of natural resource availability. The four 
key paradigms that seem to dominate are: (i) threats 
of material exhaustion; (ii) concern about rising costs; 
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(iii) long-term abundance; and (iv) social injustice 
focused on distributional challenges. They maintain 
that, while all four paradigms are valid, they are only 
true at specific scales or for specific resources, hence 
creating the potential for miscommunication. They 
suggest that responding effectively to concerns 
about resource availability requires global, national 
and local decision makers to have a more complete, 
nuanced and shared understanding of resource 
availability, as well as its implications for economies 
and political systems at multiple levels. The key 
insights from the WEF study are: 
• The role of technology, preferences, policies and 
prices is underestimated when forecasting supply 
and demand for natural resources. 
• Contrary to popular perceptions, population 
growth is and will be far less significant in spurring 
resource demand than economic growth and 
development in the period up to 2035. 
• Physical, economic, political and social 
interconnections between resources are growing, 
and will increasingly influence resource availability, 
in both positive and negative ways. 
• Defining natural resource availability often fails 
to consider how resources are distributed, both 
between countries and between individuals within 
countries. 
• Environmental factors create local and global 
risks to resource availability, while resource 
production and use are the primary factors causing 
environmental risks. 
In thinking about supply, WEF (2014) highlights 
the risk challenge. While the world has sufficient 
global stocks of natural resources to meet most of 
society’s demands, the flow of resource distribution 
is increasingly threatened by highly uncertain “above 
ground” factors, namely: 
• High levels of interconnectedness mean that local 
crises can have global repercussions, underscoring 
the need to focus on addressing social and 
environmental considerations in securing supply;
• Natural resources are distributed and consumed 
in intricate value chains, a significant portion of 
which are global. The value chains all suffer from 
distortions at different points due to, inter alia, 
monopolistic structures, constrained supply routes 
and government intervention (including subsidies 
and taxation); 
• Pricing on global markets is sensitive to the actions 
of traders and investors who are not involved 
in physical delivery, and is thus exposed to the 
prevailing views on global economic growth; and 
• Technological breakthroughs and new discoveries 
can quickly cause a shift from scarcity to 
abundance. 
4.1.2. The European Union (EU) Supply Risk 
Assessment (European Commission, 2017c)
As indicated above, in 2013 the EU imported about 91 
per cent of the minerals and metals needed (Ad-hoc 
Working Group on defining critical raw materials, 
2014). The 2017 assessment of the raw materials 
critical to the EU (European Commission – 2017a, 
2017b, 2017 c) identified 26 critical minerals and 
metals, with import reliance rates varying between 
0 and 100 Per cent. Therefore, security of supply is 
of crucial importance, especially in line with the EU’s 
aspiration of raising industry’s contribution to GDP to 
as much as 20 per cent by 2020.  
The resulting analysis identified 27 critical raw 
materials from a list of 54 candidate materials. They 
include: antimony, beryllium, borates, chromium, 
cobalt, coking, coal, fluorspar, gallium, germanium, 
indium, magnesite, magnesium, natural graphite, 
niobium, PGMs, phosphate rock, Heavy Rare Earth 
Elements (HREEs) (Heavy), Light Rare Earth Elements 
(LREEs), silicon metal and tungsten.
4.1.3. Yale Study on Materials Criticality (Graedel 
& Beck, 2015)
Researchers at Yale conducted a five-year 
assessment of the criticality of the planet’s metal 
resources in response to rising global demand 
and the increasing complexity of modern products 
(Graedel & Beck, 2015). This research builds on an 
earlier assessment by the United States National 
Research Council (NRC, 2008). The NRC study 
developed a two-dimensional “criticality matrix” to 
aid in assessing the degree of criticality of a mineral 
or metal. The matrix is based on the finding that a 
mineral or metal is critical if it is important in use and 
subject to potential supply restrictions (similar to the 
criteria used by the EU study). The Yale study adds an 
extra dimension of environmental implications to the 
criticality.
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Using this assessment framework, the study maps 
the criticality of all elements. Some observations 
include: 
• The metals that are crucial for high-tech 
applications, such as electronics and thin film solar 
cell technology, are also the most critical from 
a supply risk perspective. These include indium, 
arsenic, thallium, antimony, silver and selenium.
• With respect to vulnerability to supply restrictions, 
the most critical include thallium, lead, arsenic, 
rhodium and manganese. As for vulnerability in 
terms of unavailability of suitable substitutes, 
magnesium, chromium, manganese, rhodium, 
yttrium and several rare earth elements are critical. 
• From an environmental implications’ perspective, 
precious metals, particularly gold and the platinum 
metal group are of most concern– because of the 
adverse environmental impacts related to their 
extraction and processing.
Some important conclusions based on the findings 
include:
• An assessment of the criticality of metals should 
not be regarded as static, but as one that will 
evolve over time as new ore deposits are located, 
political circumstances change and technologies 
are transformed. Thus, determining metal 
criticality requires evaluations to be periodically 
updated. Taking into account that data revisions 
are infrequent and major technological and 
societal transformations tend to occur slowly, 
the authors consider the undertaking of criticality 
reassessments at five-year intervals as reasonable.
• Criticality is too complex, and the users of the 
information too diverse, for metals to simply 
be designated as “critical” or “not critical.” 
Corporations, national governments and resource 
sustainability experts have different goals, 
different perspectives and different time scales. 
Therefore, while universal criticality designations 
can be informative and useful, they can never be 
prescriptive.
Nuss et al. (2016) caution that, although criticality 
of one mineral or metal might be low, this does not 
necessarily convey positive news. For instance, 
chromium and manganese, which are both essential 
in steel making, display the highest vulnerability to 
supply restriction, largely because substitution or 
substitution at equal performance is not possible 
for all end-uses. However, much of the demand for 
iron is for use as steel. For this reason, a framework 
that considers the criticality of the actual product 
rather than the elements would be more useful for 
policymakers and businesses in making strategic 
choices.
4.1.4. British Geological Survey Risk List (BGS, 
2015)
The British Geological Survey regularly assesses 
the supply risk of elements that are crucial for 
maintaining economic activities and lifestyles. 
For the 2015 risk list, the ranking system was 
based on seven criteria: production concentration; 
reserve distribution; recycling rate; substitutability; 
governance (in top producing nations); governance 
(in top reserve-hosting nations); and companion  
metal fraction.44  Key highlights of the 2015 risk list 
include:
• The ongoing concern about rare earth elements 
(REEs) supply that has received significant 
attention over the past five years must not be 
ignored. This element group remains at the top of 
the list in terms of supply-side risk. 
• Other economically important metals with similarly 
high levels of risk to supply disruption include 
antimony (with application as a fire retardant), 
bismuth (used in numerous medical applications), 
platinum group metals (active components in 
autocatalysts) and tungsten (a key hard metal used 
in most cutting tools). 
• Some of these elements, particularly the rare earth 
elements and antimony, have low recycling rates 
and a limited number of substitutes. They are also 
almost exclusively mined as by-product metals. 
• China continues to dominate production of many 
metals and minerals. China is the leading global 
producer of 23 of the 41 elements and element 
groups on the list. 
• The list also provides an indication of which 
elements might be subject to supply disruption, 
most likely resulting from non-geological factors 
such as geopolitics or resource nationalism (for 
example, State intervention in production and 
44 Some metals only occur as a by-product of a host metal, 
for example indium is a by-product of zinc. Companion 
metal fraction reflects the relative weight of the by-product 
in the host metal.
110
 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
trade), along with other factors such as labour 
strikes, accidents and infrastructure availability. 
The report also underlines that the minerals and 
metals market is not static, as new reserves are 
continually added in response to drivers such as 
increased demand and advances in technology 
(BGS, 2015). In the future, recycling is likely to 
contribute an increasing share to the global market 
and substitutability may also increase as new 
technologies are developed.
4.1.5. Critical Metals for Future Sustainable 
Technologies and their Recycling Potential: 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, 
2009)
UN Environment has also looked at future minerals 
and metals supply risk with a particular focus on 
metals that have seen a rapid uptake as a result of 
the emergence of innovative green technologies 
(UNEP, 2009). The specific objectives of the report 
were to: identify and analyse the global availability, 
geographical spread and prices of critical metals; 
analyse the recycling potential including a feasibility 
assessment for potential innovative technologies 
for the recycling; and identify framework conditions 
that could help foster technologies that enable the 
implementation of closed-loop recycling systems for 
critical metals.
The analytical framework included criteria to assess 
demand/supply and criticality as follows: 
• Demand growth
• Supply risks
• Concentration of mining 
• Physical scarcity (reserves compared to annual 
demand)
• Temporary scarcity (time lag between production 
and demand)
• Structural or technical scarcity (metal is just 
a minor product in a coupled production and 
inefficiencies occur in the mining process, 
production and manufacturing)
• Recycling restrictions
• High scale of dissipative applications
• Physical/chemical limitations for recycling
• Lack of suitable recycling technologies and/or 
recycling infrastructures
• Lack of price incentives for recycling.
This framework was then used to perform a 
comprehensive analysis of 11 ‘green minor metals’, 
considered key to future sustainable technologies 
(FST).45 The study found that, in the short run (next 
5 years), tellurium, indium and gallium will become 
critical due to rapid demand growth, and there will 
also be serious supply risks combined with moderate 
recycling restrictions. In the mid-term, rare earths, 
lithium, tantalum, palladium, platinum and ruthenium 
will become critical. In the long-term (till 2050) 
only germanium and cobalt are likely to become 
critical. The report also identifies three activities to 
promote the recycling of critical metals in the future 
to insure supply. These are enlargement of recycling 
capacities; development and realization of new 
recycling technologies; and accelerated improvement 
of international recycling infrastructures.
4.1.6. German Fraunhofer Institute for Systems 
and Innovation Research and the German Mineral 
Resources Agency 
The German Fraunhofer Institute for Systems 
and Innovation Research and the German Mineral 
Resources Agency have assessed the potential 
mineral raw materials requirements of 42 innovative 
technologies with a particularly high presumed 
market potential by 2035 (Marscheider-Weidemann 
et al., 2016; Table 4.1). It presents a scenario for 
the demand of metals up to 2035. It shows the 
share of the 2013 world production of a range of 
rare metals (with the exception of copper) that may 
be required in 2035 by 42 innovative technologies, 
many of them related to energy production 
(windmills, thermoelectric generators, thin-film and 
dye-sensitised photovoltaic cells, solar thermal 
power plants, solid oxide fuel cells and micro-energy 
harvesting), storage (lithium batteries and vanadium 
redox batteries), transmission (inductive electricity 
transmission), or energy saving (lightweight tailored 
blanks for the automotive industry, lightweight alloys 
for the aircraft industry, LEDs, super capacitors for 
motor vehicles and super alloys for energy efficient 
jet engines).  
45 The term ‘sustainable technologies’ has no official 
definition; it rather describes technologies that result 
in positive environmental impacts. Examples include 
future sustainable technologies that replace an obsolete 
technology and thereby reduce environmental impacts; that 
lead to emission reductions (such as automotive catalysts); 
or that provide power efficiency during the production or 
consumption phase (such as energy efficient LED lamps). 
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The findings show that, solely for the emerging 
innovative technologies studied in the report, demand 
in 2035 could exceed the total global primary 
production in 2013 of six metals: lithium, dysprosium/
terbium, rhenium, neodymium/praseodymium, 
tantalum and scandium. For these metals, 
technological change plays a more important role 
than global economic growth in driving the increase 
in demand. The results are particularly striking in 
the case of demand for lithium for use in lithium-ion 
batteries and lightweight airframes, as demand in 
2013 was estimated as only 2 per cent of the 2013 
primary production, while it is expected to rise to 385 
per cent of 2013 production in 2035.
4.1.7. Forecasting demand and supply of key 
minerals (Christmann, 2017)
The six studies reviewed above focused on what are 
considered as strategic minerals and metals mainly 
driven by emerging technologies in the wake of the 
fourth industrial revolution.46 They also largely reflect 
security of supply concerns of the more industrialized 
countries, which rely on raw material imports for their 
industries. For many countries, and especially the 
emerging economies, the supply of commonly used 
minerals and metals will continue to be important 
(and the security of supply is a particular concern).
Christmann (2017) constructed a baseline scenario.  
The baseline model is based on the following 
assumptions:
46 The fourth industrial revolution is characterized by 
the intensified use of information and communication 
technologies and a shift towards renewables.
Table 4.1. Estimates of the share of the 2013 world production of mostly rare metals needed to meet 2035 demand 
Metal
Demand 2013 / 
Production 2013
Demand 2035 / 
Production 2013
Related Innovative technologies
Lithium 2% 385% Lithium-ion batteries, lightweight airframes
HREE (Dy/
Tb)
85% 313% Magnets, e-cars, wind power
Rhenium 98% 250% Superalloy
LREE (Nd/
Pr)
79% 174% Permanent Magnets (especially for e-cars 
and wind power)
Tantalum 38% 159% Micro-capacitors, medical technology
Scandium 17% 138% SOFC fuel cells
Cobalt 4% 94% Lithium-ion batteries, Synthetic liquid fuels
Germanium 39% 81% Fibre optic, Infrared technology
Platinum 0% 60^ Fuel cells, catalysts
Tin 50% 42% Lead-free solders, wind mills
Palladium 8% 47% Catalysts, seawater desalination
Indium 29% 45% Displays, thin layer photovoltaics
Gallium 25% 37% Thin layer photovoltaics, Integrated 
Circuits, White LEDs
Silver 22% 32% Lead-free solder, nanosilver, Radio 
Frequency Identification Devices, 
microcapacitors, high-temperature 
supraconductors, concentrating solar 
panels
Copper 1% 29% Electric motors, RFID
Titanium 4% 18% Seawater desalination, medical implants
Source: Marscheider-Weidemann et al. (2016). HREE = heavy rare earth elements (primarily dysprosium and terbium). LREE 
= light rare earth sediments (essentially neodymium and praseodymium).
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(i) Demography 
 
The projections are based on UN Population Division 
estimates (population and urbanization) and 
Kaufman et al. (2012) estimates for middle class 
growth. 
• Population: The world population, estimated to 
be 7.3 billion people in 2015, may reach 9.7 billion 
by 2050 and 11.2 billion by 2100 (United Nations 
Population Division, 2015, median scenario). This 
would mean 2.4 billion new natural resources users 
(an increase of 33 per cent) by 2050, and 3.9 billion 
by 2100 (an increase of 53 per cent).
• Urbanization: In 2000, almost 2.9 billion people 
lived in urban areas (United Nations, 2014). By 
2050, 6.3 billion people, or 66 per cent of the word 
population, may live in cities.
• Middle class:47 Kaufman et al. (2012) developed 
country-level scenarios up to 2030. Their estimate 
is that, in 2000, the global middle class accounted 
for 1.33 billion people, while in 2030, the global 
middle-class may comprise 4.7 billion people;
(ii) Demand growth
Primary production of minerals and metals (through 
mining rather than secondary production from 
recycling) will remain a necessity, at least as long as 
the world population continues to grow and there is 
no saturation of per capita needs in terms of minerals 
and metals. That perspective appears very remote 
due to the existing disparities between the developed 
and the developing countries (UNEP, 2010a).  We 
are likely to see the continuation of the exponential 
demand growth observed during the twentieth 
47 The definition of “middle class” used here is the one 
proposed by Brandi & Büge (2014) as well as by Kaufman et 
al. (2012), whereby a member of the global middle class is 
a person that pertains to a household earning or spending 
between 10 and 100 US$ per day, on the 2005 purchasing 
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Figure 4.1 - Production of selected common minerals and metals (1926-2013) 
Source: Christmann (2017), using data from Kelly & Matos (2018).
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century for common minerals and metals that are 
widely used in construction, infrastructure, mass 
produced goods and agriculture (phosphate and 
potash being two of the key ingredients used for the 
production of fertilizers) (Figure 4.1). 
To model future growth in demand, the following 
three growth trends are considered: 
• 1926-2013: This fully reflects the available data set;
• 1951-2000: This reflects post-World War II 
reconstruction in OECD countries and the 
economic development of OECD countries; and
• 2001-2013: This reflects the rapid development of 
China.
The lowest growth rate over the three periods is used 
to project metal demand forward to 2050.48 Table 4.2 
shows the average annual growth rates of selected 
metals for the three periods. The lowest growth rates 
are highlighted for each metal. As the table shows, 
demand growth will range from 1.8 per cent for lead 
to 6.0 per cent for aluminium. The average of the 
lowest growth rates is 3.9 per cent for all selected 
minerals and metals, and 3.8 per cent for metals only. 
48 This is a conservative approach that assumes past 
trends are replicated in the future. The future is likely to 
experience higher demand, since a much bigger part of the 
world is now rapidly developing. Since the forecast uses 
the lowest growth rate of previous spurts, this is a very 
conservative projection.
The growth rate for metals is a conservative estimate 
compared to the OECD’s 5 per cent up to 2030 (APR, 
2013). 
Demand for these minerals and metals up to 2050 
was estimated on the basis of the demographic and 
demand growth assumptions used as a baseline. 
This was simulated using the lowest of the average 
annual growth rates observed over the three periods 
(Figure 4.2). The scenario shows that a significant 
increase in production by 2050 would be needed if 
historical growth trends are observed going forward. 
If this scenario materializes, the production of the 
various key commodities rises significantly, ranging 
from 750 per cent for bauxite aluminium ore to 
114 per cent for lead between 2013 and 2050. 
An important question is whether the resources 
available can meet this demand. Using data from 
the United States Geological Survey on known 
reserves, Christmann (2017) calculates the share of 
this demand that can be met with current reserves 
(see Figure 4.3). He finds that, under this scenario, 
the anticipated needs for only two of the minerals 
(potash and phosphate) can be met with current 
known reserves. For chromium, reserves can only 
meet 19 per cent of the anticipated needs.
Table 4.2. Average annual growth rates of selected metals
Metal 1926 – 2013 Period (growth in %) 
1951 - 2000
2001 - 2013
Aluminium 7.8 6.0 6.0
Chromium 6.4 4.8 5.8
Copper 3.5 3.4 2.6
Lead 1.8 2.1 4.4
Manganese 5.0 3.5 7.5
Nickel 6.5 5.3 6.4
Phosphate 4.3 4.0 4.0
Iron 3.7 3.6 5.6
Potash 4.5 4.7 4.0
Zinc 2.9 3.0 3.2
Source: Christmann (2017), using data from Kelly & Matos (2018).
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Source:  Christmann (2017), using data from Kelly & Matos (2018).
Figure 4.3 does not imply that the world is running 
out of any of these minerals and metals, because 
as-yet-undiscovered resources are huge (see, for 
instance, the copper example in Johnson et al., 2014 
and Kessler & Wilkinson, 2008). However, this does 
mean that major exploration efforts are needed to 
find yet-undiscovered resources and turn them into 
mineable reserves.
A similar analysis, for copper, shows that 
demand could outstrip supply by 2020 (Figure 
4.4) in the absence of new major discoveries 
and commissioning of new mines, and if copper 
consumption continues to grow exponentially. This 
underlines the need for a massive exploration effort 
to reduce copper use (which is unlikely to happen 
in view of the current copper demand drivers) and 
to explore for deep seated, hidden, large-scale 
deposits or in areas so far considered unattractive 
by investors. This momentum could unfold further to 
the copper price hike that would logically result if this 
scenario materializes.
However, the baseline analysis is still a useful starting 
point. As discussed previously, the demand for 
infrastructure and durable goods will grow rapidly, 
largely driven by demographics - though other drivers 
may also modify this demand. It is most likely that 
cement, copper, steel and stainless steel will continue 
to be needed for houses and infrastructure, energy 
production and distribution systems. Demand for 
lead may follow a very different pattern (probably with 
much lower demand) as vehicles shift from internal 
combustion engines to electrical vehicles that use 
non-lead batteries (batteries for cars with combustion 
engines are the current main use of lead).
Using this baseline forecast, it is clear that more 
mineral deposits will need to be found. There is a high 
likelihood that there are still substantial quantities 
to be discovered, as much of the earth’s crust is yet 
to be explored. As mentioned earlier, exploration 
is skewed towards a few countries, with Canada 
and Australia capturing almost a third of the global 
exploration budget. Although estimates of potential 
resources in undiscovered deposits vary widely, the 
consensus is that mineral resources are unlikely to 
become scarce in the near future (Christmann, 2017). 
As for the investment in mining, it should be noted 
that, over the last two decades, China (through SOEs 
or companies with close connections to the State) 
became an investor of global importance - partly 
replacing TNCs belonging to the OECD group of 
countries.
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Figure 4.3. Share of projected 2050 demand that can be met by reserves as estimated by USGS for 2016 (USGS,2016)
Figure 4.4. Historical and projected primary demand of copper






































Source: Calculated from Christmann (2017) results.
116
 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
Notwithstanding the fact that there is much yet to 
be discovered, this does not guarantee supply in 
the future. Beyond low expenditure on exploration, 
it takes an average of 15.3 years between discovery 
of commercial mineral deposits and mine 
commissioning (Schodde, 2016), and this time 
frame is likely to expand as projects have to consider 
environmental and social issues (which were widely 
ignored in the past). With ongoing concerns for 
environmental sustainability, the sector is likely to 
attract more activism and more regulations -which 
will mean even longer periods to commission a mine. 
Another factor that may limit supply is availability of 
water and energy. The demand for these increases 
exponentially with declining ore grades. For example, 
Chile forecasts a 2 per cent increase in copper 
production in 2025 (from 2015 levels). However, the 
demand for water and energy will rise by 22 per cent49 
and 34 per cent, respectively (Norgate & Jahanshahi, 
2010; Northey, Haque & Mudd, 2013). As ore grades 
decline worldwide and impacts of climate change 
become more severe, the competition for water will 
increase and even lead to conflicts between mining 
companies and other water users. This might limit 
what can be produced - even when resources are 
available.
A comprehensive assessment of possible future 
demand for minerals and metals is not the focus of 
this report. Nonetheless, a good understanding of the 
drivers of supply and demand of minerals and metals 
is crucial to informing new governance structures, as 
these drivers can indicate new points of leverage. 
49 Chile plans to overcome this challenge by using 
seawater; it foresees the share of desalinated water in its 
mining operations rising from 21 per cent to 46 per cent 
(Chilco, 2016, cited in Christmann, 2017).
4.2. Drivers of demand and supply of minerals 
and metals
The seven studies summarized above focus on 
security of supply of minerals and metals. They 
therefore provide a good starting point for identifying 
drivers of future supply and demand, as security of 
supply is essentially aimed at meeting given demand. 
The key drivers emerging from a review of these 
studies are shown in Table 4.3.
The literature also provides other insights into drivers 
of supply and demand. A summary is provided below: 
• The United States National Research Council (NRC, 
2008) maintains that, over the long term (more 
than ten years), availability of mineral resources50 
depends on five factors: geologic (does the mineral 
resource exist?); technical (can we extract and 
process it?); environmental and social (can we 
produce it in environmentally and socially accepted 
ways?); political (how do governments influence 
availability through their policies and actions?); and 
economic (can we produce it at a cost users are 
willing and able to pay?).
• The Global Agenda Council on Responsible Mineral 
Resource Management groups drivers of change 
in the minerals and metals industry into five pillars: 
environmental (growing concern for biodiversity, 
climate and water), technological (intensified 
rate of change), societal (concern for fairness, 
generational change), geopolitical (potential for 
resource nationalism) and geographical (declining 
ores and movement to more remote frontiers) 
(WEF, 2015a).
• According to USGS (2015), types of commodities 
(as well as their sources) are important factors 
for evaluating supply risk. Domestic reserves and 
resources, governance risk, and trade restrictions 
are additional factors that should be considered 
when calculating supply risk and developing 
mitigation strategies.
• Macpherson and Ulrich (2017) identify key trends 
that will shape demand as the long-term shift to a 
low-carbon economy and physical natural capital 
risks; technological change of unprecedented 
depth and speed; a new global economic and 
geopolitical balance and the associated risk of 
division and polarization; the emergence of the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda, 
alongside a new generation of (individual) market 
participants that is increasingly focused on social 
issues; and a stronger institutional focus on 
long-term risks and opportunities that can affect 
economic, political and societal development and 
growth. 
50 The term “mineral resources” used in this study 
encompasses minerals as well as metals.
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• The Metals magazine argues that the megatrends 
of the next decades include the relentless growth 
of the global population, climate change, shortage 
of raw materials, increasing demand for energy, the 
shift of economic gravity, the ongoing urbanization 
trend and the accelerated creation of information 
networks (FOM, 2016).
A synthesis of the emerging drivers, points to a 
number of megatrends that will shape the future 
demand for and availability of minerals and metals. 
These megatrends are explored below.
4.2.1. Demographics
Population growth has a significant impact on 
demand for minerals and metals due to increased 
consumption. Thus, as the global population 
moves towards the 9 billion mark in 2050, and with 
a growing middle class, it will drive a sustained 
demand for minerals. However, urbanization rather 
than population growth represents a more important 
demographic trend that is likely to have a larger 
impact on the demand and consumption of minerals 
and metals. The United Nations estimates that, by 
2050, 70 per cent of the world’s population will live in 
cities. This rise of cities and urban living is predicated 
on the use of materials and metals. The strength of 
metal alloys, particularly steels, has led to a revolution 
in how cities are built.  Without them, there would be 
no buildings higher than three or four floors. Metals, 
as well as development minerals, are also critical in 
underpinning the infrastructure needed for road, rail 
and air transport networks. 
4.2.1.1. Society - changing values
More than anything, the perceptions of society 
in developed countries will shape the evolution 
of consumption, while populations in developing 
countries are more likely to seek development first. 
As mentioned, there is a growing emphasis on 
sustainable consumption and responsible sourcing. 
Consumers are increasingly expecting organizations 
to demonstrate responsible sourcing in their supply 
chain. As a result, many certification standards are 
emerging to provide this guarantee. Despite the 
voluntary nature of many such standards, a large 
number of companies are nonetheless seeking to 
obtain such certification. As WEF (2015) states, 
social pressure to act more sustainably is growing 
and has the potential to disrupt the sector.
Companies are increasingly expected to operate 
more sustainably and to define and implement 
actions reflecting this priority. The industry is 
responding: shifting its mindset, strategies and 
activities. According to WEF (2015), 80 per cent of 
senior mining executives believe that sustainability-
oriented strategies are essential for current and 
future competitive advantage, while 63 per cent of 
chief executives expect sustainability to transform 
their industry within five years. 
Table 4.3. Summary of drivers of supply and demand assessments
Study Drivers assumed as key
WEF Study Prices (markets), technology preferences, policies, population, economic 
growth 
Interconnectedness (politics, economics and society), geopolitics perceptions.
EU Study Governance/ stability, recycling rate, substitutability.
Yale Study Geology, substitutability, geopolitics, state of mining technology, regulatory 
oversight, political stability, economic policies, environmental implications 
(human and ecosystems), supply chains complexity, final product structure.
British Geological 
Survey
Product concentration, reserves distribution, recycling rate, substitutability, 
governance, companion metal fraction (in ore).
UNEP Concentration of mining, reserves, temporary scarcity (lag in supply response. 
structural scarcity) (companion metal and inefficiencies), recycling restrictions.
German Study Technology innovation; market demand (renewable energy).
Christmann Study Population, urbanisation and middle class.
Source: Compiled by authors from selected reports above.
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Consumers, OEMs and recyclers are also exerting 
significant influence on national materials strategies. 
Schüler et al. (2016b) note that the 2015 European 
Commission trade strategy, ‘Trade for All,’ reflects 
European consumers’ concerns about social and 
environmental conditions in global production sites. 
It increasingly scrutinizes the effects of Free Trade 
Agreements (FTAs) on other – especially developing 
– countries.
In developed countries, the rise of Internet and 
social media is supporting the emergence of new 
business models that will have a profound impact on 
demand for materials. There is, in particular, a strong 
movement towards alternate ownership models, 
or the rise of the ‘sharing economy’. This model is 
based on sharing underutilized assets – ranging from 
spaces (homes) to objects. One product is owned 
and shared by many users. Higher utilization means 
less demand. One example is several tenants sharing 
one vacuum cleaner. The use of social media is also 
creating global movements that can influence policy 
consumption and corporate behaviour globally. 
4.2.2. Economic growth
Economic growth is intrinsically linked to increased 
use of natural resources, given the central role 
they play in supplying the raw materials needed 
to produce goods and services. Unless economic 
growth is accompanied by significant decoupling, 
then continuous growth will mean greater demand 
for resources as this growth will be faster in emerging 
and developing economies with their growing middle 
class. The future demand for durable goods will 
thus be significant.  For example, in Africa, Mckinsey 
predicts that at least four groups of industries – 
consumer-facing industries, agriculture, extractive 
resources and infrastructure –could combine to 
generate as much as US$2.6 trillion in revenue 
annually by 2020, or US$1 trillion more than today.51 
However, future demand may be different from past 
patterns. Studies on the resource intensity of the 
economic process suggest a gradual de-linking of 
natural resources use and economic growth (Dittrich, 
2012). Technological progress has seen the efficient 
use of material resources, the production process 
51 See http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/middle-
east-and-africa/lions-on-the-move.
re-engineered, goods and services redesigned 
and substitutions with lighter materials. This has 
resulted in the production of lighter goods. Continued 
technological advances, coupled with a shift towards 
the service sector in developed countries, improve 
the prospects for further dematerialization of the 
economic process. However, having an alternative 
indicator for evaluating the resource requirements of 
the economy such as resources used to one unit of 
GDP per capita (income), Bithas & Kalimeris (2017) 
reject the vision of a dematerialized growth and the 
de-linkage of the economy from natural resources. 
They argue that resource requirements evaluated at 
the level of income approximate the human scale of 
production.  The pattern observed in the past, and 
likely to persist, is that demand for metals is strongly 
linked to general economic development. 
4.2.3. Regulations/Policy
The regulatory regimes adopted by countries 
have a significant impact on demand and supply 
of minerals and metals.  For instance, despite the 
many uncharacterized and unexplored deposits 
in the European Union, their exploitation is limited 
by the existing economic and regulatory climate, 
widespread NIMBY and BANANA syndromes (and 
resulting activism) and growing land use competition 
(EU, 2015). The result is that the EU can only supply a 
small part of its needs for many minerals and metals. 
Similarly, some have suggested that the dominance 
of China in the crucial REEs may be partly attributed 
to less stringent environmental standards, as 
opposed to the United States, which was the major 
supplier in the past and holds around 38 per cent of 
the world’s deposits but had to close many mines due 
to environmental standards (Nuwer, 2014). 
Regulation is also fuelling demand of certain minerals 
and metals. Emission regulations have been the main 
driver of demand for the platinum group metals, and 
regulations to reduce green-house gases (GHGs) 
are driving new demand for many metals as green 
technologies emerge.
Regulation can also produce unintended effects. For 
instance, the desire to improve fuel consumption, 
largely prompted by regulation, has seen car 
manufacturers switching from steel to aluminium 
bodies to reduce weight and thus reduce fuel 
consumption. This has seen a reduction in zinc 
demand, which is mainly used to galvanize steel. 
However, almost all the world’s indium comes from 
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zinc mines, as indium is a core product from zinc 
ore. There are no dedicated indium mines because 
it occurs in such small amounts that mining is 
uneconomical. Therefore, if demand for zinc declines, 
then the corresponding adjustment in the supply of 
zinc will also have an impact on the supply of indium 
(Nuwer, 2014). Yet indium is increasingly becoming a 
crucial element in high technology – mainly used in 
smart phones to make touch screens – and is now 
seen in some countries as a critical metal.
Incentives can also be used in place of regulation. In 
the United States, the material with one of the highest 
rates of recovery is lead-acid batteries, used primarily 
in cars. Their recovery rate is 98 per cent, compared 
to about 50 per cent for aluminium cans. The reason 
is that the Government, concerned about the use of 
lead, offers car companies a financial incentive to 
recycle the batteries themselves (Jones, 2013).52 
4.2.4. Governance/Political stability
Changes in the quality of governance may impact 
reserve availability. Mineral reserves are usually a 
small percentage of potential resources. Mineral 
discovery and exploitation depend on investment, 
which in turn depend on political stability and 
a favourable investment climate. There are still 
significant mineral deposits to be explored and 
reserves to be found. For example, Africa is 
considered rich in natural resources, with a geology 
as favourable to the existence of mineral deposits 
as Canada or Australia. However, whereas Canada 
and Australia respectively attracted an average of 
US$118 and US$125 per km2 per year in exploration 
investment over the 1991-2015 period, Africa only 
attracted US$36 per km2 per year (Christmann, 
2017).  It should be noted that, even within Africa, the 
bulk of this is spent in only a few countries - meaning 
that little exploration investment is made in some 
countries (see Chapter 2). The reasons behind the 
lack of exploration include poor infrastructure, poor 
governance and lack of baseline geological data.
As reserves of any mineral and metals are a dynamic 
quantity that varies on the basis of modifying factors 
52 A highly effective incentive is one that can make 
manufacturers recover and recycle their own products. This 
means that they will tend to make them easier to re-use or 
break apart in the first place. Products will be designed with 
recovery in mind.
(such as minerals or metals prices, energy and labour 
costs), periods of apparent scarcity alternate with 
apparent abundance while the geological stocks 
remain unchanged. It should be noted that the sharp 
reduction in exploration investment observed since 
2012, combined with the higher costs of finding 
(Schodde, 2017) and putting into production new 
deposits, does not bode well for future minerals and 
metals supply for the global economy. 
4.2.5. Geopolitics
A feature of Earth’s ore-forming processes is the 
creation of large spatial disparities in elemental 
abundance, with some locations hosting rich 
stores of mineable resources, and others almost 
none (Graedel et al., 2015; also see Figure 2.4).  For 
instance, Morocco currently holds 70 per cent of the 
world’s phosphorus reserves. South Africa, Zimbabwe 
and the Russian Federation control nearly all of the 
world’s platinum reserves. The Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) has 40 per cent of its cobalt, while 
China has a near monopoly of REEs.
Geopolitics are also 
becoming more 
complicated by the rise 
of resources nationalism, 
itself fuelled by the higher 
minerals and metals prices 
observed since 2012. This 
rise is usually associated 
with restricting resource 
supply and deterring 
foreign investment, thereby 
reducing future supply
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Given the critical role of minerals and metals in 
economies, their uneven distributions can cause 
challenges when trade is restricted. Mineral resource-
rich countries or countries that control a significant 
share of the global production via their investments 
abroad can use their control over producing 
companies as leverage in international negotiations. 
Their dominance enables them to distort the 
market through restrictive or dumping measures. 
In September 2010, for instance a maritime border 
dispute prompted the Chinese government to 
temporarily suspend all rare earth exports to Japan 
(Stone, 2016). 
Geopolitics are also becoming more complicated by 
the rise of resources nationalism, itself fuelled by the 
higher minerals and metals prices observed since 
2012. This rise is usually associated with restricting 
resource supply and deterring foreign investment, 
thereby reducing future supply. Commodity booms 
can frequently cause a rise in sentiments of resource 
nationalism and occasionally the nationalization of 
mineral deposits.
As emerging countries grow and industrialize, global 
supply may be disrupted as some countries seek to 
limit exports while they develop their own industries. 
For example, in 2012 Indonesia announced the 
introduction of quotas and taxes on a range of metal 
exports (including nickel, tin and copper) to support 
its growing industries (APR, 2013).
Given the crucial role of minerals and metals in the 
economy and also in defence industries, securing 
supply of materials is a national security issue for 
many countries. This means significant funds will 
continue to be spent on securing supply chains 
and finding alternatives to reduce dependence. For 
instance, Japan stockpiles minerals and metals, 
which it considers as strategic resources (ECA, 2011), 
while the fear of a future REE shortage has prompted 
the United States to invest millions of dollars into 
basic research on reducing use of rare earth elements 
and recovering them from existing products. Some 
industries have cut back their reliance on rare earth 
elements.  For instance, Tesla does not use these in 
its batteries or motors (Stone, 2016). 
4.2.6. Globalization
Ongoing trade liberalization has seen a huge rise in 
global trade.  This has significant implications for the 
supply of minerals and materials. The fact that the 
rules of trade are not entirely under the control of a 
resource exporting country somehow limits countries’ 
ability to use their possession of critical minerals 
and metals as a strategic weapon for political 
negotiation or economic domination. In 2014, a ruling 
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) resulted in 
the Chinese Government removing its rare earth 
export quotas (Stone, 2016). However, there remain 
numerous ways and means to distort free trade 
through tariff and non-tariff measures, as detailed 
in the OECD Inventory of Restrictions on Exports of 
Industrial Raw Materials,53 (which describes the trade 
restrictions for a wide range of traded minerals and 
metals at country level as of 2014). 
Liberalization of trade and rising FDI are also 
reshaping manufacturing. This has seen the 
emergence of complex manufacturing value chains 
spanning several locations and supported by global 
supply chains. An example is the supply chain of 
CdTe solar panels mentioned in the introduction of 
this chapter. Such complex supply chains can be 
highly vulnerable to supply chain disruption.
While the liberalization of trade agenda has become 
entrenched in the global economics system, this 
arrangement is evolving (see Box 4.1). 
As emerging countries 
grow and industrialize, 
global supply may be 
disrupted as some 
countries seek to limit 
exports while they 






Box 4.1. Globalization - retreat and rearrangement?
Global trade is undergoing some re-arrangements. On the one hand, as the effects of globalization start 
impacting national politics (especially in the west), the very logic of the agenda is being questioned by 
former key proponents. For instance, the United States has recently pulled out of the proposed Trans-
Pacific Trade Partnership and has questioned and called for a review of some existing trade agreements. 
On the other hand, China is laying the ground for an acceleration of global trade. 
In terms of impact on national politics, the most significant development is the United Kingdom’s exit from 
the European Union (Brexit). While migration has been a major political issue, the loss of manufacturing 
jobs due the emergence of global production networks has also been a major issue, especially in the 
United States. This has seen the United States government dis-incentivize companies from off-shoring 
production and trying to lure companies to re-shore. In an attempt to protect local industry, there have 
been threats to raise tariffs on steel and aluminium. As manufacturing is a key user of minerals, these 
threats have a big impact on supply and demand patterns of minerals and metals.
At the same time, China is boldly pushing the globalizing agenda through its ambitious ‘One Belt, One 
Road’ initiative that seeks to create a vast and global infrastructure that includes roads, railways and 
ports to facilitate global trade. This is likely to create significant demand in the short to medium term to 
build this infrastructure. Ultimately, such an infrastructure is likely to boost aggregate demand, as well as 
demand for minerals and metals.
The retreat seen in the west could be temporary, as such phenomena are driven by political cycles that are 
short term. However, the continuous loss of jobs is likely to be accelerated by the rise of automation and 
robotics: the so-called fourth industrial revolution. The anxieties driving these political cycles are therefore 
likely to persist and could well lead to a re-arrangement of global trade.
4.2.7. Mining and metals, research, innovation and 
evolution
4.2.7.1. Innovation in mining & metals industry
As the mining and metals industry is facing 
challenges and opportunities, research and 
innovation are important for addressing them. 
Research and innovation are critical to developing 
some of the solutions needed to address the 
challenges of the exponential increases in demand 
expected for most minerals and metals in the coming 
decades, while at the same time making the global 
economy as circular and sustainable as possible. 
This has led to the development of comprehensive 
research agendas such as the European ERA-MIN 
research agenda (Vidal et al., 2013), the Research 
Agenda developed by European Technology Platform 
on Sustainable Mineral Resources (ETP-SMR) or the 
European Research and Innovation Roadmap 2050 
(Reynolds et al., 2018). The industry is innovating 
in  terms of technologies used and business 
models adopted, and there are many developments 
worldwide such as the creation of United States 
Critical Metals Institute,54 the German Federal 
Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) R4 
programme on raw materials of strategic importance 
to the German economy (Bundesministerium für 
Bildung und Forschung, 2013), or the European Union 
Knowledge and Innovation Community on Raw 
Materials (which possibly the world largest research 
and innovation network with over 120 partners from 
industry, research and academia). 
a) Greater recovery of ores
As ore grades have deteriorated, the mining industry 
has innovated and found new ways to extract 
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• Technologies such as in-situ mining, autonomous 
haulage and drilling and rapid tunnelling are 
changing the process of mining. In-situ leaching 
technologies can significantly extend the amount 
of economically recoverable minerals by allowing 
the mining of previously uneconomic ore types and 
grades (Mudd, 2010).
• Various biological processes are also being 
optimized to extract metals from lower-grade ores 
with the help of bacteria. Bio-mining is already 
applied to extract copper and other metals from 
mine tailings and industrial waste.
• The use of information technology is also 
important. The United States Department of Energy 
(DoE) Critical Materials Institute is now using its 
supercomputers to search for molecules that 
might bind to rare earth elements and help them 
to float. Researchers hope that this approach can 
boost recovery of REEs from 65 per cent to 75 per 
cent (Jones, 2013).
• Big data and more sophisticated modelling are 
being used to enable more efficient planning and 
more accurate and less intrusive mining operations 
(WEF, 2015b).
b) R&D in mining exploration
Bloodworth and Gunn (undated) argue that R&D 
advances are likely to lead to a better understanding 
of ore forming processes, and this can dramatically 
change the picture of reserves. For example, they 
mention that mineral deposits for which there was no 
scientific model or exploration guides 50 years ago 
(such as porphyry deposits) are now the principal 
source of copper. Within minerals exploration, R&D is 
very active internationally in sectors such as:
7. The development of the geological 
representation of the deeper crust, essential to 
understanding the location of possible deep-
seated, concealed mineral deposits;
8. The development of geophysical investigation 
methods, as these are critical to progress under 
the first heading;
9. The development of cheaper, more efficient, 
drilling technologies; and
10. The development of data mining and predictive 
data modelling based on artificial intelligence 
technologies to identify signals that could relate 
to as-yet-unidentified mineral deposits.
More information on research and innovation 
priorities in exploration and all other research and 
innovation areas related to minerals and metals can 
be found in the ERA-MIN research agenda (Vidal et 
al., 2013), which features around 200 experts from 
academia, industry and research.
c) Extending the frontiers of mining
Mining is extending to new frontiers.  Seabed mining 
in the deep seas is also gaining traction, and in such 
areas a lack of data and information leads to a high 
level of uncertainty around environmental risks. 
Although commercial deep-sea mining has yet to 
begin, corporations and governments have been 
driven by markets and technology to increase the 
pace of exploration for mineral deposits in the deep 
ocean seabed. Many of these deposits are found 
at depths of between 1,000 and 6,000 metres and 
contain concentrations of metals of commercial 
interest such as copper, nickel, manganese, zinc, lead, 
gold and molybdenum.
Exploration companies are interested in three types 
of mineral deposits, each from a different ocean 
location and requiring a different type of mining 
technology (Hien et al., 2013). Each of the three types 
would have specific environmental impacts (see 
Chapter 5).
• Polymetallic nodules (or ‘manganese nodules’) that 
can be found on the abyssal plains (the deep ocean 
floor);
• Polymetallic sulphides from deep-sea hydrothermal 
vents (both active vents and areas where venting 
has occurred in the past) found along ocean ridge 
systems (underwater mountain chains); and
• Cobalt crusts from seamounts (underwater 
mountains) and other topographical features.
These areas all have distinct faunas across different 
regions of the world’s oceans. Most habitat-forming 
bottom-dwelling species are extremely vulnerable 
to human disturbance. The United Nations General 
Assembly has recognised this, as it has repeatedly 
committed nations to take action to ensure that deep-
sea fishing on the high seas is managed to prevent 
destructive fishing activities and damage to habitats 
and vulnerable species.
Estimates of seafloor deposits targeted for 
mining range from 600 million to 1 billion tons of 
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minerals, including 30 million tons of copper and 
zinc (AFP-JIJI, undated). Interest in seabed mining 
is rising, and the first industrial production project 
of copper-zinc-gold ore may start in the coming 
years off the coast of Papuasia (New Guinea). In 
addition, numerous contracts (with governments and 
companies) have been signed for exploration of the 
international seabed, governed by the International 
Seabed Authority,55 which is the body responsible for 
controlling exploration and exploitation of the areas 
beyond national jurisdiction (UN, 1982).
d) From mining and metal companies to material 
companies
Currently, mining metals and recycling tend to be 
separate businesses that are largely not integrated. 
This is changing as mining companies turn their 
attention to urban mining or recycling as part of their 
business and rethink their business models (FOM, 
2016). 
We are also witnessing the arrival of new players in 
the minerals value chain in the form of high-tech and 
big brand technology firms who acquire diversified 
mining portfolios with a view to securing access 
to vital inputs and taking full control of their supply 
chains. These include the electric carmaker, Tesla, 
which acquired lithium assets: a key ingredient 
for their batteries (PWC, n.d.). However, more 
fundamental rethinking is likely. For example, the 
recycling of REEs is difficult. REEs are used in very 
small quantities, making the economics of recovery 
unfavourable. However, a product-centric approach 
can change the economics of recycling.  Binnemans 
and Jones (2014) point to the recovery of rare 
earth elements from end-of-life fluorescent lamps 
as an example of product-centric recycling. Rather 
than targeting just the rare-earth content of lamp 
phosphor powder, the recycling of all the different 
waste fractions (glass, metals, plastics and phosphor 
powders) can be economical. This then involves 
rethinking the business model from the metal 
supplier to the material supplier. This transition has 
the prospect of 100 per cent re-use and zero waste 




Material science is advancing and is inventing new 
materials. Traditional metals are being substantially 
replaced by composites with higher performance. 
Lu (2010) states that aluminium use in Boeing 787 
aircraft has dropped to 20 per cent, compared to 
50 per cent in the previous model (Boeing 777). 
In contrast, carbon fibre–reinforced polymeric 
composites are 50 per cent by weight in the Boeing 
787, up from 12 per cent in the Boeing 777. 
Advances in material science are also creating 
new uses for metals. Metals may be mixed 
with other materials in a controlled way to form 
composite structures and increase their versatility. 
For example, the pillar of the world longest bridge 
is made of steel tubes that are protected against 
corrosion in the harsh ocean environment by a 
coating of novel polymeric composites combined 
with cathode attachments (Lu, 2010). Advances in 
material engineering are consequently creating new 
substitutes, while also increasing the versatility of 
traditional materials and creating new markets.
f) Additive manufacturing (3D printing) 
Additive Manufacturing or 3D printing is 
revolutionizing the way products are manufactured. 
As these technologies have progressed, engineers 
are now adopting a systematic approach to design. 
Performance parameters are defined, and solutions 
that are suitable for the process are then developed 
(rather than the other way around). Designs therefore 
fit the solution available. The result is that parts can 
be, on average, up to 20-30 per cent lighter than those 
produced in conventional ways (milled or cast parts). 
In some cases, the potential weight reduction can 
be as much as 60-80 per cent (Herzog, 2016). Such 
3D printing technology also builds a final product 
through stacking layers of material. The advantage 
of this method is that there is almost no waste. 
Therefore, 3D printing not only saves materials (this 
translates into a lighter environmental footprint) but, 
depending on the use of the items (for example, as 
parts in a car), the weight reduction also translates 
into energy savings and further reductions in the 
ecological footprint (Lee, 2016).
Growth in 3D printing may bring down demand for 
metals due to the savings it entails. However, the 
versatility of this new manufacturing process may 
see increased applications and thus higher demand 
for materials.
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g) Blockchain technology
A growing number of consumers, institutional 
investors and other stakeholders have concerns 
about the quality and transparency of existing 
product certification schemes. Blockchain technology 
has the potential to allay those fears as it enables 
the geo-tagging of ores with cryptographic tokens 
allowing the identification, trading and management 
of ore as well as secure and monitored maintenance 
of records from the moment of extraction and 
throughout the lifetime of minerals and metals. 
However, this will only be meaningful as long as 
material flows coming from separate sources remain 
separate. For recycled materials, this technology 
could be very useful to identify the plant where 
the recycled material originates from, but it will 
be impossible to trace the origins all the original 
materials that entered a specific recycling plant.  
The records, called blocks, include information on 
ownership and authenticity, exact location of ore 
extraction and the quality of production process from 
an ethical, social and environmental perspective.56 
h) The digital mine and drones
Enabled by the Internet of things (IoT), the digital 
mine is becoming a reality as planning, control and 
decision support systems are fully integrated and 
core physical processes are automated (including 
in remote locations). Moreover, mining companies 
are increasingly using unmanned drones for data 
collection (such as geophysical surveys in real time) 
and safety monitoring, especially to facilitate access 
to and inspection of difficult-to-reach or dangerous 
areas.57
These technological transformations and disruptions 
have required organizational changes and a review 
of business models. Fully integrated real-time data 
visualization and mapping, predictive modelling and 
cognitive analytics are contributing to efficiency 
gains, waste reduction and improved management 








While technologies evolve at an ever-faster pace, it is 
difficult to forecast which technologies will be market 
leaders or not have faded into oblivion by 2050. 
Christmann (2017) points to lighting technologies as 
an illustrative case. These technologies have evolved 
several times over the years, each time impacting 
mineral raw material demand. The gas mantle (which 
used cerium and thorium oxide) was invented in the 
late nineteenth century. It was later substituted by 
LEDs (which use gallium).
Such rapid, sweeping technology shifts make 
forecasting demand fairly complex. Although in 
2013 only about 2 per cent of lithium production 
was used for the production of lithium batteries, 
in 2035 the lithium demand for battery production 
may nearly four times higher than the total 2013 
world production. However, by then other battery 
technologies may have also been developed and 
industrialized.
Figure 4.5 produced by the United States National 
Renewable Energy Laboratory (Department of 
Energy), provides insight into the many competing 
photovoltaic cell technologies currently being 
developed worldwide, and the progress over time of 
their solar-to-electrical energy conversion factors. The 
upper left corner shows the material consumption 
and the solar-to-electric energy conversion factor 
is on the right scale. Each technological family, 
shown with a specific colour, has specific material 
requirements. It is difficult to predict which of these 
technologies will be the market leader in 20 years, 
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4.2.8. Shift towards a circular economy 58
The WEF (2015) scenario analysis of circular use 
of commodities and metals reaches a number of 
conclusions. First, mining will not disappear. Primary 
extraction will continue but volumes are unlikely 
to grow in line with GDP growth. This means that 
pressure to realize scale effects and cost efficiency 
will remain in the foreseeable future. Demands for 
cost effectiveness will exist in parallel with demand 
for environmentally and socially responsible actions, 
leading to new partnership and operating models.  
Second, metals will not disappear. Metals companies 
will act as a liaison between commodity producers 
and end industries. Opportunities will exist to adapt 
business model transformations and reposition as 
materials providers. Third, technology will be key. 
Mining companies have an opportunity to focus on 
waste treatment optimization and metal companies 
on the improvement of low-grade processing 
capabilities.  Fourth, it will become increasingly 
important to better understand supply chains and 
consumer preferences.
There is also a growing concern about the failure of 
the global ecosystem and alarm bells are ringing. 
The focus of the International Resource Panel’s 
activities is the recognition of the pressing need to 
decouple natural resource use and environmental 
impacts from economic growth (UNEP, 2011). In 
2017, 15,364 scientists from all over the world issued 
a second warning to humanity. Several threats are 
putting humanity’s future in doubt. These concerns 
have resulted in a strong push for a green, circular 
economy. Consumers who want to see sustainable 
production and consumption, citizens and authorities 
aware of the challenges faced by the global and local 
ecosystems and the resulting threats to humankind 
itself are leading this push. Several international 
agreements have already been concluded to tackle 
58 Material implications within a green economy include 
materials used in wind, solar and energy storage batteries 
technologies. The key materials examined in World Bank 
(2017) scenarios were: aluminium, chromium copper, 
indium (rare earth), iron, lithium, lead, manganese 
molybdenum silver, steel and zinc.  However, other materials 
acknowledged as important in for green economy include: 
antimony, boron, cadmium cerium, chromium dysprosium 
europium, gallium, germanium gold, lanthanum, neodymium 
nickel, niobium platinum, praseodymium, selenium silicon 
tellurium terbium, tin zinc and vanadium.
specific issues. The most widely known is the Paris 
Agreement under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (United Nations, 
2015), which commits participating countries to 
curbing their greenhouse gas emissions in order to 
keep the average global temperature well below +2° C 
as compared to pre-industrial levels. Other important 
examples are the Minamata Convention on Mercury 
(United Nations, 2013) and the Montreal Protocol on 
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 
Many possible actions can lead towards a more 
circular economy as shown in Figure 4.6.
Inputs59  (such as energy, water and chemicals), 
as well as waste and emissions related to the 
production of minerals and metals, can be reduced 
in several ways. For instance, waste and some 
emissions can be reduced through industrial ecology 
designs (Graedel, 2015) or the development of 
more resource-efficient mining, ore processing or 
metallurgical process. A survey of the United States 
mining industry (US Department of Energy, 2007) 
showed that the country could save over 20% of the 
energy used in mining and ore processing if existing 
best practices were systematically used, and over 
half of the energy could be saved thanks to further 
research and innovation in developing more efficient 
equipment and processes.
The demand for primary minerals and metals (from 
a mine) could be significant if all the possibilities 
offered by the circular economy concept, shown as 
green arrows in Figure 4.6, were used to the fullest. 
However, there are many obstacles in the way.
For instance, recycling of minerals and metals 
from end-of-life can be technically daunting and 
economically impossible as detailed in an earlier 
International Resource Panel report (Reuter et al., 
2013). As a result, recycling rates of many metals 
from end-of-life product are very low, sometimes less 
than 1 per cent (UNEP, 2011 and Figure 4.7).
59 Shown as red rectangles in figure 4.5.
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Figure 4.6. Schematic representation of the transition towards circular economy in relation with minerals and metals
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Source: Christmann, unpublished work.
Source: UNEP (2011). International Resource Panel Report.
128
 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
Recycling of minerals and metals provides many 
benefits such as reduced primary demand, as 
well as reduced energy and water demand for the 
production of recycled metals. However, as long as 
the demand for minerals and metals grows year after 
year, the impact of recycling will remain limited and 
more primary minerals will continue to be produced. 
The duration of the use phase of metals in specific 
applications is of great importance to determine the 
volume of potentially recyclable minerals and metals 
available from end-of-use products. To illustrate this, 
figure 4.8 shows the reduction in demand for a given 
mineral or metal that would result if demand grows 
at a 3%/year rate and the use phase of that mineral 
or metal lasts 30 years. The diagram shows (yellow 
line) that a (very theoretical) 100 per cent recycling 
rate would only partly reduce the demand for primary 
mineral and metal. This figure is close to the copper 
case, a metal that has a long use phase in many of 
its applications. This partly explains why, in 2015, 
the production of secondary (from recycling) copper 
was 4.03 Mt, which is 20 per cent of the world copper 
metal production (Brininstool & Flanagan, 2018). As 
a result, a strictly circular economy will be impossible 
to achieve as long as the demand for minerals and 
metals continues to grow exponentially, a situation 
that is likely to last for most of the twenty-first 
century, due to the above-mentioned drivers.
4.2.8.1. Reduction in consumption
The shift toward a more circular economy is seeing 
shifts in production processes to reduce waste and 
pay greater attention to recycling. Some of the key 
related trends include:
• Products are being designed to facilitate recovery 
of different metals. Design for disassembly 
facilitates separation of the proper fractions for 
further processing (Handwerker et al., 2016). 
• Products are being designed with multiple uses or 
re-use in mind. For instance, it should be possible 
to design the steel rods and beams used in 
construction so that, instead of being destroyed 
during demolition, they can easily be disassembled, 
collected, reconditioned and certified for reuse in 
new buildings (WEF, 2015).
• Recycling is being automated. One of the hardest 
steps in e-waste recycling is simply getting the 
battery or other critical-metal-rich components out 
of the larger device or machine. This is a menial 
but intricate task, often handed over to low-paid 
workers. However, unsafe practices can lead to 
contamination. Japan is at the forefront of efforts 
to automate these processes so they can be done 
economically and safely by machine. (Jones, 
2013).  
• Greater attention is being paid to remanufacturing 
and refurbishing – the disassembly, cleaning, 
repair and reassembly of a product – restoring 
it to a like-new condition. Note that reusing a 
remanufactured/refurbished engine rather than 
producing a new one can, for example, consume 
up to 83 per cent less energy and save up to 87 per 
cent of emissions. 
• More fundamental shifts include changes in the 
business model. For example, leasing of products 
or selling functions instead of products. It should 
be noted that leasing as opposed to outright sale 
provides a means to recycle easily, as products are 
returned to the seller once the lease comes to an 
end (Wäger et al., 2012).
The shift to a more circular economy is also creating 
demand for new materials as shown in table 4.1. 
Materials that were not previously in demand are now 
considered critical materials, and significant efforts 
are being made to ensure their supply.60 For instance, 
the demand for cobalt and lithium is soaring due to 
the rapid development of battery-operated electric 
cars, and the demand for gallium is sustained by the 
rapid development of LED lighting.
4.2.8.2. Substitution of rare minerals and metals
Substituting the use of scarce and expensive 
minerals or metals is one of the various ways to 
enhance resource efficiency and to transition towards 
the circular economy. Substitution can take place 
in multiple ways: one metal can be substituted by 
another in some uses (for instance aluminium can 
replace copper in high-voltage overland electricity 
supply lines) or a technology using a different 
metal can substitute an older technology that used 
60 The green minor metals include indium (In), germanium, 
(Ge), tantalum (Ta), PGM (platinum group metals, such as 
ruthenium (Ru), platinum (Pt) and palladium (Pd)), tellurium 
(Te), cobalt (Co), lithium (Li), gallium (Ga) and REE (rare 
earth elements), which are needed for the development 
of cleaner technologies. These critical metals are used 
in batteries, wind turbines, solar panels and electronics 
systems in all kinds of controls.
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different minerals or metals (for example LEDs using 
gallium instead of CFLs using europium, terbium and 
mercury).
However, substitution remains a complex topic as 
the use of substitutes in certain applications may 
result in loss or performance and/or may involve long 
qualification processes, for instance in aeronautics. 
See, for instance, Graedel et al., 2013;61  Halme et al., 
2012; Vidal et al., 2013; Tercero Espinoza et al., 2015; 
and European Commission 2017a & b for detailed 
insights into the substitutionability of individual 
minerals and metals and related research topics.
The shift to a green economy is also creating a 
demand for new materials. Materials that were not 
previously in demand are now considered critical 
materials, and significant efforts are being made to 
ensure their supply.62
61 The supplementary information includes a detailed 
database covering 62 elements, mostly metals, and their 
main uses.
62 The green minor metals include indium (In), germanium, 
(Ge), tantalum (Ta), PGM (platinum group metals, such as 
ruthenium (Ru), platinum (Pt) and palladium (Pd)), tellurium 
(Te), cobalt (Co), lithium (Li), gallium (Ga) and REE (rare 
Figure 4.8. Impact of recycling on primary metals demand - 3 per cent/ year demand growth, 30 years use phase - Primary 
production, year 1 = 100
4.2.8.3. Shift to renewable energy
The global transition towards carbon-clean energy 
production technologies will also be an important 
driver of the demand for minerals and metals.63 
Energy production from renewable energy sources 
requires much higher amounts of - common and 
rare - metals than energy production from fossil fuels 
(Baldwin et al., 2015). 
earth elements), which are needed for the development 
of cleaner technologies. These critical metals are used 
in batteries, wind turbines, solar panels and electronics 
systems in all kinds of controls.
63 Such as antimony, cobalt, gallium, germanium, gold, 
lithium, molybdenum, niobium, platinum group elements, 
rhenium, selenium, silver, tantalum, tellurium, tin, tungsten, 
vanadium or zirconium. Photovoltaic and thermal 
photovoltaic energy production, windmills and the related 
energy storage and distribution systems will require large 
amounts of aluminium, copper, iron and its main alloying 
metals (chrome, manganese, molybdenum, nickel, niobium 
and vanadium), as well as rare minor metals such as 
gallium, germanium, indium, platinum group elements, rare 
earth elements, selenium, silver, tantalum, tellurium and tin 
(United States Department of Energy, 2011; Vidal et al., 2013; 
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The International Resource Panel’s Green Energy 
Choices report finds that some demand-side 
energy efficiency technologies, including present-
day electric vehicles and a few building insulation 
technologies, may aggravate the pressure on natural 
resources - especially metallic resources (UNEP, 
2016b). Environmental damage and associated 
biodiversity loss will increase demand for mined 
products. Overall, the report concludes that the 
current structure of global resource use is likely 
to change substantially with the global energy 
transition that is necessary to mitigate climate 
change. Electricity production technologies that are 
mainly based on metal, or that use rare metals (with 
a low known reserve) have a substantial impact on 
metal depletion. The ongoing assessment of metal 
criticality by the International Resource Panel will 
hopefully give rise to more robust and appropriate 
methods to assess the criticality of metals used in 
energy technologies. A recent report by the World 
Bank also concludes that a low carbon future will be 
significantly more mineral- and metal- intensive than 
is the case with current energy technologies (World 
Bank, 2017). The report assesses what it would take 
to materially supply a subset of new technologies 
and data systems required to reach the transition 
to a low carbon energy future.  After identifying the 
relevant minerals and metals that are expected 
to play a crucial role and developing indicative 
scenarios on how the demand for those commodities 
might increase over the century, the study provides 
some initial implications for relevant resource-rich 
developing countries. 
4.2.8.4. Rise of green investment
Investment is crucial for any industry, and the 
investment community can therefore shape 
industries by providing the capital they need to grow. 
As a result, investment strategies adopted will have 
far reaching consequences for both demand and 
supply of minerals and metals. 
Worldwide, sustainability is becoming an essential 
investment criterion. These types of investments 
accounted for US$3.74 trillion in total assets under 
management at the end of 2011 (Macpherson & 
Ulrich, 2017). Many market players have started 
using sustainable, responsible and impact-based 
strategies for investing in assets. For example, PFZW 
(Netherlands giant healthcare pension fund) has 
announced its intention to quadruple sustainable 
investments to a value of US$16 billion by 2020. The 
pension fund will also aim to halve the CO2 footprint 
of its investments before 2020 by comparing 
companies in each sector and picking the best 
performers (WEF, 2015). Over the past decade, green 
bonds have also emerged.
Macpherson and Ulrich (2017) indicate that 
green finance will likely be supported across the 
investment value chain and bolstered by the 2016 
Paris Agreement. Furthermore, investment for the 
achievement of the SDGs, which have become a 
framework for environmental and social investment 
themes, will gain momentum (especially among 
millennial, value and impact investors). This is the 
case of the Church of England National Investment 
Bodies (NIBs), which have recently adopted a new 
investment policy for the extractive sector centred 
on business conduct, responsibility and corporate 
governance (including in the management of risk, 
the side effects of extractive operations and the 
safeguarding of operating standards). This covers 
ethical risks, human rights, social concerns, health 
and safety, corruption and taxation, as well as 
environment and ecology (with the possibility of 
divesting where risks are high).64 
4.3. Conclusion
Ali et al. (2017) point out that the successful delivery 
of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
and implementation of the Paris Agreement require 
technologies that use a wide range of minerals and 
metals in vast quantities. While mineral and metal 
recycling plus technological change will contribute 
to sustaining supply, mining must continue and grow 
for the foreseeable future if we are to ensure that 
minerals and metals remain available to industry. 
New links are needed between existing institutional 
frameworks to oversee responsible sourcing, 
trajectories for mineral exploration, environmental 
practices and consumer awareness of the effects 
of consumption. An international process is needed 
to mitigate the shocks of future supply crises, which 
could be undertaken through a covenant or even 
a treaty. Going forward, the authors propose the 







viable continuity of global mineral supply over the 
coming decades (thereby averting the looming 
crisis): (1) reach consensus on international targets 
for global mineral production; (2) monitor impacts 
of mineral production and consumption; (3) improve 
coordination of mineral exploration; (4) support 
investment and research into new mineral extraction 
technologies; (5) harmonize global best practices for 
responsible mineral resource development; and (6) 
develop maps and inventories showing the availability 
of recyclable metals.
Nonetheless, painting the future picture of minerals 
and metals supply and demand is fairly complex, 
as the respective patterns can change dramatically 
over time due to numerous economic, technical and 
geopolitical factors. For example, in 1954 Africa was 
the key supplier of non-fuel mineral commodities of 
to the United States, closely followed by the United 
Kingdom. By 2014, China was the main source of 
supply for 24 of these commodities, followed by 
Canada.
Drivers of supply and demand tend to interact 
and influence each other in ways that might be 
counterintuitive. For example, higher incomes can 
lead to increased demand for durable goods, but 
at the same time the middle class might be more 
sensitive to the message of responsible consumption 
and thus reduce demand. High demand and high 
prices can also lead to the development of new 
substitutes or new technologies to mine previously 
uneconomic resources (such as fracking technology 
to tap shale gas) that can result in abundance. A shift 
to a green economy and the new digital technologies 
are, on the one hand, creating demand for minerals 
and metals that were previously in more limited 
demand and, on the other hand, reducing demand 
through greater emphasis on recycling and other 
circular-economy related practices. The drivers of 
demand and supply are in constant flux and how they 
interact shapes the pattern of demand-supply.
The way in which minerals are mined, processed 
and used may change dramatically. There is growing 
concern about the impact of mining and processing 
metals on the environment, especially with respect to 
biodiversity and climate change. These new concerns 
are emerging as ore grades are deteriorating, thereby 
creating higher demand for water and energy.  At 
the same time, consumers (mainly in developing 
countries) are demanding that products be produced 
sustainably. Mining companies will have to rethink 
their business models to cope with shifting consumer 
preferences and a tightening regulatory landscape. 
They will need to start seeing themselves as material 
providers so that they can internalize all the costs 
and develop models that can integrate mining, 
processing, product development and recycling. The 
regulation of mining companies may need to change 
to fit this new model.
Meanwhile, primary metal extraction will cover 
most of the world’s material demand in the coming 
decades (Dolega, 2016). Meeting future materials 
demand will mean significant investment in 
exploration and the development of new mines. 
These are costly and risky ventures. It will require 
improving governance at the national level and 
reducing political risk, so as to attract the required 
investments. This could lead to new areas being 
opened up for exploration and development.  
The complexity of the aforementioned issues points 
to the need for a governance framework that can 
accommodate a supply and demand landscape 
that will be in flux going forward. As the value chain 
extends to include recycling and becomes more 
complex, mining companies will have to revisit their 
business models to accommodate a changing 
landscape. The prospect of increased exploration 
and mining to meet future demand requires a sharper 
focus on mitigating the impact of mining, especially 
as extraction moves towards new frontiers where 
past experience in managing these externalities may 
not suffice. 
A coordinated international effort to develop foresight 
capabilities is required to enlighten public and 
industrial strategies, and to strengthen minerals 
and metals governance. There is a need for an 
international body with a similar role to that of the 
International Energy Agency in the energy sector.
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7. Current governance 
architecture
Mine tailings reservoir in Magadascar, receiving slurry through a pipeline from an ore processing plant. Photo: Roel Slootweg © Shutterstock
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5 ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS OF MINING 
5.0. Introduction  
The earlier chapters of this report show that mining 
is important for economic development (Chapter 
2) and for sustainable livelihoods, as in the case of 
ASM (Chapter 3). Demand for minerals will continue 
to grow due to, inter alia, population growth, rising 
urbanization and an expanding middle class - 
especially in the developing countries (Chapter 4). 
This trend is expected to continue, albeit at a slower 
pace, irrespective of the pursuit of a low carbon 
strategy and/or substantial progress towards a 
circular economy. 
This chapter explores the environmental and 
social externalities of mining activities and the 
potential impacts on the viability and future of 
other economic sectors. In particular, sectors that 
show a strong dependence on ecosystem services 
(such as agriculture, nature-based tourism and 
fisheries) may be negatively affected if mining’s 
potential impacts on ecosystem assets and their 
flows to beneficiaries are not addressed. Examples 
of this include deforestation-led erosion affecting 
hydropower dams; habitat loss and fragmentation 
affecting wildlife populations in tourist destinations 
and pollination services; coastal habitat destruction 
decreasing fish stocks; and water and soil 
contamination affecting agricultural production. 
Therefore, the need to invest resource wealth in 
sustainable development goes hand in hand with 
the imperative to manage resource development 
in a way that does not undermine other economic 
sectors.
There is the potential for the impacts of extractive 
activities to become more severe in the future, 
given the trend towards mining lower grade ores. 
One common explanation is that ‘most rich ore 
deposits would have already been exploited leaving 
only lower grades, while others argue that the 
cost effectiveness of mining lower ore grade in 
already developed mine sites distorts the grade 
ratings’ (Dolega et al., 2016).  Whatever the case, 
mining lower grade ore will lead to larger amounts 
of waste, as well as higher energy and water 
demands. Equally, as easily accessible reserves 
become depleted, exploration is moving into more 
remote and often fragile areas. Deep-sea mining is 
one example of a new and challenging frontier for 
mineral extraction. These trends could potentially 
increase environmental and social impacts. The 
good news is that the social and environmental 
impacts of mining now receive far greater attention. 
Public scrutiny by national and international civil 
society has been one force for change. Governments 
are now held to a higher standard of accountability, 
as are donors and international financial institutions.
Environmental and social responsibility does 
not end with the mining operation itself. As an 
inherently obsolescent industry, the closure planning 
of a mine65  must be undertaken as part of the 
development process. Managing environmental and 
social liability potential past closure has been among 
the most neglected areas of mineral governance. 
While laws such as the United States Comprehensive 
Environmental Responsibility Compensation and 
Liability Act (CERCLA) have helped to raise the issue 
of environmental liability, the social impacts of mine 
closure remain largely neglected. Planning for a post-
mining economy that considers social development 
and community satisfaction with quality of life must 
remain an essential goal of improved governance in 
the sector. 
This chapter outlines key environmental and social 
impacts associated with mining activities.  Please 
note that the focus is on the negative impacts of 
mining, as these often present the most pressing 
challenges both for environmental management 
and governance.  However, it should be noted 
that steps are being taken to achieve neutral or 
positive impacts on biodiversity as a result of 
mining activities. Some examples of good practice 
and industry initiatives to address biodiversity and 
ecosystems service impacts are provided in later 
chapters of the report.
65 Mine closure is discussed in Chapter 6 (section 6.1.11).
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5.1. Extractive industry and the environment
The frequently severe and enduring impacts of 
mining activities on the natural environment are 
widely reported. For instance, surface mining often 
cuts back forest and other vegetation cover, removes 
topsoil66 and introduces heavy machinery (which can 
be particularly damaging in fragile environments).  
Chemicals and other harmful substances used to 
process ores can enter waterways and the natural 
environment when not managed appropriately. 
There is often an extensive amount of mine waste 
that can be toxic in nature, posing a significant risk 
through failures of storage facilities to contain the 
waste. There have been a number of catastrophic 
events linked to failures of large facilities, such as the 
Samarco tailings dam disaster in Brazil in November 
2015 (Hatje et al., 2017) (see Figure 5.1). In addition, 
mining does not happen in isolation. There are a 
range of ancillary activities to support operations, 
including roads, railways, energy generation facilities 
and so on. Where mines are located in remote areas, 
the need for new infrastructure and energy generation 
can be particularly important to consider.
The extent and severity of mining impacts on the 
environment depend on the type of operation and 
the sensitivity of the environment (and these vary 
throughout the life cycle of the project). The impacts 
of mining can extend beyond the operations of the 
mine. Closed mines have the potential to cause 
environmental damage as well as posing a risk to 
safety.  Therefore, the potential impacts throughout 
the whole life cycle of a project, and for years beyond 
closure of the mine itself, need to be considered. 
The environmental impacts of extractive activities 
are summarized below, with a view to outlining 
key parameters for environmental governance of 
the sector in later chapters. For a more detailed 
discussion, see Dolega et al. (2016).
5.1.1. Freshwater competition and contamination
A number of environmental problems associated with 
mining stem from contamination and competition 
in relation to surface water and groundwater. The 
66 For instance, for each carat recovered from the Catoca 
mine in Angola, the fourth-largest diamond mine in the 
world, more than a tonne of material is removed (ECA, 
2011).
mining industry is a heavy user of water. It has been 
estimated that 1,600 litres of water are used to obtain 
19 kgs of copper (CSIRO, 2016). This demand creates 
competition for water between mining and other 
uses, especially agriculture. Groundwater lowering for 
mining further aggravates water stress. According to 
ICMM/IFC (2016), 70 per cent of mining operations 
of the six largest mining companies are located in 
water-stressed countries. 
Effluent production poses another challenge. 
Toxic effluent waters from processing that are 
not properly treated or retained can directly 
contaminate surface waters and affect ecosystems, 
biodiversity and human health. The impact of toxins 
can be compounded in the food chain through 
bio-accumulation. The effluent waters contain toxic 
chemicals used in the processing of mineral ores 
such as cyanide, organic chemicals and leached 
heavy metal oxides (including lead and zinc oxides) 
and may also have high levels of acidity (UNEP, 
2010b; ELAW, 2010 cited in Dolega et al., 2016). Water 
contamination has been shown to have a severe and 
far-reaching impact on fish habitats and populations 
located downstream of mines - including aquaculture 
and fisheries (Daniel et al., 2014). 
The extent and severity 
of mining impacts 
on the environment 
depend on the type 
of operation and 
the sensitivity of the 
environment [...] The 
impacts of mining can 
extend beyond the 
operations of the mine. 
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Figure 5.1. The Samarco tailings dam failure in relation to protected areas and habitats
Source: IUCN & UNEP-WCMC (2017).
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Water contamination can result from a number of 
mining activities, including those listed below:
• Effluents discharge: Mining discharges many 
effluents that can seep into water bodies including 
groundwater. There can also be excess water in the 
mineral deposit area as well.
• Excavation leading to water table intrusion: Mining 
often penetrates the earth to depths that reach 
the water table. This allows groundwater to flow 
into the mining pit, which may contaminate local 
groundwater. Contaminated groundwater may 
affect the clean water supply, surface water and 
agricultural soil (via irrigation). 
• Leakages and collapse from Tailing Storage 
Facilities (TSF):67  Leakages from TSFs, if the floor 
and sides are not properly sealed, can lead to 
high concentrations of toxic reagents and heavy 
metals in groundwater. Heavy rainfall, tectonic 
activity and poor construction and management 
can cause a storage facility to collapse and release 
tailings to the environment. Tailings dam failures 
are one of the most devastating environmental 
accidents.68The risk factors for a failure, especially 
from heavy rainfall events and snowmelt, have 
increased with climate change as it likely to lead 
to heavier precipitation events. Figure 5.1gives an 
example of the large areas that can be potentially 
impacted by TSF failures. 
• Acid Mine Drainage (AMD): AMD is one of the 
main problems related to mining. AMD occurs 
when sulphide minerals, which are part of waste 
67 Tailings are the materials left over after wet processes 
used to separate the valuable fraction from the uneconomic 
fraction of an ore. The leftover slurry is referred to as tailings, 
and consists of fine particles and chemical reagents. 
Sometimes, it has high concentrations of toxic substances. 
The tailings are usually stored in impoundments known as a 
Tailing Storage Facility (TSF). 
68 In Brazil in November 2015, a tailings dam failure 
discharged more than 50 million cubic meters of sludge into 
the surrounding areas. The resulting mudflow interrupted 
the drinking water supply of at least 260,000 people. More 
than 600 inhabitants lost their homes and several people 
died. The mudflow contaminated more than 600 km of the 
nearby river Rio Doce (Neves et al. 2016). Water samples 
from the river indicate concentrations of substances 
such as lead, aluminium, iron, barium, copper, boron and 
mercury greatly exceed tolerable levels. The river’s toxic 
water composition now renders it useless for irrigation or 
consumption.
rocks or mining tailings, are exposed to oxygen 
and water - leading to a chemical reaction in which 
sulfuric acid forms. The acid dissolves heavy 
metals, such as arsenic, cadmium, mercury or lead, 
and can contaminate groundwater and soil if no 
restraining systems are installed. AMD after mine 
closure poses a particular threat. Globally, many 
regions face ongoing environmental damage due 
to AMD at closed mining sites. Australia estimates 
that it has 50,000 abandoned mines (Unger et al., 
2012 cited in Dolega et al., 2016). Exemplifying 
a common problem, drinking water was 
contaminated in 2010 by AMD from the abandoned 
Brookstead tin mine in Tasmania (White, 2013, 
cited in Dolega et al., 2016).
Mining activities adjacent to watercourses can also 
cause impacts, such as increased siltation due to 
removal of nearby vegetation cover or changes to the 
temperature regime. 
Water contamination can have a huge impact on 
biodiversity and ecosystem services.  As well as the 
direct impacts of water contamination on aquatic 
life and the wildlife (such as mortality), there are a 
number of other potential impacts. Increased silt 
within watercourses can disrupt visibility and the 
migration patterns of aquatic species, whilst water 
extraction can reduce the availability of water for 
animals and birds at crucial times and locations. In 
extreme cases, long-term changes in the water table 
can fundamentally change the soil conditions in an 
area, leading to different habitat types becoming 
established. 
Changes in sediment depth or water temperature 
within watercourses can also change plant and 
animal assemblages over time. Factors such as 
changes in sedimentation or silt can also impact 
the way ecosystems function and may disrupt 
the environmental, social and economic services 
they provide.  For example, water contamination 
in important fishing or aquaculture areas can have 
particularly negative social and economic impacts.
5.1.2. Impacts to the marine environment
As indicated in Figure 5.1, rivers contaminated 
as a result of mining activities can flow into 
coastal areas, causing impacts on the marine 
environment.  Furthermore, extractive activities in 
the sea and disposal of waste into the sea also pose 
environmental problems, as outlined below.
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• Seabed mining for diamonds in the Sperrgebiet 
region of southwestern Namibia has removed a 
strip of beach 300 metres wide and 110 kilometers 
long. This has taken the beach down to the bedrock 
and increased turbidity and sediment as a result 
of the disposal of the sand tailings directly into the 
ocean (ECA, 2011).
• Mining sites close to bodies of water - like in 
Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea 
and Norway - often dispose of tailings directly 
into rivers or the sea. Currently, sixteen mines in 
eight countries use deep-sea tailings disposal 
techniques (Groß, 2016 cited in Dolega et al., 2016). 
Submarine disposal for mines close to the coast 
is relatively cheaper than on-land disposal, leading 
to distorted price competition with mining sites 
following best-practice waste treatment standards.
Not all risks associated with disposal of tailings in 
deep-sea locations are entirely known. However, initial 
studies already indicate that deep-sea disposal is 
associated with a reduced abundance of aquatic life, 
and there is a general consensus that this practice 
should be banned (Dolega et al., 2016).  Box 5.1 
describes the impacts of seabed mining.
Recent research has shown 
that deep seabed mining 
is likely to cause many 
adverse impacts on deep-
sea ecosystems, including 
a loss of habitat and 
biodiversity
Box 5.1. Impacts of seabed mining
Recent research has shown that deep seabed mining is likely to cause many adverse impacts on 
deep-sea ecosystems (Figure 5.2), including a loss of habitat and biodiversity (van Dover et al., 2017). 
Although the direct seabed footprint may be relatively small in terms of habitat removal or damage, the 
noise, vibrations and changes in light levels can be hugely impactful for marine species. A key concern 
around this is the potential interference of noise and vibrations on marine mammals that use sonar for 
navigation and communication, particularly where this may cause disturbance or barriers along important 
migration routes, at breeding and feeding sites or at critical times of the life cycle. Migratory routes may 
be also be disrupted and cause long-term impacts on migratory patterns. In a similar way to impacts 
on freshwater habitats, potential contamination from discharge, changes in sediment regimes and local 
microclimates have the potential to impact biodiversity and ecosystem services. Communities that rely 
on healthy fisheries can be particularly impacted by mismanagement of mining operations in the marine 
environment. However, where mining operations are conducted sensitively, the fishing exclusion zones 
around them can create refuges for some fish species.  
There is widespread concern that such impacts will be significant and even irreversible because:70
• Many deep-sea species reproduce slowly, live in slow-changing environments and are likely to be highly 
vulnerable to mining impacts;
• The deep sea helps regulate the planet’s life systems, and little is known about the effects of seabed 
mining on that capacity;
• Many deep-sea habitats – hydrothermal vent zones in particular – are compact, localized and particularly 
vulnerable to external impacts;
• There is insufficient scientific knowledge to adequately assess the likely effects of deep-sea mining on 
habitats, biodiversity and ecosystems; and
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Figure 5.2. Environmental impacts of deep-sea mining
5.1.3. Solid waste production69 
Depending on the specific ore grades and degree 
of overburden, the ratio of waste to metal mined is 
large. For example, to mine seven grams of gold, on 
average one tonne of waste material must be mined, 
not including the overburden. Mineral extraction is 
the largest global waste producer, particularly from 
copper, zinc, bauxite and nickel mining (Roche et 
al., 2017; Dolega et al., 2016; Hudson-Edwards et 
al., 2010). The waste generated is usually stored as 
tailings that, as earlier noted, are a major hazard. 
69 MIDAS Research Highlights: High-level summary of 
the key project outcomes, 2016, http://www.eu-midas.net/
library.
Box 5.2 presents how UNECE is supporting member 
countries to address this concern.
The footprint required to store or dispose of solid 
waste can be very large.  This can create additional 
pressures on surrounding habitats, as areas are 
cleared to accommodate large spoil heaps. In 
addition, leachate and particulate matter from solid 
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Box 5.2. Tailings management
UNECE promotes responsible mining as part of a green economy agenda through a range of largely 
separate sectoral activities and instruments.  Tailing management and management of methane gas 
are two areas in which UNECE provides good practice guidance.  Under the UNECE Convention on 
the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents and the Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourse and International Lakes, safety guidelines and good practices for tailings 
management facilities were developed in 2008. 
Tailings Management Facilities (TMFs) store large amounts of mining waste that is generated as 
a by-product when extracting minerals. As such, they can pose serious threats to humans and the 
environment, especially in the event of improper design, handling or management. Hence, a failure may 
result in uncontrolled spills of tailings, dangerous flow-slides or the release of hazardous substances - 
leading to major environmental catastrophes. Effluent from mining tailing (particularly from coal, iron and 
uranium ore mines) is also potential sources of groundwater and soil pollution with heavy metals and 
radionuclide.
Under the Convention on the Transboundary Effects on Industrial Accidents, UNECE promotes effective 
TMF management across the pan-European region. The Safety Guidelines and Good Practices for Tailings 
Management Facilities aim at supporting Governments and stakeholders’ efforts, with a view to limiting 
the number of accidents at tailings management facilities and the severity of their consequences for 
human health and the environment. Several projects on improving TMF safety have been or are being 
implemented in Eastern Europe (Ukraine) and the Caucasus (Armenia and Georgia) based on the UNECE 
Safety Guidelines. The Convention has also taken special note of the need to improve tailings safety in 
Central Asia, where the risk of accidents caused by a natural disaster or infrastructure failure is very high. 
UNECE has initiated and works through an inter-agency coordination group on industrial and chemical 
accidents to strengthen institutional and capacity development for industrial accident prevention, 
preparedness and response.
Source: UNECE (2014)
5.1.4. Air pollution 
All mining stages can affect air quality since 
fine particles and dust are often produced and 
dispersed by the wind. This can lead to a range of 
environmental impacts and adverse human health 
effects, particularly if the dust contains heavy metals.  
Air pollutants also pose a risk to ecosystems, and 
this in turn can impact human health and welfare 
through contaminated food, water and a loss of other 
ecosystem services. Air pollution can also impact 
biodiversity, through both direct and indirect impacts.  
For example, the ability of some plants (including 
a number of agricultural crops) to photosynthesize 
can be compromised by consistent coverings of 
dust, while large quantities of airborne material can 
reduce visibility or cause disruption to the movement 
of animals.  Over longer periods, species fitness and 
survival may be compromised by air pollution, either 
through direct contact or bio-accumulation of heavy 
metals in the food chain.
5.1.5. Soil erosion and contamination 
Land conversion due to mining and its infrastructure 
destroys or contaminates soil cover in many cases, 
which constitutes a long-term or even total loss of 
agricultural potential. Mining processes, such as 
crushing and milling, significantly reduce soil particle 
sizes, thereby aggravating erosion by rainfall, runoff 
water or wind. This can have significant impact on the 
immediate and downstream ecosystems and human 
health. In addition, high sediment loads in surface 
waters commonly lead to drastic changes in aquatic 
ecosystems (as described in more detail above). The 
overall impacts on soil health and biodiversity can be 
very significant in terms of damaging soil structure, 
reducing soil biota and disrupting hydrological 
processes.  This can drastically reduce the number 
of plant species able to grow, modifying habitats 
(and thus the species they support) and leading 
to an increased risk of bio-accumulation for some 
contaminants. 
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Producing one tonne of usable uranium oxide 
requires processing 3,000 tonnes of waste, which 
often contain elevated levels of radioactivity (ECA, 
2011). In addition to uranium mining, the waste from 
extracting other metals is associated with radioactive 
by-elements that can also irradiate tailings sludge. 
Rare-earth element mining and processing often 
coincide with radioactivity leaks from thorium (Dold, 
2014; Walz et al., 2016 cited in Dolega et al., 2016). 
Gold production in the Witwatersrand basin in South 
Africa has produced several billion tonnes of gold 
tailings, with about 600,000 tonnes of contained 
uranium oxide in these tailings (Winde, 2013). Wind 
erosion can then transport the radioactive dust, and 
rainfall and oxygen may dissolve the radioactive 
particles and trigger mine drainage, thereby 
contaminating streams, aquifers and groundwater. 
The radioactivity can enter the food chain and have 
severe and lasting impacts on biodiversity and 
human health.
5.1.7. Habitat clearance 
During mine development, the clearance of natural 
habitats to gain access to mineral deposits - as well 
as to build facilities for storage, processing and waste 
- can have a profound impact on the populations of 
a number of species (particularly if those sites are 
important for key functions such as breeding, feeding 
or migration) (see Box 5.3).
A study by Murguia (2015) showed that large-
scale metal mining activities exert or may intensify 
pressures on bio-diversity by directly and/or indirectly 
changing habitats in an adverse way. The study 
examined the global spatial distribution of mines 
and deposits for five key metals across different 
biodiversity zones.  The study found that mines 
and deposits (especially bauxite and silver) are not 
randomly distributed, but are concentrated within 
intermediate and high diversity zones. In addition, 
increased demand for minerals and the depletion of 
easily accessible reserves are pushing exploration 
and mining into previously inaccessible and/or fragile 
areas, such as the Arctic, and more remote areas 
of the world’s tropical forests, where the impacts 
of direct and induced habitat loss associated with 
mining are particularly severe.
In Europe, a number of initiatives have been 
undertaken to address the loss of biodiversity from 
extractive activities (See Box 5.4). The International 
Finance Corporation’s performance standard 6, 
specifically noting “biodiversity conservation,” is also 
a key development in this regard. In 2012, the revised 
standards required that projects achieve ‘no net loss’ 
of biodiversity in areas of natural habitat and a net 
gain in areas of critical habitat through adoption of 
the mitigation hierarchy. They also include additional 
requirements for operations in protected areas 
(IFC, 2012). This standard has been adopted by 
the Equator Principle Finance Institutions and has 
become a blueprint for best practice in a number of 
industries, including mining and oil and gas. 
Habitat removal can lead to population declines 
in a number of species through direct mortality, 
as well as reduced fitness and survival associated 
with a loss of foraging and breeding areas.  This 
can lead to alterations in the structure and function 
of ecosystems, thereby affecting the provision of a 
range of ecosystem services for people including 
water regulation, pest control, pollination, food 
provision and protection from storms, floods and 
coastal erosion. 
Box 5.3. Biodiversity hotspot: Guinea Sangaredi mine
Bauxite mines and alumina refineries typically 
create serious ecological problems. Bauxite ore 
is mined in open pits, requiring the removal of 
vegetation and topsoil. The Alumina refining 
produces highly caustic “red mud” that negatively 
affects surface and groundwater quality. In addition 
to direct environmental impacts, there are more 
profound effects associated with the increased 
population and infrastructure development 
associated with the mine.
The Sangaredi Mine is Guinea’s largest and most 
profitable mine. Sangaredi Mine is a vast open pit 
approximately 20 kilometres from one end to the 
other. The mine is located in the Upper Guinea 
Forest, and is located within one of the world’s 
most biologically rich, yet seriously threatened, 
ecosystems. Biological assessments of the area 
surrounding the bauxite mine and proposed 
alumina processing facility identified 5 reptile 
species, 17 amphibian species, 140 species of 
birds, 16 species of mammals and 8 primate 
species, including the endangered West African 
chimpanzee and western red colobus.  New 
developments will likely put immense pressure on 
this environmental “hotspot.”
Source: UNEP (2008), cited in ECA (2011).
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Box 5.4 - Protecting biodiversity from extractive activities in Europe
Although Europe is not a big global player in mineral production, Europe has a significant and important 
extractive industry that generates close to 49 billion euros and employs close to 287,000 people.  The 
potential impact of this industry on biodiversity has been acknowledged.  In response, Europe has 
implemented actions to address the loss of biodiversity resulting from extractive activities (EU, 2010). 
Natura 2000 is the centrepiece of the EU nature and biodiversity policy. This is an EU-wide ecological 
network of nearly 26,000 of Europe’s most valuable and threatened species, habitats and ecosystems. 
There is no automatic exclusion of non-energy extractive industry (NEEI) activities in and around Natura 
2000. Instead, extractive activities shall follow the provisions outlined in Article 6 of the Habitats Directive 
to ensure that these activities do not adversely affect the integrity of Natura 2000 sites. The Commission 
Guidelines on ‘Non-energy mineral extraction and Natura 2000’ show how the needs of extractive industry 
can be met while avoiding adverse effects on wildlife and nature. They examine how the potential impacts 
of extraction activities on nature and biodiversity can be minimized or avoided altogether. They also 
highlight the importance of strategic planning, the appropriate assessment of new developments and 
the need for adequate mitigation measures. The guidelines contain many examples of best practice and 
show how some extraction projects can ultimately be beneficial to biodiversity by providing high-quality 
ecological niches (European Comission, 2010).
Europe also regularly assesses the guidelines to determine if they are still relevant. The REFIT Fitness 
Check Tool is a comprehensive policy evaluation of the Birds and Habitats Directives. The evaluation 
assesses if the Directives are fit for purpose by examining their performance against five criteria: 
relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, coherence and EU added-value. This retrospective exercise considers 
what has worked well or poorly, and compares actual performance to earlier expectations. The results will 
be used by the Commission to inform future decisions relating to the EU’s nature policies. 
In a recent evaluation (European Commission, 2016), several industry stakeholders referred to the overly 
restrictive application of the provisions of the Nature Directives by the authorities, which has led to a de 
facto ban on activities in the Natura 2000 protected areas in some parts of the EU. Stakeholders have 
called for a more balanced, proportional and sustainable approach to licensing of potential new mining 
and quarrying developments.
The European Commission has also adopted the Action Plan for nature, people and the economy to 
improve implementation and contribute to reaching the EU’s biodiversity targets for 2020. The Action 
Plan, which calls for reconciling and building bridges between nature, people and the economy, focuses 
on four priority areas and comprises 15 actions to be carried out between now and 2019. Aims include 
identifying best practices on investment for extractive operations and for land rehabilitation and 
restoration by non-energy mineral extractive industry with Member States and other stakeholders, in order 
to complement the existing guidance on non-energy mineral extractive industry (European Comission, 
2017d).
Finally, conferences on extractive industry and biodiversity have been organized within the scope of the 
EU Raw Materials Weeks 2017 and 2018. For more information see: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/content/
raw-materials-week-2017_en and http://eurawmaterialsweek.eu/.
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5.1.8. Impacts on important areas for biodiversity 
Impacts on biodiversity and ecosystems can be 
particularly high where mining activities are located in 
protected areas and other areas of high biodiversity 
value and sensitivity (such as Key Biodiversity 
Areas). Globally, it is estimated that there are 1,604 
mining operations within Key Biodiversity Areas and 
2,075 in Protected Areas.  The countries with the 
greatest number of mining operations within areas 
of biodiversity importance are the United States, 
China, Australia, Brazil and Canada.  These areas of 
biodiversity importance vary in their size and degree 
of vulnerability and irreplaceability. World Heritage 
sites are designated based on outstanding universal 
value and, of the 241 sites that are based on natural 
and mixed natural and cultural values, 33 contain 
a total of 68 mines within their boundaries, with a 
single site containing 12 mines. Alliance for Zero 
Extinction sites represent the last refuge for Critically 
Endangered and Endangered species based on the 
IUCN Red List of Threatened species. Of the 588 sites 
globally identified, 60 contain one or more mines in 
29 countries.  AZE sites are typically small in size, and 
the impacts of mining can therefore be particularly 
severe and could contribute to a global extinction of 
species if not managed properly.  
Figure 5.3 shows areas of biodiversity importance 
(Key Biodiversity Areas and Protected Areas) globally, 
highlighting those that contain mines. These are 
categorized according to the number of mines per 
km2 of biodiversity area.  
Areas of biodiversity importance with relatively 
higher numbers of mines (proportional to the 
designated area) have a greater the potential for 
negative impacts from mining. These higher risk 
areas are predominately found along the west coast 
of the Americas, Western and South-eastern Africa, 
Australia, South-east Asia and across Europe.  
In addition to pressures on areas of biodiversity 
importance as a result of mining activities, there 
have also been instances of protected areas being 
downgraded, downsized or degazetted to allow for 
mineral and oil and gas exploration (Mascia, 2014).  
This could lead to potentially large impacts on the 
conservation status of particular areas and species.
5.1.9. Climate change
While mining affects the environment, climate change 
also has impacts on the mining sector. Extractive 
industries contribute to climate change mostly due to 
environmental destruction of potential carbon sinks 
due to deforestation and degradation of ecosystems. 
Moreover, extraction and processing of natural 
resources can be very energy intensive. Mining is one 
of the most intensive users of heavy fuel oil. Thus, the 
industry has a significant climate change footprint 
(see Box 5.5). The Box describes an action to mitigate 
GhG that is a by-product of coal production. The 
use of extractive natural resources, especially fossil 
fuels, is also the key source of greenhouse gases 
(GHG) that cause climate change. Northgate & Haque 
(2010) provide useful data on the contribution of 
mining to GhG.
It is also now widely recognized that available mineral 
deposits are increasingly deeper and of lower ore 
grades, and that this will lead to growing demand 
for water as well as greater mine waste. This raises 
energy consumption and increases the industry’s 
climate footprint (Rüttinger & Sharma, 2016; 
Dolega et al., 2016). This close connection between 
extractive industries and climate change is further 
complicated by some of the following factors:
• Most mine infrastructure was designed on the 
assumption that the climate is not changing. 
With respect to Canada, Pearce et al. (2010) 
note that the greater intensity and frequency of 
precipitation could damage mining facilities and 
infrastructure. For instance, walls of open-pit 
mines and contaminant structures may not safely 
withstand floods.  The impacts of climate change 
are already being felt. For instance, production 
time lost as a result of closure of coalmines due to 
flooding impacted royalty revenues received by the 
Queensland state of Australia, thereby resulting in 
losses in excess of $5 billion to the State’s gross 
state product (Sharma et al., 2013).
• Climate change-induced drought cycles can 
strain relationships between mining companies 
and communities as each party tries to adapt. 
In Australia, community concerns around mine 
water discharge during floods, and competition 
over water scarcity during droughts, have led to 
some negative reputational impacts for the mining 
industry (Sharma et al., 2013). Indeed, communities 
expect the extractive sector to do more to help 
them adapt to climatic changes. 
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• Climate change polices will impact demand and 
supply of mineral resources. A shift to renewable 
sources of energy and recycling or moving 
from carbon economy to the “green economy” 
is seen as the key pathway for climate change 
mitigation. This would mean less intensive use of 
natural resources. At the same time, adaptation 
and mitigation actions that call for upgrading 
of infrastructure, building flood defenses and 
development of renewable resources will increase 
demand for materials and thus extractives 
resources (Buorgouin, 2014). Global warming due 
to climate change is also opening new areas to 
mining. 
• Climate change will intensify human migration 
and displacement with the potential to destabilize 
governance and property rights regimes, and 
open the door for powerful actors to expand their 
claims on natural resources and thus deepen the 
struggles for control and use of natural resources 
(Freudenberger & Miller, 2010).
Climate change is therefore recognized as a serious 
risk to biodiversity (IPCC, 2002).  It is likely to 
exacerbate many of the impacts discussed in the 
sections above, including increased water scarcity, 
contamination events due to the failure of mining 
infrastructure and pressures associated with indirect 
impacts (see below for more information).  
For the extractive economies, climate change is 
a pressing environmental threat and a significant 
business risk. Climate shocks threaten the larger 
global economy that relies on raw materials derived 
from mineral resources. Some of the world’s largest 
mining operations currently operate in remote, 
climate-sensitive regions (Rüttinger & Sharma, 
2016). Climate change will provoke adjustments in 
the value of mineral resources and, more importantly, 
climate mitigation instruments may profoundly 
alter institutions of mineral resource governance 
in unpredictable ways (as materials for renewable 
energy infrastructure and alternative construction 
materials are developed) (Freudenberger & Miller, 
2010).
Box 5.5. Methane management
Coal production, transportation, storage and use account for approximately 40 per cent of global 
greenhouse gas emissions (UNECE, 2015). Methane, a by-product of coal production, is a potent 
greenhouse gas with a 100-year global warming potential 25 times that of CO2. For the top three world 
producers of coal, total coal mine methane is estimated to range from 5.5 billion cubic metres to 19.3 
billion cubic meters (289.8 Tg CO2e or 289.8 Tg of carbon dioxide) (United States EPA, 2009). The health, 
safety and environmental impacts of methane released during coal mining also need to be addressed. 
In many underground coalmines, methane creates unsafe working conditions that can result in human 
fatalities.  At the same time, the safe extraction of methane saves the lives of miners (even though 
methane extraction has its own risks), while efficient use and destruction of the valuable gas provides an 
affordable but cleaner burning fuel for the communities that surround mining complexes.
While technological advances have significantly reduced methane emissions from even the gassiest 
mines, deployment of these technologies and movement towards zero methane-related fatalities and 
lowered methane emissions is not universal, and may be impeded by a lack of awareness of the guiding 
principles for methane drainage and use in coal mines (UNECE, 2015). In this context, UNECE has 
developed Best Practice Guidance on Effective Methane Drainage and Use in Coal Mines. The document 
presents recommended principles and standards on coalmine methane capture and use in a clear and 
succinct way, providing decision makers with a solid base of understanding from which to direct policy 
and commercial decisions.
The principles outlined therein are intended to complement existing legal and regulatory frameworks and 
to support development of safer and more effective practices where industry practice and regulation 
continue to evolve. While the Best Practice Guidance is envisioned primarily as a tool to support 
performance- and principle-based regulatory programmes, it can also complement more prescriptive 
regulation and support the transition to performance-based regulation.
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5.1.10. Induced, indirect and cumulative impacts
In addition to the direct impacts of mining operations, 
there are a host of other indirect and induced effects 
that often occur within the landscape. 
Mining, when properly managed, can have positive 
outcomes. It not only offers direct employment to a 
local workforce (sometimes at higher salaries) but 
also stimulates ancillary development to provide 
better infrastructure and services required by an 
operation (such as health care). Particularly in areas 
of low employment and high poverty, in-migration 
of people to the area is a common effect. Additional 
positive impacts include increased revenues for 
local government, development of infrastructure, 
local contracts, benefit sharing and diversification 
of livelihoods. If not properly planned and managed, 
mining can result in negative environmental 
consequences including land conversion, habitat 
fragmentation and degradation, increased levels of 
wildlife poaching, increased fishing pressure and 
so on. A recent assessment of chimpanzees in 
eastern DRC found that key populations had declined 
by 80-98 per cent, principally due to poaching 
for bushmeat (Plumptre et al., 2015).  Hunting is 
particularly intense around artisanal mining and 
logging camps, where bushmeat is often the main 
source of protein (Ondoua Ondoua et al., 2017). 
These impacts can be particularly profound if mining 
takes place within previously undisturbed areas, 
and can far outweigh the direct impacts of mining 
that have been outlined above (Edwards et al., 2013; 
Laurance et al., 2009). 
Mining activities can also cause indirect yet profound 
impacts through the introduction of invasive species 
that lead to population declines of native species 
though predation and competition for resources, 
breeding sites and so forth. This can in turn lead 
to altered habitats and ecosystem functions, with 
resulting impacts on the provision of ecosystem 
services. Furthermore, mining tends to occur in 
clusters around a region and the impacts need to 
be managed with cumulative development in mind. 
Thus, there may be synergies in waste-management 
systems or other mitigation measures that can be 
more efficiently managed at a regional level if such 
a cumulative approach is built into environmental 
assessments.
Mining activities can 
also cause indirect 
yet profound impacts 
through the introduction 
of invasive species that 
lead to population 
declines of native species 
though predation 
and competition for 
resources, breeding sites 
and so forth.
5.2. The mining industry and society
Mining activities are embedded in communities 
and thus have profound impacts on the affected 
communities. Many activities require land and water, 
and this will consequently have an impact on the 
livelihoods of the communities occupying the area 
where mineral extraction is to take place. 
5.2.1. Social breakdown
Mining activities can have a significant impact on 
social structure (see Box 5.6) and social order due to 
unusual labour flows: 
• Disruption of livelihoods due to displacement, 
dispossession and the impact of environmental 
challenges wrought by mining activities. This has 
direct implications as it disrupts complex land 
tenure systems of the people with informal and 
traditional rights.
• Social disharmony due to increased internal 
economic inequalities – for example, between 
men and women, between those with jobs at the 
mine and those without, and between communities 
receiving royalty payments and other benefits 
and resource rents and those who do not. The 
emergence of mechanized mining is also leading 
to a reduction of employment opportunities. 
Gender inequalities are particularly exacerbated 
due to unequal access to jobs in the mining sector, 
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the loss of male support for household work 
and women expending more energy accessing 
safe water and food because of degraded 
environments.  As men are more likely to migrate 
to work in the mines, this leads to a high share 
of female-headed households. For example, in 
Zimbabwe female-headed households represented 
up to 40 per cent of households in 2015 (World 
Bank, 2015). Migration of mine workers also 
leads to an increased prevalence of HIV due to 
prostitution around mining sites (Hargrove, 2008; 
Sagaon-Teyssier et al., 2017). HIV/AIDS has a 
disproportionate adverse impact on women and 
girls. This is not simply due to higher infection rates 
among this group, but also because of women’s 
traditional role as caregivers meaning that healthy 
women are forced to exit the labour force to care 
for sick household members. 
• The local economic structure is altered as 
livelihoods are lost and local economic activity 
is reorganized to meet the needs of the mine. 
Local communities become dependent on the 
mine and thus vulnerable to economic cycles of 
commodities markets. 
• A large influx of outsiders or immigrant miners who 
not integrated into the local community or subject 
to its social constraints means a breakdown of 
norms that keep order and harmony, thereby 
creating tensions that can lead to violence.
The result of all these social changes can lead 
to the collapse of social order and unleashing of 
phenomena including violence, prostitution, gambling, 
drug use and alcoholism that can accompany such 
breakdown. The use of child and forced labour is also 
common in mining, which constitutes a menace to 
society.
Gender inequalities are 
particularly exacerbated due 
to unequal access to jobs in 
the mining sector, the loss of 
male support for household 
work and women expending 
more energy accessing safe 
water and food because of 
degraded environments.
Box 5.6. Displacement from the Thach Khe iron ore 
mine
The Thach Khe iron ore mine is an open pit iron 
ore mine in central Viet Nam. Its reserves have 
been estimated at 544 million tonnes, or 60 per 
cent of Viet Nam’s total iron ore reserves. 
Mining activities were expected to impact 
around 4,000 hectares of land in six communes 
with about 4,000 households (16,800 people). 
These households were required to relocate. 
Under the resettlement plan, all households 
should have been resettled between 2009 and 
2013, with 60 per cent of the total relocated 
between 2010 and 2011. However, the mining 
company failed to contribute the promised 
capital. In 2009, the company had committed to 
contribute AU$65 million by 2010 but by 2012 
had provided AU$11.05 million. 
As a result, resettlements were significantly 
delayed and some not completed. The delay in 
the resettlement process has seriously affected 
the lives of the displaced people. In particular, 
the mining company commenced excavation 
operations before relocation had been finalized. 
The local people who had not been resettled 
on time were exposed to water shortages and 
contamination, air pollution, dust and noise.
Source: UNDP and UN Environment (2018).
5.2.2. Human rights
Serious human rights violations accompany the 
social breakdown that can occur in the wake of 
the onset of extractive activities. Forced eviction 
or relocation are common features of mining 
operations. This is a serious human rights violation, 
especially for indigenous people whose livelihoods 
are closely intertwined with the land. They derive 
much of their livelihoods from biodiversity services, 
and they have accumulated significant relevant 
knowledge for their sustainable use. Many indigenous 
people are ill-equipped to participate in modern 
economies, and the expropriation of the land usually 
leads them to destitution.
Another challenge relates to militarization of society. 
The competition for resources (land, water and 
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revenues derived from extractives activities) can lead 
to serious conflicts that can lead to parties taking 
up arms. Mining companies can arm themselves 
to protect their properties; local people can form 
militias to protest their rights; and governments can 
deploy security forces to forestall or quell violence. 
Militarization inevitably leads to human rights 
violations, with women disproportionately impacted 
through increased sexual violence in these areas 
(Manning, 2016; Gilmore et al., 2016).  Human rights 
defenders in mining areas also receive threats and 
attacks. Lakhani (2017) reports that 21 land rights 
defenders have been killed in Guatemala since 2010.
In addition, workers’ rights constitute an important 
issue in the context of the extractive industry.  ILO 
(undated) states that, in many large-scale mining 
operations, freedom of association and collective 
bargaining have often been contested by mining 
companies - leading to severe clashes between 
labour and management. The denial of civil liberties; 
undue restrictions on the right to strike; interference 
by governments in the functioning of workers’ 
organizations; and restrictive legislation are common 
challenges. The fatal shooting of 34 workers at the 
Marikana platinum mine in South Africa in August 
2012 underscores some of the gross human right 
violations due to employment conditions in mines 
that may pay wages that are barely above the poverty 
line.
5.2.3. Conflict
Extractive industries often operate in complex social 
environments surrounded by communities living 
in extreme poverty. The perceptions of increased 
inequality that result from mining booms usually 
generate tensions between local governments and 
national governments due to resource nationalism, 
as well as local-level conflicts relating to property 
rights and mining impacts.  Conflict can easily 
become a full-blown war and can represent the most 
devastating social impact of extractive activities (as 
was observed in the case of the Bougainville conflict 
in Papua New Guinea) (Cochrane, 2017). 
The very existence of extractive resources unleashes 
new political dynamics, as various factions seek to 
control the resources - especially if the State is weak 
or corrupt. Extractive resources corrode governance 
structures and weaken the State, as they become the 
object of capture. In this context, local conflicts can 
easily take on new dimensions. Local militias can 
easily morph into mafias. The potential monetary 
gains can lure foreign rebel groups and mercenaries 
into the fighting and broaden existing conflicts. 
Methods used by armed groups to exploit minerals 
include extorting or “taxing” mining companies 
and intermediaries, or directly operating mineral 
extraction sites. 
Conflict situations are more likely to attract extractive 
firms that have higher risk tolerance and lower 
reputation concerns. Such firms are much more 
likely to have poor industry practice in terms of the 
environment, human rights and fiscal performance. 
Conflicts then exacerbate all the other challenges, 
and mining can become a “threat multiplier.” Conflict 
driven by minerals is now a major item on the global 
agenda and has seen the launch of many initiatives to 
curb the flow of resources to armed groups from the 
sale of minerals.
5.2.4. Health and safety 
Extractive activities have the potential to create 
serious health and safety challenges in terms of 
occupational exposure as well as public health 
in general. The health challenges due to mining 
activities are closely related to the environmental 
challenges. Contamination of water, air and soil 
eventually translates into human health challenges. 
For instance, an environmental assessment of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo found extremely 
significant concentrations of highly toxic cobalt salts 
in the Katanga province, illustrating the link between 
environmental damage and human health (ECA, 
2011). Poor working conditions are also of concern. 
Issues include low or non-existent health standards, 
fatal accidents with heavy machinery, shaft and slope 
collapses and water invasions (Schuler et al., 2016a). 
Furthermore, underground mining has specific risks 
such as subsidence, slopes collapse and methane 
leaks. The extent of these impacts is recognized in 
some regulatory systems in the form of specialized 
agencies such as the Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) in the United States.
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5.3. Application of S-LCA to assessing social 
and environmental impacts70 
5.3.1. Social - Life Cycle Assessment (S-LCA)
There are a variety of approaches to assess the 
social and environmental impacts and benefits of 
mining and/or metallurgy. Tools taking into account 
a life-cycle perspective such as life-cycle assessment 
(LCA) are especially powerful in assessing material 
supply chains, as they allow consideration of 
the various life-cycle stages (from extraction 
of raw materials to end-of-life), identification of 
different burdens and possible ‘hot-spots’ and the 
identification of unintended consequences. Life-
cycle approaches are indispensable in supporting 
decisions toward more sustainable consumption 
and production (Pennington et al., 2007), and are 
increasingly forming the backbone of European 
environmental policies. Examples of life-cycle based 
environmental policies include the Communication 
on Sustainable Consumption and Production (EC, 
2008) and the Communication on Circular Economy 
(EC, 2015).  
Life-cycle assessment (LCA) in the metals and 
mining sector provides a tool for systematically 
evaluating the potential environmental and social 
impacts of products, services and technologies. LCA 
examines inputs (resources and energy) and outputs 
(emissions, wastes and desired products) from 
“cradle to grave,” that is, across the entire product life 
cycle from resource extraction to material processing 
to manufacturing and fabrication to use and then to 
end-of-life (Cleveland and Morris 2014; ISO 2006a, 
2006b). With this approach, LCA can help identify 
and avoid shifting of environmental burdens, such 
as from one life cycle stage to another or from one 
environmental threat to another. Recent work has 
focused on broadening the traditional LCA framework 
to integrate environmental, social and economic 
aspects at varying spatial levels, also referred to as 
life cycle sustainability assessment (LCSA) (UNEP, 
2011). Publicly available life-cycle inventory (LCI) data 
are collected for different world regions and countries 
70 Other approaches include environmental impact 
assessment, environmental and social impact assessment, 
environmental risk assessment (Manhart et al, 2018) and 
so on .The intention here is not to review all the approaches 
but to show the application of SLCA to assessing social and 
environmental impacts.
such as the United States,71 Europe,72 and China.73
Recent years have seen a tremendous increase in 
the literature related to environmental LCAs (E-LCA) 
of the mining and metals production sector.74 The 
production of primary (virgin) metal typically includes 
ore mining and concentrating, smelting or separation 
and refining to obtain the element in its metallic form, 
alongside a variety of processing routes (Chapman & 
Roberts, 1983; Gupta ,2004).
Common environmental impact categories include, 
cumulative energy requirement and global warming 
potential, as well as more local impacts related 
to the release of toxic substances (human- and 
eco-toxicity impacts) or air emissions (particulate 
matter, acidification, and eutrophication), as well as 
water use and land use related indicators. The metal 
and mining industry also routinely conducts LCA 
studies using industry data (Baitz, Bayliss, & Russell-
Vaccari, 2016). However, studies are often conducted 
independently leading to potential inconsistencies, for 
example in the system boundaries and background 
data sources used.
Social LCA (S-LCA) integrates traditional 
LCA methodology with additional social and 
socioeconomic aspects. Unlike traditional LCA that 
focuses on environmental impacts, S-LCA aims 
at assessing both negative and positive impacts 
affecting different stakeholders throughout a 
product’s life cycle. It represents one of several 
approaches to evaluating social implications in 
material supply chains. While data collection in 
E-LCA is based mostly on physical quantities related 
to a product or service life cycle, S-LCA requires 
information on organization-related aspects along the 





74 See, for example, Baitz, Bayliss, and Russell-Vaccari, 
2016; Lee & Wen, 2016; Norgate, Jahanshahi, & Rankin, 
2007; Nuss & Eckelman, 2014; Rönnlund et al., 2016; 
Schreiber et al. ,2016; Vahidi, Navarro, & Zhao, 2016; van der 
Voet et al., 2013; Weng et al., 2016; and Zaimes et al., 2015.
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The S-LCA methodology was developed in 
accordance with the ISO 14040 and 14044 standards 
for E-LCA (ISO 14044, 2006). Methodological 
guidelines on S-LCA have been issued within the 
Life Cycle Initiative, a cooperation initiative between 
UN Environment and the Society of Environmental 
Toxicology and Chemistry (SETAC) (UNEP/SETAC 
Life Cycle Initiative, 2009). The UNEP/SETAC 
Guidelines are the outcome of a broad, global, 
transparent and open process involving many 
relevant stakeholders from the public, academic 
and business sectors. They provide an important 
methodological reference framework for S-LCA, 
especially for the first two phases of S-LCA (goal 
and scope definition and life cycle inventory). As 
social sustainability can encompass a variety of 
aspects, they recommend a set of stakeholder 
categories and impact subcategories. However, 
the S-LCA methodology is still under development, 
and a standardized set of indicators for assessing 
social performance is still lacking. Several alternative 
methodological frameworks for social life-cycle 
assessment have been proposed in recent years 
(Kühnen & Hahn, 2017; Pelletier et al., 2016; Petti 
et al., 2016; Sureau et al., 2017). When modelling 
a supply chain in an S-LCA study, data gathering 
consists of both primary (site-specific) data and 
secondary data on social aspects related to country-
specific sector (CSS) available in S-LCA databases 
(Sala et al., 2016).75
Use of S-LCA database for preliminary screening of 
social risk in raw materials industries 
S-LCA databases are repositories of social indicator 
data relevant to a set of impact categories. Data used 
to populate the databases are drawn from a broad 
range of reputable, publicly available sources such as 
the statistical agencies of the World Bank, the World 
Health Organization and the International Labour 
Organization. The data available for each indicator 
cover a set of country-specific sectors. When data 
are unavailable for some countries or sectors, 
extrapolation techniques are applied. In general, these 
databases include three main components (Figure 
10.9):
75 Currently, two commercial databases for S-LCA are 
available: Social Hotspot Database (developed by New 
Earth, http://socialhotspot.org/) and Product Social Impact 
Life Cycle Assessment developed by GreenDelta (https://
psilca.net/).
• A global input/output model, representing the 
structure of the global economy 
• A worker hour’s model that ranks CSS by labour 
intensity (disclosing, for each country and sector, 
the worker hours needed to produce 1 US$ of 
output) 76
• A social risk assessment module (for each 
indicator, risk levels are assigned and converted 
into characterization factors).
By multiplying the level of social risk in country-
specific sectors by the worker hours per dollar of 
output in each sector, the S-LCA database quantifies 
(in an additive manner) the distribution of potential 
social risk along product supply chains. Risks are 
quantified in “medium risk hours”, which is the 
number of worker hours along the supply chain 
that are characterized by a certain social risk. The 
resulting data sets can be used, complementary 
to other social impact assessments, to highlight 
possible social risks in supply chains and carry out 
supply chain due diligence. An illustrative preliminary 
example of such an analysis is presented in the 
annex (Appendix 5). 
Figure 5.4 is a schematic figure showing the general 
structure of social life-cycle assessment databases 
as one possible source of data for evaluating social 
implications in material supply chains.
76 The worker hours model is derived by dividing total 
wages paid out by country and sector per dollar of output 
based on the GTAP (Global Trade Analysis Project) I-O 
model, and country/sector-specific wage estimates to 
characterize worker hours per country, sector and dollar of 
output.
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Uncertainty and data quality
Data quality is a critical issue in any LCA study. 
The database used for the analysis provides an 
assessment of the data quality for the results 
obtained, which is summarized in Figure 5.5 above. 
Data quality is particularly poor in the category of 
corruption and bribery for India, while fatal and 
non-fatal accidents categories have low temporal 
conformance in most of the countries (data available 
from the original data source were five years older 
than the database). We note that assessments such 
as the one above should be seen as a starting point 
for further analysis at a more detailed level, such 
as through due diligence implementation in supply 
chains. Furthermore, other sources of uncertainty 
affecting the analysis include:
• The input/output model used to develop the 
database; 
• The extrapolation techniques used in the social risk 
assessment (for instance, when data for a specific 
country are unavailable, regionally representative 
countries are used as proxies); and 
• The different reporting schemes used in data 
collection by different countries (for instance data, 
for the same indicator on labour accident can 
come from insurance records, labour inspectorate 
records and so on). 
Europe is reliant on imports for many metals. In some 
cases, when the extra-EU supply is concentrated 
in very few countries with poor governance and 
substitution possibilities are limited, materials 
are considered as critical for the EU economy.77 
The European Union produces an assessment of 
materials’ criticality on a regular basis in order to 
tackle the risk of potential supply disruption. Besides 
security of supply considerations, the import of 
raw materials from other regions implies a shifting 
of environmental and social burdens linked to the 
production of these materials. As an example, the 
report analyses the EU supply of aluminium and the 
social impacts related to the import of this material 
from different countries. The entire EU supply of Al 
is composed of 36 per cent of domestic production 
(mainly from Germany, France and Spain) and 64 per 
cent imports from extra-EU countries (mainly Norway, 




Figure 5.5. Data quality assessment for five criteria
 
R C T G F R C T G F R C T G F R C T G F R C T G F R C T G F R C T G F R C T G F
Association and bargaining rights 2 3 4 1 4 2 3 4 1 4 2 3 4 1 4 2 3 4 1 4 2 3 4 1 4 2 3 4 1 4 4 4 5 3 4 2 3 4 1 2
Corruption and bribery 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 3 5 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3
Discrimination - gender wage gap 3 2 4 2 3 4 2 3 2 3 4 2 4 2 3 3 1 3 1 1 3 1 4 1 2 3 1 3 1 1 3 1 3 1 2 3 1 5 1 1
Fair salary 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 4 1 2 2 2 3 1 2 2 1 4 1 2 2 2 4 1 1 2 2 3 1 2 2 1 4 1 2 2 2 2 1 2
Fatal accidents 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 5 3 3 2 3 5 1 3 2 3 5 1 2 2 3 4 1 2 3 3 5 2 3 2 3 5 1 3 2 3 3 1 2
Human trafficking 2 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 4 2 1 1 1 4
Indigenous rights 3 1 2 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 3 1 2 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 3 1 2 1 1
Non-fatal accidents 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 5 2 3 2 3 5 1 3 3 4 5 3 3 2 3 3 1 2 3 4 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 2 3 4 1 2
Safety measures 2 4 1 3 2 2 4 1 5 2 2 4 1 3 2 2 4 1 5 2 2 4 1 3 2 2 4 1 4 2 2 4 1 5 2 2 4 1 1 2
Working time 2 3 3 1 3 2 3 5 1 3 2 3 3 1 3 2 4 5 1 4 2 1 2 1 3 2 3 4 1 3 2 3 3 1 3 2 2 2 1 3
Australia Brazil United StatesSounth AfricaRussian FederationFranceIndiaChile
Source: PSILCA database. 
Notes: Criteria: R: Reliability of the source(s); C: Completeness conformance; T: Temporal conformance; G: Geographical 
conformance; F: Further technical conformance. Scores are ranging from 1 (very good quality) to 5 (bad quality).
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In this report, we calculate the social risk of metal 
production sectors in producing countries using 
the PSILCA database and weight them according to 
their share in EU supply. Figure 5.6 below shows the 
amount of medium risk hours per 1$ output of Al. The 
production from EU countries is grouped together in 
one category (Total EU) in order to match it against 
the extra-EU supply. Child labour, fair salary and 
corruption are the most critical social impacts, with 
Mozambique and the Russian Federation contributing 
the most to these impacts.
Figure 5.7 shows the relative contribution of the 
supplying countries (and EU) to the different social 
risks, and compares it with the supply share in 
terms of mass. While EU supply is 34 per cent of the 
total, its contribution to social impacts is generally 
lower. Similarly, Norway’s share of aluminium supply 
to the EU is 14 per cent, but the social impacts 
relating to this country are much lower in all the 
impact categories. From a policy perspective, these 
examples highlight that a sustainable supply of raw 
materials should consider the shifting of burdens due 
to international trade and imports.
While the assessment of environmental impacts can 
benefit from more established techniques (E-LCA), 
the quantitative assessment of social impacts along 
the supply chain is still in its early stages. S-LCA 
databases offer a wide spectrum of information on 
global supply chain working conditions and human 
rights that could be used for a better understanding 
of social risk in different world regions and sectors. 
For example, in this assessment, S-LCA was used 
to compare the mining sector in different countries 
based on the social risk for a selected set of impact 
categories. However, the fact that the analysis is 
at the level of country-sectors means that possible 
regional differences within the country or company 
behaviour might not be fully taken into account. 
Further refinement of these metrics can, however, be 
undertaken at the sub-national level, particularly with 
the assistance of the corporate sector (see Appendix 
5.1 for examples of applications of S-LCA).
5.3.2. Tracking impacts at the corporate level 
through improved governance 
The United States statistician, W. Edward Deming, 
studied Japan’s tremendous business success 
in the aftermath of World War II and proposed 
a much-celebrated concept in business circles 
known as “Total Quality Management” (TQM). 
Japan’s resource usage was particularly efficient 
and their environmental and social impact per unit 
of industrial output continues to be far lower than 
most developed countries. Deming proposed that 
Total Quality Management entails looking at all 
stakeholders involved in the process of production 
and consumption of a product.  Expanding on this 
concept in the 1990s, environmental managers 
suggested adding an ‘E’ to the acronym and 
expanding its scope to include all environmental 
flows in the production process. TQEM lays a lot 
of emphasis on the measurement of performance, 
continued change and innovation. Decision-making 
should be data-driven and there should be an 
emphasis on continuous improvement.  
Design should be geared toward quality and must 
anticipate problems, as opposed to reacting to 
mistakes. From an environmental standpoint, this 
may be achieved through management changes, 
technological improvements and the establishment 
of self-correction mechanisms. There is a need 
for corporations to institute this management 
mechanism and for governments to encourage its 
establishment through institutional cooperation. 
TQEM programmes require greater communication 
between various departments of a corporation 
so that environmental concerns can be tackled 
collectively. For example, the manufacturing and 
sourcing department needs to coordinate modular 
design for easy recyclability with the research and 
development (R&D) department of a company. Most 
large United States corporations have developed 
TQEM programmes that have also been embraced 
by the larger mining companies. However, change 
management within the mining sector has met with 
certain structural limitations around the way material 
flows are considered by the business environment. 
Although social and environmental performance of 
the sector has shown a remarkable shift from the 
two-decade period of 1995 to 2015 (Franks, 2015), 
the broader structural incentives for change need to 
be realigned with non-linear material flows. 
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Figure 5.6. Illustration of possible social risk in the EU supply of raw materials.
Figure 5.7. Illustration of possible relative contributions to the social risk of EU aluminium supply and comparison with the 
production shares 
Source: Authors’ preliminary assessment calculated using PSILCA database.
Source: Authors’ preliminary assessment calculated using PSILCA database.
Industrial ecologists suggest that a product remains 
the responsibility of the producer until it is actually 
absorbed by the system it enters. Therefore, food 
products that are digested by organisms no longer 
remain the responsibility of the producers. However, 
products containing materials such as steel and 
plastics do indeed remain the responsibility of the 
producer since they are not permanently digested or 
“metabolized” by any entity and become a liability on 
the system after usage. This is particularly a problem 
with obsolescent technology items such as cars, 
computers and photocopiers.  Increasingly, there is a 
trend to have product-take back schemes, where the 
producer must take back the product after use and 
is responsible for either refurbishing it or disposing 
of it in an environmentally appropriate manner.  Such 
schemes have been especially successful with 
photocopiers and laser printers in the United States.
A few attempts have been made in the management 
literature to examine various ways of implementing 
the principles of industrial ecology in the corporate 
world, most notably in the writings of Paul 
Shrivastava, who notes that industrial societies have 
traditionally led managers to focus their efforts 
on the creation of wealth through technological 
expansion, whereas managers in post-industrial 
societies must shift their efforts towards managing 
risks that accrue from the creation and distribution 
of wealth (Shrivastava, 1995). His analysis is based 
on a study of major industrial accidents such as the 
methyl isocyanate leakage from a Union Carbide 
plant in Bhopal, India. Risk, he proposes, is thus the 
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does indeed provide many jobs, but that services 
associated with product repair and recycling can 
provide comparable impacts when evaluated through 
life-cycle analysis. 
It is also important to consider how corporate entities 
manage their data, and the impact this can have on 
community conflicts. The demand for transparency 
in the extractive industries is partly driven by this 
concern. Lack of data on impacts – both positive 
and negative – can lead to conspiracy theories 
and exacerbate conflicts as shown in Box 5.7. 
However, it is important to recognize that many of 
these initiatives are currently focused on economic 
reporting rather than reporting of ecological and 
social impacts. The situation of monitoring and 
governing impacts is even more complex when 
dealing with artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), 
which is often linked to conflict and can prove to be 
less amenable to formal regulatory reform. 
primary motivating force behind the adoption of 
industrial ecological principles by managers in the 
modern corporation.
While Shrivastava’s model of “eco-centric 
management” is useful from a macroscopic 
perspective, he does not offer suggestions for how 
the business administration of a corporation or 
government institutions should change in tangible 
ways. What follows is a brief set of recommendations 
in nine significant sectors of a modern corporation 
that would follow the paradigm of industrial 
ecology. It is important to appreciate that 70 per 
cent of our economy is now in the service sector 
and hence many of the changes recommended for 
the manufacturing sector will inevitably need to be 
reinforced in the service sector.
The measures described above are by no means 
an exhaustive listing, but provide a skeletal set of 
points to consider when reconfiguring a corporation 
to account for material cycles. These measures 
also attempt to bear in mind that manufacturing 
Stockpiles at Sundown. Photo: mabus13 © Getty images 
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1. Strategic Planning Division
• Plan to integrate vertically rather than 
horizontally in order to minimize transactional 
impact on mineral resources that are to be 
used in the production process.
• Avoid large transportation costs and resulting 
pollution by geographically locating facilities in 
closer proximity to each other. 
• Look for synergies in energy and waste 
utilization with nearby industries through the 
establishment of eco-industrial parks. Share 
best practices with industries to achieve better 
cooperation.
2. Government and Community Relations 
Department
• Lobbying efforts of the industry should focus 
on long-term voluntary compliance initiatives, 
which could reduce the infrastructure 
required for compliance-centered government 
agencies. However, voluntary compliance 
must be effectively enforced internally.
• Favour integrated environmental regulations 
rather than the conventional air, water and 
waste mode of incremental regulations.
• Dispute resolution and negotiation strategies 
should be favoured over legal action to reduce 
transaction costs of litigation, unless it is 
important to set an institutional precedent with 
a case.
3. Research and Development Division
• Utilize industrial ecology concepts of Design 
for Environment and Dematerialization to 
develop eco-friendlier products.
4. Manufacturing / Sourcing Division
• Coordinate activities with R&D sector to 
ensure manufacturing processes optimize 
energy usage for product manufacturing.
• Choose suppliers that are in close 
proximity to the manufacturing location to 
reduce transportation costs and risks of 
environmental accidents.
5. Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) 
Department
• Move from compliance-oriented EHS 
management to proactive pollution prevention.
• Work with R&D department to see if emissions 
can somehow be reused in the manufacturing 
process in your company or in other nearby 
companies.
6. Financial Management and Accounting 
Departments
• Use a low discount rate for evaluating the 
future benefits of environmental projects in 
order to ensure that the long-term benefits 
are accounted for. Consider reporting 
performance over longer time horizons as 
well.
• Include the cost of resource depletion or 
resource amelioration when calculating the 
company’s profitability.
7. Human Resources Department
• Provide training for all employees on 
environmental issues so that company 
initiatives are appreciated and taken in context 
(an ecoliteracy requirement across the 
company).
• Encourage employees to live near the 
company’s location and provide incentives for 
use of collective or public transportation.
8. Marketing Department
• Reduce advertising through paper-based or 
other disposable media.
• Persuade industry competitors to produce and 
market items with ecological impact data and 
benchmarks on product labels to encourage 
positive competition on environmental 
performance.
9. Customer Service Department
• Encourage customers to participate in 
product-take back by offering incentives for 
recycling and return of products.
• Provide services for product repair or 
telephone guidance for home repairs with 
modest fees as a revenue stream, rather than 
encouraging obsolescence.
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Box 5.7. Information deficits on impacts and conflict escalation78
In the extractive industries, a lack of access to reliable information about the distribution of benefits and 
the impacts of projects can be a key contributor to the breakdown of trust and misperceptions that can 
fuel social conflicts and spiral into violence. Social conflicts in the extractives sector threaten national 
cohesion and peace, and prevent the sector from making important development contributions. In Peru, 
over US$8.5 billion of investment in the extractives sector have been blocked due to conflicts, whilst 53 
people were killed and more than 1500 injured over the past 15 years.79 80 per cent of conflicts were 
related to the environmental impacts of mining operations, above all the availability and quality of water 
resources. The International Finance Corporation and the International Council of Mining and Metals 
have found that 70 per cent of operations of the world’s biggest mining companies are located in water-
stressed areas. The impacts of climate change, including increasing water scarcity, will only make matters 
worse. Getting it right is more important than ever before. Whereas a number of global initiatives are 
already promoting greater transparency in the sector, environmental transparency is often neglected. The 
Global Reporting Initiative is a voluntary mechanism that has been operational since 1997 and includes 
a series of standards for effective reporting of impacts that could be further strengthened through 
accountability mechanisms.
The importance of access to information has been recognized at the global level and initiatives promoting 
transparency are proliferating. Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration emphasizes the need for citizens to 
have appropriate access to information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities 
and the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. Founded in 2003, the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was the first global effort to bring greater transparency to the 
extractive sector. The 51 EITI implementing countries commit to publishing annual reports that disclose 
the revenues from the extraction of the countries’ extractive resources. Companies report payments to 
government (taxes, royalties) and the government reports what it has received (EITI, 2017). The reports 
are reconciled by an independent auditor and also include information related to beneficial ownership 
disclosure, licence and contract information.  In this way, over US$1.9 billion worth of government 
revenues from oil, gas and minerals have been disclosed so far. 80
Whereas initiatives such as EITI represent an important first step in providing public access to financial 
information in the extractive sector, they stop short of increasing transparency related to the social and 
environmental performance of projects. Financial transparency is critically important, but the concerns of 
local communities in the vicinity of operations tend to focus on the more immediate impacts of a project. 
This includes the impact of operations on the availability and quality of local water supplies or the number 
of local jobs created. Excluding this data from public disclosure creates ‘information asymmetries’, where 
stakeholders have unequal access to information. So far, efforts to increase transparency in the sector do 
not go far enough to address these information asymmetries and help citizens understand the distribution 
of benefits and risks across a project life cycle.
There are also large risks of corruption during procurement, such as companies being forced to procure 
from businesses connected to political elites.81This needs to be addressed.
78 Contributed by: David Jensen and Inga Petersen – UN Environment, Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch.
79 The Economist ‘Mining in Latin America: From conflict to cooperation’, February 6, 2016. http://www.economist.com/
news/americas/21690100-big-miners-have-better-record-their-critics-claim-it-up-governments-balance.
80 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Factsheet (April 2017) https://eiti.org/sites/default/files/documents/eiti_
factsheet_en.pdf. 





Environmental and social impacts are the main 
factors leading to a lack of public acceptance in 
the extractive sector.  The fact that even closed 
mines can have a significant legacy impact long 
after operations ceased underscores the social and 
environmental challenge of extractives.  
Indeed, many initiatives to attain social licences to 
operate are concerned with mitigating environmental 
and social externalities that come with mining 
activities. As will be seen in Chapter 7, many 
initiatives have been implemented to address these 
impacts of mining. Notwithstanding these initiatives, 
negative externalities remain a major concern.  
Mining is moving to new areas that are more 
fragile or into global commons (the sea), for which 
governance experience is limited. 
Furthermore, the impacts of mining activities on 
the environment cannot be seen in isolation, as 
many have the potential to effect human health and 
livelihoods.  
The project-based or standalone approach of 
dealing with impacts of mining needs rethinking. 
In large mining districts, strategic environmental 
assessments that include cumulative impacts and 
management need to be mainstreamed. 
Moreover, an assessment should be made of the 
trade-offs of mining versus recycling to ascertain 
the optimal profile of recycled versus mined material 
sourcing. Then a holistic approach in managing 
impacts can be internalized across the whole value 
chain. This may also involve the advent of new 
companies and players that form a new kind of 
industrial ecosystem. 
The analysis of the environmental and social impacts 
of mining presented in this chapter suggests a 
need for both national and international governance 
mechanisms to build more sustainable global 
supply chains that mitigate the environmental and 
social impacts of the sector, as well as developing 
innovative tools to manage such impacts. The next 
chapter, which is the first within the second part of 
this report, examines governance challenges of the 
extractive sector.
Appendix 5. Illustrative example of Social Life-
cycle Assessment
Using data from the S-LCA database PSILCA, the 
IRP Working Group calculated the possible social 
risk related to the mining sector in the following 
countries: Australia, Brazil, Chile, France, India, 
Russian Federation, South Africa and the United 
States. It should be noted that the resulting 
assessment represents one possible approach 
for highlighting social issues and should be 
complemented by additional assessments, some of 
which are highlighted in later sections of this chapter. 
While S-LCA databases have a broad coverage of 
countries and sectors, data are not specific for sites, 
companies, specific technologies and local issues. 
They represent top-down approaches collecting data 
from international sources and input/output models. 
The main criteria applied for country selection is 
international coverage (at least one country for 
each region) and the relevance of the mining sector 
in the national economy. Based on the relevance 
for the mining sectors, the following set of impact 
subcategories was selected from the database: 
association and bargaining rights; corruption and 
bribery; discrimination - gender wage gap; fair salary; 
fatal accidents; human trafficking; goods produced 
by forced labour; indigenous rights; non-fatal 
accidents; safety measures; and working time. Each 
impact sub-category is characterized by one or more 
indicators calculated for the selected country and 
for the mining sector. The assessment, however, 
also includes the calculation of social risk for all the 
upstream sectors in the supply chain; that is, for all 
the CSS providing inputs to the mining sector in the 
country under investigation. Table 5.1 shows the set 
of stakeholders, impact subcategories, indicators and 
data sources used for the assessment. This is drawn 
from the PSILCA database. 
Figure 5.8 shows the preliminary social risk results 
as normalized values on a 0 to 1 scale, where 
1 is assigned to the maximum value in the set 
(corresponding to the highest risk in a certain impact 
subcategory) and 0 is assigned to the minimum value 
(corresponding to the lowest risk). This is based 
on a preliminary elaboration of data from PSILCA 
database. Considerable uncertainties might exist (as 
discussed earlier).
Given the preliminary nature of the analysis, the 
report does not display country names, but rather 
letters corresponding to different development status: 
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countries A, B and C have a Human Development 
Index  (HDI) higher than 0.85; D, E and F have an HDI 
between 0.75 and 0.85; and G and H have a HDI lower 
than 0.75. 
For most of the categories, country H has the 
highest social risk values, while A shows the best 
performance (red line). However, hotspots in social 
impacts are also found for other countries with 
regard to certain impact subcategories; for example, 
non-fatal accidents (D and F), fatal accidents (G), 
corruption and bribery (C, D, F, and G), indigenous 
rights (B), and association and bargaining rights 
(F). Results show that social risk in most developed 
countries is generally lower than in the emerging 
economies (with the exception of the corruption 
category). Stronger legislation on labour rights and 
better governance may be some of the underlying 
reasons for this difference in social risk results.  
When comparing countries with similar development 
status, more nuances in social risks are visible. Figure 
5.9 shows the relative social risk results of countries 
having a Human Development Index higher than 0.8, 
which corresponds to countries A, B, C, D, E from 
the original set shown in Figure 5.8. Some social 
risk peaks are visible here; for instance, for countries 
C and E that were hidden in the previous figure 
(especially for the impact categories gender wage 
gap, fair salary, fatal accidents, human trafficking, 
working time, association and bargaining rights). 
 
Table 5.1. An example of indicators and data sources used in social LCA 
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 Illustrative example of Social Life-cycle Assessment
Figure 5.8. Illustration of possible social risk in the mining sector - country comparison
Figure 5.9. Illustration of possible social risk in the mining sector - most developed countries.
Source: Authors’ analysis
Source: Authors’ analysis
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Mining cart in silver, gold, copper mine. Photo: TTstudio © Shutterstock
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6 CHALLENGES OF EXTRACTIVE GOVERNANCE
6.0. Introduction
The previous chapters in the first part of this Report 
have provided a review of the status of mining 
today. As shown earlier, while mining can contribute 
towards sustainable development, this contribution 
also comes with externalities (as discussed in 
Chapter 5). If not addressed, these externalities 
can undermine the viability of other economic 
sectors and sustainable development outcomes. 
Therefore, realizing the true benefits of mineral 
resources hinges on a governance framework that 
fosters sustainable development while mitigating 
the externalities that come with mineral exploitation. 
This chapter focuses on the challenges of 
mineral resources governance and approaches to 
addressing these challenges.
6.1. Challenges
Various factors conspire to make natural resources 
difficult to manage. These emanate from: (i) complex 
policy environment; (ii) power asymmetry; and (iii) 
political economy dynamics.
6.1.1. Complex policy environment:
• Extractive resources tend to be owned by the state 
on behalf of the people; thus, they are arguably 
more difficult to govern given the competing 
claims. Also, stakeholders span international, 
national and local domains82.Governments are 
faced with a regulatory dilemma (Pedro, 2017:19-
20), as they have to balance the various interests 
in a fair and equitable way and craft policies 
accordingly. This is difficult, and poor handling of it 
can lead to conflicts.
• Huge influxes of volatile revenue flows from 
extraction activities can lead to economic 
management challenges. Governments are faced 
82 It is obvious that there are situations where the 
government could be the owner and the extractor of the 
resources.
with distributional and investment challenges 
to ensure that transient mineral revenues 
are translated into lasting benefits (Pedro, 
2006).83 Doshi et al. (2015) make the point that 
‘governments in many resource-rich countries 
face two important related challenges or decisions 
with regard to the resource rents: How much of 
the resource rents should be spent or saved? How 
to spend the revenues?’ These questions involve 
facing macroeconomic management challenges 
of risks and absorptive capacity: 
 ○ Macroeconomic risks present themselves 
in two main ways. First, there is a potential 
deterioration of non-resource tradeable 
(exporting and import competing) sectors 
due to appreciation of the exchange rate 
as a result of excessive current domestic 
investment or consumption expenditure 
driven by huge influxes - the so-called 
Dutch Disease. Second, there are also 
potential adverse consequences due to 
the impact of volatility on government 
revenues. Both these challenges can 
complicate fiscal planning, often resulting in 
inefficient pro-cyclical “stop-go” government 
expenditures. 
 ○ Absorptive capacity: capacity of government 
to spend effectively and efficiently depends 
on technical and institutional capacities. 
Constraints on human and institutional 
capacities can reduce the effectiveness 
of sudden and large increases in public 
investment. An optimal policy would 
therefore scale up public investments only 
in line with the growing “absorptive capacity 
frontier” that an economy can achieve
• Meeting these challenges requires both the 
technical capacity to understand the resource 
83 Two underlying principles here are the ‘common 
good’ nature of extractive resources and the desire for 
‘intergenerational equity’(see chapter 9).
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endowment parameters (quantity, quality, 
extraction methods and rate of extractions) and 
also the economics of extraction. Only then can 
one devise a fiscal strategy (level of tax rates, 
royalties, cost recovery limits, corporate taxes, 
depreciation allowances and SWF)84 However, 
adequate human and financial resources are 
lacking in many resource-rich countries. For 
instance, Sierra Leone’s Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPASL) illustrates the capacity problem. 
In 2010, EPASL had a budget of USD 150,000 a 
year with nine staff. Given such limited resources 
(human capacity and operational budget), carrying 
out its broad mandate of setting environmental 
standards, monitoring the impacts of all activities 
nationwide and mainstreaming environmental 
priorities across government was close to 
impossible. It had a backlog of more than 200 
environmental impact assessments pending 
review (ECA, 2011).
• The use of natural resources can produce 
significant externalities, as discussed in the 
previous chapter. For example, Lahiri-Dutt (2016) 
documents extensive environmental damage 
caused by coal mining in India, including forest 
degradation, complete alteration of the flora and 
fauna leading to decay of the local agricultural 
economy, land subsidence, falling water table and 
pollution of rivers by coal washeries. At the same 
time, communities – especially poor indigenous 
communities such as the Adivasi – have 
been displaced and have seen their traditional 
hunting and fishing livelihoods destroyed. Such 
externalities may be hard to address by existing 
political institutions. For instance, environmental 
problems often take decades or even centuries to 
emerge; their solutions may take just as long.
• Sustainable development requires mineral assets 
to generate material benefits for the future 
generations that are deprived of them. This 
introduces accountability issues in terms of how 
much wealth is generated and how it should be 
distributed (ECA, 2011).
84 Governments can mitigate the impact of the Dutch 
Disease by delaying consumption or investment in the 
domestic economy, in favor of purchasing foreign financial 
and capital or property assets instead. This deferral from 
spending domestically can be achieved through sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs) managing a portfolio of foreign 
investments.
• Capturing a fair share of income flows that from 
granting mineral rights and, more critically, the 
recovered resources is problematic. In competing 
to attract investment, resource-rich developing 
countries may be compelled to provide incentives 
– in the form of favourable tax regimes and 
less stringent environmental regulation – that 
reduce their potential resource rent capture. By 
means of an example, many deals signed by 
African countries when demand was limited and 
the economic environment unfavourable saw 
many extraction companies receive extensive 
exemptions in taxes, duties, waivers or reduced 
royalties, which resulted in significant lost 
opportunities when the 2000s commodities boom 
hit. For instance, when gold prices rose from 
US$300 to US$1,600 between 2000 and 2010, 
mining companies’ revenue rose at four times 
the rate of government’s revenue. In Zambia in 
2010, mining exports were US$10 billion but the 
government revenue was only US$240 million or 
2.4 per cent of the export revenue (APR, 2013). It 
is a challenge to ensure that governments receive 
a fair share of mining revenues in a competitive 
yet dynamic world. This is because volatile 
markets that fluctuate complicate competition 
for investment. Governments are under pressure 
to provide sufficient incentives for extractive 
companies to invest, while collecting adequate 
revenue for socioeconomic development. A 
properly structured fiscal regime seeks to balance 
these objectives. 
6.1.2. Power asymmetry
Arguably, the terms of many contracts have not been 
sustainable in the long run due to those contracts 
delivering disproportionate benefits to investors as 
a result of the latter’s stronger negotiating position 
(Darby, 2010). Countries usually operate from 
a position of weakness in relation to extractive 
companies mainly due to:
• Their inability to get a fair deal due to weak 
negotiation capacity. Generally, the mining 
companies know more about the nature and value 
of the resource and can leverage the information 
asymmetry to extract an unfair share; 
• The consolidation of the extractive sector is such 
that just a few multinationals control production 




• Complex organizational structure and accounting 
practices of mining companies and their extensive 
use of offshore companies make it difficult for 
poorly staffed governments and authorities to 
monitor, regulate and hold mining companies 
accountable. The inability to monitor mining 
activities and sales of mineral wealth means that 
governments cannot receive their rightful share of 
extractive revenues. 
The weak negotiation capacity has been recognized 
and a number of initiatives to support governments 
have been put in place such as the African Legal 
Support Facility and the CONNEX Initiative (which is 
briefly described in Box 6.1 above).
Sustainable 
development requires 
mineral assets to 
generate material 
benefits for the future 
generations that are 
deprived of them.
Box 6.1. Improving negotiating capacity – The CONNEX Initiative
Extractive projects tend to be large, costly, risky and long-lived. They often require complex contracts 
between governments and (mostly foreign) investors that define the long-term relationship between the 
parties. Negotiating such contracts is a challenge. Geologists need to ascertain the quality of a deposit; 
industry specialists assess market conditions, investors’ strategies and prices; financial analysts model 
trade-offs between, say, royalties and income taxes; and other specialists evaluate environmental and 
social impacts (Sauvant, 2017). Host countries need experienced lawyers to negotiate the terms of 
contracts (including renegotiation provisions) with the world-class advisors typically available to large 
foreign investors. However, many governments face challenges from a lack of expertise, an imbalance of 
financial resources, time pressure and the potential for corruption.
No institution currently provides governments with comprehensive, multidisciplinary negotiation support 
at short notice (if necessary), regardless of economic sector or geographic region. Only partial support is 
available for resource-constrained host countries, for example, through the African Legal Support Facility 
and the International Senior Lawyers Project (Sauvant, 2017).
The G7 Initiative on “Strengthening Assistance for Complex Contract Negotiations (CONNEX),” launched at 
the G7 Brussels Summit in 2014, aims to provide developing country partners with multidisciplinary and 
concrete expertise for negotiating complex commercial contracts, with an initial focus on the extractives 
sector. The CONNEX Initiative is designed to ensure such complex commercial contracts are well-
conceived and well-negotiated for a host country’s successful and inclusive development, while protecting 
the interests of the host country and investing companies. Three pillars constitute the CONNEX Initiative: 
information integration and accessibility to existing resources; enhancing existing negotiation support; 
and linking to long-term capacity building and increasing transparency. CONNEX has also established a 
collaborative relationship with the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) on its open web 
portal (www.negotiationsupport.org) to enhance the accessibility to negotiation support through the 
integration and accessibility of relevant information (CONNEX, 2016).
The CONNEX initiative recognizes that immediate assistance, such as dispatching experts for the contract 
negotiations through the CONNEX Initiative, should be carried out in parallel with the long-term capacity-
building and the improvement of transparency.
One of the actions to implement the Initiative is the CONNEX Support Unit, which provides independent, 
high-quality, demand-oriented, multidisciplinary and rapid support and expertise during the negotiation 
of large-scale, complex investment contracts in the resource sector. Government bodies of developing 
countries can request support: (see http://connex-unit.org/).
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6.1.3. Political economy dynamics
• Resource extraction has been shown to weaken 
governance capacity by producing rent seeking 
dynamics and cleptocracy (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; 
cited in GiZ, 2003), which in some cases explains 
the prevalence of conflicts in resource-rich 
countries. A particular problem in these countries 
is that, as governments receive large extractive 
revenues, they tend to be less reliant on revenues 
from taxation, which in turn undermines the 
government’s accountability to its electorate.  
• The nature of many extractive resources tends 
to be very attractive to military and political 
“entrepreneurs”, as receiving huge rents simply 
entails capturing a very small territory - a state 
Moore (2000) calls “political underdevelopment”. 
Indeed, the combination of valuable resources 
with weak States may encourage violent domestic 
and/or cross-border conflict. According to UNEP 
estimates (2009), as much as 40 per cent of 
intrastate conflicts are linked to or fuelled by 
natural resources. Discovery of natural resources 
also tends to give rise to nationalism and 
irredentist tendencies. Local stakeholders tend to 
become more radicalized.
In addition to these enduring characteristics of the 
mining governance landscape, a number of other 
challenges, some of more recent origin, complicate 
such governance and need to be taken into account 
for it to be effective. The rest of this section 
discusses these challenges and makes general 
suggestions as to how they can be addressed, which 
are elaborated later on in the report.
6.1.4. The Centre is losing power
Centralized power at the level of the national 
government is being dissipated upwards, 
downwards and horizontally - creating a new 
governance landscape for governments.
• Bixler et al. (2015) report that there has been a 
‘dramatic shift in technology and social norms 
that have fundamentally changed the way we 
coordinate and make decisions at individual, 
organizational and societal levels. The term 
“network society” has been applied to this mode of 
organization’. Through networks, people leverage 
informal relationships to exchange ideas, build 
rapport, identify common interests, work together, 
share power and solve problems of mutual 
interest.
• Lockwood et al. (2010) note that the world has 
seen ‘shifts in power and authority upwards from 
national to supranational scales, as demonstrated 
in the use of international conventions, and 
downwards to sub-national and local scales 
via the devolution of central government’s 
responsibilities’. 
• The accessibility of information and 
communication technologies to even the poorest 
people in the poorest of countries has created 
an informed society, and this is changing the 
narrative of governance. As a result, the following 
trends are being observed:
 ○ There has been acceleration towards more 
‘disaggregated and diverse governance, in 
which a wide variety of groups (international 
institutions, national governments, 
sub-national governments, state- and 
privately-owned corporations and a rich 
variety of civil society groups) are involved 
in influencing governance norms and rules’ 
(Darby, 2010).
 ○ Also, increased pressures from an informed 
citizenry for a greater say in decisions, 
and growing interdependencies among a 
wide range of actors, necessitating greater 
interactions, have contributed to the trend 
towards a greater horizontal distribution of 
power. 
• Similarly, power shifts rather than greater 
participation, as well as equity and responsiveness 
of government to citizens, often lead to transfer 
of power to private bodies, customary authorities 
and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)/ 
Civil society organizations (CSOs). This is 
creating issues of legitimacy, accountability and 
inclusiveness (Lockwood et al., 2010).
• OECD (2011; cited in Atanasijevic, 2016) argues 
that the “majority of states in the global South 
can be described as hybrid political orders”. Such 
orders are characterized by the co-existence and 
overlap of conflicting claims to legitimacy and 
economic resources by many actors (State and 
non-State). The assumption of a strong State 
is inadequate when formulating interventions 
embedded in the complex realities of hybrid 
political orders (Atanasijevic, 2016). 
Challenges
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• Corporations are also being asked to take on 
greater social responsibilities. Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), which has been the social 
engagement mechanism through voluntary 
contributions to wider society – beyond their 
shareholders and core business - has been 
challenged. Boundaries between voluntary and 
mandatory engagement are recently blurring.85 For 
instance, legislation on CSR reporting is also being 
debated in the European Union (GIZ, 2003).
Globalization is changing the global governance 
landscape. As globalization progresses, new 
challenges and actors are coming into play. The 
global governance landscape is also becoming more 
complex.
• The commodities boom of the 2000s pushed 
many large-scale natural resource projects into 
more politically unstable and fragile states. 
This can be perceived as part of a general trend 
towards natural resource investments moving into 
countries from geopolitically unstable regions and 
into more fragile environments such as the Arctic 
(Emmerson & Lah, 2012). 
• The world has seen a rise in resource nationalism 
– both in producer States keen to maximize 
revenues, as well as in consumer States keen 
to secure supplies (Darby, 2010). This has seen 
countries revising mining contracts and launching 
new mining policies.
• The increasing importance of emerging countries’ 
extractive corporations. These enterprises, which 
are largely State-owned enterprises (SOEs), 
have become key players in natural resources 
exploitation at home and abroad (Acosta, 2010). 
This creates a new dynamic where traditional 
global governance tools that were built on Western 
values are becoming inadequate (GIZ, 2003). 
• Also, as global power has shifted from G8 to 
G20, the diversity of G20 nations implies a less 
homogenous approach to issues of natural 
resources governance, such as issues of political 
and civil liberties that lie at the core of current 
85 CSR is a continuum going from charity to responsible 
business conduct. Thus, CSR may or may not include 
environmental aspects or considerations. Scrupulous 
companies may abuse CSR by providing charity while 
polluting the environment. Ghana (ACET, 2017) and India 
are introducing CSR into legislation.
transparency and accountability instruments 
(Carish & Rickard-Martin, 2013; Darby, 2010). 
• Globalization has seen the rise of global terrorism 
and introduced a new security challenge for 
the natural resources sectors, creating a nexus 
between natural resource governance and 
security. Natural resources can therefore be 
leveraged to fund global terrorism. 
• Consumers in the West (also the global middle 
class) are increasingly demanding more 
sustainably produced products and requiring that 
global supply chains provide these guarantees. 
This is resulting in a re-arrangement of global 
supply chains. Thus, actors at different points 
along the supply chain are starting to request 
information about sustainability mineral 
exploitation and processing to fulfill their supply 
chain responsibility. This is creating demand for 
standard setting platforms, whereby compliance 
can be verified by the business itself or by third 
parties. The Global Reporting Initiative is such a 
platform. This consumer demand is also providing 
a business opportunity for some to charge a 
premium under various ethical labels such as 
Fairmined gold.
• Investors are increasingly seeking to invest in 
businesses that support sustainability, leading 
to a rise of sustainability-driven investments 
such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. 
Consequently, companies that seek financing 
from capital markets must continually intensify 
their sustainability instruments. Many extractive 
companies are listed companies. Thus, as 
sustainability-driven investment grows, their 
values and their ability to attract investors 
will increasingly depend on how well they 
meet sustainability goals. Indeed, the growing 
power of investment managers is such that 
changing the investment grade depending on 
level of compliance to the Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative (EITI) standard could 
arguably be an effective way of enforcing 
transparency (Acosta, 2013a).
The changing governance landscape has outstripped 
the abilities of central governments and international 
bodies to develop effective regulatory frameworks 
and institutions (Darby, 2010). To respond to the 
changing landscape, new governance frameworks 
are needed. Some actions are proposed below. 
Governance tools need to be more flexible and 
anticipatory. Such adaptive governance also calls for 
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collaboration and learning, as well as the creation or 
strengthening of institutions that can structure and 
influence these processes. Governance frameworks 
in the natural resources sector should be flexible 
enough to accommodate changes as they occur 
and incorporate new actors and stakeholders as the 
need arises (on the basis that one-size will not fit 
all). Adaptability calls for systematic self-reflection 
on procedures, processes and performance through 
monitoring, evaluation and review. It also calls for 
processes to change management as a result of 
review outcomes (Lockwood et al., 2010). Crona and 
Hubacek (2010) note that more research is needed 
to understand how relations among actors, and the 
structuring of these relations, affect natural resource 
governance outcomes. 
There is a need to develop governance frameworks 
tailored to the needs of communities, civil society 
groups and governments at very local levels. These 
should not be simply a watered-down version of 
existing national-level transparency programmes 
(Darby, 2010). Particular attention should be 
given to traditional authorities, as they often grant 
social licence to operate.86 Box 6.2 on the next 
page presents a case study in Ghana where a 
mining company undertakes activities as part of 
its social licence to operate.  State and provincial 
governments, as well as traditional authorities, also 
play a crucial role in managing conflicts between 
resource users. They also play a critical role in 
ensuring that revenues generated by major natural 
resource projects are converted into sustainable 
development in the communities where those 
resources are located. 
The role of governments vis-à-vis corporations 
delivering development outcomes needs to 
be clarified. While CSR is crucial in delivering 
sustainable development, the ultimate responsibility 
lies with government. Indeed, more ambitious 
CSR initiatives may undermine the legitimacy 
of governments and lead to citizens holding 
corporations more accountable than governments.
86 Beyond the formal licence granted by governments, 
mining companies need the acceptance of local 
communities in which they operate. This is the ‘social 
licence to operate’.
Effective solutions to natural resource management 
challenges demand working across jurisdictional 
and sectoral boundaries; that is, a networked 
system of governance. This will require practitioners, 
policymakers and academics to: (1) focus, refine and 
expand the concept of governance to inform analysis 
of socioecological systems; (2) form networks with 
leaders who create opportunities for transformative 
collaboration around shared problems; (3) reflect on 
the nature of network successes and strategies for 
evaluating outcomes; (4) understand governance 
processes and practices at multiple scales and the 
mechanisms for engaging communities and other 
stakeholders in multi-level decision-making; and (5) 
be sensitive to the fact that networks are susceptible 
to the differences in power, influence, and resources 
among network participants (Bixler et al., 2015). 
There is a need for a reconceptualization of the 
State towards a more practice-oriented perspective 
that seeks new entry points for natural resource 
governance in fragile States.  Atanasijevic (2016; 
citing Boege et al., 2008) argues that “states should 
be viewed as hybrid political orders or places in 
which diverse and competing claims to power and 
logics of order co-exist, overlap and intertwine”. This, 
in his opinion, is an improvement over the current 
perception of States in terms of their ability to fulfil 
core functions and provide basic services (and thus 
labelling them as weak, fragile or collapsed). 
Effective solutions 
to natural resource 
management challenges 
demand working across 
jurisdictional and 
sectoral boundaries; 




Box 6.2. Obtaining a Social Licence to Operate (SLO)
The enclave nature of mining is a concern, especially given the fact that the public usually owns the 
minerals, yet it is excluded from the extractive activities. Mining companies aware of the tension are 
usually fairly proactive through Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), so as to provide some benefits to 
local communities and buy their favour (in the form of asocial licence to operate).87 In Ghana, the formal 
gold mining sector has been particularly active with some ambitious CSR programmes.  One of the more 
successful initiatives is Newmont Ghana’s Ahafo Linkages Program (ALP), which is a partnership between 
Newmont Ghana and the International Finance Company (IFC). 
The Ahafo Linkages Program is designed to help maximize the growth potential of the following local 
businesses: (1) local suppliers development - helps local businesses acquire the skills necessary to work 
within Newmont’s supply chain; (2) local economic development - works to diversify the local economy 
by building the capacity of businesses not directly involved in mining, such as egg producers, brick 
makers and caterers; (3) strengthening the business association - strengthen the Ahafo Local Business 
Association (ALBA), an organization that fosters business growth in the region (ALBA currently has over 
100 members working in a number of sectors); (4) training local trainers - training of local business 
service providers who support local businesses on an ad-hoc basis during and after the close of the Ahafo 
Linkages Program; and (5) business-to-business encounters - this is supplier–buyer matchmaking where 
potential clients are paired with ALP businesses for commercial relationships leading to appointments 
and deals; this event optimizes market diversification opportunities for companies receiving technical 
assistance.
According to Newmont, ALP has created more than 15,000 direct and indirect jobs. Between 2007 and 
2009, 99 suppliers from its local Ahafo host communities were awarded contracts to the tune of US$14.5 
million. The company contracted business worth US$272 million with Ghanaian businesses in 2008. 
The businesses under the Ahafo Linkages Program also accessed US$6.8 million from other clients 
apart from Newmont Ghana in 2009. The Program broadly offered training in record keeping, business 
management, market diversification, finance facilitation and technical/productive assistance to over 210 
local small and medium-sized supplier businesses in its Ahafo host communities. A total of 341 Ghanaian 
businesses were also awarded contracts worth over US$144.3 million, accounting for over 60 per cent of 
the Newmont Ghana’s total purchases in 2009. 
Source: IFC (undated).
87 Some see CSR as way to salve or soften the concerns of local communities.
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The role of governments 
vis à vis corporations 
delivering development 
outcomes needs to 
be clarified. While 






the legitimacy of 
governments and lead 




In addition, there is a need to shift from a Western-
centric88  governance model and engage emerging 
countries as co-creators of global governance. A 
serious and long-term diplomatic commitment 
is urgently needed to improve the quality of the 
dialogue on these issues with governments, 
companies and civil society groups in emerging 
countries. Darby (2010) argues that inviting these 
countries to participate in existing international 
standards will continue to fail. Enrico and Rickard-
Martin (2013) instead argue for balancing the 
interests of the industrialized West and East with 
the emerging voices of the resource-rich South, 
which would offer an opportunity to fashion 
governance norms for sanctions that will enjoy truly 
88 The Western-centric governance model puts great 
emphasis democratic institutions, transparency and 
accountability, respect for individual human rights and a 
limited government role.
global respect. There is a need to demonstrate to 
middle-income countries and investors from those 
countries that the natural resource governance 
agenda is not a front for global political competition, 
but rather a way of reducing risks to and costs of 
their investments in developing countries. This will 
probably require the development of new global 
but more inclusive standards. One approach is to 
explore how instruments from emerging countries 
can be leveraged; for example, China’s Due Diligence 
Guidelines,89 which are, interestingly, based on OECD 
due diligence guidelines. 
Resource nationalism and revision of mining policy 
should be welcomed as an opportunity to engage 
governments on their appropriate role vis-à-vis 
mining companies in delivering development. By 
assuming a greater stake in the extractive sector, 
governments can also lower the unreasonable 
expectations on extractive companies (ICMM). 
Governments can also learn from experiences 
of how two Scandinavian countries successfully 
navigated these challenges (see Box 6.3).
‘
89  The guidelines call for Chinese mining companies 
undertaking outbound mining investment, cooperation 
and trade to strictly “observe the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights during the entire life-cycle of 
the mining project” and to strengthen “the responsibility 
throughout the extractive industries value chain”. The 
Guidelines further contain requirements to “conduct 
risk-based supply chain due diligence in order to prevent 
engagement with materials that may have funded or fuelled 
conflict”. They apply to all Chinese companies that are 
extracting and/or using mineral resources and their related 
products and are engaged at any point in the supply chain 
of minerals. The Guidelines are designed to align with 
international standards and allow for mutual recognition 
with existing international initiatives such as OECD 





Box 6.3. Scandinavian resource nationalism in the early 20th century90
Ownership and control over key natural resources was a recurring political question for the two 
Scandinavian kingdoms of Sweden and Norway during what is often referred to as the first wave of 
globalization. Both countries were rich in natural resources, especially forests, minerals and hydropower, 
and were also largely dependent on capital from abroad. The inflow of foreign capital into natural 
resource industries created unease over the increase of foreign influence, as well as the possibility of an 
unfavourable “dependant” economic development, where the home countries would not enjoy the full 
value of their resources. 
Consequently, the two countries introduced a series of resource nationalist measures with the aim of 
addressing these concerns. In 1888, the Swedish government nationalized the unfinished railway to 
its largest iron ore deposits in Lapland from a bankrupt British company. Through its control over the 
railway, the Swedish State managed to push through a part-nationalization of the mines in 1907 with the 
other part being reserved for a Swedish-owned company. In 1906, the government also introduced strict 
regulations on further acquisitions of forested lands by joint stock companies in the northern countries, in 
order to prevent further proletarization of forest-owning smallholders and farmers in the area. Initially, the 
public debate had especially focused on foreign-owned sawmill companies, but was set to target all joint 
stock companies regardless of ownership. After a series of German acquisitions of smaller iron mines in 
central Sweden in the years leading up to the First World War, the Swedish Riksdag passed the Restriction 
Act in 1916, which restricted all joint stock companies where foreigners could hold more than 20 per cent 
of the voting share power from obtaining new properties with forests, mines, hydropower or peat.
In Norway, Parliament passed a temporary concession law in 1906 for minerals, hydropower and forests, 
which was passed into permanent law in 1909 and revised again in 1917. As a rule, the Norwegian 
government refused new foreign acquisitions of forests but, unlike the Swedish Restriction Act, the 
Norwegian concession laws were not used to bar new foreign direct investments in mining and 
hydroelectricity. Instead, these were mostly welcomed as long as the investor was willing to accept a 
series of concession terms. These included provisioning from locally produced machinery and materials, 
restrictions on foreign labour, royalties and nationalization without remuneration after a set period of 
time -- usually 60-80 years. Initially, Norwegian-owned companies were exempt from these terms, but 
this exemption ended in 1909 in order to prevent circumvention (as well as because of a political desire 
to regulate all private resource industries). Publicly owned hydroelectricity generation, on the other hand, 
remained free from these regulations.
While the contingency of historical development makes it impossible to draw any absolute development 
“lessons”, a few factors stand out in the experience of Scandinavian resource nationalism: First, resource 
nationalism was messy. Even in fairly stable and almost religiously and ethnically homogenous countries 
like Sweden and Norway, resource nationalism stirred up major political disagreements over exactly what 
constituted the ‘national interest’ and if any group or economic sector should have privileged access to 
resources or resource rents.
Secondly, timing was crucial for the Scandinavian resource nationalist policies. Resource nationalist 
policies in both countries were generally introduced at an early stage in the development, before much 
foreign direct investment had been sunk into the projects. These policies were generally not retroactive, 
which meant that foreign companies were allowed to retain resources they already owned unimpeded. 
This likely reduced the level of conflict between the Scandinavian governments and private business, as 
well as foreign investors’ home governments.
90 Contribution by Andreas R.D. Sanders.
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Third, regulatory consistency was important. Most of the resource nationalist policies described above 
were introduced before or during the First World War, when the value of the key resources of the two 
Kingdoms was generally increasing. However, these policies were not reversed in the economic downturns 
of the early 1920s and 1930s, despite some calls to remove them to spur investments. This consistency 
over time likely increased the credibility of the two sets of national resource policies.
Fourth, building independent State capacity was vital. For the resource nationalist policies to work, they 
had to be devised in such a way that did not ‘throw the baby out with the bath water’. In order to avoid 
unintended consequences, the Scandinavian Governments needed knowledge of the industries they 
sought to regulate. However, this also opened the possibility of regulatory capture, if representatives from 
these industries had too much influence over the shape and form of regulations. The two countries tried 
to solve this in different ways. The Norwegian system relied more on checks by democratic institutions in 
the concession system, while the Swedish system was more technocratic and gave more independence 
to experts.
In conclusion, the results varied considerably. While some of the Scandinavian resource nationalist 
initiatives could be seen as a success, they often failed to live up to their ambitions of their supporters, 
and sometimes brought unintended negative consequences for economic development. However, it is 
also possible that the resource nationalist interventions also mollified the public’s uncertainties around 
economic globalization. The retention of some control over politically sensitive sectors may explain part of 
the foundation for the broad and stable support for a pragmatic open economy in both countries. 
The field of natural 
resources became a 
target of financialization, 
as financial markets 
started seeking new 
assets to diversify their 
portfolios with assets 
that are negatively 
correlated with stocks 
and thus can act as a 
hedging strategy [...] more 
research is needed to 
better understand how 
financialization impacts 
the more fundamental 
aspects of commodity 
markets.
6.1.5. Financialization of natural resources
Financialization has been defined as the ‘increasing 
importance of financial markets, financial motives, 
financial institutions, and financial elites in the 
operation of the economy and its governing 
institutions, both at the national and international 
levels’ (Epstein, 2005; cited in Nölke et al., 2013). 
It has been asserted that this growing dominance 
of finance has led to a profound transformation of 
modern capitalism (which some do not view in a 
positive light).  Nölke et al. (2013) argue that, for 
financialization to be sustained, it invariably needs 
to incorporate new economic sectors such as the 
public sector, social security systems, the housing 
markets or other spheres of social reproduction — 
and reorganize them according to the rationality of 
the financial markets.
The field of natural resources became a target of 
financialization, as financial markets started seeking 
new assets to diversify their portfolios with assets 
that are negatively correlated with stocks and thus 
can act as a hedging strategy. Tang and Xiong 
(2010) trace the financialization of commodities to 
the 2000s. They argue that, because commodities 
offer a ‘diversification benefit to portfolios of stocks 
and bonds, fund managers were able to promote 
commodity futures as a new asset class for 
institutional investors in the early 2000s following 
the collapse of the equity market. As a result, billions 
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of dollars of investment have gradually flowed into 
the commodities markets.’  
The Institute of International Finance estimates that, 
between 2005 and 2011, the value of commodity-
related assets under management increased almost 
nine-fold to US$450 billion (Sy, 2013). Much of the 
investments have flowed into commodity-index 
related instruments. Index instruments means that, 
as investors move in and out of the various indices, 
the prices of the commodities in those indices 
move together irrespective of the fundamentals of 
demand and supply of the various commodities in 
the index. For example, crude oil, copper, cotton, 
soybeans and live cattle – a seemingly unrelated 
set of commodities – went through a synchronized 
boom and bust cycle between 2006 and 2008 (Tang 
& Xiong, 2010). As a result of the financialization 
process, the price of an individual commodity is no 
longer simply determined by its supply and demand. 
Instead, commodity prices are also determined by a 
whole set of financial factors, such as the aggregate 
risk appetite for financial assets, and investment 
behaviour of diversified commodity index investors 
(Tang & Xiong, 2010). What happens is that the stock 
and bond markets can have the same impact on 
different commodities (Sy, 2013). This is having a 
negative impact on commodity markets. Büyükşahin 
and Robe (2013) find that financial traders could 
be important transmission channel of negative 
equity market shocks into the commodity space.  
Financialization of commodities is now a concern 
and has prompted calls for tighter regulation (Cheng 
& Xiong, 2013). However, this concern needs to be 
balanced with the fact that the increasing presence 
of index investors can have the advantage of more 
shared commodity price risk (Kyle & Xiong, 2010). 
There is no clear way forward on the matter of 
financialization. Much more research is needed 
to better understand how it will impact extractive 
resources and the effectiveness of various policy 
tools. Some proposals going forward are provided 
below. 
According to Tang and Xiong (2010), however, 
policymakers need to be cautious about imposing 
any stringent position limits on financial investors as 
such limits also constrain the potential risk-sharing 
benefit. All the same, the same authors find that 
returns correlation between stocks and commodities 
has increased significantly in the wake of huge 
inflows to commodity-indexed investments. They 
argue that these findings provide a policy tool to 
stem the flow of investments in commodities as the 
past large inflow of commodity index investment 
was motivated by the low correlations observed in 
the historical data. Thus, simply improving public 
awareness of the increased correlation between 
commodities and stocks is likely to tame the rapid 
growth of commodity index investment and reduce 
the adverse volatility spillover effect.
In addition, more research is needed to better 
understand how financialization impacts the 
more fundamental aspects of commodity 
markets.91 Cheng and Xiong (2013) investigate 
whether financialization has affected commodity 
markets through the mechanisms that underpin 
the functioning of these markets (storage, risk 
sharing and information discovery). They find that 
financialization may have transformed the latter 
two functions of commodity futures markets. 
They indicate that better understanding of these 
mechanisms can benefit from future research, 
particularly in the following areas:
• A systematic modelling of the various trading 
motives of hedgers and speculators at different 
times is necessary to uncover dynamics of risk 
sharing in commodity futures markets. 
• Incorporating informational frictions and the 
informational role of commodity prices into 
existing theoretical and empirical frameworks is 
likely to significantly improve our understanding of 
the boom and bust cycles of commodity prices. 
• Better understanding of how risk reallocation 
and information transmission from commodity 
markets affect the real economy and the global 
financial markets.
91 Research can then be used to support better regulation 
of commodity markets. As pointed out in chapter 2 (Box 
2.1) traders already had a stranglehold on commodity 
trade and traders do tend to be located in the global 
financial centres. For resource-rich countries, one avenue 
is therefore to lobby for countries hosting commodity 
trading hubs to better regulate commodity trading and 
their financialization. CSOs in Switzerland (which is one 
of the most important trading hubs) are already pushing 
for responsible business practices (with respect to 
human rights) to be required by the constitution (see 
Chapter 9). Resource-rich countries may be able to 
influence commodity trading for their mutual benefits by 
partnering with CSOs and using other lobbying channels.  
Non-resource-rich countries can also seek an international 
convention to regulate traders (although this is a much 
more difficult route).
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6.1.6. International investment law and 
sovereignty
Extraction of natural resources requires significant 
investments. For many resources-producing 
countries the investment (and the expertise) cannot 
be sourced internally and therefore must be sourced 
from international investors. This has seen many 
States creating appealing incentives to attract the 
needed investments. In an era of globalization, these 
investments have been increasingly underpinned 
by a heavy reliance on bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) or on investment chapters in free trade 
agreements (the two together are referred to as 
international investment agreements or IIAs). Such 
treaties have largely overshadowed the role of 
so-called “State contracts”. International investment 
law regulates certain investments made by foreign 
investors in a host State. It defines certain disciplines 
or standards of treatment that States agree to 
accord to foreign investors. In case of dispute, it 
provides foreign investors the possibility of bringing 
a claim against the host State before an international 
arbitration tribunal. The rationale for capital-
importing countries granting enhanced protection 
to foreign direct investment was, inter alia, the 
expectation that such investment would contribute 
to their economic and social development. 
However, Vinuales (2015) argues that international 
investment law has played an unbalancing role by 
overemphasizing the protection of investors over the 
authority of the host State and, more importantly, the 
public interest. ECA (2016) notes that the signing of 
BITs does not necessarily translate into increased 
flows of foreign direct investment. It calls for a 
balance between the need to protect investors and 
the importance of providing developing countries 
with the policy space to pursue their development 
objectives. It notes the punitive actions that can 
arise from dispute settlements. 
Arbitration and foreign investment agreements seem 
to be trampling on the principle that peoples and 
nations have sovereignty over their resources, and 
that the public interest overrides the private interest. 
International investment law overemphasizes the 
protection of foreign investors. Vinuales (2015) 
supports these arguments by making the following 
observations:
• Virtually any type of State regulatory action is now 
subject to potential challenges under the broad 
“fair and equitable treatment” (FET) standard. 
FET clauses merely state that States shall 
accord fair and equitable treatment, leaving the 
specific implications of such treatment for arbitral 
tribunals to interpret. The growing reach and 
implications of FET, particularly in connection with 
the investor’s “legitimate expectations,” has come 
under much criticism. 
• The ‘pursuance of a foreign investment project 
(protected by international investment law) may 
be to the detriment of the human or collective 
rights of the population affected by extractive 
activities, as well as to the aspirational goals 
for development of resource-rich countries. The 
protection of the environment in the area covered 
by the investment project may be governed by a 
multilateral environmental treaty, which directs 
the State to act in a manner inconsistent with the 
letter or spirit of a narrow investment protection 
clause’. 
• Foreign investors can directly bring a claim against 
the host State (without the need to fully exhaust 
domestic remedies) before an international arbitral 
tribunal set up specifically to hear that claim. 
Further, many questions are not explicitly (or 
even implicitly) addressed in these treaties and 
remain applicable either as a matter of general 
international law or as a matter of systemic or 
simply contextual interpretation, and interpretation 
has tended to favour foreign investors. A recent 
study by UNCTAD found that foreign investors 
prevail in more than 70 per cent of such cases 
(Mann, 2015).
• It is unclear which domestic laws have to be 
respected at the time the investment is made. 
‘Domestic law may impose several conditions 
for an investment in extractive industries to 
proceed, ranging from obtaining a licence to invest 
(admission), to the authorization to prospect, 
and an environmental permit based on an impact 
assessment. Disturbingly, investment tribunals 
have limited the scope of relevant domestic laws 
to mere foreign investment laws; that is, those 
regulating the licence to invest, as an investment 
“made” once the investment licence has been 
granted, irrespective of whether the main permits 
to conduct the relevant activities are granted (for 
example, a permit to explore or an environmental 
permit)’.
Moving forward, there is a need to review 
international investment laws (See Box 6.4). Some 
avenues have been proposed:
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It is critical for international or regional organizations 
to seriously recalibrate the investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) system. Dupuy and Viñuales 
(2014) argue that investment arbitration is just one 
example of a broader and generally positive global 
movement towards the application of the rule of 
law at the international level through the use of 
international courts and tribunals. However, there are 
further avenues for reform that could improve the 
system significantly. Viñuales (2015) points to the 
following: 
• Introduce a requirement that local remedies be 
exhausted first. 
• Ensure that tribunals do respect treaty 
requirements. In many cases, existing treaties 
expressly require the pursuance of grievances 
before domestic courts, and yet several tribunals 
have disregarded the intent of the State parties.
• Pay greater attention to systems of control of 
investment tribunals. The interpretations given by 
different tribunals of fundamentally similar points 
has differed so widely that the very rule of law that 
investment arbitration is supposed to support has 
been undermined.
• There is a need to better integrate domestic law 
and other norms of international law (for example, 
customary concepts expressing sovereignty as 
well as human rights and environmental law). 
• Investment treaty arbitration should be a two-way 
process in which investors have obligations too, 
whether arising from domestic law or contracts or 
from international soft-law standards. These need 
to be integrated in the interpretation of investment 
treaties.
Arbitration and foreign 
investment agreements 
seem to be trampling 
on the principle that 
peoples and nations 
have sovereignty over 
their resources.
Box 6.4. Before signing International Investment 
Agreements (IIAs)
UNDP (2018) warns that governments should 
be wary before signing IIAs, as most models 
remain silent on environmental and social 
issues. They advise that governments should 
use the following checklist before negotiating 
a new IIA to attract foreign mining companies. 
The government should:
• Understand the advantages and 
disadvantages of its IIA model and the 
current trends in addressing these issues.
• Review whether its model IIA promotes 
or constrains sustainable development 
objectives and safeguards the right to 
regulate, while protecting and promoting 
foreign investment.
• Introduce or strengthen clauses about the 
protection of the environment and human 
rights in its IIAs.
• If a dispute occurs, ensure that the 
dispute settlement tribunal has relevant 
environmental or human rights expertise, 
and required access for third parties to the 
arbitration.
• Consider getting support in developing 
their investment frameworks and treaties 
in line with sustainable development from 
specialist sources.
 
6.1.7. llicit financial flows (IFFs) and sustainable 
development 
As indicated previously, one of the key prerequisites 
to converting extractive wealth into sustainable 
development is capturing a fair share of revenues 
that come from the extraction of resources. 
However, diversion of flows is a major challenge for 
many resource-rich countries. The sums involved 
can be substantial. Due to the very nature of the 
flows, data are hard to collect. Nonetheless, APR 
(2013) estimates that Africa annually loses close 
to US$38 billion due to mispricing, an amount 
equivalent to total ODA received by African countries. 
The continent also loses an additional amount of 
US$25 billion annually through other illicit flows.  At 
a global level, Kar and Curcio (2011 cited in Le Billon, 
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2011) estimate a total of US$1.2 trillion in illicit flows 
globally in 2008. This was ten times the amount of 
ODA provided by OECD/DAC that year.
Le Billon (2011) explains that illicit flows occur 
through three channels:
i. Corruption: Outright theft either by public 
officials or by public officials in collaboration with 
private firms. For instance, APR (2013) reports 
that, between 2010 and 2012, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) lost US$1.2 billion in 
revenues from underpricing of mining assets in 
five deals only. This figure is double the combined 
budget of education and health of Congo (DRC), 
underscoring the scale of impact from these 
losses. 
ii. Smuggling or illegal resource exploitation: 
Companies export the resources mined without 
full declaration, thus not paying all the duties 
or just smuggle the resources out. Smuggling 
is especially rife in artisanal mining. Indeed, 
smuggling of diamonds that were then used to 
finance conflicts led to an international outcry that 
resulted in the Kimberley Process Certification 
Scheme (KPCS) in an attempt to stem the flow of 
“conflict diamonds.”
iii. Accounting tricks: Extractive sectors involve 
complex technical and financial processes that 
require a high degree of expertise to properly 
assess tax payments. These complex processes 
open the door to manipulation, particularly if 
auditing capacity is limited or corrupt (Le Billon, 
2010). To facilitate tax evasion, many companies 
have obfuscating organizational structures. 
Companies use a myriad of offshore companies 
that trade with each other. This facilitates the illicit 
diversion of revenues in particular through the use 
of transfer pricing tools.92
92 Transfer pricing refers to an accounting practice 
where companies charge their subsidiaries for services 
rendered. This can be used to avoid taxes by overpricing 
services provided by subsidiaries located in tax havens. 
One example of this is the case of Glenco in Zambia. One 
of its Zambian mining companies (Carlissa Investment) 
registered in the British Virgin Islands, which was in turn 
owed by Glenco Finance, registered in Bermuda, was selling 
Copper to Glenco at prices far below the market price (APR, 
2013).
The common thread in illicit financial flows is the 
use of tax havens to channel the flows. However, 
these off-shore centers typically have little or 
limited disclosure rules. Through “layering” (use of 
multiple investment companies) and other tricks, 
they are able to hide real owners. Using this veil, 
even “respectable” multinational corporations can 
participate in questionable deals. Given the limited 
capacity of regulatory authorities and civil society, 
these arrangements are virtually impenetrable 
(APR, 2013). Developed countries now recognize 
this arrangement as a threat to their tax base. The 
recognition of this has brought the issue of illicit 
financial flows to the fore. Tackling such flows 
is now a topic on the global governance agenda.  
Some global initiatives such as OECD guidelines 
(anti-bribery convention, corporate governance) and 
OECD standards for automatic exchange of financial 
accounts information in tax matters are already in 
place. 
With respect to natural resource governance, 
tackling illicit financial flows should be of paramount 
importance. Some suggestions by Le Billon (2011), 
AUC/ECA (Undated), Toigo (2016) and others 
include:
• Outlaw transfer mispricing. Countries should 
ensure that they have clear and concise laws and 
regulations that make it illegal to intentionally 
state the price quantity, quality or other aspect 
of trade in goods and services incorrectly or 
inaccurately, in order to move capital or profits 
to another jurisdiction or to manipulate, evade or 
avoid any form of taxation, including customs and 
excise duties (AU/ECA, undated).
• There is a need for comprehensive databases and 
benchmarks on prices of goods and services that 
can support tax authorities to analyse imports 
and exports.  There should also be supporting 
systems to make data shareable and also to 
provide capacity development in transfer pricing. 
Countries should seek to develop special units 
dedicated to transfer pricing (AUC/ECA, 2011). 
• Establish country-by-country reporting 
requirements through international accounting 
standards. Multinational companies tend to report 
consolidated accounts of their various operations 
rather than disaggregate by countries. This hides 
evidence of manipulations of accounts, as one 
cannot clearly tell where production is taking 
place and where sales are being recorded. Also, 
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countries should look at restricted contracts to 
companies incorporated in fair-tax and high-
disclosure jurisdictions.
• Transparency requirements should extend 
beyond revenues to licensing, contracts, physical 
resource flows and other production factors, as 
well as to public expenditure and environmental 
impact assessment reports, data and decisions. 
Transparency should include extending due 
diligence on politically exposed persons (that is, 
politicians and bureaucrats susceptible to being 
corrupted or defrauding the State) and also to 
trading and banking partners (Le Billon, 2011). 
• Mandatory disclosure of beneficial ownership: 
This can make it easier for tax authorities to 
“follow the money” and assess the correct tax 
liability of an extractive company operating 
under their jurisdiction, as well as highlighting 
potential conflict of interest for politically exposed 
persons. Note that EITI has recently extended its 
scope to beneficial ownership and now requires 
implementing countries to ensure companies 
disclose their beneficial owners, with a view to 
reaching full disclosure by 2020. The early EITI 
pilot mapping beneficial ownership in 11 countries 
points to a number of gaps and difficulties in 
getting to the bottom of complex corporate 
structures, thereby highlighting the fact that 
significant work is needed at the technical and 
political levels. 
• Move from voluntary to mandatory transparency 
and translate transparency into accountability. 
Continue to promote voluntary participation in 
disclosure schemes while extending mandatory 
disclosure instruments beyond current 
jurisdictions.93 Also seek to create synergies 
between mandatory disclosure legislation and the 
voluntary instruments through data sharing.
• Integrate elements of the tax justice and tax 
evasion agendas to expand their relevance to 
efforts to reduce illicit financial flows. Countries 
should connect anti-corruption, illegal exploitation 
and tax agendas. They should also foster dialogue 
between policymakers in these different areas. 
Identify options for synergies between increased 
revenues from taxation, formalization of illegal 
93 Note that Mandatory disclosure regimes now exist in 
relation to stock markets in Canada and the EU.
exploitation and anti-corruption reforms. 
• Promote standards for tax maximization in the 
poorest resources-rich countries. There is a need 
for greater focus on promoting ethical standards 
and CSR practices that push corporations to 
maximize tax payments in the poorest countries. 
While companies would still aim to minimize 
global tax payments, such a standard would also 
encourage maximization of taxes in the poorest 
countries.  
6.1.8. From the formal versus informal dichotomy 
to an intertwined relationship  
Natural resource governance is usually targeted at 
formally recognized stakeholders and, in particular, 
it assumes that formally licenced extractive 
companies carry out extraction. However, on the 
ground, there are many entities that extract natural 
resources under what would be called “informal” 
arrangements. 
Studies usually present a dichotomy between 
the formal and the informal, designating the 
co-existence of the two as ‘dual economy’. However, 
the simple informal-formal dichotomy misses the 
range of actors and interactions under the formal 
and informal labels. The informal-formal is more 
of a continuum rather than a distinct dichotomy. 
The continuum of actors can be illustrated, for 
instance, in the multiple coal economies of India 
(Lahiri-Dutt, 2014). They point to four economies: 
the State-owned enterprise, Coal India Limited (CIL), 
representing the ‘national coal’ economy; the private 
entrepreneur-owned collieries producing coal that 
is captive to power plants represent a ‘neo-liberal 
coal’ economy; then non-legal small-scale mines 
produce ‘statecraft coal’; and the innumerable 
poor, spread throughout India’s coal-bearing tracts, 
illegally produce ‘subsistence coal’. They argue 
that, although the economies may look superficially 
different, the various production regimes create 
several sub-economies that interact in interesting 
ways. They show that, instead of a clear-cut formal-
informal division, .it is more like Russian dolls, 
whereby the informal contracting economy hides its 
informal labour arrangements within the formal Coal 
India Limited (CIL) economy. The coal produced by 
both serves the same market yet, in employment 
terms, the contractors’ labourers remain informal.
The overlap between formal and informal mining 
may create opportunities for formal mining to 
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violate human rights and undermine sustainable 
development by essentially subcontracting poor 
practices informally. For instance, company may 
claim compliance with best practices while it 
sources minerals and metals from informal suppliers 
who are not observing them. More importantly, the 
formal company can be a shell for money laundering 
from illegal and informal mining activities (as has 
been observed in Colombia (OECD, 2016)). 
There is a growing recognition that the mineral policy 
framework needs to recognize the reality of informal 
mining (UNEP, 2012). Some proposed approaches 
for moving forward are listed in the next few 
paragraphs (see also Chapter 3).
With regard to informal mining, it would be helpful to 
re-consider current mindsets and legal frameworks 
altogether. The formal and the informal domains 
intersect, overlap and interact with each other 
instead of existing in a binary relationship. However, 
this interdependence is rarely acknowledged in 
policymaking. Lahiri-Dutt (2014) argues that, to 
deal with the diverse worlds that recognize the 
informal-formal continuum, we should reconsider 
current legal frameworks. The very term “informal” 
is closely associated with illegality (UNEP, 2012). 
This is unfortunate as, in many cases, artisanal 
mining is a traditional livelihood for many, whereas 
formal extractive activities destroy other sources 
of livelihoods – thereby forcing people to go into 
artisanal mining like in India (Lahiri-Dutt, 2007). 
Steps need to be taken to bring the artisanal 
and small-scale mining (ASM) sector into the 
mainstream by providing the required financial and 
technical support. The policy environment should 
encourage cooperation between small- and large-
scale miners, including converting ASM into viable 
operating enterprises (ECA, 2002; ECA, 2011). 
Indeed, there is much that can be gained from 
decriminalizing informal mining and putting in place 
frameworks to support it. For instance, in Mongolia, 
efforts have been made through amendments to 
laws (Minerals Law, Land Law and Personal Income 
Tax Law), which have made it possible to “formalize” 
the sector with very positive results for the 
Government. The contribution of informally mined 
gold to the National Treasury increased significantly 
from 3.2 kg in 2013 to 3.2 tonnes in 2014 (Lahiri-Dutt 
& Dondov, 2016).
Governance instruments need to carefully assess 
potentially negative side effects such as job losses in 
the ASM sector due to unintended shifts to the large-
scale mining sector. Instruments must be carefully 
considered, attentively monitored and accompanied 
by positive contributions to local development and 
active dialogue (Schüler, 2016).
There needs to be a better understanding of the 
overlap between formal and informal mining and 
the need for ways to address this. Formal mining 
companies have more resources and better 
capacity, and this overlap can be used to transfer 
skills and other capacity. Indeed, local content-
development activities should seek to see how 
formal mining could be leveraged to develop ASM 
as sub-contractors. Moreover, recognition of ASM 
through such linkages can also reduce tensions and 
conflicts. 
6.1.9. Climate change and the extractive sector
Climate change phenomena and mineral resource 
exploitation are closely intertwined as outlined in 
Chapter 5.  Furthermore, demand for minerals and 
metals will be profoundly affected by shifts to a 
green economy (as discussed in Chapter 4).
The extent to which the extractive sector can 
mitigate impacts and adapt to climate change is 
crucial for the sector, as well as for national and 
global economies. Some actions going forward are 
discussed below.
Regulations are needed to mandate what mines 
plan for climate change during their operational 
lifespan and through decommissioning. Climate 
change may lead to more heavy precipitation 
events, resulting in more frequent accidents. 
Consequently, infrastructure such as dams should 
be constructed with strong consideration for all 
possible atmospheric conditions or seismic activities 
(Azam & Li, 2010; cited in Dolega et al., 2016).  
Current construction codes/standards that guide the 
development of mining infrastructure (for instance 
tailing dam building codes) need to be revisited to 
ensure that they are adequate. Regulatory certainty 
with regards to climate change also needs to be 
established before adaptation and mitigation efforts 
truly take hold in the mining sector. Developing this 
certainty should be a priority for regulators (Pearce 
et al., 2009). 
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There is a need for improved understanding 
of climate-change risks and for mitigation and 
adaptation strategies to be developed. This calls for 
improved climate modelling and communication 
of climate change projections to better understand 
the risks that might affect mine sites and the 
main mining regions (Pearce et al., 2009). Greater 
collaboration is also needed among mining 
companies, regulators, scientists and other industry 
stakeholders to develop practical adaptation 
strategies that can be integrated into existing 
and new mine operations, including in the post-
operational phase (Pearce et al., 2011). 
Greater flexibility in resource management plans 
and supply chains is also needed to accommodate 
abrupt changes in climatic conditions. This is critical 
given that a significant amount of mineral resources 
come from developing nations, which already lack 
resources for climate adaptation. There is therefore 
an increasing need to undertake robust measures 
to ensure that supply chains are climate-resilient 
(Rüttinger & Sharma, 2016).
The climate change-mineral resources link provides 
an entry point for a larger debate on environmental 
and social standards in mining (Rüttinger & Sharma 
2016). As climate change has galvanized the world 
to seek greater collaboration, it is creating truly 
global governance platforms.  These platforms need 
to be leveraged in order to develop more effective 
governance platforms for the extractive sector. 
Due to growing concerns about the impacts of 
climate change, it is becoming imperative that 
governance initiatives include climate change 
costs as part of the disclosures they receive from 
extractive companies. A group of Latin American 
NGOs/CSOs mounted a campaign calling on the EITI 
to include climate costs and also for EITI to define 
what it can contribute to the debate on climate 
change in the sector. NGOs/CSOs have demanded 
that EITI modify the standard to ensure that fossil 
fuel companies disclose whether or not their 
projects can proceed in a 1.5 or 2-degree C world 
(Peters, 2016). 
Policymakers could support and encourage 
the industry to address climate change risks 
more pro-actively by supporting international 
knowledge hubs.  This calls for collective 
knowledge management, to develop a common 
pool of regional and catchment-wide expertise 
in preparing for, and managing, both real and 
perceived impacts from climatic changes. There is 
also a need for engagement and communication 
across different stakeholder groups – to facilitate 
timely information exchange, build cooperative 
relationships and address community anxiety about 
the socioecological impacts of mining. 
6.1.10. Host country capacity constraints 
As pointed out in section 6.1, mineral resource 
flows can cause macroeconomic challenges 
(macroeconomic risks and absorptive capacity) 
that many countries face due to weak capacity and 
institutions. Host governments not only need to 
attract investment in the extractive sector on terms 
that give them a fair share of the rents, but they 
also need to use these rents to develop the value 
chain and build new sectors in their countries. Some 
proposals towards this end include the following:
First, in order to convert extractive revenues into 
sustained levels of prosperity; governments need to 
build the capacity for domestic investment – referred 
to as “investing in investing” (Collier, 2011, p. 7). It 
includes the need to build capacity for public and 
private investment, build the financial system and 
lower the unit cost of construction and equipment, 
for instance through regional market integration.
Second, rent capture may be achieved through 
various tax instruments integrated into a package 
that is attractive for investors and host countries 
alike. Self-adjusting instruments that cater for both 
vibrant and stagnant global demand scenarios 
should be considered, such as Resource Rent Tax 
(RRT) or formula taxes that work on profitability 
rather than profit. Taxes that lead to sterilization of 
mineral deposits should be minimized or not used 
(ECA, 2011).
Third, building the capacity of governments to be 
able to plan for and use natural resources effectively 
is crucial and urgent. In response to the challenge, 
one trend that has gained significant traction 
is saving part of the natural resources flows in 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) domiciled mainly 
in rich countries (See Box 6.5). This approach 
has been successfully applied in some developed 
resource-rich countries like Norway to manage the 
“Dutch Disease”. Developing countries, however, and 
particularly those with high levels of international 
debt, may be cautioned against 
 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
182
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
Box 6.5. Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs)
Resource-rich developing countries face the significant challenge of using their natural wealth to improve 
the living standards of average citizens, rather than wasting it through weak institutions and corruption - 
the “resource curse.” One increasingly popular option for dealing with the resource curse is to sequester 
part of resource revenue in a special fund generally called a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). These special-
purpose financial vehicles aim to help ensure proper management of resource revenues. SWFs can have a 
number of components that may include:
• A stabilization fund, which captures in excess a pre-determined commodity price (used to project 
flows for budget purposes) and release these funds to support the budget when price falls below the 
predetermined price. 
• A development fund that captures a portion of the resources flows and puts them in a fund to focus on 
long-term projects such as infrastructure. 
• A heritage fund, which captures the resources and saves them for future generations. These funds are 
long-term investments to be drawn on by future generations.
By their nature, SWFs generate and afford the sponsors added flexibility to achieve downstream policy 
objectives subject to risk and uncertainty. For example, a SWF can help to stabilize the macroeconomy 
by keeping some assets offshore. It can smooth resource revenues to make budget allocations more 
predictable. In addition, it can offer countercyclical resources for the economy following an economic 
shock. Moreover, as a storehouse of financial assets, SWFs can help maintain a balance between 
current expectations and long-term commitments. Through all of these functions, SWFs are capable of 
dampening or, at the very least, managing the negative consequences of resource wealth. 
However, some of the skills and functions associated with SWFs (relating to asset management) are 
not traditional government functions. This implies that new skills and new institutional set-ups would 
be required. Governing, managing and operating an SWF can be inordinately challenging, as these are 
organizations modelled on high-performance Western institutional investors (Clark & Monk, 2012). For 
SWFs to be effective, countries need to build first-rate institutional investors capable of managing money 
on a global scale. In addition, SWFs will require institutional reforms to improve in-country capacity for 
revenue management. Therefore, SWFs are no substitute for good governance. In fact, they make the 
need for good governance even more crucial. 
Furthermore, for an SWF sponsor to realize the benefits of such a fund, the establishment of a SWF 
must be part of a broader package of institutional reforms designed to improve the country’s capacity 
for resource revenue management. In short, the creation of a SWF will not, on its own, improve fiscal and 
monetary outcomes (Davis et al., 2003). 
Challenges
183 
setting up Norwegian-style sovereign wealth funds 
that invest almost exclusively in foreign assets 
(Collier, 2007). SWFs are hard to justify in poor 
countries and are unlikely to help in the urgent task 
of delivering sustainable development. According to 
APR (2013), such funds have returns of 1 per cent 
while investments in infrastructure have returns 
of 15-20 per cent and can add about 2 per cent 
growth per year to African countries. Investment 
in social protection has an even higher impact. 
Well-designed social protection schemes can build 
resilience, support growth and reduce inequality. 
Social programmes can be integrated with public 
works programmes to increase impact. Therefore, 
the need to build capacity is an urgent one. However, 
the issues of absorptive capacity and volatility are 
significant challenges for poor countries as well, 
and well-designed SWFs can be a component of an 
effective strategy for addressing them.
Fourth, stronger linkages need to be created 
between the extractive industry and local industry. 
In setting terms for access to mineral resources, 
governments should impose linkage conditions on 
mineral rights holders and provide incentives for 
investors to structure projects in ways that deepen 
project integration into the broader national — and 
regional — economy (Pedro, 2017: 26-28). Building 
on CSR efforts on the ground should be especially 
encouraged.  For instance, by 2010, the Ahafo 
linkages project implemented by Neumont Mining 
in Ghana had assisted in the development of 125 
local suppliers with business valued at US$4.7 
million. The Ghana Chamber of Commerce, the 
mining commission and the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) are building on this and identifying 
firms that can be strengthened to increase supply 
(ECA, 2011).
In addition to the capacity of host countries 
to manage resource wealth for sustainable 
development, there is also a need for capacity to 
regulate the mining sector. As highlighted in Chapter 
5, impacts arising from this sector either directly 
or through associated activities can undermine 
sustainable development by impacting the future 
economic development of other important and 
natural resource-based sectors. Many countries 
have mechanisms in place for impact assessment 
and mitigation, principally the Environmental and 
Social Impact Assessment process for projects and 
the Strategic Environmental Assessment process for 
programmes, policies and plans. However, a number 
of resource rich countries have limited capacity of 
environmental regulators to effectively implement 
these processes (Brooks & Wright, 2016). 
Large-scale mining is a highly technical industry 
and there is therefore often a need for greater 
technical capacity in environmental ministries 
and departments to understand impacts and the 
mitigation measures that can be deployed. There is 
an increasing level of innovation within the mining 
sector to tackle these challenges but the incentives 
to use costly mitigation measures can be lessened 
if there is no awareness or demand from host 
governments. Equally, inadequate staff numbers 
and limited financial resources within governments 
further constrain their ability to place demands 
on corporations. Ensuring that resource wealth 
is channelled into building effective government 
institutions to regulate the mining sector will be 
an important component of this sector’s ability to 
contribute to sustainable development. 
In addition to the 
capacity of host 




is also a need for 
capacity to regulate 
the mining sector [...] 
Impacts arising from 
this sector either 
directly or through 
associated activities can 
undermine sustainable 
development.
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6.1.11. Planning for mine closure
If mine closure is not considered at the design of 
the mine, the impact of the mine closure can be very 
costly. Fixing this tends to fall to the public purse, 
as mines almost always close when they are losing 
money and their operators are strapped for funds 
and facing a variety of other challenges (NOAMI, 
2010). Planning for mine closure must begin before 
approvals are given for the development of a mining 
project (MMSD, 2002).  Significant benefits have 
been achieved at little or no cost, simply because 
proper advance planning results in pollution 
prevention. For example, it may cost nothing to 
achieve an acceptable slope on a waste dump if 
these steps are planned from the beginning. By 
contrast, re-contouring an established waste dump 
can be enormously expensive if no attention is paid 
to these issues until the mine closes (NOAMI, 2010). 
The Mine Closure Plan, which should be submitted 
at the feasibility stage, must include plans for 
decommissioning, restoration and ‘rehabilitation 
of each component of the mining area with cost 
estimates. An appropriate funding mechanism is 
essential to ensure sufficient funds are available for 
mine closure activities and that all decommissioning 
and rehabilitation requirements are complete. 
Furthermore, the plan must be reviewed periodically’. 
ICMM points out that mine closure encompasses 
both managerial and technical issues (ICMM, 2008).   
It requires a continual testing of assumptions 
and recommendations to match evolving social, 
economic and environmental conditions and 
expectations. Mine closure is an ongoing concern 
and a work in progress. Even in countries like 
Canada, which have put much effort into this, a 
NOAMI (2010) survey found that some risks are 
not addressed (such as third-party interference, 
catastrophic events or contingency planning for 
worst case scenarios). Besides this, most agencies 
managing mine closure lack consistent ways to 
store data and information, which is critical when 
addressing emergencies.
It is advisable to have an ‘independent mine closure 
law that establishes a single agency to implement 
the law. This model gives the business community 
assurance that one agency will take the lead on its 
problems and that it will not have to answer to many 
differing opinions on how operation, reclamation and 
closure success will be measured’ (see Box 6.6 for 
a good practice). This model also allows the public 
and NGOs a single place to go for information on 
mining.
NOAMI (2010) proposes the following principles in 
formulating a mine closure policy:
• There should be a plan for mine closure.
• Legislation governing mine closure should be 
modernized.
• More appropriate technological alternatives for 
implementing a mine closure plan should be 
considered.
• More economically appropriate alternatives for 
carrying out mine closure should be researched.
• Governments should take into account the 
interest and opinions of civil society, especially 
those communities directly affected by mining 
enterprises.
• The experiences of those countries with a well-
developed mine closure policy regime should be 
taken into account.
• Specific standards or closure requirements should 
reflect a careful balancing of the benefits and 
costs of the standards or requirements. Policies 
should be designed to encourage mine owners 
to achieve a specific standard or requirement at 
lowest cost.
• Policies should be designed to encourage or 
provide incentives for technological innovation 
in mine closure, to reduce costs of compliance 
(economic incentives tend to provide greater 
incentives for innovation than technology or 
performance standards).
If mine closure is not 
considered at the design 
of the mine, the impact 




Box 6.6. Almadén mine closure – an example  
of good practice
Mine closure usually poses two challenges. 
On the one hand, closed mines can pose 
environmental hazards as pointed out above 
and, on the other hand, mine closure can 
depress a city/region as the mine tends to be a 
major employer in the region. Mine closure can 
lead to ghost towns. It is therefore crucial that 
measures to mitigate potential environmental 
threats are accompanied by consideration 
of how the economic challenges can be 
addressed. Almadén mine is a good example 
of leveraging a closed mine to generate new 
economic activity. The mine, which has only 
been closed since 2003, is now a well-organized 
museum with guided tours.  It is also now a 
UNESCO World Heritage site due to its long 
history that captures the story of mercury 
mining. This has made it a global tourist 
attraction.
Source: UNESCO (2012) https://www.worldheritagesite.
org/list/Heritage+of+Mercury.
6.1.12. The next frontier: governance of the 
impacts of deep-sea mining and broader lessons 
moving forward
Commercial interest in exploiting mineral wealth on 
the deep ocean floor first became a major topic of 
debate at the United Nations in the 1960s. However, 
technical challenges, the cost of extraction and 
environmental and legal concerns kept development 
at a slow pace. Nowadays, with technology 
maturing, and amidst growing geopolitical concerns 
about security of land-based supplies, the interest 
has been rekindled (as shown by the rapid increase 
in the number of exploration contracts issued by the 
International Seabed Authority in the past decade). 
Areas approved for exploration now cover over 
1.5 million square kilometres in the Pacific, Indian 
and Atlantic Oceans. Sites of mining interest often 
include highly vulnerable marine ecosystems and 
biodiversity hotspots. Environmental impacts risk 
being significant and possibly irreversible, and are 
juxtaposed with short-term socioeconomic benefits. 
This poses an important sustainability question and 
a complex governance challenge. Governance of 
deep-sea mining in particular needs to be framed by 
the Sustainable Development Goals 14 (oceans) and 
12 (sustainable consumption and production).
As with other new industries, the dominant policy 
questions are whether, why, where and how to 
authorize or even encourage deep seabed mining, as 
well as how to ensure that any deep seabed mining 
contributes to fulfilling societal needs (including 
economic development).  This section provides a 
case study of future impact governance challenges 
relating to deep-sea mining and draws extensively 
on the final report of the MIDAS project 94 95and 
on a briefing paper by the Deep-Sea Conservation 
Coalition.96
6.1.12.1. Environmental governance of submarine 
deposits 97
Many of the richest seafloor deposits are found 
in the half of the world’s ocean floor that lies 
beyond the jurisdiction of any one country. Under 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), the sole authority governing the 
exploration and exploitation of the global seafloor 
is the International Seabed Authority (ISA).  So far, 
the ISA has signed 28 contracts for exploration 
of mineral deposits with Member States and their 
contractors98 (private or State-owned companies or 
agencies). The most recent exploration contract was 
awarded to Poland during the 23rd annual session 
of the ISA in 2017, in an area on the mid-Atlantic 
Ridge, which has been tagged by the Convention on 
Biological Diversity as an ecologically or biologically 
significant area (thereby calling into question the 
application of the precautionary principle).
Under international law (UNCLOS), deep-sea mineral 
exploitation must be governed “to ensure effective 
94 MIDAS Research Highlights: High-level summary of 
the key project outcomes, 2016, http://www.eu-midas.net/
library.
95 MIDAS D9.6: Report on the implications of MIDAS 
results for policymakers with recommendations for future 
regulations to be adopted by the EU and the ISA, 2016, 
http://www.eu-midas.net/library.
96 Deep Sea Conservation Coalition, 2017, Deep-sea 
mining: briefing paper, http://www.savethehighseas.org/
resources/publications/deep-sea-mining-briefing-paper/.
97 http://eu-midas.net/legal_framework.
98 For an overview of contractors and exploration areas: 
see https://www.isa.org.jm/maps.
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protection for the marine environment from harmful 
effects”, to prevent damage to marine fauna and 
to ensure the “protection and preservation” of the 
marine environment. Thus far, the ISA has developed 
its regulations for exploration and is working on its 
exploitation regulations. It has set a target date of 
2020 to finalize the regulations for exploitation of 
deep-sea minerals. If this target is met, large-scale 
commercial mining of the deep seabed could begin 
in international waters a few years later (assuming 
that market conditions are favourable). 
These regulations must ensure that the key UNCLOS 
obligations are fully met. Key issues are core 
environmental concepts such as defining “serious 
harm” and ”harmful effects”; and fundamental 
principles such as the “precautionary approach”, 
“common heritage of mankind” and transparency. In 
relation to mining activities that may cause serious 
harm, the ISA has a mandate under UNCLOS to: (i) 
set-aside areas where mining will not be permitted; 
(ii) deny a new application for a contract to conduct 
seabed mineral activities; (iii) suspend, alter or 
terminate operations; and iv) hold the contractor and 
its sponsoring State liable for any environmental 
harm (Levin et al., 2016).  A recent review of the ISA 
has, however, confirmed several governance issues 
such as lack of transparency and environmental 
capacity.99 The report concluded that the Authority 
is not yet fulfilling its obligations to ensure that 
activities in the area are carried out for the benefit 
of humankind. Outside the realm of ISA, individual 
countries can also authorize mineral exploration and 
exploitation in the seabed areas within their national 
jurisdiction, known as their continental shelves. The 
world’s first deep seafloor mining may start in 2019 
within the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
of Papua New Guinea, where the Canadian company 
Nautilus Minerals is due to start mining for gold, 
silver and copper from hydrothermal vent zones.100
The economic implications of deep-sea mining are 
also still debated, and this is closely linked to the 
benefit-sharing obligations under UNCLOS. A study 
99  Seascape consultants, 2016, Periodic Review of the 





by the German Ministry for Economics showed that 
the economic profitability of deep-sea mining is still 
very uncertain,101 and at least one Government-level 
assessment of seabed mining has found economic 
claims to be questionable.102 The social implications 
of deep-sea mining also remain to be considered. 
Local communities in places such as Papua New 
Guinea are campaigning for a ban, fearing deep-sea 
mining places their food resources and livelihoods at 
risk, and emphasising that they are the custodians 
of the world’s largest ocean.  At the same time, new 
technologies could emerge to make such mining 
more environmentally tolerable, while the demand 
for minerals for green technologies continues 
to rise dramatically with no clear governance 
mechanism to meet such projections (Ali et al., 
2017). However, a 2016 report from the Institute for 
Sustainable Futures in Sydney, Australia, concluded 
that - even under the most ambitious renewable 
energy scenarios - this demand can be met without 
mining the deep sea (Teske et al., 2016). The level 
of uncertainty on the demand and supply sides is 
likely to continue, and a clear understanding and 
governance path for the impacts of such frontier 
resources therefore becomes more urgent.
6.1.12.2. Deep-sea mining and Sustainable 
Development Goals
Clearly there is a need to reframe deep-sea 
mining governance in the light of the Sustainable 
Development Goals. The future requirements for 
deep-sea mining need to be evaluated in a holistic 
manner; that is, taking into account transitions to 
sustainable consumption and production systems 
and changes in lifestyle as consumer awareness 
about the impacts of consumption increases 
worldwide103 If deep seabed mining is allowed to 
101  Ramboll IMS Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH, 2016, 
Analyse des volkswirtschaftlichen Nutzens der Entwicklung 
eines kommerziellen Tiefseebergbaus. Bundesministeriums 




102  In New Zealand, the Chatham Rock (CRP) 
Environmental Protection Authority (EPA) decisions 
questioned economic claims made by proponents. 
http://www.epa.govt.nz/EEZ/previous-activities/notified-
consents/chatham_rock_phosphate/Pages/default.aspx.
103  Deep sea mining: Charting the risks of a new frontier.
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take place, then governments must ensure that the 
ISA regulations include robust requirements for:104 
• Strict limits on adverse environmental impacts, 
with clear conservation and management 
objectives;
• Strategic or regional environment management 
plans;
• Site-specific environmental management plans;
• Environmental impact assessments (EIAs);
• Mechanisms for independent scientific review, 
monitoring and compliance;
• Liability provisions, insurance and bonds, a redress 
and liability fund and a sustainability fund; and
• Transparency, including provisions to ensure 
public accountability and reporting, as well as 
public availability of environmental data.
The ISA must also improve its structure and working 
methods to ensure it has the capacity to develop and 
apply regulations to protect the marine environment. 
This means establishing procedures to ensure 
that it works with greater transparency, as well as 
enhancing its environmental expertise (for instance, 
through the creation of an environment committee). 
The case of deep-sea mining and concerns over its 
likely impact underline the importance of having an 
effective international governance system around 
resource extraction that bridges science and policy. 
6.1.13. An integrated approach to evaluating 
impacts 
The environmental impacts of mining outlined in 
Chapter 5 have an integrative scientific basis for 
evaluation. Extraction of minerals brings them from 
higher states of “entropy” – or natural disorder 
- in geological environments to lower states of 
“entropy” – implying a more ordered and refined 
output through the investment of energy. However, 
manufactured uses of these elements raise their 
entropy again. Energy in the form of extraction 
technologies as well as labour are then required 
to extract the metals back from the product at the 
http://www.dw.com/en/deep-sea-mining-charting-the-risks-
of-a-new-frontier/a-42258847.
104  Deep Sea Conservation Coalition, 2017, Deep-sea 
mining: briefing paper, http://www.savethehighseas.org/
resources/publications/deep-sea-mining-briefing-paper/.
end of the product cycle. The viability of reuse and 
recycling of minerals in the stockpile of products 
is dependent on the durability of the product itself 
and the recoverability of the material. From a purely 
resource-use-minimization perspective, it would be 
more sustainable to have a durable product than 
having to remanufacture products from disposable 
products. 
However, if one considers the broader systems 
ecology of material usage (calibrating stocks and 
flows of minerals with rising demand based on 
population or development), one has to consider 
whether durability of the product would require more 
mining at the expense of recycling. For example, 
if we make more durable aircraft but there is still 
a greater demand for them, the metal locked in 
their existing stock would not be available for 
recycling, and hence mining of the metal would 
become necessary. Energy use calculations, as 
well as the social and environmental trade-offs of 
mining versus recycling, are needed in more detail 
to ascertain the optimal profile of recycled versus 
mined material sourcing. This section will consider 
the aforementioned hybridity of mineral supply and 
its implications for developing effective governance 
systems. 
Combining concerns about energy usage and 
entropy leads to another useful concept, called 
“exergy”, which is increasingly being explored as a 
metric to understand the irreversibility of certain 
kinds of resource extractions.  The exergy of a 
material can be defined by its ability to do useful 
work in achieving thermal equilibrium with its 
environment. While energy can neither be created 
nor destroyed under normal circumstances, a 
material’s exergy can be destroyed based on an 
increase in entropy through mixing and dispersal. 
Although energy and exergy have the same 
measurement units (Joules), exergy is a more 
useful concept for understanding material usage 
and sustainability and could usefully be further 
developed (Dincer & Rosen, 2007). So far, the use of 
exergy in governance systems has been relatively 
limited to local or regional efforts at comparing 
energy utilization. However, the metric has the 
potential for broader application, as well in impact 
comparisons for more effective governance (Rosen, 
2013).
Minerals will need to be considered from multiple 
supply sources and mining companies would need 
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to reinvent themselves as material service providers 
from multiple sources rather than just mining itself. 
This may also involve the advent of new companies 
and players that form a fresh kind of industrial 
ecosystem. A potential win-win outcome related 
to mineral supply flows in this context is the use 
of minerals in green technologies, particularly for 
cleaner energy production that could in turn help to 
harness minerals more sustainably. The key to such 
an approach would be to track the overall impact 
reduction of the extractive process, as more use of 
those minerals in green technologies could also lead 
to greater aggregate ecological impacts. 
An IRP Report on Green Energy Choices undertakes 
an analysis of life-cycle impacts, land occupation 
and material requirements of different technology 
groups. An interesting finding of the report is that, 
‘when replacing conventional fossil fuel-based power 
plants, renewable technologies offer substantial 
reductions in both emissions of greenhouse gases 
and other pollutants (including those causing 
eutrophication, acidification, particulate matter/
photochemical smog and various forms of toxicity).  
For further details on the ecological impacts of 
renewable technologies’ ( see the IRP Report (UNEP, 
2016b)). It is also essential to track the energy-
material flow relationship. Substituting certain 
minerals for use in green technologies will likely 
have an impact on energy consumption that is 
an important metric for systems-wide aggregate 
impacts. Furthermore, we need to consider the role 
of recycling within a “circular economy” paradigm 
with greater technical complexity (World Economic 
Forum, 2014). Post-consumer resource usage is 
also changing to consider aggregate composites 
of metals and plastic or glass materials collectively 
for different uses. Thus, the conventional view of 
recycling metals through their disaggregated waste 
streams is also shifting (Sahajwalla, 2015). 
6.1.14. Gender and extractive industries 
governance
Extractive industries - mining, oil, and gas operations 
and projects - are generally seen as the domain 
of men (involving rough and heavy work of which 
women are physically incapable and in places 
where women ‘should not be’). These cultural 
and ideological representations of the formal, 
industrialized extractive operations and their 
managerial masculinity are inherently inappropriate 
and unhelpful for two reasons. First, they erase 
the long history of women’s direct and indirect 
contributions to extractive industries—as workers, 
wives sustaining and supporting the households’ 
well-being, builders of strong and healthy mining 
communities and as supporters of men’s struggles 
against capitalist exploitation (John 1980; Lahiri-
Dutt & Macintyre, 2006; Mercier & Gier, 2007; Nash, 
1979; Parpart, 1986; Pattenden, 2005; Rhodes, 2006; 
Rolston, 2014; Smith, 2008). The resulting gender-
segregated labour regimes in these operations 
strip women of their autonomy and render their 
political agency invisible (Alexander, 2009; Gier 
& Mercier, 2006; Horowitz, 2017; Jenkins, 2014; 
Lahiri-Dutt, 2012; Loeb, 2007; Murray & Peetz, 
2010). Second, such masculinity also undermine 
women’s rights — to struggle against exploitation, to 
resist the gendered social impacts, to emerge from 
victimhood, and, most importantly, to contribute 
efficiently and effectively to extractive industries 
(Deonandan et al., 2017; Jenkins & Rondón, 2015; 
Keenan & Kemp, 2014; Lahiri-Dutt, forthcoming; 
MacDonald & Rowland, 2003). 
Therefore, although naturalized in discursive, cultural 
and ideological constructions as an essentially 
male domain, masculinity is not the natural order 
of mining, and gender neglect hides women and 
devalues their agency in this sector. This section 
focuses on how gender mainstreaming is related 
to meeting sustainable development goals through 
better governance of extractive industries, discusses 
policy issues and offers examples of what can be 
done. It argues that gender inclusivity is essential for 
extractive industries governance, and substantiates 
the argument by offering examples of good practices 
and policies that can be used to mainstream gender 
in the sector.
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 
established by the United Nations Development 
Programme, mainstream gender at their heart. 
In particular, Goal 5 relates to gender equality 
by arguing that the provision of equal access to 
education, decent work and representation in 
political and economic decision-making processes 
to women will fuel sustainable economies and 
benefit societies and humanity at large. The 
specific targets that are relevant for extractive 
industries governance include: the ending of all 
forms of discrimination against all women in mining 
communities as well as in mining organisations and 
mining sites; ensuring women’s full and effective 
participation and equal opportunities for leadership 
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at all levels of decision-making in mining-related 
matters; undertaking reforms to give women equal 
rights to economic resources as well as access to 
ownership of and control over land and other forms 
of property and natural resources; enhancing the use 
of enabling technologies with a view to empower 
women; and adopting (and strengthening) policies 
and enforceable legislation that can promote gender 
equality and empowerment of all women in both 
extractive industries and in areas of their operation. 
A range of evidence, presented collectively in the 
book titled ‘Gendering the Field: Towards Sustainable 
Livelihoods for Mining Communities’ (Lahiri-Dutt, 
2011), has shown that the sustainability of economic 
developments triggered by extractive industries 
could be significantly increased by removing inherent 
biases and identifying strategies to ensure equal 
benefits for women and men in mining communities.
The gendered sustainable development targets are 
relevant to improving the governance of extractive 
industries to make them more efficient, and to 
make natural resource management more gender-
just (Silva-Segovia and Salinas-Meruane, 2016; 
Sweetman & Ezpeleta, 2017). Currently, women are 
discriminated against in extractive industries, yet 
they experience a disproportionately large burden 
of the negative impacts of mining. This is because 
the gender roles of women and men in most rural 
communities are such that it is women who are 
impacted more when environments are degraded 
and when the social and cultural fabrics are 
disrupted by new mining operations (Eftimie et al. 
2009). The gendered impacts of large-scale projects 
exacerbate gender inequality and disadvantage 
women by overlooking their rights, needs and 
aspirations - leading to loss of traditional autonomy 
and power. For country-wise analyses, see: for 
Canada, MiningWatch Canada 2005; for China, 
Huang & Ali, 2015; for India, Lahiri-Dutt & Ahmad, 
2012; for Papua New Guinea, Macintyre ,2003; 
for Indonesia, Robinson 2003. For an overview, 
see Macdonald and Rowland, 2003. Moreover, at 
higher levels of mineral-resource-related decision-
making that pertains to extractive industries, 
women are conspicuously absent. The immediate 
task, therefore, is to mainstream gender in political, 
economic and public aspects of extractive industry 
governance.
The international NGO Oxfam has shown that 
the impacts of mining are not gender neutral 
and, although women bear the negative impacts 
of mining more than men, they rarely receive 
the benefits that men do. Hill et al. (2017) show 
that women are not consulted when extractive 
companies negotiate access to land, compensation 
or benefits; extractive operations undermine 
women’s ability to provide food and clean water 
for their family and can increase their workload 
by damaging the environment; compensation and 
benefits are paid to men who are seen as the heads 
of households denying women access to mining’s 
financial benefits, thereby increasing their economic 
dependence on men; and women can lose their 
traditional status in society when mining creates 
a cash-based economy where the transient male 
workforce can bring increased alcohol, sex workers 
and violence into the community (thereby affecting 
the women’s safety). Evidence also shows that 
women mine workers often face discrimination 
and poor working conditions, are victims of sexual 
harassment and receive lower wages or pay for 
equal work to that carried out by men (Benya, 2017; 
Botha, 2016; 2015).
Two reasons, therefore, emerge to justify a gender-
inclusive extractive industries governance. First, 
gender equality and inclusiveness can help to 
improve the performance of extractive industry 
governance (Gibson and Kemp, 2008). It would 
therefore be reasonable to consider if extractive 
industries can transform the lives of millions 
of people in resource-rich developing countries 
and can help drive economic growth, create new 
jobs and reduce poverty instead of enhancing 
economic disparities between those who benefit 
from mining and those who do not (thereby 
creating intergenerational poverty or entrenching 
vulnerabilities around their operations) (Cane 
2015). Discrimination against women can be an 
impediment to successful business development 
that can, in turn, lead to or sustain longer-term 
economic growth. As evidence from other 
businesses suggest, gender-sensitive governance 
can lead to improved management efficiency. 
Gender-sensitive governance can also minimize 
disruptions in production or community conflicts. A 
World Bank policy brief (World Bank, 2013) suggests 
that employing women and incorporating women 
into community-level consultations can create a 
more predictable business environment with fewer 
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production disruptions, thus avoiding cost increases 
and loss of income. The Minerals Council of Australia 
(2013) notes that women’s economic empowerment 
can be good for community development as they 
have a better record of accomplishment of starting 
successful businesses and repaying microcredit 
loans; women also show a greater willingness to 
respect safety and environmental safeguards.
Second, extractive industries must use the 
opportunity to contribute to gender equality by 
stepping up their efforts to empower women 
and lead to a more gender-just, gender-equal and 
inclusive future for humanity. There is growing 
evidence from across the world that gender 
inclusivity leads to better economic and social 
outcomes from new extractive projects. The World 
Bank (2013) notes that the benefits of including 
women’s perspectives in extractive industries are 
manifold, and that the employment of women 
brings community gains: where women have 
access to employment and contribute to household 
finances, families invest more in education, health, 
and nutrition and have better well-being than 
in households where women have less access 
to employment and finances. The Bank also 
suggests that the consultation of women — in land 
compensation matters, in environmental decision-
making and in other forms of spending — leads 
to more sustainable investment because the 
decisions are more acceptable to both women and 
men in communities (Lahiri-Dutt, 2012). Growing 
evidence points to an increasing engagement of 
women in community affairs (Kemp et al., 2010), in 
mining companies’ negotiations and agreements 
(O’ Faircheallaigh 2013), in sustainability reporting 
(Grosser & Moon, 2008), in women’s access to local 
economic and community development (Keenan & 
Kemp, 2014), in services and infrastructure (Keenan 
et al. 2014), in the inclusion of indigenous women in 
the workforce (Parmenter, 2011) and in the provision 
of employment (Lahiri-Dutt, 2006). Responses 
to gender concerns in industry initiatives have 
been much slower than in other natural resource 
management sectors (Macintyre, 2011), yet many 
mining companies are now involving women in 
community consultations to indicate preferred 
avenues for investment to have more sustainable 
outcomes and developmental impacts.
Following SDG 5, which recommends the 
implementation of new legal frameworks for 
female equality and removal of practices that harm 
women to end gender-based discrimination in the 
workplace, gender should be mainstreamed in the 
mining project cycle. In the first phase of exploration, 
gender analysis needs to be an integral part of social 
mapping to note the gender-differentiated livelihoods 
and coping strategies, the access to and ownership 
of resources and the gendered power dynamics. 
Women need to be made a part of consultations 
for ‘prior and informed consent’, that is, at the 
beginning of community engagement. During the 
mine-planning phase, gender impact assessments 
can be integrated to social mapping surveys, cultural 
impact assessments and R&R planning. During the 
construction phase, gender-differentiated needs 
would reveal the separate needs and interests of 
women and men. During mine operation, community 
development projects, training and education 
can have a distinctive gender focus, and similarly 
women-targeted credit can be offered to set up 
small businesses and develop income-generating 
activities. Planning for mine closure can also ensure 
that women are a part of community consultations 
and livelihood projects.
Historically, women 
have directly and 
indirectly contributed 
to extractive industries. 
However, sex-based 
discrimination has 
forced women to stay 
out of the workplace 
in the extractive 
industries, without 
being able to claim the 
economic benefits.
Historically, women have directly and indirectly 
contributed to extractive industries. However, 
sex-based discrimination has forced women to stay 
out of the workplace in the extractive industries, 
without being able to claim the economic benefits. 
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On the other hand, women in host communities have 
become more vulnerable to the risks and insecurities 
caused by the environmental, social and cultural 
impacts on the surrounding areas. Clearly, the 
concept that benefits will trickle down to the entire 
household through the male household head has not 
worked. At the same time, evidence from all around 
the world has accumulated to show that gender 
inclusiveness in extractive industries development is 
beneficial for both the communities and the mining 
operations. Instead of stepping backwards, the 
extractive industries need to rise to the occasion 
and take up the opportunity to mainstream gender 
in all areas of their operations in order to promote 
development that is sustainable, and that benefits 
both women and men in an inclusive manner.
6.2. Conclusion
The challenges of extractive resource governance 
are well known, and some drivers have been well 
researched. However, other drivers that are more 
recent have not been well studied. This chapter has 
undertaken a comprehensive review of challenges 
and potential approaches. The approaches reviewed 
provide a good foundation for developing a more 
holistic framework that is flexible enough to address 
both current and emerging challenges. 
All stakeholders in the extractive value chain have a 
role to play. 
• Host countries: Host country governments have 
a critical role to play in ensuring mining supports 
sustainable development through designing 
effective fiscal regimes and building the capacity 
needed to effectively and efficient absorb mineral 
rents. 
• Home countries: Home States have much 
more power over mining companies and thus 
can mediate the significant power asymmetry 
between mining companies and host countries. 
Home countries are also critical to reforming 
the international trade and investment regimes 
that constrain the use of the full range of 
policy instruments to achieve resource-based 
industrialization at the local level).105
105  Acosta A (2013), Extractivism and Neoextractivism: 
Two Sides of the Same Curse, in Beyond Development: 
Alternative Visions from Latin America, ed. M. Lang and D. 
• International community: The international 
community also has a crucial role in closing 
governance gaps. For example, multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) are crucial in 
managing and mitigating environmental impacts. 
Global policy action is needed for setting global 
standards in the form of rules and regulations, 
voluntary instruments and reporting obligations in 
areas that include:
 ○ Mining companies: Mining companies 
are expected to operate responsibly 
including disclosing information; producing 
integrated social and environmental impact 
assessments; participating in local area 
assessments; paying a fair share of taxes 
and royalties; and not engaging in corrupt 
and other illegal practices.
 ○ Civil society organizations:  Civil society 
organizations play a key role in exerting 
social pressure and shaping public opinion 
to ensure mining companies operate 
responsibly.
These roles will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 10.
The insights gained here can also help to improve 
understanding of how existing frameworks can 
become more responsive. In the next chapter, the 
report discusses the current governance architecture 
in the mining sector and also undertakes an 
assessment of existing governance instruments. 
Insights from these two chapters will be useful 
in developing the key prerequisites for effective 
governance of the sector, which is the subject of 
Chapter 8.
Mokrani. 6: 1–86, Quito: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and 
Amsterdam: Transnational Institute.https://www.tni.org/
files/download/beyonddevelopment_extractivism.pdf.
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7. Current governance 
architecture
Mining trucks at gold mine. Photo: travfoto © Shutterstock
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7 CURRENT GOVERNANCE ARCHITECTURE
7. 0. Introduction
The previous chapter examined the challenges 
of natural resource governance and presented 
ways of addressing these challenges. This chapter 
highlights the current natural resource governance 
policy frameworks or instruments, regulations and 
initiatives that seek to mitigate negative social and 
environmental impacts and also harness natural 
resource exploitation. 
7.1. The Governance space
Four dimensions that are critical in characterizing 
natural resource governance are the actors, the 
spatial boundaries, the power relationships and the 
normative frameworks (Table 7.1). 
7.1.1. Stakeholders in extractive sector 
governance (Figure 1.1)
Stakeholders that participate in the extractive sector 
governance include, but are not limited to, ‘home’ and 
‘host’ governments, intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs), private commercial entities and ‘third’ sector 
actors such as non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), the finance sector and institutional 
investors, shareholders, industry associations, 
labour, consumers and diverse communities 
within civil society. Each of these actors pursues 
different sets of interests on different spatial and 
temporal scales and in different social, cultural, 
political, economic and environmental contexts. A 
characteristic feature of the extractive sector is the 
influential role played by transnational corporations 
(TNCs), including State-owned enterprises from 
other countries (Cotula, 2012; Holden & Pagel, 
2013; UNCTAD, 2009). Conflicting interests and 
asymmetries of information, negotiating skills, 
leverage and power between governments, TNCs 
and communities represent major political economic 
challenges.
The divergence in expectations between 
stakeholders has been a key driver of conflict in 
the extractive industry. This happens as ‘certain 
stakeholders may become or feel excluded from 
the decision chain. Stakeholders may also lack 
knowledge of the economic specificities of a mining 
project, fail to collectively understand how mining 
can benefit each group and view value creation as a 
“zero sum” game of winners and losers’ (Pedro et al., 
2017). 
7.1.2. Spatial boundaries
Different actors and normative frameworks 
shape extractive sector governance at different 
spatial and temporal scales, including the local, 
national, regional and international levels. The 
spatial boundaries of governance at each of these 
scales are often not aligned with the biophysical 
and spatial characteristics of resources, many of 
which are location-specific point resources. Mineral 
resources are concentrated in relatively small 
areas, conditioned by specific geological features 
and are unevenly distributed, which means that 
they must be exploited where they occur - most 
often through capital-, technology- and know-how-
intensive techniques. However, many activities in the 
extractive sector and their impacts straddle, migrate 
across or biophysically impact on assets located 
beyond jurisdictional boundaries. A recent example 
of such impacts is the collapse of a mine-tailing dam 
in Brazil in November 2015, which generated a wave 
of toxic mud killing 20 people and severely affecting 
hundreds of kilometres of river, riparian lands and 
Atlantic coast across the two states of Minas Gerais 
and Espirito Santo (Garcia et al., 2017).  Even in the 
absence of environmental catastrophes, the impacts 
of mining can extend well beyond the footprint of 
the operation. For example, in the Brazilian Amazon, 
mining has been shown to drive deforestation far 
beyond operational lease boundaries (Sonter et al., 
2017). Particularly in remote locations, the need for 
new infrastructure and energy generation can lead 
to far-reaching impacts across a landscape. Another 
example is the worldwide contamination by mercury 
emissions from coal burning via trade winds (UNEP, 
2013). Extractive activities are also extending to 
global commons, for instance, seabed mining. 
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Table 7.1. Dimensions of natural resource governance
Dimension Description
Stakeholders (Figure 1.1) Governments (home and host nations), intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs), development and investment banks, insurance companies, 
investors, shareholders and diverse communities within civil society 
(consumers, workers, local populations, trade unions and the media). 
Different interests, social, cultural, political, economic and environmental 
contexts.
Geography (space and time) Different spatial and temporal scales, including local, national, regional 
and international, and past, present, future and inter-generational.  
Spatial boundaries are often not aligned with the biophysical and spatial 
characteristics of resources (mineral resources in particular are aligned 
with geology not with political boundaries). Temporal scales are often 
not aligned with decision-making processes.  
Power relationships Asymmetric relationships of power, authority, cooperation or influence 
at multiple levels. Vertical when predominantly hierarchical, horizontal 
when predominantly cooperative and voluntary.
Normative frameworks More formal normative frameworks include treaties, laws, policies, 
contractual agreements and technical standards. Less formal normative 
frameworks include administrative, commercial, professional/cultural 
practices and interpersonal relationships.
Source: Authors’ compilation
7.1.3. Power relationships
Chapter 2 highlighted the fact that the mining sector 
is capital-intensive and requires highly specialized 
skills. The minerals and metals value chains are also 
global. The sector therefore tends to be dominated 
by powerful MNCs, which creates significant 
asymmetry in power and information. This is 
particularly relevant in the geographical south, where 
governments lack skills and knowledge about the 
resources they have, their value and the complexities 
of the public management of this sector. The result 
is that these governments have weak bargaining 
power. This weak negotiation capacity is further 
compounded by the fact that their capital markets 
are highly underdeveloped (forcing them to rely on 
foreign capital).
7.1.4. Relevant normative frameworks
Decision-making by different actors in the extractive 
sector is enabled, constrained and influenced by a 
wide variety of normative frameworks. More formal 
normative frameworks include treaties, constitutions, 
laws, policies, regulations, contractual agreements, 
international finance standards and voluntary 
standards of practice.
Less formal normative frameworks include 
administrative, commercial, professional, voluntary 
agreements and cultural or interpersonal practices. 
The categories of normative frameworks are 
discussed below.
International agreements establish a basic 
architecture of extractive sector governance at 
a global level, through the recognition of several 
general rights and obligations of nations/States. 
For example, States are afforded permanent 
sovereignty over extractive resources within their 
respective territories, and sovereignty or sovereign 
rights over certain extractive resources depending 
on where they are located offshore as defined by 
the International Seabed Authority governance 
framework.  Beyond the environment, there are also 
a number of international convention/agreements 
in other areas such as human rights (ILO 169) 
and mining in the Antarctic (Convention On the 
Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities). 
A number of multilateral environmental agreements 
also relate to mining.  For example, mainstreaming 
biodiversity in the mining sector (among others) was 
on the agenda of the 14th Conference of the Parties 
(COP-14) to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
held in Egypt in November 2018.  Under the United 
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Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
the Paris Agreement is likely to have impacts for 
the extractive sector as countries move towards 
cleaner energy sources.  Of particular relevance to 
the artisanal and small-scale mining sector is The 
Minamata Convention on Mercury, which aims to 
ban new mercury mines, phase out existing ones 
and move towards regulation.  
International agreements are also working to keep 
pace with changes to the mining sector, in particular 
where mining is becoming more common in ‘new’ or 
particularly sensitive areas.  Two examples of this 
are the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the 
Antarctic Treaty (which prohibits all activities relating 
to Antarctic mineral resources, except for scientific 
research), and the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).  Under UNCLOS, a 
framework has been established (the International 
Seabed Authority) to regulate deep-sea mining 
activities, including developing and enforcing rules 
for mining in areas beyond national jurisdiction.
National laws, policies and regulations establish 
detailed frameworks concerning rights to extractive 
resources, management and development of the 
extractive sector by taking into account impacts 
on the environment and other economic sectors, 
as well as the allocation of associated benefits and 
impacts. An important issue in several countries is 
the discrepancy between formally recognized rights 
to resources, and the resource-related expectations 
and dependencies of local communities (Toulmin & 
Quan, 2000; Tiess, 2011; Hamor, 2004). 
National policies and laws that are (or can be) of 
particular relevance to the management of the 
mining sector and its impacts on biodiversity are:
• National Biodiversity Strategies and Action 
Plans (NBSAPs) (many of which include specific 
recommendations relating to the mining sector);
• National Development Plans (where they explicitly 
recognize the value of biodiversity such as those 
in Uganda and Ghana);
• National Mining Policies and Codes (which 
can require or support certain technologies, 
obligations and/or approaches that consider 
biodiversity and ecosystem services); and 
• Legislation that mandates environmental and 
social impact assessments and strategic 
environmental assessments.  
A suite of national laws and policies is likely to play 
an important role in the governance of the mining 
sector, including those relating to protected areas 
and, fundamentally, those that enshrine human 
rights in decision-making processes.  However, a 
lack of capacity at the national and subnational level 
to understand, implement, regulate and enforce 
legislation can prove a significant challenge.  Lack 
of political will, low integrity and lack of input from 
CSOs are equally important.
International finance standards - The organizations 
funding mining operations are also increasingly 
aware of their environmental and social risks and 
responsibilities.  In response to this, the International 
Finance Corporation (IFC), the World Bank and many 
other multilateral development banks have devised 
environmental and social safeguards.  These set 
out the criteria that a project must meet in order to 
receive funding and have become important drivers 
for the uptake of internationally accepted standards.  
IFC’s performance standards have been adopted 
by the Equator Principles Finance Institutions and 
have become a blueprint of best practice for a 
number of industries, including mining and oil and 
gas. These include the IFC’s Performance Standard 
6 on Biodiversity Conservation and Sustainable 
Management of Living Natural Resources.  Revised 
in 2012, the current standards require that projects 
achieve ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity in areas of 
natural habitat, and a net gain in areas of critical 
habitat through adoption of the mitigation hierarchy. 
They also include additional requirements for 
operations in protected areas (IFC, 2012). 
Equally, the World Bank’s Environmental and Social 
Framework sets criteria for lending to governments 
and was expected to be launched in 2018.  Given 
the important role that governments play in many 
stages of mining activities (particularly planning and 
through State-owned enterprises), this provides a 
valuable mechanism to embed environmental and 
social considerations into publicly funded projects.  
Voluntary and private standards – As mining 
companies seek to earn a ‘social licence to operate’ 
(discussed in more detail below), this has resulted 
in an ‘explosion of soft regulation in recent years’ 
(Pedro, 2015). Such ‘voluntary initiatives are aimed 
at addressing potential consequences of mining on 
the environment (for instance, owing to tailing spills, 
deforestation, loss of biodiversity, soil erosion, water 
depletion and CO2 emissions), poverty and  
 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
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Figure 7.1. Supply and value chain in the extractive sector 
inequality, employment and inflation, immigration, 
displacement, loss of ancestral lands and livelihoods 
and other human rights violations’.
Industry associations play an important role in 
developing and disseminating good practice around 
environmental management within the mining 
sector.  For example, in recognition of the risk that 
mining poses to protected areas, IUCN and ICMM 
have produced good practice guidance on protected 
areas and biodiversity. In line with Article 6 of the 
Convention concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage, ICMM member 
companies have agreed not to explore or mine in 
World Heritage sites.  The Mining Association of 
Canada’s Towards Sustainable Mining initiative 
provides information and support to members to 
minimize and manage impacts, including developing 
a Biodiversity Conservation Management Framework 
and Protocol.
A number of certification initiatives for mined 
products have been developed, some of which 
include biodiversity among their criteria. Examples 
include: 
• The Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance, 
which aims to involve a range of stakeholders 
(including affected communities) in the 
development of an assurance system to improve 
the environmental and social performance of the 
sector (to be launched in 2018). 
• Responsible Jewellery Council has developed 
a whole supply chain approach to its initiative, 
including consideration of performance against its 
responsible standards from mining raw materials 
to selling finished jewellery.  
• Responsible SteelTM aims to ensure that steel 
certified under its scheme has been produced and 
sourced responsibly.   
While by no means universally applied, such 
initiatives can help guide the mining sector towards 
more ‘sustainable’ and ‘responsible’ practices and 
recognize efforts made to avoid, minimize and 
manage environmental and social impacts.  Many 
relevant initiatives are discussed further in section 
7.3 below.
As shown above, the governance space is made up 
of actors, spatial boundaries, power relationships 
and normative frameworks.  These all play out in the 
mineral value chain, which is discussed below. 
7.2. Value chain governance 
The movement of extractive resources across 
national boundaries is driven by the organization 
of production, trade and investment into globalized 
supply and value chains (Kaplinsky & Morris, 
2002) These chains have diverse characteristics 
– including various degrees of complexity, 
fragmentation, interconnectedness and resource 
intensity, as well as different structures of control 
and ownership (OECD, 2013). Figures 2.1 and 2.2 
below provide simplified examples of a supply 
and value chain in the extractive sector. They 
illustrate that minerals supply and value chains are 
characterized by interactions among multiple actors 
across multiple countries.
Relationships – Actors and normative frameworks 
are influenced and shaped by relationships of 
power, authority, cooperation or influence at multiple 
levels. These relationships can be hierarchical, 
or cooperative and voluntary. The prominent and 
influential role of private transnational entities, 
including transnational corporations (TNCs), 
not-for-profit organizations and other formalized 
partnerships and associations, is a defining feature 
of extractive sector governance in recent decades. 
The ability of TNCs to influence extractive-sector 
Source: Adapted from Dicken (2011).
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decision-making across globalized value chains 
depends on the governance structure of the chain 
in question.106 The aforementioned asymmetry of 
power between TNCs, government and communities, 
for instance, may prevent developing country 
governments from securing a ‘fair’ mining deal 
and this could also inhibit local communities from 
exercising their rights. Taxation base erosion and 
profit shifting thanks to sophisticated engineering of 
complex corporate structures put in place by some 
TNCs (involving subsidiaries located in tax heavens) 
have become sufficiently problematic to draw the 
attention of the OECD, which has put in place a work 
programme to address this problem.107
Figure 7.2 presents five well-known illustrative 
modes of interaction between different private sector 
actors within globalized value chains, as well as the 
corresponding degrees of power asymmetry and 
coordination. Extractive sector value chains tend to 
be characterized by high levels of concentration, with 
transnational mining companies exercising a high 
106  There are few cases where a TNC would carry out all 
activities in the value chain. Many just carry out mining and 
processing, while others perform smelting, refining and 
manufacturing.
107  OECD web pages on base erosion and profit shifting: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/.
degree of coordination and power over private sector 
activities in the relevant value chain. In a number of 
extractive sectors, TNCs participate in collaborative 
networks designed to promote better governance 
within and across global value chains – a focal point 
being the International Council for Mining and Metals 
(ICMM), but some key global players are not yet part 
of ICMM.
The operationalization of the governance concept 
requires careful consideration of two value chains 
- the natural resource extraction value chain and 
natural resources policy value chain (discussed 
below). It is the performance of these value chains 
that determines the quality of governance.
Finding, extracting natural resources and 
transporting them to the market is an expensive and 
technically demanding business. It is the domain 
of resource extraction companies. It is a high-risk 
and capital-intensive affair. Each stage in the value 
chain presents challenges (environmental, social and 
economic externalities) and also opportunities for 
revenues generation and local content development.
The increasing demand by consumers for 
sustainable products is moving the governance 
challenge to the customer level and to the full 
product life cycle (disposal/recycling level).Therefore, 
what happens after a resource is extracted, 
processed and transformed into a






















Market Modular Relational Captive Hierarchy
Turn-key supplier Relational supplierPrice
Source: Adapted from Gereffi et al. (2005).
Figure 7.3. The concept of a policy value chain
Source: World Bank (2009).
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product, used and finally disposed of are legitimate 
governance concerns now. The downstream value 
chain is also relevant to any full consideration of 
a material life cycle. However, this report focuses 
predominantly on the Extractives Production Value 
Chain, from the Framework Conditions applicable 
to the upstream activities (mining, ore processing/
metallurgy and refining, see Figure 2.2), with some 
consideration of the Downstream Value Chain in 
the context of consumer efforts to influence how 
metals and minerals extraction takes place, and who 
benefits from it.
How a country benefits from resource extraction 
depends crucially on the policies adopted. This is 
captured by the concept of a policy value chain for 
extractive resources.  This is shown in Figure 7.3. 
The key challenge here is having the institutions and 
capacity to manage the extractive sectors and invest 
the resource rents. 
On the economic side, good governance of mineral 
extraction requires adequate incentives to attract 
investment into a risky business environment, 
combined with a taxation regime or revenue sharing 
arrangement to give the host country a fair share 
of revenues. Beyond this central governance issue, 
however, there are other fundamental challenges of 
monitoring, regulation and management in order to 
avoid the negative outcomes of mining described 
in Chapter 5 and ensure that benefits accrue to the 
host communities and societies, as well as to the 
extractive industry.  
Various instruments have been put forward to 
address the governance challenges and the negative 
impacts of the extractive sector. These efforts 
have usually been prompted by a challenge at a 
particular node of the value chain and, as such, 
these instruments/initiatives seemed to be narrow, 
focusing on a particular part of the node. To obtain 
a Social Licence to Operate at the local level, many 
extractive companies have sought to address the 
externalities that come with resource exploitation 
and mitigate risks. This has been the impetus of 
many current instruments/initiatives.  Indeed, one 
can trace the growth of these instruments as each 
challenge rises to the top of the global agenda. 
Environmental damage has always been the most 
basic challenge, as resource exploitation involves 
disturbing the natural environment and possibly 
also creates pollution that further damages the 
environment, sometimes for decades – and much 
longer - after actual mine closure. As various 
concerns have come to the fore and become part 
of policy debates, new instruments have been 
rolled out. With the focus shifting to sustainable 
development more broadly, more instruments have 
been specifically oriented in that direction. 
7.3. Overview of natural resource governance 
instruments/initiatives108
At present, a plethora of instruments are in operation 
(see Appendix 7 for a list of almost 90 identified 
natural resource governance instruments).109 It is 
possible that some have been missed. We have 
treated multilateral environmental agreements 
(MEAs) with caution - See Box 7.1. These range from 
comprehensive policy frameworks to platforms for 
dialogues; from legally binding instruments backed 
by UN sanctions and national laws to voluntary 
instruments; and from a single stakeholder-led to 
multi-stakeholder platforms that bring together 
many types of stakeholders. Instruments also span 
across geographical locations, from specific sites to 
global initiatives. 
7.3.1. Mapping instruments
As there are potentially many ways to map extractive 
resource governance initiatives, the purpose of 
the mapping will have a major impact on how 
it is done. For the purposes of this report, the 
central motivation is ensuring extractive resources 
contribute towards sustainable development. 
The core concerns around extractive resource 
governance mainly arise due to externalities 
associated with extraction, ore processing, 
metallurgy and refining (Chapters 5 & 6 above), and
108  The terms instrument/initiatives as used here include 
standards, voluntary initiatives, international laws and 
treaties, assessments, indexes, foras and platforms. Some 
are voluntary, others mandatory. Some are just platforms 
for dialogue and sharing information, some are standards 
and codes of practice. The major criterion for inclusion is 
that the target of the instrument is the mineral resources 
industry. This can be explicitly stated or the fact that the 
challenges being targeted are largely driven by extractive 
activities. For example, while Illicit Funds Flows (IFFs) and 
biodiversity protection challenges are impacted by many 
sectors, extractive activities tend to be the major culprit.
109  Though the list is fairly comprehensive, we may have 
missed some of the initiatives and some may no longer be 
in use (for example Dodd-Franks).
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Box 7.1. Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs)
A Multilateral environmental agreement (MEA) is an intergovernmental document intended as legally 
binding with a primary stated purpose of preventing or managing human impacts on natural resources. 
MEAs play a critical role in the overall framework of environmental laws and conventions. Complementing 
national legislation and bilateral or regional agreements, multilateral environmental agreements form the 
overarching international legal basis for global efforts to address particular environmental issues. 
Over the years, many MEAs have been promulgated. Researchers and analysts agree that there is a 
proliferation of MEAs. There is no agreement on how many MEAs there are as the different methodologies 
used for counting MEAs have resulted in different numbers. 
• The Ecolex project sponsored by UNEP, FAO and IUCN recognizes 519 environmental treaties in total 
(Kanie, 2018);
• The International Environmental Agreements (IEA) database includes over 1,300 historic and current 
IEAs.110   The IEA website categorizes MEAs as: Energy; Freshwater Resources; Habitat; Nature; 
Ocean; Pollution (air, land, marine and waste); Species (agriculture, bird, fish, mammals); Weapons and 
Environment. 
• The UN website InfoMEAs lists 53 regional and 34 global treaties and protocols.  It uses a much more 
compact categorization that groups them into four categories:  Biodiversity; Chemicals and waste; Climate 
change and atmosphere; and Marine and freshwater. 
• Kanie (2018) points that other research identifies more than 500 MEAs registered with the UN, including 
61 on atmosphere; 155 on biodiversity; 179 on chemicals, hazardous substances and waste; 46 land 
conventions; and 197 on water issues.
Some MEAS are very specific to the extractive industry. The Minamata Convention on Mercury is very 
specific on mercury regulation. Most of the MEAs are much broader, covering issues that go beyond 
the extractive sector. The Convention on Biodiversity is a relevant MEA in the governance of extractive 
resources, as extractive activities have the potential to disrupt biodiversity.  However, the disturbance 
of biodiversity goes beyond extractive activities. In this regard, it is hard to say which MEA is relevant 
to extractive activity and which is not. Although many MEAs have implications for extractive activities, 
the authors feel that including all MEAs as potential governance instrument muddles the governance 
landscape and we have been selective on which MEAs to include (Morin & Bialais, 2018). 
110  Defined to include efforts to regulate human interactions with the environment that involve legally binding 
commitments (“agreements”) among governments (“international”) that have environmental protection as a primary 
objective (“environmental”)
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typically relate to the capacity to effectively manage 
the sector in a way that delivers sustainable 
development. There are many aspects of sustainable 
development that are addressed by the existing 
instruments. Some are very narrow, focusing 
on a single issue such as human rights. Some 
focus on local level issues, while others focus on 
broader national development. Some sustainable 
development issues, such as conflict prevention, 
and transparency and accountability, have become 
part of the global agenda with global efforts thus 
deserving special attention. 
The other key dimension relates to stakeholders. 
Stakeholders, who make choices on what issue to 
pursue, drive the design of instruments, and these 
are mainly driven by their own self-interest. A Civil 
Society Organization (CSO)-led process can deliver 
very different results from an industry-led initiative 
tackling the same issue. For example, Publish 
What You Pay (PWYP) transparency efforts got 
more traction when governments and development 
partners got on board to establish the Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)111 that 
has a multi-stakeholder membership. Mori et al. 
(2016) found that, for many organizations, the key 
motivation for seeking sustainability certification 
was the fact that it adds value. However, pressure 
from consumers and CSOs are also important 
drivers. 
The stakeholders that are targeted by any given 
initiative are equally important. Therefore, an 
industry-driven initiative targeting members of the 
industry is likely to have a greater impact than if it 
targets non-industry stakeholders. For example, the 
Canada Mining Association (CMA) moved from an 
ambitious Whitehorse mining initiative that targeted 
many stakeholders to a more targeted Towards 
Sustainable Mining (TSM) initiative that largely 
targeted its members specifically. The implication 
is that attention should be given to the lead 
stakeholder(s), the motivation of the stakeholder and 
which stakeholder(s) is targeted by the initiative. 
The natural resource target is important too. Some 
issues are focused on a single or a group of related 
resources such as precious metals, while others 
are more general. In addition, the nature of the ore/
111  Website: https://eiti.org/.
mineral extracted and the method of extraction 
generate very different challenges. For this reason, 
some instruments may target ASM and others LSM. 
Geographical coverage is another important 
dimension. Some instruments target activities at a 
single location, while others apply to regions and yet 
others are global.
Compliance requirements constitute another 
significant aspect. The law (local and international) 
backs some instruments, and thus compliance is 
mandatory. Some are voluntary, but even voluntary 
compliance requirements need to distinguish 
between where certification and auditing are required 
to claim compliance. Instruments can be knowledge- 
and experience-sharing platforms, policy frameworks 
or legal frameworks. 
Another dimension of interest is the node of the 
value chain targeted. There are three relevant value 
chains for extractives. There is the extractives 
production value chain (upstream) that captures 
activities including exploration, mine development, 
production, sales and mine closure. The extractives 
production value chain also has a downstream part 
that is concerned with processing of resources, 
manufacturing final products using the extractive 
resources as raw material, retailing and recycling the 
products. The policy value chain node is concerned 
with contracting, regulation, collection and allocation 
of revenues and executing sustainable development 
projects. An initiative can target one or several of the 
nodes.
An additional dimension is how the initiative 
relates to other instruments. The relationship can 
be to complement, duplicate, and/or to assist 
implementation. As we seek to have interoperability 
and reduce the burden on stakeholders, it is 
important to know how an initiative relates to other 
instruments.
Based on the above discussion, the key Natural 
Resources Governance (NRG) mapping dimensions 
are summarized in Table 7.2.
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Traditionally, companies have focused on issues related to responsible mining, 
such as CSR and environment, and the corresponding instruments will be broadly 
classified as Sustainable Development-Responsible mining (SD-Responsible mining). 
Some issues that fall within the realm of responsible mining but have received much 
attention and thus require specific focus. One of these issues is conflict prevention, 
with corresponding initiatives to be classified as Sustainable Development-Conflict 
Prevention. Another concern has been transparency of natural resources revenues 
flow, with instruments focusing on this to be classified as Sustainable Development - 
Transparency & Accountability (SD-T&A). Instruments tackling broad macroeconomic 
issues such as industrialization, local content, taxation and so forth will be classified 
as Sustainable Development-Macroeconomy.
Lead Stakeholder
There are mainly four groups of stakeholders: (i) government, (ii) civil society 
organizations (CSOs), (iii) industry/private sector, and (iv) public-private partnerships or 
multi-stakeholders.  
Geographical Focus There are three types of geographical coverage: (i) national, (ii) regional, or (iii) global
Natural Resources 
Focus
Instruments can cover: (i) extractive resources in general, (ii) mining, (iii) oil and gas, 
(iii) a mineral group such as precious metals; or (iv) a single commodity like coal or 
diamonds
Sector Focus 
Sector covered can be (i) artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM), (ii) large-scale 
mining (LSM), or (iii) Both (ASM+LSM).
Impetus/ Motivation
The motivations behind the initiatives are various. The key motivations are: (i) 
sustainable development, (ii) risk management (to pre-empt regulatory or consumer 
backlash), and (iii) marketing or branding.
Type
The main types of instruments are: (i) platforms (to facilitate dialogue, knowledge 
exchange/experience sharing and advocacy, (ii) policy framework, (iii) standards, 
guidance and indexes (benchmarking tools), (iv) capacity-building platforms and 
toolkits and (v) legal frameworks (laws and international treaties/conventions/
agreements).
Compliance
There are three levels of compliance: (i) mandatory (legal requirement), (ii) voluntary, 





Many instruments refer to other standards. They can reference, complement, adapt/




Initiatives can be targeted at one or several nodes. The nodes are: Extractive 
production value chain (Upstream) that has exploration, development, production and 
trading/sales nodes. 
Policy Value Chain 
Node
Initiatives can also target one or several policy nodes.  The policy value chain nodes 
are: (i) contract award, (ii) regulation and monitoring, (iii) taxes and royalty, (iv) revenue 





Initiatives can also target one or several downstream nodes from mine to recycling. 
The nodes are: (i) processing/beneficiation, (ii) smelting/refining, (iii) manufacturing 
products, (iv) retailing, and (iv) recycling.
Stakeholder 
Targeted 
Stakeholders groups are the same as those defined for the lead stakeholder category 
above.
Source: Authors’ classification
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7.3.2. Summary of Instruments
This section will examine a number of initiatives with 
the aim of mapping them using a categorization 
developed above (Table 7.2). The list of initiatives 
has been developed using a combination of 
Internet searches, various reports and consultation 
with experts. While every effort has been made 
to capture as many as possible, the list is by no 
means exhaustive. However, the list provides a 
good representation of the landscape. Appendix 7 
contains the full listing of the initiatives.
7.3.2.1. Sustainable development coverage
Table 7.3 shows the instruments grouped by the 
sustainable development perspective discussed in 
Table 7.2.
As Figure 7.4 shows, the bulk of NRG instruments 
examined in this report (61 per cent) cover 
sustainable development issues related to 
responsible business practices.  Figure 7.4 (lower 
panel) provides a further breakdown of issues 
covered under sustainable development-responsible
Ore crushing. Photo: Alf Manciagli © Shutterstock.
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Table 7.3. Initiatives by sustainable development perspective
business. Most of the instruments cover the issue of 
sourcing sustainably and this covers many aspects 
of supply chains. Several issues may therefore 
be covered, such as human rights, environmental 
concerns, mining practices and so forth.  Other 
instruments tend to focus on a single issue. The 
issue that most single-issue instruments tend to 
focus on is the environment. Although security of 
supply is a key motivation for instruments, there 
are few instruments that are exclusively focused 
on this. Security of supply concerns tend to be part 
of the responsible business practices. Concern for 
welfare of Artisanal Small-scale Mining (ASM) is also 
becoming an important concern and about 10 per 
cent of responsible business practices instruments 
focus on this.
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7.3.2.2. Mapping instruments by lead stakeholder
Many instruments are driven by the government or 
public sector, in particular the international bodies 
like the UN and regional bodies like OECD (Figure 
7.5 and Table 7.4). This is understandable given that 
responsible business practices are a crucial concern 
for governments. Although about one third of the 
instruments are multi-stakeholder driven, only about 
40 per cent of the multi-stakeholder instruments 
are formal public-private partnerships (indicating 
that 60 per cent cannot be fully described as multi-
stakeholder as they are led by industry (32 per cent) 
or CSO (29 per cent)). 
7.3.2.3. Mapping by extractive resource addressed 
About a quarter of the initiatives/instruments 
address extractives (metals and minerals, while 
another 18 per cent address the extractives in 
general (metals and minerals plus oil and gas). Only 
two instruments address oil and gas exclusively 
(Figure 7.6 and Table 7.5). An estimated 18 per cent 
are focused on a single mineral resource, with gold 
being the mineral targeted by most instruments. 
About 11 per cent related to a group of minerals and 
these are mainly instruments focusing on tungsten, 
tin and tantalite (3Ts) and gold, which are minerals 
linked to conflicts in the Great Lakes region of Africa. 
Concern for welfare of 
Artisanal Small-scale 
Mining (ASM) is also 
becoming an important 
concern and about 10 
per cent of responsible 
business practices 
instruments focus on 
this.
Figure 7.4. NRG instruments
Source: Authors’ analysis
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Source: Authors’ analysis
Figure 7.5. Analysis by lead stakeholder









It is useful to observe that a quarter of the 
instruments are not specific to extractive resources 
but apply to a broad range of sectors. These are 
instruments that address the general challenges of 
sustainable development. However, they single out 
the extractives sector as a high priority and some 
have specific sections on extractives. For example, 
the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) has a special 
supplement on extractives, while the International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is in the 
process of producing a reporting standard focused 
on extractives.
7.3.2.4. Mapping by geographical coverage
Most instruments reviewed in this report – which 
largely exclude the plethora of national-level 
instruments – have a global coverage, reflecting the 
multinational scale of much of the formal extractive 
industry. Only 13 per cent of the instruments have 
a regional focus, and these are mainly instruments 
targeting conflict minerals in the Great Lakes region 
(Figure 7.7).
Only 13 per cent of 
the instruments have 
a regional focus, and 
these are mainly 
instruments targeting 
conflict minerals in the 
Great Lakes region
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Table 7.5. Initiatives by extractive resource
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Figure 7.7. Regional instruments
Source: Authors’ illustration
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7.3.2.5. Mapping by the mining sector
Most instruments focus on the formal or large-
scale mining (LSM) sector. The challenges of 
the informal sector are very different and require 
different approaches. Twenty-three  per cent  of the 
instruments have a focus on ASM sector (See Table 
7.6). Half of these focus on developing conflict-free 
supply chains as the industry sought to comply with 
regulations or manage its public image. Twelve per 
cent of the instruments have the improvement of 
the ASM sector as part of their objectives, even if the 
main objective is risk management. 
7.3.2.6. Mapping initiatives by motivation
Though the main objective of any initiative is 
sustainable development (at least some aspect of 
it), the key motivation in setting up the initiative is 
guided by the interest of the lead stakeholders. Risk 
management is the main reason for the setting 
up of 44 per cent of the instruments (Figure 7.8). 
These are typically the instruments where the lead 
stakeholder is from industry. For the industry, the 
principal reasons for setting up instruments are: 
obtaining the social licence to operate, ensuring 
security of supply (for downstream users), improving 
public image and responding to consumer concerns. 
It is important to note that governments, CSOs 
or multi-stakeholders’ coalitions largely drive 
instruments that have sustainable development as 
their main motivation.
7.3.2.7. Mapping by type of Initiative
Forty-five per cent of the instruments are platforms 
for standard setting or assessment/indexes or 
guidance, namely benchmarking tools. This is 
followed by 16 per cent of instruments that are 
platforms for capacity-building (this includes 
networking and knowledge sharing). Fifteen per 
cent are platforms for advocacy (including dialogue 
and coordinating activities).  Nine per cent of the 
instruments are policy frameworks and 15 per cent 
are legal frameworks (Figure 7.9).
From the perspective of participation, 48 per cent of 
the instruments are purely voluntary. Seventeen  per 
cent are voluntary but contingent on being a member 
of the organization proposing them. For instance, 
all members of ICMM must sign to commit to the 
ICMM principles (See Box 9.4). For 20 per cent of the 
instruments, formal certification or audit by a third 
party is required to demonstrate compliance, while 
15 per cent of the instruments are backed by force 
of law or by an international convention/agreement/
treaty - meaning they are mandatory.
7.3.2.8. Relation to other Instruments
As Figure 7.10 shows, about one-third (36 per 
cent) of the instruments have a relationship with 
other instruments: 10 per cent implement other 
instruments, 10 per cent complement others, and  
9 per cent adapt or adopt other instruments.112 This 
means that about one third of the instruments have 
potential for interoperability. This is of interest and 
can provide the building blocks for a flexible yet 
holistic governance framework.
7.3.2.9. Mapping by value chains addressed
The three value chains of interest are the extractive 
value chain (EVC), the policy value chain (PVC) 
and the downstream value chain (DVC).  All these 
value chains are addressed to various degrees. By 
design, all the value chains address an aspect of the 
extractive value chain (as that was the criteria for 
selection).  
Out of all the instruments, 34 per cent address the 
extractive value chain only, 24 percent address both 
extractive and the policy value chains, while 31 per 
cent address the downstream value chain (Figure 
7.11). Then, 11 per cent address issues across the 
three value chains. It should be mentioned that that 
the criteria for assigning an initiative to a particular 
value chain are very flexible. The initiative does not 
need to address all the nodes in a value chain. For 
instance, many of the instruments addressing DVC 
are mostly those concerned with performing due 
diligence as opposed to helping countries develop 
downstream activities.
112  Please note that a neat classification is hard. 
For example, RMF-RMI maps its indicators to a wide 
range of related initiatives (i.e. implements) and also 
seeks to complement and amplify the work of other 
initiatives (see the RMI Methodology report 2017 at 
https://responsibleminingindex.org/en/methodology). In 
classifying, we have tired to capture the key objective.









BGI ASM Welfare, environment Gold Risk Management
CASM ASM Welfare  Sustainable Development
CFSI-CFS Conflict Prevention 3Ts+Gold Risk Management
CTC Good governance of ASM 3Ts Sustainable development
DDI ASM Welfare Diamond Sustainable development
Dodd-Frank Conflict Free Supply Chains 3Ts+Gold Public interest
Fairmined Improve ASM welfare Gold Sustainable development
ICGLR-RINR Formalize ASM, conflict free 
supply chains
3Ts+Gold Sustainable development
iTSCi Responsible sourcing 3Ts Risk management 
KPCS Responsible sourcing Rough Diamond Conflict prevention
MCM ASM Welfare, environment Gold Sustainable development
OECD –DD Respect human rights and 
avoid contributing to conflict 
through mineral sourcing 
 Sustainable development
RJC Human rights, labour rights, 
environmental impact, mining 
practices, product disclosure 


















Figure 7.8. Instruments by driving motivation 
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Figure 7.9. Instruments by type and by compliance/participation





Overview of natural resource governance instruments/initiatives
211 
Source: Authors’ classification
Figure 7.11. Instruments by value chain
7.4. Looking ahead
The chapter has highlighted the fact that diverse 
actors, geographical spaces that extend globally, 
complex power relationships and many normative 
frameworks characterize the governance space (see 
Table 7.7 for the list of instruments). This is reflected 
in the plethora of initiatives that have emerged as 
different actors pursue their interests. As we saw, 
some initiatives have very narrow scope (single-
actor-driven) and some multi-stakeholder-driven 
have a very broad scope. As a result, few initiatives 
explicitly address the SDGs. Perhaps a more 
important question is whether they are effective 
in their defined domains, be they narrow or broad. 
The next chapter discusses the effectiveness of the 
various instruments. 
[...] few initiatives 
explicitly address the 
SDG. Perhaps a more 
important question 
is whether they are 
effective in their defined 
domains, be they 
narrow or broad. The 
next chapter discusses 
the effectiveness of the 
various instruments.
 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
212
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
Appendix 7
Table 7.7. List of Instruments
No. Abbreviation Initiative (full name)
1 AC Aarhaus Convention
2 AGAM Agreement Governing the Activity of States on the Moon and other celestial bodies
3 AMV Africa Mining Vision
4 AKVG Akwé: Kon Voluntary Guidelines
5 ASI Aluminium Stewardship Initiative
6 BIG-E Batumi Initiative on Green Economy
7 BBOP The Business and Biodiversity Offsets Programme (BBOP)
8 BEPS Base Erosion and Profit Shifting
9 BetterCoal BetterCoal Code
10 BGI Better Gold Initiative
11 CASM Communities and Small-Scale Mining
12 Connex Connex Initiative
13 CBD Convention on Biological Diversity
14 CCUWL Convention Concerning the Use of White Lead in Painting
15 CRAMRA Convention on The Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities
16 CRIRSCO Committee for Mineral Reserves International Reporting Standards 
17 CFG Conflict Free Gold Standard
18 CFSI-CFS Conflict Free Sourcing Initiative-Conflict Free Smelter
19 Chinese DD Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Mineral Supply Chains 
20 CMCCC- 
GSRM
China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals Importers and Exporters 
(CCCMC)- Guidelines for Social Responsibility in Outbound Mining Investments (GSRM)
21 CMN Commonwealth Mining Network 
22 CTC Certified Trading Chains 
23 DDI/DDS Diamond Development Initiative/Diamond Development Standard 
24 DI Devonshire Initiative 
25 Dodd-Frank US Dodd-Frank Act (Section 1502)
26 EICC-ESWG EICC Environmental Sustainability Working Group 
27 EIP European Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials (EIP)
28 EITI Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
29 EO Equitable Origin
30 EPs Equator Principles
31 EPRM European Partnership for Responsible Minerals
32 ETP SMR The European Technology Platform on Sustainable Mineral Resources
33 Fairmined Alliance for Responsible Mining (ARM)-Fairmined Standard
34 Fairtrade Fairtrade Gold and Precious Metals
35 FATF The Financial Action Task Force
36 FORAM Forum on Raw Materials
37 FIASMEC The Fraser Institute Annual Survey of Mining and Exploration Companies
38 FRP Framework for Responsible Mining
39 GBAI The Global Battery Alliance Initiative
40 GMI Green Mining Initiative (GMI)
41 Green Lead The Green Lead Initiative
42 GRI Global Reporting Initiative
43 HEI Health in the Extractive Industries 
44 ICGLR-RINR The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region – Regional Initiative against the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources 
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45 ICMC International Cyanide Management Code for the Manufacture, Transport, and Use [of] 
Cyanide in the Production of Gold
46 ICMM International Council on Mining and Metals 
47 IFC-GPHJCEI IFC – ‘A Strategic Approach to Early Stakeholder Engagement – A Good Practice Handbook 
for Junior Companies in the Extractive Industries’
48 IFC-PS IFC Performance Standards on Environmental and Social Sustainability 
49 IFRS International Financial Reporting Standards for extractive sector
50 IGF-MPF Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development /Mining 
Policy Framework
51 ILO169 ILO169 - Indigenous and Tribal People Convention 1989
52 ILO176 International Labour Organisation Convention on Mine Safety and Health (1995)
53 IRA Indigenous Rights in the Arctic  
54 IRMA Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance 
55 iTSCi The International Tin Research Institute (ITRI) Tin Supply Chan Initiative
56 KPCS Kimberley Process Certification Scheme 
57 LPRM Local Procurement Reporting Mechanism
58 LBMA-RGG London Bullion Market Association - Responsible Gold Guidance 
59 MCM The Minamata Convention on Mercury
60 MInGov Mining Investment and Governance Review 
61 MPEPAT Madrid Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Atlantic Treaty
62 NamiRo NamiRo
63 NRC/NRGI The Natural Resource Charter (NRC)/Natural Resource Governance Institute (NGRI)
64 NRRI Natural Resources Risk Index 
65 OECD –DD OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chain Management of Minerals for 
Conflict Affected and High-Risk Areas 
66 OECD-Global 
Forum
The Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes 
67 OfD Oil for Development
68 PDAC e3Plus Prospectors & Developers Association of Canada 
69 PPA-RMT Public-Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade 
70 PWYP Publish What You Pay 
71 RS Australian Steel Stewardship Forum/ Steel Stewardship Council Ltd
72 RJC Responsible Jewellery Council 
73 RMC Responsible Mining of Cobalt 
74 RCI Responsible Cobalt Initiative
75 RMDI The Responsible Mineral Development Initiative 
76 RMF-RMI The Responsible Mining Foundation - Responsible Mining Index
77 RMI Raw Materials Initiative (RMI) 
78 RRMI Responsible Raw Materials Initiative 
79 SfH Solutions for Hope 
80 StAR The Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) initiative
81 STRADE Strategic Dialogue on Sustainable Raw Materials for Europe
82 TAI The Access Initiative
83 TSM Towards Sustainable Mining
84 UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
85 UNDP-SEMESHD Sustainable and Equitable Management of the Extractive Sector for Human Development 
86 UNFCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
87 UNGC UN Global Compact 
88 UNGP UN Guiding principles on Business and Human Rights
89 VPs Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights guidelines 
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8 EFFECTIVENESS OF MINERAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE INSTRUMENTS
8.0. Introduction113 
Although the mineral resources governance (MRG) 
instruments discussed in the previous chapter have 
played an important role in mitigating some of the 
most damaging impacts from the extractive sector, 
some serious accidents have nonetheless occurred 
(such as the Brazil tailing dam accident). Building 
on these instruments will be an important part of 
any attempt to ensure that the sector optimizes its 
contribution to sustainable development. For this to 
materialize, it is key to understand how effective they 
have been. That is the subject of this chapter. 
8.1. Effectiveness of MRG instruments 
In Chapter 7, 89 governance instruments were listed. 
These existing instruments have made significant 
contributions to improved governance.  Some of the 
success stories are summarized below.
• The EITI website points that, in countries like the 
DRC, Myanmar and Nigeria, the EITI has been 
central to many reforms of the sector. Across 
Central Asia, it has been key in many legislative 
changes.  In Francophone Africa, government 
systems have been strengthened.  In Latin 
America, trust has been built. Research suggests 
that EITI has improved the investment climate and 
that EITI has been less affected by corruption and 
tax evasion.114 Furthermore, Lujala et al. (2017) 
point that a review of 50 evaluations concludes 
that the EITI has succeeded in disseminating 
the norm of transparency, establishing the EITI 
standard and institutionalizing transparency 
practices. 





The MMSD initiative that was the precursor of the 
ICMM initiative aimed to create a shared idea of 
the appropriate and necessary roles for each of the 
major actors in mining and sustainable development 
– government, civil society and the private sector 
– asking ‘what is a company’s role and what is not 
a company’s role?’ An assessment of the initiative 
points out that, as a result, the understanding of 
sustainable development in the mining and minerals 
sector has markedly improved and there was 
increased sophistication in talking about how mining 
should maximize its contribution to sustainable 
development. This success launched the CEO-led 
International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) 
initiative that outlines values its members should 
hold. ICMM has succeeded in implementing many of 
MMSD’s recommendations for industry and provides 
the primary basis for collective action in the sector 
(Buxton, 2012). The ICMM has had good successes 
in steering its members towards responsible 
practices, while also contributing to national 
development (see Box 9.7). 
• United Nations General Assembly Resolution 
64/109 adopted at its 64th session notes that the 
implementation of the KPCS has had a positive 
impact in reducing the opportunity for conflict 
diamonds to play a role in fuelling armed conflict. 
It further notes that the KPCS would help to 
protect legitimate trade and ensure the effective 
implementation of the relevant resolutions on 
trade in conflict diamonds. 115
115  United Nations General Assembly, 64th Session. 
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly (64/109). 
The role of diamonds in fuelling conflict: breaking the 
link between the illicit transaction of rough diamonds 
and armed conflict as a contribution to prevention and 
settlement of conflicts (A/RES/64/109) http://www.un.org/
depts/dhl/resguide/r64.shtml.
 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
216
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
Much of the impact assessments of these 
instruments have, however, been anecdotal or taken 
the form of self-assessments. It is difficult to gauge 
their success rates. It is unfortunate - but perhaps 
unsurprising given the complexities involved - 
that the impact of many of the MRG instruments 
is not known. Miller and Bush (2014) highlight 
the importance of collating evidence to back up 
rhetorical claims over instruments, especially 
certification schemes. Schiavi and Solomon (2007) 
argue that, for schemes to achieve their full potential, 
they should include monitoring mechanisms to 
assess performance claims. However, Stark and 
Levin (2011) and WWF (2013) found that few 
schemes had properly evaluated their effectiveness.
Though there seems to be no study that has 
comprehensively assessed the effectiveness 
of most of the existing instruments, there have 
been studies assessing some aspects of certain 
instruments.  For instance, Mori et al. (2016) 
reviewed several natural resource Sustainability 
Certification Schemes (SCS), while Stark and Levin 
(2011) assessed eight standards that are considered 
optimal for improving governance. Darby (2010) 
and Acosta (2013a) assessed transparency and 
accountability instruments. Atanasijevic (2016) and 
ECA (2013) evaluated efforts at managing conflict 
minerals in the Great Lakes region. Lipschutz and 
Henstridge (2013) also assessed a number of 
mineral resource governance programmes. Le Billon 
(2012) assessed instruments on the potential for 
stopping illicit flows from the sector. 
Based on these studies and other literature, identified 
shortcomings of current extractive governance 
instruments will be summarized and some ideas 
presented on how performance challenges can 
be addressed. Each of the initiatives discussed in 
chapter 7 contributes to governance in its defined 
domain. Thus, the critique is not meant to imply that 
initiatives are of no use, but to point that collectively 
there are governance gaps.
8.1.1. Unintended consequences 
Some instruments have had unintended impacts 
that have undermined their effectiveness:
• They arguably distract from the pressing need to 
build effective global governance institutions to 
regulate multinational organizations. Furthermore, 
they undermine the regulatory role of governments 
by building a false argument that voluntary self-
regulation is more effective (Darby, 2010).
• Some instruments have had the perverse impact 
of achieving the opposite of the intended effect:
 ○ The United States Dodd-Frank Act, which 
requires US-registered companies to ensure 
that their supply chains do not contribute 
to conflict or human rights abuse, led to 
the imposition of a national mining ban in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
between September 2010 and 10 March 
2011. As a result, it is estimated that up to 
two million artisanal miners ended up out 
of work (Seay, 2012; cited in Atanasijevic, 
2016). Due to a lack of alternatives, many 
had to turn to other sources of livelihood 
or to join armed groups that could have 
contributed to the ensuing spike in 
violence. Parker and Vadheim (2015 cited in 
Atanasijevic 2016) estimate that violence in 
the DRC increased by almost 150 per cent 
and looting by nearly 300 per cent as a result 
of the Dodd-Frank Act.
 ○ The implementation of Nigeria’s Extractive 
Industries Transparency Initiative (NEITI) 
led to greater disclosure of information on 
extractives by Government. However, the 
greatest beneficiaries seem to have been 
the elite, technocrats and policymakers. 
According to Shaxson (2009), these 
beneficiaries became strategic consumers 
of this information to better understand the 
nature of extractive industries in Nigeria 
and thus how to maximize benefits for 
themselves.
 ○ The OECD Due Diligence Guidance 
created unfair competitive advantage for 
manufacturers and exporters that operate 
in non-OECD States that do not apply the 
rules vis-à-vis companies based in OECD 
countries (Carisch & Rickard-Mathew, 
2013). This could be generalized as some 
countries enjoy a massive but unsustainable 
competitive advantage from having low 
environmental and social standards in 
addition to being non-transparent.
Effectiveness of MRG instruments 
217 
Some proposals to address these shortcomings 
have been proposed. First, MRG instruments 
are no substitute for governments. They should 
seek to empower governments by building skills 
and institutional capacity of the various relevant 
bodies, such as a functional Directorate of Mines, 
Environmental Agencies and Geological Surveys, in 
order to deliver sustainable development. This also 
means building capacity of bodies designed to hold 
governments to account, such as an auditor general, 
parliament and so on. 
Second, while government regulations can enhance 
supply chain transparency, a purely regulatory 
response can lead to unintended consequences. 
The Solutions For Hope (SfH) initiative observes 
that, with respect to the Great Lakes region, 
without a parallel in-region development strategy, 
a regulatory approach to conflict minerals could 
discourage downstream companies from sourcing 
minerals from the very regions the policies are 
meant to assist. Responsible-sourcing instruments 
should include support for workers in artisanal and 
small-scale mining (ASM) and local communities 
to participate in these value chains (Schüler et al., 
2016b).
Third, there is the need for gradual implementation 
of laws, mechanisms and instruments that foster 
transparency-based natural resources governance 
and stakeholder engagement. This would allow 
for the formulation of alternatives in order to avoid 
unintended consequences. Atanasijevic (2016) 
argues that, with regard to informal trade, incentives 
to trade informally such as the DRC’s high export 
taxes (compared to neighbouring countries) should 
be removed before measures to enforce legal 
trade are implemented. According to ECA (2013), 
resources should also be provided to help host 
countries build the necessary capacity and enforce 
the required measures, as well as alleviate their 
negative impacts. Timing is also crucial, according 
to Carisch and Rickard-Mathew (2013). They 
argue that ill-timed legal action can fundamentally 
undermine the quick and coercive power of 
sanctions. For instance, anyone under indictment 
by the international judicial system has little hope 
of political rehabilitation through compliance, and 
therefore has no incentive to bend to UN sanctions.
Fourth, deep understanding of relationships between 
stakeholders is important but it can be made difficult 
where stakeholders belong to differing cultures 
and no specific efforts are undertaken to overcome 
cultural differences. A lack of understanding of the 
relationship between stakeholders can lead to wrong 
assumptions of loyalty, confidence, authority and 
power. With regards to Eastern DRC, Atanasijevic 
(2016) observes that actors range from customary 
societal entities to traditional authorities and 
from State officials to armed groups and national 
military units. He points out that power, authority 
and economic profit are shared, interlinked and 
competed for among various actors. However, he 
found that this de facto governance of minerals 
is characterized by a reasonably well-organized 
system of cooperation, coordination and hierarchical 
attribution of roles among different actors. He 
argues that this hybrid governance poses significant 
problems to the implementation of ongoing State-
centred and business-oriented instruments that 
seek to combat informal trade mainly through 
strengthening State capacity. This, according to 
him, is because hybrid governance comprises a 
deep-rooted history of informal trade networks. 
He therefore argues that acting on misguided 
expectations can significantly impact the balance 
of the existing order and might result in insecurity 
without necessarily improving the transparency or 
traceability of the mineral supply chain. 
8.1.2. Lack of buy-in 
Instruments have lacked buy-in from some key 
stakeholders due to a number of factors that are 
summarized below: 
• Transparency and public quadruple bottom 
line accountability are not supported in some 
countries’ political systems.
• Major cultural differences among stakeholders.
• Compliance is expensive for most small and 
medium-sized companies because of the costs 
involved to achieve compliance (investment 
and development of skills) and to demonstrate 
compliance (the assurance process) (Mori et al. 
2016, Barry et al., 2012, ITC, 2010). Komives and 
Jackson (2014) have noted that accessibility is a 
particular concern for small-scale producers.  
• Trust across stakeholders is low, especially 
between Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and 
the private sector. Many CSOs have expressed 
reservations over working closely with the 
private sector due to reputational risks. They 
feel that working together is akin to selling 
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out or they could be used to ‘rubber stamp’ a 
consultation when it is a box-ticking exercise.  
For example, Lehman (2015) states that CSOs 
are not adequately engaged in the EITI process. 
Indeed, the stakeholder engagement processes 
carried out by some of the instruments are 
considered superficial and ineffective (Mori & Ali, 
2016). Some CSOs have built their own hurdles, 
such as requesting payments for some of their 
reports that should be made widely available 
as useful databases to measure progress 
towards transparency and quadruple bottom line 
accountability of individual companies.
• In some countries, traditional authorities tend to 
have stronger legitimacy than governments in 
their areas of jurisdiction because the people trust 
them. However, formal organizations (especially 
development partners and mining companies) 
are wary of engaging with traditional authorities 
since they are often not subject to the formal 
transparency and accountability requirements of 
formal State institutions (Lockwood et al., 2010).
• Many instruments have failed to achieve 
significant buy-in from both publicly and privately- 
owned companies from the emerging economic 
powers among the G20 states. 
Buy-in can be improved through a number of actions. 
Mineral resources are not all alike, as sustainability 
issues vary according the specific resource exploited 
and the methods used to extract and process 
the minerals to produce a marketable product. At 
the same time, the political context matters too. 
There is a need for “context-specific governance 
solutions” in order to avoid “any and all” panacea 
of the idealistic and value-laden “good governance” 
term. Atanasijevic (2016) states that future research 
is required on the nexus between natural resource 
management and hybrid political orders that 
incorporate non-formal authorities. 
In addition, simplified ways should be developed 
to implement sustainable governance standards. 
Work is also needed to learn how to overcome 
cultural differences, a topic that is well identified in 
the broader business community (Usunier & Lee, 
2012), from where experience can be transferred to 
the mines and metals industry.  This is necessary 
for those small to medium-scale companies that 
are interested in engaging in the agenda, but which 
do not have the resources to develop or be involved 
in developing more comprehensive standards. Part 
of this could include producing a map of existing 
mineral resource governance standards to help 
companies negotiate their way through the current 
complex array of different standards.
Building credible information systems that can 
deliver accurate and accessible information is 
critical in building trust. The Canadian practice of 
making it compulsory, via the NI 43-101 National 
Instrument (Ontario Securities Commission, 2018), 
for companies listed on stock markets to provide 
details, according to specific rules, on reporting 
the information of the technical and economic 
studies they need to perform prior to obtaining 
their mining permits (resources and reserves 
reporting, conceptual studies, preliminary economic 
assessments, prefeasibility and feasibility studies) 
is possibly the best available current practice in this 
field. This practice facilitates the availability of a 
wealth of information and data to all stakeholders, 
including via a national repository where all the 
reports are stored and can be retrieved by anyone 
worldwide.116 Legitimacy is strongly associated 
with trust in information from governing bodies 
(Turner et al., 2016). Innovative use of new ICT 
platforms including social media can be crucial in 




that can deliver 
accurate and accessible 
information is critical in 
building trust.
Linking an initiative to other well-known initiatives is 
also important for strengthening buy-in. This confers 
legitimacy and improves the branding potential of 
a scheme. Being able to claim compliance to the 
UN Global Compact, for example, can confer a 
116  However, it is important to note most mining 
companies – as well as minerals traders, and processing 
and financing companies– - are not listed
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competitive advantage. Also, the ability to satisfy 
regulatory guidelines such as the OECD due 
diligence requirements can provide market access 
(Gulbrandsen, 2005, cited in Mori et al., 2016).
8.1.3. Lack of compliance
Key challenges of MRG initiatives include the lack 
of compliance and lack of participation by some 
key companies or some States with a major role in 
the global mineral resources-based supply-chains. 
Indeed, many governance schemes have been 
criticized on the basis that they are voluntary. In 
other words, there is no requirement for a company 
or a country to adhere to them. Also, there are no 
tangible sanctions for not belonging to an initiative, 
or for belonging to an initiative but not implementing 
it (Darby, 2010). Acosta (2013; citing Global Witness, 
2006) points out that, although non-compliant 
members could in principle be expelled from the 
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), 
the credibility of the scheme is compromised by 
the fact that no country has ever been expelled 
despite ‘significant implementation lapses’.  Similarly, 
Stark and Levin (2011; cited in Mori et al., 2016) 
assessed different certification schemes and 
found that violations do not carry consequences. 
Acosta (2014) asserts that the lack of sanctions 
for non-compliance impacts the credibility of the 
schemes and stakeholders’ perceptions. In addition, 
certified entities that are in compliance may be 
discouraged and that could affect their capacity 
to improve performance and generate positive 
outcomes.
There is a need for innovative ways to ensure 
compliance. Some approaches are discussed below: 
A broader range of sanctioning mechanisms should 
be explored. Acosta (2013) points to the need to 
establish several layers of sanctioning mechanisms 
that include domestic sanctions imposed by citizens; 
informal industry sanctions (peer mechanisms); 
donor conditionality and the challenge of individual 
investors and fund managers who demand greater 
transparency in order to invest. Private-sector driven 
mechanisms could be particularly useful. Acosta 
(2013) argues that private-sector instruments 
may help inform the design of appropriate 
institutional and reputational sanctions that make 
non-compliance costlier for governments.
In addition, efforts should be made to leverage the 
positive side-benefits of compliance. Companies 
that adopt certification standards experience 
improvements in their management systems and 
employee satisfaction, thereby leading to higher 
productivity (Mori et al., 2016; citing Vogt et al., 
1999; Lewis & Davis, 2015 and Delmas & Pekovic, 
2013). Since sustainability certification systems 
tend to be based on best practices,117 organisations 
seeking compliance certification need to improve 
their management systems or develop them based 
on best practices in order to comply. This leads to 
positive changes in management and production 
practices, which can improve performance, quality 
and productivity. This side-effect is an important 
incentive for many organizations and should be 
leveraged to a greater extent. 
There is the need for flexibility to allow different 
approaches for different participants. This is 
particularly critical to enable those with costs 
and/or technical difficulties to achieve the same 
goals through different approaches. Furthermore, 
technical and financial support and capacity-building 
are important to ensure that schemes are more 
accessible and flexible (Mori et al., 2016). 
8.1.4. Uneven focus
A key shortcoming of governance instruments is 
uneven focus on various crucial aspects of mineral 
resource governance; with some aspects addressed 
extensively, while others have received sparse 
attention. 
• There has been uneven focus on the impacts of 
mineral resources extraction. In Africa, there is 
more focus on the financial impact of mineral 
resources, whereas in Latin America, focus 
is more on the social impacts (Lipschutz & 
Henstridge, 2013). 
• Instruments geared towards strengthening civil 
117  Some of these best practices have been documented 
in a series of Reference Documents: Best Available 
Techniques on the Management of Tailings and Waste-
Rock in Mining; Activities (European Commission, 2009); 
Iron and Steel Production (European Commission, 2013a); 
The Manufacture of Glass (European Commission, 2013b); 
The Non-Ferrous Metals Industries (European Commission, 
2017d); The Production of Cement, Lime and Magnesium 
Oxide (European Commission, 2013c).
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society engagement represent the large share of 
existing instruments (Acosta, 2010).  
• Within programmes that target governments, 
there is an emphasis on capacity-building for the 
executive branch of government, as opposed to 
the accountability actors within government - such 
as the legislature or audit functions (Lipschutz & 
Henstridge, 2013).
• The beginning and end of the value chain receive 
more attention than the middle parts of the value 
chain (Lipschutz & Henstridge, 2013).
• Instruments are biased in favour of “demand-
side interventions”. Instruments that encourage 
greater citizen involvement and participation to 
promote transparency and accountability illustrate 
this point. However, fewer instruments focus on 
incentives and the role of domestic political actors 
including legislatures (Acosta 2010).
• There is lack of comprehensiveness or holistic 
considerations in the many standards available. 
Some standards are overlapping on some 
issues, while others are not being addressed. For 
instance, existing voluntary instruments do not 
adequately address sustainability issues (WEF, 
2015b).
• Instruments have focused more on information 
generation than comprehensiveness. Simply 
making information available is not enough 
because the documents generated tend to 
be highly technical in nature (Darby, 2010). 
Information also needs to be comprehensible and 
usable by stakeholders.
The following actions have been proposed that can 
help make governance instruments more balanced 
and relevant:
• While ensuring governments capture a fair share 
of extractive rents, they must also focus attention 
on the allocation of mineral resource wealth 
to ensure it is invested to enhance sustainable 
development outcomes. This can be achieved 
through a sharper focus on social outcomes 
such as health and education (including through 
the possible provision of cash transfers), 
holding governments accountable for these 
outcomes, as well as investing to build capacity 
and effectiveness of institutions to regulate and 
manage the social and environmental impacts 
of mining. A key priority is the need to channel 
mineral revenue to promote transformational 
change in resource-rich countries.
• There is a need for greater focus on sharing 
relevant and accessible data, information and 
thus knowledge. They should be presented in plain 
and understandable language, and in a timely and 
accurate way (Darby, 2010).
• Knowledge (and its management) is a key 
component of developing solutions to complex 
problems of mineral resources governance. 
Solutions to such problems have to be informed 
by a broad range of knowledge sources including 
scientific research, on-ground experience, and 
traditional ecological knowledge. As a result, the 
right kind of freely flowing information, together 
with effective cross-cultural communication, can 
stimulate the creativity that is crucial to solving the 
various natural resource governance challenges 
(Lockwood et al. 2010). 
• Comprehensiveness can be improved by 
supporting and stimulating the market for 
‘information intermediaries’ (the organizations 
that can then use various media to repackage 
information in specific ways for different 
audiences). 
• Transparency and accountability could be greatly 
improved by focusing on developing government 
capacity in the area of records management, 
including online cadastral systems and making 
public reporting of technical and economic 
project data compulsory, along the lines of the 
Canadian NI 43-101 standard. This standard is 
a major contribution towards transparency and 
better governance, and is compulsory for any 
company publicly listed on the Canadian stock 
market. Darby (2010) notes that the inability 
of all parties to quickly and easily establish the 
boundaries of local land titles (held locally), 
exploration, development and extraction licences 
(most often held nationally in the capital city) 
often leads to local conflicts. Strengthening 
government systems around the filing of, and 
public access to, information is important. 
Internet, GPS technology and Global System for 
Mobile communications (GSM) have created a 
significant opportunity to create highly effective 
systems that map the concessions held by major 
mineral resource users across all sectors. At the 
same time, these technologies make information 
publicly available and easily accessible, thus 
empowering local communities to monitor 
activities. This also relates to ensuring access to 
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environmental information and data, including 
environmental and social impact assessment 
reports and management plans. Environmental 
data are important for informing the bidding 
process, strategic planning and monitoring 
project development.  The transparency of 
this information enables stakeholders to hold 
proponents and governments to account.
8.1.5. Proliferation of standards
In the clamour to fill governance gaps due to the 
weak regulatory capacity of resource-rich countries, 
there has been a proliferation of standards (many of 
which are voluntary). Such proliferation has led to a 
number of challenges.
• Fatigue across all stakeholder groups – civil 
society groups, donors and the private sector 
(WEF, 2015b; ECA, 2013). For example, the number 
of voluntary instruments overwhelms many 
mining companies and downstream users. 
• Stakeholders struggling to decide which 
instruments to adopt. Indeed, many mining 
companies report uncertainty about the value of 
particular upstream instruments, even when they 
are currently investing significant resources (WEF, 
2015b). 
• To distract consumers from the real impact 
of their operations, companies can use the 
instruments as public relations exercises. Indeed, 
Darby (2010) argues that the proliferation of 
instruments, allows companies and countries 
to search for the lowest-common denominator 
in terms of standards that will maximize their 
reputation whilst minimizing the need for actual 
action. Similarly, Stark & Levin (2011, cited Mori et 
al., 2013) refer to the potential for greenwashing 
in certification through the deceptive use of 
aggregated data to indicate compliance with 
schemes.
• It can be difficult to identify key messages 
and send appropriate signals to important 
stakeholders and supply chain partners. 
• The sector as a whole finds it challenging to 
cooperate and identify common goals and 
strategies. Groups with similar interests often 
compete for limited resources, championing their 
initiative or agenda over others (WEF, 2015b). 
In their study of certification schemes, Mori 
et al. (2015) find that, although the majority of 
schemes (87%) cross-reference other standards 
within their own standards or guidelines, very few 
(33%) recognize the certificates, labels or claims 
provided by other schemes within their own 
processes. 
• The instruments carry a large administrative 
burden that can be prohibitive for smaller 
companies. Note that filling the questionnaire 
that comes with certain initiatives can be very 
burdensome. For example, MInGov (a World Bank 
initiative) has a questionnaire with 64 indicators 
and over 300 questions created.
• Voluntary instruments are also vulnerable to 
financial cycles (WEF, 2016). Donors are more 
generous during financial booms and cut back 
during financial slowdowns (which is when help 
may be needed the most). 
The potential for integration and coordination among 
instruments, government regulations/laws and 
industry/corporate standards should be considered 
in the design, implementation, operation and revision 
processes of voluntary instruments. Some ways to 
improve standard setting are discussed below.
There is a need for unified systems or at least a 
core set of cross-cutting standards. These can then 
be complemented with mineral-specific modules 
to address gaps not covered by unified systems. 
WEF (2015) points out that the landscape can 
be simplified by classifying instruments by type. 
This can then form the basis for developing core 
standards.
Greater efforts are 




ones. As soft law, 
voluntary instruments 
can feed into regulation, 
thereby helping to 
design and pilot “smart 
regulation”.
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Greater efforts are needed to find synergies between 
voluntary instruments and regulatory (mandatory) 
ones. As soft law, voluntary instruments can feed 
into regulation, thereby helping to design and pilot 
“smart regulation”. They can be used to test ideas 
and build relationships among stakeholder groups 
in a pre-regulatory environment. For example, the 
International Cyanide Management Code (ICMC) 
has become a quasi-regulatory framework, which 
has been incorporated into the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) framework; the next step is for it 
to be adopted into regulation. This process rewards 
companies that have worked with stakeholders 
to help develop and implement the Code. There 
have been some efforts to adopt elements of 
international standards into national law. Examples 
include principles such as the mitigation hierarchy 
and ‘no net loss’ of biodiversity that are increasingly 
referred to in national policy and legislation. 
These concepts form part of the IFC performance 
standards and, as such, the implementation of these 
standards by large developments have increased the 
understanding of these concepts within a number of 
countries ahead of their inclusion in legislation.
At a minimum, there is the need for cross-
stakeholder coordination on goals, standards 
and metrics to increase interoperability118 among 
the different instruments. Interoperability has the 
potential to reduce the costs of assurance and avoid 
duplication, as the latter can lead to inconsistencies 
and a loss of credibility. It can also amplify the 
outcomes achieved by different instruments and 
further their reach. The potential for integration 
and coordination among instruments, government 
regulations/laws and industry/corporate standards 
should be considered in the design, implementation, 
operation and revision processes of voluntary 
instruments (WEF, 2015a). Instruments, especially 
certification schemes, should operate together to 
improve interoperability and cross-recognition (Mori 
& Ali, 2016). A robust theory of change should inform 
this (ISEAL, 2018). ISEAL (2018) further points out 
118  ISEAL (2018) defines interoperability as the degree 
to which diverse systems, organizations and individuals 
are able to work together to achieve a common goal. 
With respect to standards, interoperability is not only 
the capacity standards working together (recognizing/
referencing other schemes) but also leveraging the diversity 
of stakeholders, expertise, coverage and approaches of the 
individual standards to create a more responsible sector.
that achieving interoperability is easier said than 
done, as standards/organizations may lack shared 
objectives and strategies. The key is to start small, 
build trust and be creative. It is also important to 
find common ground in a non-competitive space to 
add value, as well as providing scope for sharing and 
learning across initiatives.
Moreover, standards should be developed in such a 
way that actors can graduate as they learn. Towards 
Sustainable Mining (TSM) is a supportive approach 
for integrating mining companies with different 
performance levels that allows members with low 
environmental performance to join the initiative and 
gradually improve. TSM statistics show that this 
top-runner concept gives positive incentives, with 
the result that the average performance level of the 
members increases significantly (particularly in the 
first years of membership) (WEF, 2015a).
Innovative use of emerging ICT platforms to 
automate information gathering across a number 
of standards is gaining ground.  For example, 
GeoTraceability technology that combines 
traceability with bar codes, mobile phones and 
global positioning systems aims to deliver real-
time electronic tracing of mineral shipments and 
data availability prior to export in line with OECD 
guidelines and the International Conference on 
the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR)’s Certification 
Mechanism (Atanasijevic, 2016). As discussed 
in Chapter 4, emerging block chain technologies 
have great potential to improve chain-of-custody in 
certification schemes.
8.1.6. Lack of theory of change
Instruments have been criticized for lacking 
an explicit ‘theory of change’ on how activities 
can translate into strengthened governance 
(Acosta, 2010, 2013). For example, proponents 
of EITI assume that government and corporate 
accountability can be improved if data about 
extractive sector revenues are published and publicly 
debated. Furthermore, this is expected to empower 
citizens to demand more equitable management of 
resources and sustainable development (Haufler, 
2010). This may not be the case and may actually 
empower the elites who are more skilled in digesting 
the information to better position themselves (as 
pointed out previously in the case of EITI in Nigeria 
(See Box 8.1)).
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Box 8.1. Transparency – progress but still room for improvement
In the extractive industries, a lack of access to reliable information about the distribution of benefits 
and the impacts of projects can be a key contributor to a breakdown of trust and misperceptions, which 
can fuel social conflicts and spiral into violence.  The importance of access to information has been 
recognized at the global level, and initiatives promoting transparency are proliferating. Principle 10 of the 
1992 Rio Declaration emphasizes the need for citizens to have appropriate access to information on the 
environment that is held by public authorities, as well as the opportunity to participate in decision-making 
processes. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was one of the global efforts to bring 
greater transparency to the extractive sector. The 51 EITI implementing countries commit to publishing 
annual reports that disclose the revenues from the extraction of the countries’ extractive resources. 
Companies report payments to government (taxes, royalties) and the government reports what it has 
received. The reports are reconciled by an independent auditor and also include information related to 
beneficial ownership disclosure, licence and contract information.  
While initiatives such as EITI do represent an important first step in providing public access to financial 
information in the extractive sector, they stop short of increasing transparency related to the social and 
environmental performance of projects. Although financial transparency is critically important, concerns 
of local communities in the vicinity of operations tend to focus on the more immediate impacts of a 
project. This includes the impact of operations on the availability and quality of local water supplies 
or the number of local jobs created. Excluding these data from public disclosure creates ‘information 
asymmetries’, whereby stakeholders have unequal access to information. Current efforts to increase 
transparency in the sector do not go far enough to address these information asymmetries or to help 
citizens understand the distribution of benefits and risks across a project life cycle.
Acosta (2010) points out that the distinction 
between means and ends appears to be conflated. 
This is because, while most transparency and 
accountability instruments are geared towards 
attaining an expected or desirable outcome such 
as improved economic performance or poverty 
reduction, most project interventions seek process-
oriented outcomes. These include increasing 
participation of CSOs, promoting disclosure of 
contracts and/or demanding increased revenue 
transparency. The underlying assumption is that 
such outcomes would have a direct impact on wider 
objectives such as reducing corruption and poverty 
in resource-rich countries. However, many of these 
instruments fail to address the causal mechanisms 
(and obstacles) through which the intended 
development outcomes are likely to take place. 
Furthermore, there is a wide variation in the critical 
aspects that define development outcomes. 
It is vital to develop an explicit theory of change that 
identifies the different roles, political motivations 
and mechanisms that allow different stakeholders 
to oversee a government’s commitment to greater 
transparency and accountability in the management 
of natural resources (Acosta, 2014). 
Greater effort needs to be invested in determining 
casual linkages between project interventions 
and actual governance outcomes. This will entail 
a number of actions. It would be important to 
construct and maintain Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) that would link specific project interventions 
with outcome variables. The adoption of these 
benchmarks has been suggested to the EITI Board 
and Secretariat by a recent impact and evaluation 
study (Rainbow Insight 2009; cited in Acosta, 2013a).
It is essential to produce reliable, up-to-date 
and user-friendly datasets that allow a better 
assessment of project interventions through 
quantitative and qualitative methods. While it is good 
to have a theory of change, it is also critical to have 
an evaluation framework that can assess the impact 
of interventions. Assessing impact also entails 
capturing data at an appropriate level (Acosta, 2010).
The theory of change needs to be underpinned by a 
solid understanding of obstacles to change. Some 
attempts have been made to identify the impact of 
intervening factors in the fight against corruption 
(Acosta, 2010). These highlight the importance of 
broader political institutions, and particularly the 
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need for a separation of powers and a stronger 
judiciary. 
While many existing initiatives have faced 
challenges, some researchers (such as Le Billon, 
2012) point to the fact that many have not been in 
existence long enough to demonstrate impact. Thus, 
an evaluation at this point may be premature. Le 
Billon (2012) further notes that many instruments 
have gradually gained support and acceptance 
within the international policy community mainly due 
to:
• Greater awareness of the resource curse - many 
stakeholders are anxious to ensure that the long-
term developmental failure associated with the 
1970s commodities boom will not be repeated;
• Support by prominent opinion leaders such as 
Tony Blair and George Soros; by multi-national 
businesses in developed countries like De Beers; 
by developed countries such as the United 
Kingdom and Norway; and by well-funded, well-
organized civil society organizations like Global 
Witness;
• A sustained, constructive and voluntary multi-
stakeholder approach, backed by national 
legislation once adopted;
• Relative complementarity of these instruments; 
and
• Public pressure due to the legitimacy of the cause, 
making companies reluctant to reject these 
instruments publicly.
8.2. Stakeholder engagement
Effective engagement of stakeholders is central 
to successful stewardship of mineral resources 
(Mining, Minerals, and Sustainable Development 
Project (MMSD), 2002). According to GIZ (2003), 
their crucial role emerges from the fact that 
actions of stakeholders (particularly governments 
and mining companies): (i) are the sources of 
governance problems; (ii) tend to advocate for a 
particular solution; (iii) are the objects of governance 
instruments; and (iv) are joint co-producers of 
governance. Barry et al. (2012) posit that the 
content of a scheme is based on the negotiation 
between subject matter specialists and interested 
Machine and Truck in Coal Mining. Photo: Framenism © Shutterstock
 Stakeholder engagement
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stakeholders. Hence, awareness of their various 
roles is critical, underscoring the importance of 
stakeholder analysis so as to establish an effective 
partnership. However, this can be complicated for a 
number of reasons.
• Governments may claim that development is their 
objective, yet the interest of government actors 
may be far from sustainable development. The 
State may be unable or unwilling to monitor and 
regulate the activities of extractive companies and 
therefore safeguard the interests of its citizens 
(Darby, 2010). 
• Development partners claim to seek to enable 
resource-rich States to avoid resource curse 
dynamics and to reap positive development 
benefits. Their actions are, however, largely 
determined by the agenda of their governments 
or their mother institutions (for international 
development organizations). This results in the 
duplication of efforts in reform instruments, as is 
the case with the Africa Mining Vision (see Box 
1.2) and the National Resource Charter (NRC). 
• Business organizations are not, by nature, usually 
driven by an overarching policy vision. Rather, what 
drives them is their business needs arising in the 
context of local extractive operations, or demands 
and expectations that other actors raise with 
them. Extractives corporations therefore choose 
their fields of engagement selectively. They can 
be partners in governance in some areas, but 
might still cause problems in others. For example, 
they might engage in local development projects 
but at the same time are responsible for serious 
environmental problems. They may also engage in 
voluntary instruments such as EITI, but still lobby 
against more binding regulations. In addition, 
some private sector actors intentionally refrain 
from partnerships because of reputational risks.
• Civil society organizations (CSOs) seek to promote 
a perceived “common good” (Risse, 2002; cited in 
GIZ (2003). They play a key role in advocating for 
stakeholders likely to suffer the greatest loss from 
resource extraction, as well as in implementing 
instruments to improve governance of mineral 
resources. However, they tend to be issue-oriented 
and thus may miss the bigger picture. Some 
tend to partially duplicate efforts made by other 
instruments, rather than coordinate efforts to 
cover as many nodes as possible (as they are in 
competition for resources from donors). They also 
tend to be wary of cooperating with governments 
and the private sector, lest they are seen as being 
compromised. For this reason, they can be difficult 
partners and sometimes may even radicalize 
the population so that positions become too 
entrenched for negotiations to be possible. 
• Forming partnerships can also be challenged 
by the different approaches adopted by 
stakeholders. Some stakeholders adopt whole-
value chain approaches by seeking to support 
comprehensive reform of resource governance. 
This group usually concentrates on national level 
policy implementation. A second group of actors 
approaches specific nodes by specializing in one 
or more themes in resource governance that they 
consider crucial and feasible to have a meaningful 
impact (usually on such nodes along the value 
chain) (GIZ, 2003). See Box 8.2 for the challenges 
of stakeholder participation. 
Effective engagement 
of stakeholders is 
central to successful 
stewardship of mineral 
resources [...] According 
to GIZ (2003), their 
crucial role emerges 
from the fact that 
actions of stakeholders 
are the sources of 
governance problems; 
tend to advocate 
for a particular 
solution; are the 
objects of governance 
instruments; and are 
joint co-producers of 
governance. 
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Box 8.2. Challenges for stakeholder participation
Although stakeholder participation is now often 
claimed, and may indeed be required by project 
financiers, it can risk becoming a tick-box 
exercise. Szablowski (2007) pays particular 
attention to a World Bank process that has 
been revamped in the wake of complaint that 
the Bank had funded projects that displaced 
people. This has led to the inclusion of social 
specialists in the World Bank technocracy, as 
well as participatory processes as a way of 
establishing legitimacy. However, Szablowski 
argues that the participatory development has 
been mere rhetoric. The policy largely neglects 
participation, as it does not require basic 
measures to facilitate informed local input into 
the decision- making processes. Szablowski 
notes that the World Bank participatory 
approach fails to account for power relations, 
and is also highly expert-driven as opposed to 
participant-driven. Even in consultations, there is 
minimal input by the communities in the actual 
design of the process. More crucially, he notes 
that - despite the fact that there is “consultation” 
- the community does not ultimately have 
the right to refuse development.  Bastida and 
Bustos (2017) examine the mining legislation 
development process in the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia. The authors observe that it is vital 
to strengthen the capacities of institutions and 
actors that participate in decision making is 
needed to foster sustainable mineral resources 
management. This challenge needs to be 
addressed.
Some approaches to improve stakeholder 
engagement include:
• Collaborative efforts need careful thought. Actors 
that pursue a whole value chain approach should 
ideally develop close forms of collaboration. 
They will pool their efforts and resources as 
much as possible to increase the effectiveness 
of their interventions and avoid duplicating each 
other’s efforts. It may prove beneficial to establish 
a division of labour among the actors with a 
comprehensive reform agenda, either along the 
different nodes of the chain when working in 
the same country, or a per country division that 
could be supported by cross-country exchange 
of knowledge and best practices. For particular 
nodes of the chain, collaboration with more 
specialized actors may be preferable to sole 
reliance on partnering among generalist parties as 
the latter are likely to lack specialized knowledge 
and experience in certain fields (GIZ, 2013).
• It is also crucial that all stakeholders are 
meaningfully engaged. Mori et al. (2015) 
indicate that participation and cooperation of 
stakeholders in developing, monitoring and 
reviewing instruments is essential to assure the 
success of any certification scheme. Engagement 
can also help to regulate or reduce conflict and 
improve the legitimacy of the scheme. However, 
the heterogeneous nature of stakeholder groups 
underscores the importance of targeted strategies 
to engage groups that may not be heard through 
traditional governance channels (Turner et 
al., 2016). Darby (2010) notes that one way of 
improving stakeholder consultation (especially 
in the case of CSOs-private sector consultations 
that are fraught with reputational risk) could be 
to have independent third parties agreed on by all 
stakeholders to conduct the consultation process 
(based on a standard for the independent audit of 
stakeholder consultations). 
• Stakeholder engagement should be strategic. 
ISEAL Alliance (2013, cited in Mori et al., 2016) 
recommends establishing the most appropriate 
occasion to engage with stakeholders to avoid 
engaging them unnecessarily at the expense of 
efficiency.
• It is also necessary to understand underlying 
social structures in stakeholder engagement. 
Diversity alone is not enough in this context. 
Crona & Hubacek (2010) argue that bringing 
together diverse views and opinions by selecting 
stakeholders from different organizations and 
sectors is not enough. They assert that individuals 
are embedded in social ties, and these ties 
constrain and influence peoples’ perceptions 
about management practices. The examination 
of social structures (formal or informal) therefore 





Addressing the above-mentioned issues and 
shortcomings will be crucial in formulating a 
mineral resource governance framework in line 
with sustainable development imperatives. While 
existing governance instruments suffer from a 
variety of shortcomings, they can be leveraged as 
building blocks for a new framework. If the new 
framework addresses all the specific challenges 
associated with minerals management issues, 
it will likely be excessively complex. Therefore, 
a suitable framework should capitalize on the 
positive aspects of existing instruments and provide 
means to address current knowledge gaps, whilst 
reconciling the potential unintended consequences 
if instruments are not well designed. This is the topic 
of the next chapter, which looks at prerequisites 
of an effective governance framework. In Part III 
of the report, the structure of such a more holistic 
governance framework will be explored. 
Coal mining from above. Photo: Mark Agnor © Shutterstock.
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Aerial view to the iron ore open mine. Photo: M.Khebra © Shutterstock
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9 PREREQUISITES OF AN EFFECTIVE MINERAL RESOURCE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
9.0. Introduction
Chapter 8 assessed various mineral resource 
governance instruments by highlighting their 
strengths and weaknesses and suggesting 
approaches to enhance their effectiveness to help 
achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. This 
chapter throws light on the prerequisites for an 
effective governance framework. 
Failure to govern mineral resources is not due to 
a lack of understanding of how natural systems 
work. Rather, the problem is primarily political and 
behavioural in nature, related to governance and 
human failures to create institutional arrangements 
that support coordinated actions locally, nationally 
and internationally. Indeed, as summed up by 
Lockwood et al. (2010), the natural resource 
governance (NRG) challenge is the quintessential 
“wicked problem” 119that calls for novel policy and 
institutional responses. 
The current global policy context provides new 
momentum and opportunities to address this 
problem. Sustainable development is now the 
global agenda, with clear Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) articulated and adopted by the global 
community. The key question related to mineral 
resource governance is how the exploitation of these 
resources can contribute to achieving the SDGs. 
This will require the capture of a fair share of mineral 
resource rents, equitable distribution and sensible 
investment of the rents, as well as a mitigation of the 
negative impacts of mining activities discussed in 
Chapter 5.  The remainder of this report tackles the 
subject of how this can be achieved.
119  As pointed in chapter 1, challenges that are classified 
as a “wicked problem” are characterized by complexity and 
contestation originating from multiple problem causes, 
divergent problem perspectives/solution strategies and 
fragmented institutional settings that would require 
institutional adaptation and innovation to be resolved.
9.1. The need for a holistic framework 
Chapter 7 identified the following three fundamental 
characteristics of mineral resource extraction: 
complexity, power asymmetry and competing 
interests in political economy. At the most basic 
level, a mineral resource governance framework 
should seek to increase transparency; build 
capacity to reduce the power asymmetry between 
governments, industry and other stakeholders; 
establish institutions that will promote trust among 
competing interests and align understanding 
about shared value; and protect all parties from the 
corrosive effects of corruption. Translating mineral 
wealth into lasting economic gains will further 
require a broad range of policies that transform 
extraction from an enclave industry and link it to 
the broader economy through local content and 
value addition (APR, 2013; NRC 2010; Pedro, 2017). 
Figure 9.1 illustrates the multitude of actors and 
potential linkages. Mineral resource revenues 
should be leveraged to implement sustainable 
development projects – through stimulating 
economic diversification, careful investment in 
physical and social infrastructure and provision of 
public goods, while also addressing the externalities 
of mineral resource extraction (economic, social and 
environmental damage).
As already discussed in Chapter 8, decision-making 
in the extractive sector is shaped by a complex 
global, regional, national and local architecture of 
relationships among individuals and institutions. 
The term governance (Box 1.1) refers to the many 
ways in which individuals and institutions manage 
their common affairs in this context. Governance of 
the extractive sector is a process characterized by 
diverse actors, normative frameworks, hierarchical 
relationships and spatial/temporal boundaries. 
These components are illustrated in Figure 9.2 on 
the next page.
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Figure 9.1. Linkages in the mineral resources sector
Source: Lydall, 2009
Figure 9.2. Key components of extractive sector governance
Source: Pedro et al., 2017
The management of mineral resources requires the 
interventions of different actors in different spatial 
and temporal horizons in both ‘home’ and ‘host’ 
countries. This is compounded by the challenges 
of managing point resources that are local in 
nature, while at the same time governed by global 
instruments and subject to geopolitical tensions. 
This calls for a holistic framework.
While the framework above attempts to balance 
competing interests of various actors located in both 
‘home’ and ‘host’ countries, it misses out one key 
actor who is also impacted (maybe even more so). 
These are the future generations who may not have 
access to the depleted resources and who may have 
to deal with negative impacts of resource extraction 
and use. This calls for a framework that takes into 
account the needs of future generations. See Box 
9.1.
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Box 9.1. The case for intergenerational governance instruments?
Henckens (2016) makes the case for an international agreement on minerals based on intergenerational 
equity and resource conservation arguments, with a suggested quota development model.  For some 
mineral resources, the current level of extraction is likely to pose a problem for future generations. 
Depletion of a mineral resource means that it will become much more expensive for future generations to 
continue to use these minerals. While technology may reduce some of the adverse effects of depletion, 
future generations may be deprived of potential innovations for which these specific materials would be 
essential. 
The question is how the currently unsustainable extraction of mineral resources can be decreased to 
safeguard them for future generations. It is admittedly unlikely that market forces alone will sufficiently 
impact the prices of minerals to resolve the unsustainable use of certain minerals in a timely way. An 
international agreement on the conversation and sustainable use of geologically scarce minerals is 
necessary. The agreement will recognize that the geological scarcity of mineral resources differs between 
different minerals. It will therefore make a selection of priority minerals, determine how far the extraction 
rate of these substances must be reduced and decide on a fixed time period within which the extraction 
must decrease from the current rate to a sustainable rate. The design of such an agreement will be 
based on two basic principles contained in existing international environmental agreements: (1) the 
inter-generational equity principle, and (2) the principle of conservation of natural resources. Furthermore, 
the obligatory reduction of the extraction of mineral resources will affect the sovereign rights of resource 
countries to exploit their own resources. Any international agreement should make arrangements to 
ensure resource countries are adequately compensated for their loss of income.
Tilton (2010) argues that, while mining may not seem sustainable as resources are fixed and thus will be 
depleted, this is not the right way to look at sustainability. He argues for an opportunity-cost paradigm.  
This focuses on what society has to sacrifice or give up in order to produce more minerals. When the real 
price for a mineral commodity rises over the long run, it is growing less available or scarcer. Even in the 
absence of physical depletion, economic depletion may therefore occur as mineral commodities become 
too expensive to use.  However, technology tends to counterbalance this by coming up with new more 
efficient methods to exploit resources (that may not have been available with old technologies), as well as 
new substitutes and so on. The long-term availability of mineral commodities is therefore determined by a 
race between the cost-raising effects of depletion and the cost-decreasing effects of new technology. He 
argues that, if society can continue past trends of creating new technologies to offset the cost-increasing 
effects of depletion, mining can be indefinitely sustainable. This favourable future, however, is not assured. 
It requires economic geologists, mining engineers, metallurgists and others in the mining sector to 
constantly develop new, lower cost methods for finding and extracting mineral commodities to offset 
the relentless upward pressure of depletion on costs. The success of economic geologists and others 
in this endeavour will determine the future of mining, and this will in turn shape the future for economic 
geologists.  Mudd (2010) also points that true sustainability of mineral resources, however, is a much 
more complex picture and involves exploration, technology, economics, social/environmental issues and 
advancing scientific knowledge.  Predicting future sustainability is therefore not a simple task. 
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acknowledging that minerals are essential for 
modern living and formally recognizing the concept 
of sustainable mining and minerals development, 
the Johannesburg Declaration (Box 9.2) agreed to 
emphasize actions and partnerships at all levels 
to address the issues and concerns (including 
environmental impacts) throughout the life cycle 
of mining operations. There was also an emphasis 
on reclamation and rehabilitation of degraded sites 
(Dalupan, 2004).
9.2. The need to decouple economic growth 
from environmental and social impacts 
Caring for the environment is one of the key pillars 
of sustainable development (the others are social 
and economic impacts). However, mining by its 
very nature disturbs the environment and poses 
many threats to human well-being (as discussed 
in Chapter 4). Therefore, mining activities must 
be conducted with due care for the associated 
environmental and social impacts if it is to deliver 
sustainable development. The World Summit on 
Sustainable Development outlines the thinking 
that should guide the mining sector. While 
Gold mining place in Guyana Photo: kakteen © Shutterstock
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Box 9.2. The World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) or the Johannesburg Declaration
The 2002 Summit was a follow-up to the Rio (Earth) Summit of 1992. It reaffirmed sustainable 
development as a central element of the international agenda and gave new impetus to global action to 
fight poverty and protect the environment. The understanding of sustainable development was broadened 
and strengthened as a result of the Summit, particularly the important linkages between poverty, the 
environment and the use of natural resources. Governments agreed to and reaffirmed a wide range of 
concrete commitments and targets for action to achieve more effective implementation of sustainable 
development objectives. The Johannesburg Declaration created “a collective responsibility to advance and 
strengthen the interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development—economic 
development, social development and environmental protection—at local, national, regional and global 
levels.” Agreements coming out of the summit included:
• A call on developed countries that have not done so to make concrete efforts towards the internationally 
agreed ODA targets (0.7 per cent of GNP for ODA); 
• Governments to actively promote corporate responsibility and accountability, based on the Rio Principles, 
and to support continuous improvement in corporate practices in all countries. 
• Governments to enhance partnerships between governmental and non-governmental actors, including 
major groups and volunteer organizations, on programmes and activities for the achievement of 
sustainable development at all levels
For the mining sector, one key achievement of the WSSD was the adoption of industry recommendations 
from the Mining, Minerals and Sustainable Development Project (MMSD). The MMSD initiative aimed to 
create a shared idea of the appropriate and necessary roles for each of the major actors in mining and 
sustainable development – government, civil society and the private sector – asking ‘what is a company’s 
role and what is not a company’s role?’ Between 2000 and 2002, consultations were carried out across 
20 countries in all regions covering over 700 participants. The results helped to frame the sector’s 
contribution to the 2002 Johannesburg Sustainable Development Summit. These were adopted and 
became the basis for guiding the mining industry actions.  Mining executives committed to maximizing 
their sector’s contribution to sustainable development, and they adopted the MMSD agenda. The 
International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM) - an umbrella organization of leading companies such 
as Rio Tinto and Anglo American - succeeded in implementing many of MMSD’s recommendations for 
industry.  
A review of the MMSD in 2012 (Buxton, 2012) found that global rules for best practice in the sector have 
emerged in the decade since the MMSD report. Nonetheless, there is still a lack of implementation, 
independent verification, public reporting or consequences for non-compliance.  A key challenge has 
been the capacity of governments in developing nations to ensure that mining contributes to sustainable 
development.
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It is difficult to achieve the crucial balance to ensure 
that mining delivers economic and social benefits 
while not causing irreparable damage to the 
environment, and indeed economic benefits tend 
to trump environmental concerns. China is facing 
the challenge and is paying more attention to the 
environmental impact of mining by trying to promote 
a more sustainable path (see Box 9.3).
9.3. The need to protect human rights
As discussed in Chapter 6, extractive resources 
generate conflict that leads to human rights 
violations. The protection of human rights is the 
responsibility of States. However, many governments 
in the global south may be unwilling to protect 
human rights, especially when exploitation of natural 
resources benefits the elites. In addition, government 
unwillingness may be the result of undue influence 
by unscrupulous mining companies. Weak and 
fragile States may also be unable to enforce 
human rights. Indigenous people are particularly 
impacted (Box 9.4).  This underscores the need for a 
governance framework that prioritizes human rights.
Extractive resources 
generate conflict 




protect human rights] 
may be the result of 
undue influence by 
unscrupulous mining 
companies
Box 9.3. China’s green mining initiative
China is the biggest producer of minerals globally, with over 110,000 mines. These mines generate 
significant solid ore waste dumps (over 220 billion tons), as well as significant environmental hazards (Lei 
et al., 2016).  Sustainable development, and mitigating environmental degradation in particular, is an issue 
that is at the top of China’s agenda (thereby bringing about a determined shift to reduce the environmental 
impact of mines).
In 2010, the Ministry of Land and Resources launched the “green mines” standard. The standard 
concerns the implementation of management systems in terms of health, safety and environment, 
energy efficiency, waste reduction, investment for environmental production, mine site rehabilitation and 
engagement in community development. By 2014, 661 mines were certified. 
The Ministry of Land and Resources has also published a comprehensive plan to guide the green 
development of the mineral sectors from 2016 to 2020. The plan gives top priority to the ecological 
protection of Chinese mines and aims to establish model green mines in at least 50 mining regions. The 
plan also encourages Chinese mining companies to become more involved in the governance of the 
internal mining industry with regards to international norms, policies and standards for cooperation and 
investment in the global mining industry. 
More recently, the Ministry teamed up with five other ministerial departments to jointly announce the 
‘Guidance to Facilitate Development of Green Mines’ initiative (Dolega & Schüler, 2018).   The new 
guidelines call for more support, particularly financial support, from different levels of governments 
for green mining development. The guidelines require all newly built mines to comply with the national 
standard for green mines; encourage the technical upgrading of existing mines; and facilitate the building 
of a more effective/powerful system to support green mining development. 
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Box 9.4. ILO 169 Convention - Advancing the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Although indigenous people constitute about 5 per cent of the world’s population, they account for 15 
per cent of the poor. Furthermore, where economic growth has resulted in overall decreasing inequality, 
indigenous and tribal peoples tend not to benefit from such progress; poverty among indigenous peoples 
is often increasing (ILO, 2015). They are particularly impacted by mining activities, as their livelihoods are 
more tied to the land and rely on biodiversity services. They are also much less exposed to modern life. 
They therefore tend to be hit much harder by the environmental and social impacts of mining discussed 
in chapter 5. Indeed, extractive industries have been accused of encroaching more and more onto 
indigenous territories that are rich in untapped natural resources (FAO, 2016a).
The rights of indigenous people have been recognized as a major concern, and this prompted the adoption 
of ILO convention 169. This Convention is based on the recognition of the aspirations of indigenous and 
tribal peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life and development, as well as 
to maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions within the framework of the States in 
which they live. Emphasizing the principles of equality, consultation, participation and cooperation, the 
Convention is a framework for participatory democracy, social peace and sustainable development.
Nevertheless, as of 2015, only 22 countries had ratified Convention No. 169, ILO (2015) points out that it 
has had far-reaching impacts on the laws and societies of ratifying Member States. Major reforms have 
been achieved, such as the constitutional recognition and protection of the rights of indigenous peoples. 
However, the Convention’s influence goes beyond ratifying countries: it has also helped in shaping laws 
and policies in many other countries, as well as influencing the work of international organizations at the 
global and regional levels. Indigenous and tribal peoples’ rights and issues are now an integral part of 
major global agendas. For instance, concerns for indigenous peoples’ rights and well-being are also an 
integral part of the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda. The Addis Ababa Action Agenda recognizes 
that indigenous peoples’ traditional knowledge, innovations and practices can support sustainable 
livelihoods, while also calling for a focus on indigenous peoples in the context of social protection. 
ILO recognizes the need for further action and its strategy seeks in to further intensify dissemination of 
Convention 169, including by promoting dialogue among the key stakeholders, sharing experience of good 
practices and training.
ILO also recognizes that indigenous and tribal women face discrimination on multiple grounds, both 
outside and within their communities. ILO will seek to develop interventions to address the specific 
barriers and challenges faced by them. This will include interventions to give women a voice within and 
outside their communities, building knowledge on the role of women in traditional economies, support for 
entrepreneurship and awareness-raising to prevent and tackle gender-based violence.
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From a conceptual point of view, the debate on 
due diligence in terms of human rights revolves 
around a central question that is equally relevant to 
environmental considerations: to what extent should 
enterprises – or their CEOs – be held accountable 
for common goods or public interests that may 
lie beyond the interests of their shareholders? So 
far, in most European jurisdictions, such a legal 
obligation has not yet been clearly enshrined in civil 
law. One exception is the United Kingdom, where 
the Companies Act of 2006 includes an obligation 
to respect the environment within the company’s 
operations.
A potential way of thinking about this lies in the UN 
Guiding Principles on Human Rights (see Box 9.5). It 
is currently the “dominant paradigm for discussing 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)” (Jesse & 
Koppe, 2013, p. 188). Given that, multilateral human 
rights treaties have so far failed to hold multinational 
enterprises directly accountable for human rights 
violations, the framework calls on States to ensure 
that business enterprises do not violate human 
rights, and that remedies are available in case of 
violations.
Another major question is whether a home State 
of a multinational enterprise has a duty to protect 
citizens abroad from human rights violations; 
that is, whether it must ensure that the enterprise 
conducts itself in a human rights’ sensitive way in its 
country of operation. Since 2011, home State duties 
concerning the “extraterritorial” actions of their 
multinational enterprises have come to the fore, and 
it has become widely recognized that enterprises 
have human rights responsibilities across their value 
chains. The 2011 UN Guiding Principles stop short of 
establishing a clear “extraterritorial” duty, but they do 
encourage States to act as if the duty existed. 
International human rights bodies have gone a step 
further by clearly affirming the obligation of States to 
regulate extraterritorial obligations of their business 
enterprises.120 Moreover, in recent years, many legal 
scholars have argued that such “extraterritorial” 
obligations have already been codified in the human 
rights treaties, for example in Article 2 of ICESCR121.
120  Ref. S. qil, s. Antwerp; ICESCR Art 2.
121  Verweis auf Maastricht Principles, s. auch Buch, QIL.
Some have also claimed that it is not a question of 
“extraterritoriality”, but rather falls under the scope 
of application of domestic law.122 The emerging 
principle of common concern,123 as discussed 
above, justifies such an interpretation of existing 
international human rights law. 
Finally, in as much as the protection of fundamental 
human rights amounts to a Common Concern, and 
given the lack of appropriate institutions at the global 
or regional level in this area, it has been argued 
that States should bear an obligation to act beyond 
the scope of territorial application of their national 
laws as a matter of principle, in order to ensure the 
protection of fundamental human rights (Cottier, 
2012; Cottier et al., 2014).
Following this legal practice and debate, and 
considering the fact that extraterritorial actions of 
multinational enterprises – in particular of mining 
companies – have been the core focus of public 
debate in countries of the global north in recent 
years, it is widely claimed that home States should 
find ways to influence extraterritorial actions of their 
enterprises. The concept of “policy coherence for 
sustainable development”, as enshrined in the UN 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and its 
17 Sustainable Development Goals, also fosters 
such a perspective (UN, 2015). 
122  Noch bei SKMR nachschauen, wie genau formuliert? 
CK s. Krajewski. Swiss Centre of Expertise in Human Rights 
(n 21).
123  New concepts are seeking to capture the idea 
of shared responsibility in greater detail. One of these 
concepts is the emerging principle of common concern, 
which is invoked in several international treaties. The 
principle of common concern goes beyond the concept of 
the common heritage of mankind or the concept of global 
commons; it encompasses all uses of natural resources 
that are of common interest to the global community, 
irrespective of whether or not the resources are classified 
as heritage. Attempts at a more detailed definition of the 
principle of common concern are ongoing. Evolving theory 
suggests that it ought to be applied to problems related 
to natural resources that cannot be solved unilaterally. 
There should be a common interest in resolving these 
issues, and equity-related questions should be concerned. 
If these conditions are fulfilled, a general duty to cooperate 
is affirmed (irrespective of the classification as a home 
or host State); and, in the absence of common action, an 
actor may act unilaterally. Given the globally shared interest 
in minerals, it should not be too difficult to affirm the 
existence of a “common concern” (Buergi Bonanomi, 2018).
The need to protect human rights
237 
Box 9.5. United Nations Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights
The 2011 UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights (also known as the Ruggie framework) presented 
a conceptual framework that outlines the duties of states vis-à-vis business enterprises and the responsibilities of 
business enterprises. The framework rests on three pillars: (1) the duty of States to protect human rights; (2) the 
responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights; and (3) access to remedies for those affected by human 
rights violations. 
According to “the duty of states to protect human rights” (first pillar), States must take the necessary measures to 
protect their citizens from actions of enterprises that have adverse impacts on human rights. Following the principle 
of proportionality, a State should choose measures that intervene as little as possible while still being effective. This 
means that there is no need to go beyond voluntary standards of business enterprises as long as these are effective. If 
they prove to be ineffective, however, public regulation should be considered. Public regulation may consist of a binding 
duty to exercise due diligence, including a duty to report on human rights sensitive actions and a duty of care. While 
an obligation to exercise due diligence is normally considered for inclusion in civil and criminal law, regulations in other 
fields of law such as competition or risk insurance law, can have an equivalent effect. In the implementation process, 
the buzzword is “smart mix”, indicating that a combination of voluntary and binding standards may be most appropriate 
in a majority of cases, given the limited effect of voluntary settings.
The 2011 UN Guiding Principles also define how “intense” causality between the action of the enterprise and the 
human rights violations should be in order to trigger liability. Principle 13 of the Guiding Principles states that business 
enterprises should “avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own activities”. This 
includes impacts “that are directly linked to their operations, products or services by their business relationships, even if 
they have not contributed to those impacts.” This takes account of the fact that business enterprises may be involved in 
human rights impacts “either through their own activities or as a result of their business relationships with their parties.” 
Importantly, activities can include both actions and omissions. As a consequence, a home State’s duty to protect entails 
the obligation to ensure that parent companies exercise due diligence towards their subsidiaries.
There is currently no harmonized legal basis for implementing the 2011 UN Guiding Principles in Europe or in any other 
country. However, the Principles have galvanized the debate and contributed to the adaptation of “regulatory narratives”. 
The UNGP have had good success. In a performance assessment, Ruggie (2017) finds that - although company 
uptake of the UNGPs is becoming more widespread - it remains partial and is not yet deep enough. However, uptake is 
not limited to Western firms or governments. A dozen developing countries have already issued or are in the process 
of developing National Action Plans. Even regulatory authorities in China are recommending that Chinese mining 
companies should “observe the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights during the entire life cycle of the 
mining project.” The International Bar Association has issued official guidance on what the UNGPs mean for law firms 
as businesses in their own right, and in their role as wise counsel to clients. The governing body of international football, 
FIFA, has agreed to align its processes with UNGPs in the furor after awarding successive World Cups to the Russian 
Federation and Qatar (countries that are seen as not respecting human rights).124 The International Olympic Committee 
is considering a similar move.
UNGPs are becoming entrenched in the public domain and in UN processes for uptake. For example, a white paper 
issued by a group of major investment banks in early 2017 claimed that, under the UNGPs, investment banks have very 
limited responsibility for what their clients do with loans or advice provided by banks. This generated widespread push-
back from civil society, thereby forcing the group to issue several clarifications. 125
124  Problems in Russia included its anti-LGBTQ law and the manner of land acquisition by the authorities for tournament 
purposes. In Qatar, the core issue is migrant workers who essentially become bonded labour, exploited by recruitment firms 
and contractors (and even more so by subcontractors) building stadiums and other infrastructure.
125  For more information, see https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/thun-group-of-banks-releases-new-discussion-
paper-on-implications-of-un-guiding-principles-for-corporate-investment-banks.
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9.4. The need for greater engagement of 
home countries 
Most of the environmental and social impacts of 
minerals extraction discussed in Chapters 4 and 
5 occur in the upstream end of the mining value 
chain. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
many governance challenges that give rise to the 
resource curse phenomena are most intense in 
the upstream part of the extractive value chain. 
Therefore, governance initiatives tend to focus 
on the upstream end of the value chain. However, 
given the complexity of today’s globalized value 
chains in commodity extraction and trading, 
responsibilities related to these value chains accrue 
to different actors. These include not only the host 
State and the multinational enterprise (directly or 
indirectly), but also the investor’s home State and 
international governance. All of these actors share 
the responsibilities to avoid and compensate for 
social and environmental impacts of mining, as well 
as the other challenges associated with extractive 
activities.  Each actor has a different task in fulfilling 
those responsibilities. 
Accordingly, it would be wrong to conceive 
negative environmental impacts as being solely 
the responsibility of enterprises and States directly 
involved in commodity extraction. Companies 
indirectly involved, such as through trading activities 
and the provision of logistics services, are also 
responsible for negative environmental impacts, 
as they causally linked to the impacts through their 
supply chain (Buergi et al., 2015). The degree of 
responsibility depends on the degree of the causality 
of actions. This is also where the responsibility of 
the home States of indirectly involved multinational 
enterprises becomes relevant. A simple dichotomy 
between home and host countries fails to account 
for the complexity of mineral value chains. Many 
commodity companies engage in different, vertically 
integrated activities along the value chains of 
specific commodities; and they run operations 
at different stages of extraction, processing and 
distribution of the product. For example, copper may 
be mined and extracted from the ore into refined 
copper bars in country A, in operations owned by 
a company from country B. The bars may then 
be exported to country C, where another country 
B-owned operation may turn the bars into wire, 
which is then exported to the country D, where it is 
built into electric motors.  An investment has diverse 
impacts at each of these intermediate-processing 
stages (Gereffi & Fernandez-Stark, 2011).
In international law, such a framework of shared 
responsibility for environmental impacts can be 
derived from the existing human rights framework 
and – to a certain extent – from existing 
international environmental law (Buergi, 2015a; 
Buergi, 2015b). In addition, new concepts are 
seeking to capture the idea of shared responsibility 
in greater detail. One of these concepts is the 
emerging principle of common concern, which is 
invoked in several international treaties. The principle 
of common concern goes beyond the concept of 
the common heritage of mankind or the concept 
of global commons; it encompasses all uses of 
natural resources that are of common interest to the 
global community, irrespective of whether or not the 
resources are classified as heritage. Attempts at a 
more detailed definition of the principle of common 
concern are ongoing. Evolving theory suggests that 
it ought to be applied to problems related to natural 
resources, which cannot be solved unilaterally. 
There should be a common interest in resolving 
these issues, and equity-related questions should 
be concerned. If these conditions are fulfilled, a 
general duty to cooperate is affirmed (irrespective 
of the classification as a home or host State); and 
in the absence of common action, an actor may act 
unilaterally (Cottier, 2012). Given the globally shared 
interest in minerals, it should not be too difficult to 
affirm the existence of a “common concern”. This 
means that international governance also has a 
responsibility to avoid market failures in mining.
As regards home States’ responsibility to avoid 
market failures in mining, a key question centres 
around the extent to which a home State is 
responsible for actions occurring beyond its borders 
- also referred to as “extraterritorial” actions (see 
section 9.3). In recent years, this question has been 
discussed extensively in the business and human 
rights debate. The “business and environment” 
debate has also offered some promising responses 
- particularly within the scope of the green economy 
agenda (see section 4.2.9). Nonetheless, we are 
still a long way from an international recognized 
framework providing clear guidelines on regulatory 
questions of “extraterritoriality”. However, since 
international law is most advanced in respect of 
human rights, drawing lessons from the human 
rights framework can help to uncover regulatory 
gaps in environmental law. This, in turn, is an 
important step on the way to closing responsibility 
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and liability gaps in globalized integrated value 
chains. The ensuing discussion points to the need 
for a governance framework that ties home and host 
countries in a shared responsibility. 
The new focus on home States raises the question 
over the extent to which binding standards might be 
necessary to ensure that companies act responsibly 
across value chains. While the primary focus of 
these processes is on the implementation of human 
rights, environmental concerns have been included 
or not included on an arbitrary basis. Box 9.6 
discusses the processes taking place in Switzerland. 
The Switzerland case is especially pertinent, given 
the powerful role it plays in global value chains as 
a major commodity-trading hub (see Box 9.6). The 
case for transparency can be further strengthened 
by existing initiatives that seek to compel companies 
to disclose what they pay to national governments 
(such as Publish What You Pay (PWYP) and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)). 
Compelling home countries and their companies 
involved in minerals value chains to be part of EITI 
and PWYP processes can further increase the 
engagement of home countries. It is instructive 
to note that EU reporting systems are making 
transparency easier.
Open-cast mine, general view. Photo: Dmitriy Kuzmichev © Shutterstock
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Box 9.6. The Responsible Business Initiative in Switzerland
Switzerland is a good case study of the shift from a host State perspective to a home State perspective in 
governance. This shift of perspective is largely the result of efforts by civil society organizations (CSOs) – 
including Public, Eye, Alliance Sud and Bread for All. The CSOs managed to raise the interest of public opinion 
in Switzerland on the business and human rights agenda. As a result, the implications of the 2011 UN Guiding 
Principles are widely discussed, not only in the executive and legislative branches of the Swiss government, but 
also in business forums and in the media. 
The Responsible Business Initiative is supported by about 80 CSOs and demands the introduction of a new 
Article 101a “Responsibility of Business” in the Swiss Constitution. If the initiative is accepted, the Swiss 
Government will have to put introduce legislation on “mandatory due diligence”. This includes a legal obligation 
for Swiss business enterprises to incorporate processes to ensure that human rights and the environment are 
effectively respected. This also extends to the enterprises’ actions abroad, and to the companies under their 
control. According to the initiative, carrying out appropriate due diligence requires enterprises to “identify real and 
potential impacts on internationally recognized human rights and the environment”; “take appropriate measures to 
prevent the violation of internationally recognized human rights and international environmental standards”; “cease 
existing violations”; and “account for the actions taken”. 
The initiative has triggered several parliamentary acts as well as a stakeholder process initiated by the 
Swiss Government seeking ways to implement the 2011 UN Guiding Principles. So far, this has resulted in 
the introduction of a National Action Plan (NAP) by the Swiss Government. In this NAP, the Federal Council 
recognizes that Swiss companies should carry out human rights’ due diligence not only within, but also beyond, 
Switzerland. However, it recommends not going beyond voluntary standards, at least as long as mandatory 
standards are not widely established in other countries. Potential regulation in this area would have to have a 
broad base of international support to avoid placing Switzerland at a disadvantage as a business location. 
Beyond human rights and environmental issues, another concern has been transparency in financial affairs and 
illicit financial flows. The Federal Council issued a background report on commodities in 2013. The aim is to 
ensure that Switzerland’s strong commodity trading sector acts responsibly, thereby avoiding reputational risks. 
These developments have fostered innovative legislative processes in Switzerland that will remain ongoing 
for the foreseeable future. If Swiss voters accept the initiative, new obligations will have to be implemented 
into national law. With respect to human rights, the 2011 UN Guiding Principles clearly explain how obligations 
related to due diligence can be framed. With respect to the environment, however, the lack of a consistent 
framework assembling all established and emerging legal principles in this field of law will make this task much 
more difficult. The strength of new legal provisions in Swiss law will also depend on their legitimacy, which in 
turn depends on the extent to which the actors concerned have already accepted such duties as good practice.
In addition, efforts have been made to strengthen non-binding CSR frameworks. These efforts centre on the 
OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises. The Swiss OECD National Contact Point (NCP) provides an 
institution for mediation between companies and victims. Processes to render the NCP more effective and 
transparent are under way (OECD, 2017; Mugglin, 2017). Furthermore, the Swiss Government has supported 
sector-driven private initiatives – from the banking sector, for instance – to “translate” and implement the UN 
Guiding Principles.
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9.5 . The need for responsible business 
practices 
At the local level, extractive activities are expected 
to provide jobs and local development, while at the 
national level there are expectations that revenues 
(taxes and royalties) will fund development projects. 
However, this is not usually the case. The highly 
capital-intensive nature of the industry means that 
few jobs are created (APR, 2013; NRC 2010; Pedro, 
2017). Similarly, the enclave nature of the sector 
means that there are few linkages to the local 
economy (APR, 2013; NRC 2010; Pedro, 2017). At 
the national level, as discussed in chapter 6, there 
are significant revenue leakages through accounting 
practices of mining companies and other forms of 
illicit financial flows (Pun, 2017; Le Billon 2011; APR 
2013). This means that development objectives 
are not fully realized. Mining companies have tried 
to mitigate these through CSR activities at local 
levels and greater transparency through platforms 
like EITI at the national level. These efforts have 
been inadequate, however, and this has led to calls 
for greater local content and local participation in 
extractive value chains through legal mandates 
(AMV, 2016; Pedro, 2017).
While this is leading to more responsible business 
practices, there is a need for greater integration 
of these practices in companies’ strategies. The 
industry, through ICMM, has been pushing its 
members in this direction, and many members are 
now part of the GRI that keeps track of responsible 
practices (see Box 9.7).
While industry self-regulation and national mandates 
can go a long way in institutionalizing responsible 
business practices, the transparency and global 
nature of extractive value chain means that all gaps 
can be addressed.  This makes a strong case for 
an overarching framework to guide responsible 
practices.  For example, environmental practices can 
only achieve desired impacts if they are anchored in 
instruments that extend beyond national boundaries. 
One such proposal is the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business Environment (see Box 9.8).
Switzerland is a good 
case study of the shift 
from a host State 
perspective to a home 
State perspective 
in governance. This 
shift of perspective is 
largely the result of 
efforts by civil society 
organizations [...] These 
managed to raise 
the interest of public 
opinion in Switzerland 
on the business and 
human rights agenda.
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Box 9.7. ICMM and Sustainable Development
ICMM is a CEO-led international organization of mining and metals companies established in 2001 to 
ensure members’ continued access to resources, capital and markets by improving their performance 
on sustainability. ICMM’s 25 company members have responsibility for more than 900 sites in more than 
50 countries. Collectively, they account for between 30 – 50 per cent of global production of many major 
commodities such as aluminium, copper, iron ore and gold. ICMM seeks to minimize the impacts of 
mining and maximize its benefits, thereby enhancing mining’s contribution to society by strengthening the 
industry’s environmental, social and economic performance, and championing the responsible production 
of materials 
ICMM’s work on sustainability is organized into three thematic areas:
• Environmental stewardship: Mining operations and host communities all depend on water, land and 
energy. Companies are increasingly expected to demonstrate responsible stewardship to secure access 
to these shared resources. Many firms are also involved in reducing emissions, supporting low-emission 
technologies and helping the communities in which they operate to adapt to the effects of climate 
change.
• Role of mining and metals in society: The mining and metals industry can help societies and economies 
develop, particularly in non-OECD countries. By supporting learning and contributing to economic and 
social progress, the industry delivers benefits beyond the direct jobs it creates and the taxes it pays.
• Human well-being: Responsible mining and metals production puts people first. This means a firm 
commitment to the safety, well-being and social development of the communities of operation. Despite 
the hazards of the industry, workplace accidents and occupational diseases are preventable through 
effective risk management. This involves constantly looking at ways to help raise health and safety 
standards in the sector.
ICMM aims to achieve change through a number of avenues including:
Partnerships: ICMM has sustained engagement with international organizations such as the United 
Nations, OECD, World Bank, the International Maritime Organization and leading civil society organizations 
such as Amnesty International, GRI, Oxfam and WWF. 
Training and toolkits: ICMM has developed toolkits and best practice guidance in partnership with other 
stakeholders. Examples include guidance on water reporting guidance and on managing impacts with 
communities. ICMM is also active in training through webinars and regional workshops on managing 
community relationships, closure and water management. 
In its pursuit of sustainability goals, ICMM has established 10 principles to which members must adhere.  
These are: (1) ethical business and sound governance; (2) sustainable development in decision-making; 
(3) respect for human rights; (4) effective risk management; (5) health and safety performance; (6) 
environmental performance; (7) conservation of biodiversity and land-use planning; (8) responsible use 
and supply of materials; (9) social contribution; and (10) engagement and transparent reporting. 
Member companies commit to implementing 10 principles and 8 position statements for sustainable 
development. These principles are benchmarked against leading international standards including the 
Global Reporting Initiative, the Global Compact and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human 
Rights.
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Part of the core of ICMM requirements is sustainability reporting. All member companies are expected 
to implement and publish independently verified reports on their sustainability performance. At the core 
of the framework is a requirement to use the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) framework and its Mining 
and Metals Sector Supplement (MMSS). This is perhaps where the ICMM initiative is most challenged, as 
many scholars have critiqued the GRI framework.
Fonseca et al. (2012) summarizes some of the criticisms of GRI reporting as follows:  
• The GRI approach to reporting sustainability has significant problems that may ultimately camouflage 
organizations’ un-sustainability, as companies who follow the GRI framework tend to focus on 
specific issues within their organizations, thereby running the risk of losing sight of the big picture for 
sustainability. This practice can actually lead to flawed decision-making.  
• The indicators run the risk of translating into generic, non-contextual statements about the company’s 
overall plans and goals. For example, a model biodiversity programme in a particular site may very well 
obscure biodiversity losses in different regions for companies that have many sites. 
• Scholars have also criticized GRI-based sustainability reports for presenting unreliable information. These 
critics often argue that corporations are “cherry-picking” issues and manipulating the reporting process to 
portray an image of a socially and environmentally responsible company. 
In the light of this problem, ICMM launched an Assurance Procedure that is helping to promote third-party 
auditing in mining companies’ reporting practices. However, Fonseca et al. (2012) argue that the role of 
third-party assurance is not to question the design of the GRI framework; rather it is concerned with the 
extent to which mining companies are complying with GRI. The auditors therefore cannot properly address 
misinformation, such as optimistic statements and incorrectly aggregated data that may be produced 
due to the framework’s inherent flaws. They argue that the problems of GRI reporting stem first from the 
misuse of the framework’s required principles and indicators. However, they posit that, even if mining 
corporations were to fully comply with the GRI framework, such an effort would be largely insufficient 
to structure a sustainability assessment and reporting process that could meet the gold standard of 
sustainability reporting – the Bellagio Principles. They point out that the GRI approach to assessing and 
communicating mining contributions to sustainability has gaps within each analysed principle.
ICMM seeks to minimize 
the impacts of mining 
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Box 9.8. The case for the UN Guiding Principles on Business and the Environment?
Given the legitimacy of the Ruggie framework and the fact that its structure has been widely adopted 
to frame State duties and corporate responsibilities, its systemic approach could “provide a model to 
address State duties and business responsibilities to care for the environment” (Jesse & Koppe, 2013, p. 
188). Jesse & Koppe (2013) even recommend analogous pillars, including (1) a state duty to care for the 
environment, (2) a responsibility of business enterprises to care for the environment, and (3) stakeholder 
access to remedies in to the event of breaches of such duties and responsibilities.
The scope of such a corporate responsibility and (home) State duty vis-à-vis the environment would 
need to be carefully laid out in the Guiding Principles on Business and the Environment. On the one 
hand, substantive content may be derived from binding international environmental law, as codified in 
international environmental treaties or reflected in general principles of law and international customary 
law. On the other hand, specific environmental duties can be derived from the above-mentioned widely 
recognized voluntary CSR frameworks – including the OECD Guidelines, the UN Global Compact, and the 
ISO 26000 standards – but also from sector specific voluntary settings. In order to gain legitimacy, it will 
be important to refer to the legal basis in the corresponding explanations.
Jesse and Koppe (2013) have carefully compiled the most relevant general principles of international 
environmental law, while also reflecting upon their meaning in a business context. Examples include 
the principle of prevention and the precautionary principle, the principle of good neighbourliness or the 
maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (the rightful use of one’s own property cannot be a legal wrong 
to another). The prohibition of causing transboundary pollution is recognized as a rule of customary 
international law. It is further submitted that this prohibition or duty of care “is not limited to the 
environment in other states and to the environment in areas beyond national jurisdiction, but also extends 
to the environment – both the human environment and the environment as such – within states’ own 
jurisdictions.” While States have the sovereign right to exploit their own resources, such exploitation must 
be carried out with due regard to the environment - a duty that is reflected in a number of international 
agreements. In addition, a range of environmental standards frequently included in voluntary CSR 
frameworks is sufficiently recognized to nurture an overall environmental responsibility framework (Buergi, 
2015b; Jesse & Koppe, 2013). As with the Ruggie framework, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
the Environment would not need to be entirely built on binding law, but their legitimacy and success would 
depend on the extent to which the relevant business community and civil society accept the specific rules 
as adequate. 
While States have the 
sovereign right to exploit 
their own resources, such 
exploitation must be 
carried out with due regard 
to the environment - a 
duty that is reflected in a 
number of international 
agreements.
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As pointed out in Chapter 1, extractive resources 
have the potential to deliver on the SDGs. This will 
require responsible business practices to be woven 
into all aspects of extractive activities. This topic is 
addressed in the next chapter.
9.6. The need for balance between security 
of supply concerns versus sustainable 
development aspirations
Although much of the extractive industry is located in 
OECD countries and emerging economies, extractive 
industries are also important to the economies of 
many developing countries.126However, output from 
developing countries is largely used in the more 
developed countries as inputs to key industries, 
and these imports are therefore also crucial to the 
economies of importing countries. This means 
that, for developed countries, security of supply is 
of utmost importance while, for most resource-rich 
countries, development is the main concern. While 
both objectives can be achieved simultaneously, 
this can be a challenge. Security of supply may 
override concerns for good governance and, in many 
126  OECD is a group of mostly industrialized and wealthy 
countries that support free market. The 34-member 
countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom and the United States. Emerging economies are 
economies that are not too rich, not too poor and not too 
closed to foreign capital (Economist, 2017).  Countries 
that fall into this category are usually considered emerging 
because of their developments and reforms. The IMF, 
the International Monetary Fund, classifies 23 countries 
as emerging markets. These are: Argentina, Bangladesh, 
Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Hungary, Indonesia, 
India and Malaysia.  Developing countries are countries 
that are not rich. The World Bank (though it no longer uses 
the term developing countries) classifies countries into 
four income categories using GNI per capita: Low-income 
(<n $1,035); lower middle income ($1,036 - $4,085); upper 
middle income ($4,086 a- $12,615); and high- income (> 
$12,615). Low- and middle-income economies are usually 
referred to as developing economies, and the Upper Middle 
Income and the High Income are referred to as Developed 
Countries. The United Nations classifies 3 categories 
of countries: Developed, Countries in Transitions and 
Developing Countries. It is not clear what criteria are used 
to categorize countries, although it seems likely to be GNI 
per capita.
cases, minerals become the key enabler of poor 
governance. The clamour for quick development 
may also bring about resource nationalism (Box 9.9), 
which can dampen investment and deny people their 
much-needed development. 
Box 9.9. Resource nationalism
Resource nationalism is characterized by 
the tendency for producer States to take (or 
seek to take) direct and increasing control of 
economic activity in natural resource sectors 
(Ward, 2009). Resource nationalism might be 
considered no more than a case of producer 
nations ‘wanting to make the most of their 
endowment’ (Andreason, 2015). Resource 
nationalism presents itself in various forms, 
including raising taxes and royalties, increases 
in local content requirements, indigenization and 
local equity requirements, domestic processing, 
value addition and the review and renegotiation 
of contracts (Botham, 2018).
The market cycle theory posits that 
commodity super-cycles prompt an increase 
in State intervention, as governments seek 
to increase their share of revenue from rising 
commodity prices. Likewise, during periods of 
depressed prices, governments of resource-
dependent countries implement various policy 
interventions, protectionist measures and 
new laws to increase revenue to counteract 
decreased revenues. However, Ward (2009) 
points out that today’s resource nationalism 
is driven by a far more complex and varied set 
of factors than price alone, unlike that of the 
1970s. It needs to be understood in the context 
of global concern for resource security, climate 
change, sustainable development and poverty 
reduction.
Therefore, a key prerequisite for an effective 
governance system is that it fulfills both 
requirements, thereby creating a symbiotic 
relationship.  The European Union Raw Material 
Initiative aims to strike this balance (see Box 9.10).
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Box 9.10. EU-Raw Materials Initiative (RMI)
Given the continued and growing strategic importance of raw materials for the European manufacturing 
industry, where one of the main drivers is the shift to a low carbon and circular economy, the European 
Union is implementing a wide range of actions under the EU Raw Materials Initiative (RMI) to help ensure 
their secure, sustainable, responsible and affordable supply (European Commission, 2008a). 
 RMI has three pillars which aim to ensure:
1. Fair and sustainable supply of raw materials from global markets. 
2. Sustainable supply of raw materials within the EU. 
3. Resource efficiency and supply of “secondary raw materials” through recycling.
Raw materials, in particular Critical Raw Materials, are important for the competitiveness of key European 
industrial value chains, including automobile, machinery, electrical engineering, ICT and defence sectors. 
Their availability is also a fundamental precondition for the transition to a low-carbon and circular 
economy, including e-mobility and renewable energy. This is what makes responsible sourcing and 
extraction of Raw Materials play an even more prominent role in RMI. Recognition of this fact also 
features prominently in the renewed EU industrial policy strategy adopted in September 2017. 
Global demand for raw materials will increase as a result of growth in developing countries. It is important 
to bear in mind that the United Nations projects that world population will reach 8.6 billion by 2030. 
Therefore, even in a perfect circular economy, primary production of raw materials will remain necessary. 
Consequently, this will put a considerable and increasing pressure on resource-rich countries, their natural 
environment and local communities at extraction sites. Moreover, economic development, stabilization of 
labour markets, migration levels and limiting poverty in numerous resource-rich countries are all largely 
dependent on income from the extraction of mineral resources. Therefore, increasing attention must be 
paid to the environmental and social impacts of production, both in EU and non-EU countries.
The traditional approach to ensuring the economic security of raw materials supply has been increasingly 
complemented by responsible and sustainable governance, sourcing and extraction of raw materials.  This 
evolution has the potential to become a driver for responsible and sustainable growth and jobs in the EU 
and in third countries.  However, an important precondition is the capacity to monitor the sustainability of 
value chains sourcing raw materials. This requires their full transparency, availability of data and evidence.
The European vision is firmly committed to implementing the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
The SDGs framework does not include an explicit goal on raw materials. However, raw materials sectors 
can contribute, directly or indirectly, to all goals. The EU supports SDGs implementation politically and 
financially via numerous EU and international actions. This includes the EU’s Non-Financial Reporting 
Directive, Accounting and Transparency Directive, Conflict Minerals Regulation or Extractive Industry 
Transparency Initiative, OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas and the European Partnership for Responsible Minerals.
The latest important EU policy linked to raw materials was published on 17 May 2018. The European 
Commission adopted the agenda for safe, clean and connected mobility along with the Strategic Action 
Plan for Batteries. The Action Plan aims, inter alia, to facilitate access to European sources of raw 
materials and to secure access to raw materials from resource-rich countries outside the EU. The Action 
Plan announced:
1. The use of all appropriate trade policy instruments, such as Free Trade Agreements, to ensure fair and 
sustainable access to raw materials in third countries and promotion of socially responsible mining. 
2. The promotion of the ethical sourcing of raw materials for the batteries industry.
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9.7. The need for data, information and 
knowledge 
Information is crucial to making good decisions. 
However, the diversity of actors in the extractive 
value chain means the various actors require 
different types of information. As pointed out 
earlier (Chapter 7), due to significant variations in 
capacities of the actors, there are huge differences in 
information available (information asymmetry). This 
asymmetry means that some actors can capture 
a disproportionate share of extracted resources, 
thereby creating the basis for the contestation 
that is a feature of the extractive value chain. Even 
when information asymmetry is not exploited to 
the benefit of the informed, it still creates mistrust 
that can lead to misunderstandings and even 
conflict. In recognition of the importance of access 
to information for effective public participation, the 
Aarhus Convention was promulgated (see Box 9.11).
Box 9.11. Aarhus Convention: increasing public 
participation in decision-making
The Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
(Aarhus Convention) recognizes access to 
information as a prerequisite to effective 
public participation in policy formulation and 
decision-making. The Aarhus Convention 
grants the public broad and concrete rights of 
participation in decision-making and imposes 
obligations regarding access to information on 
parties and public authorities. The obligations 
imposed on Parties include the need to: make 
environmental information available within no 
more than two months of a request; ensure 
that public institutions have and updated 
relevant environmental information; encourage 
operators to inform the public regularly of the 
environmental impact of their activities; provide 
for public participation procedures that allow 
sufficient time and supply enough information 
for the public to participate effectively in 
decision-making; take due account of the 
outcome of the public participation process; 
and ensure that persons exercising their rights 
are not penalized, persecuted or harassed (ECA, 
2004:15).
Accurate information requires that data be available 
and accessible to users. However, data collection 
can be a challenge due to the lack of transparency 
prevalent in the sector. This has been a concern of 
civil society, which has prompted the establishment 
of initiatives that focus on this (such as EITI, StAR, 
PWYP, as shown in Chapter 7). Transparency alone 
is not enough, as actors can suffer from information 
overload. This underscores the need for capacity 
to process the data and make it relevant to various 
stakeholders. Equipping stakeholders, especially 
the public, with ICT tools and the knowledge to 
use the tools and make sense of the outputs is 
therefore vital. On the government side, effective 
communication for policymaking needs to go 
beyond simple disclosures and develop a practice of 
two-way communication and careful explanation of 
government decisions (as well as the reasons behind 
them). Information and effective communication are 
particularly key for meeting the threshold of Free, 
Prior and informed Consent (especially with respect 
to indigenous peoples) (see Box 9.12).
The challenge around data relates not only to the 
mineral resource data, but also to a suite of other 
social and environmental variables. Increasing 
accessibility and availability of data for use in the 
decision-making process does, however, require 
overcoming significant technical, social and political 
barriers. At the global scale, a number of tools have 
been developed to help increase access - including 
the Integrated Biodiversity Assessment Tool for 
biodiversity data. Taking on this broader challenge of 
integrating data to increase transparency and reduce 
conflicts, MAP-X has developed simple-to-use 
platforms (see Box 9.13 and Figure 9.3).
Equipping stakeholders, 
especially the public, 
with ICT tools and the 
knowledge to use the 
tools and make sense of 
the outputs is vital.
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Box 9.12. Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC)
The ILO convention 169 discussed in Box 9.4 was further strengthened by the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2007to recognize their rights 
and mention Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) as a prerequisite for any activity that affects their 
ancestral lands, territories and natural resources. 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) is understood as follows:
• Free implies that there is no coercion, intimidation or manipulation; 
• Prior implies that consent is to be sought sufficiently in advance of any authorization or commencement 
of activities, and respect is shown to time requirements of indigenous consultation/consensus processes; 
and 
• Informed implies that information is provided that covers a range of aspects, including the nature, size, 
pace, reversibility and scope of any proposed project or activity; the purpose of the project, as well as 
its duration; locality and areas affected; a preliminary assessment of the likely economic, social, cultural 
and environmental impact, including potential risks; personnel likely to be involved in the execution of 
the project; and procedures the project may entail. This process may include the option of withholding 
consent. Consultation and participation are crucial components of a consent process.
FAO (2016b) points out that, for an FPIC process to be effective and result in consent or lack of it, the 
way in which the process is conducted is paramount. The time allocated for the discussions among 
the indigenous peoples, the cultural appropriateness of the way the information is conveyed and the 
involvement of the whole community (including key groups like women, the elderly and young people) 
are all essential. A thorough and well-executed FPIC process helps guarantee everyone’s right to self-
determination, allowing them to participate in decisions that affect their lives. FAO (2016b) also points out 
that, in the last two or three years, development experts have recognized that FPIC is not only important 
for indigenous peoples but is also good practice to undertake with local communities, as involving them 
in the decision-making of any proposed development activity increases their sense of ownership and 
engagement and, moreover, helps guarantee their right to development as a basic human rights principle.
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Box 9.13. MapX case study – Mapping and monitoring the sustainable use of natural resources127
Conflicts in the extractives sector threaten national cohesion and peace, and prevent the sector from 
making important development contributions. Indeed, one of the key manifestations of the resource curse 
is conflict. This is mainly driven by competition to control and thus capture the benefits from mineral 
resources. As mentioned in chapter 6, there are many initiatives designed to reduce conflict and ensure 
minerals are conflict free. While competition over control/ownership of resources drives many of the 
resource-based conflicts, conflicts can also be grievance-driven when they are largely attributed to the 
externalities of extractive activities including pollution (see Chapter 5). 
In Peru, over $8.5 billion of investment in the extractive sector has been blocked due to conflicts, whilst 
such conflict has resulted in 53 people being killed and more than 1,500 injured over the past 15 years. 
An estimated 80 per cent of conflicts in the country were related to the environmental impacts of mining 
operations (mainly relating to availability and quality of water resources). The International Finance 
Corporation and the International Council of Mining and Metals have found that 70 per cent of the 
operations of the world’s biggest mining companies are located in water-stressed areas. The impacts of 
climate change, including increasing water scarcity, can aggravate this situation. Appropriate governance 
responses are needed to address this. For instance, Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration emphasizes the 
need for citizens to have appropriate access to information on the environment that is held by public 
authorities, as well as the opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. 
While a number of global initiatives are already promoting greater transparency in the sector, 
environmental transparency is often neglected. Transparency and accountability initiatives tend to 
focus more on transparency in relation to revenues and contracts, as in the case of EITI. While financial 
transparency is critically important, the concerns of local communities in the vicinity of operations tend to 
focus on the more immediate impacts of a project. This includes, for example, the impact of operations 
on the availability and quality of local water supplies or the number of local jobs created. Information on 
such impacts will help citizens understand the distribution of benefits and risks across a project life cycle.
Much like other industries, the mining industry is undergoing dramatic transformations brought about 
by the information and communication technologies that are driving the fourth industrial revolution. 
These technologies include robotics, autonomous vehicles and 3D printing, which impact production and 
efficiency of mining operations. More crucially, the industry has embraced ‘big data’, producing ever more 
information relating to its operations. These technological developments have fundamentally altered how 
companies interact, communicate and share information with their stakeholders. These technologies can 
also empower people in their interactions with the extractive sector, as they also allow them to access 
information generated and also new data to reduce the information asymmetry that has usually benefited 
mining companies.
Mandated by the G7+ group of fragile and conflict-affected states, UN Environment has partnered with the 
World Bank to develop an integrated information management and stakeholder engagement platform for 
the extractives sector. The online platform consolidates and authenticates information on the financial, 
social and environmental impacts of projects at the site, district or national levels, and then displays 
this information on a map to help analyse the performance and development outcomes linked to the 
extractives sector. MapX allows for multi-party data sharing and provides access to a range of datasets 
held by the government, private sector operators, academia, development partners and local communities 
in a single location. MapX implementing partners support stakeholders in a structured co-design 
process to identify specific information needs and improve the uptake of data within decision-making, 
performance monitoring and dialogue processes.
127  Contributed by David Jensen and Inga Petersen.
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MapX is being designed to provide stakeholders with access to the “best available data” on an unbiased 
platform that includes a transparent authentication process for each layer. Impartial data authentication 
is important as it helps build trust in the information. Prior to publication on MapX, each dataset is scored 
against a series of data integrity indicators including data sustainability, reliability, accessibility and 
openness as part of an independent assessment process. MapX then tracks the performance of each 
dataset over time to build trust in the information and provide feedback to data providers to improve data 
quality.   
In the Democratic Republic of Congo, MapX is being implemented to support four separate objectives:
• Host Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) reports and related company-level, site-specific 
data in order to provide users with project-level information dashboards and performance monitoring 
tools.
• Help EITI stakeholders visualize and contextualize information about impacts of the extractives to improve 
understanding and informed decision-making. 
• Facilitate the mainstreaming of EITI data with other national datasets by integrating all key layers into a 
single platform using a spatial data infrastructure. 
• Apply the data integrity assessment to provide quality monitoring of national data sets. 
Even though the platform is still in the early stages of implementation, a number of lessons have 
started to emerge. First, relating payment and production information to individual mining concessions 
is critically important to bring financial data to life and make it relevant to local communities. MapX 
visualizes payments at the site level by concession or company. It dynamically streams live data from the 
national mining cadastre and matches this with EITI payment data in order to visualize the total volume 
of payments across the country. The resulting financial heat map can then be compared to other key 
socioeconomic indicators to determine important correlations such as human development indicators. 
Second, top-down one-size-fits-all solutions do not exist. Stakeholders in the extractives sector demand 
solutions that can adapt to local circumstances, build on existing national or local systems and provide 
tools that are specific to the context. In DR Congo, for example, MapX was customized to track changes 
in specific variables and land cover over time. This resulted in the development of a dedicated time-slider 
tool following specific demands from platform users for this functionality. 
Third, information needs to be disaggregated by project to be truly relevant to local stakeholders. Above 
all else, local stakeholders want to know how an extractive project is impacting and benefiting their 
communities. MapX has developed project-specific dashboards that display key information such as 
ownership, annual production, workforce statistics and so forth. This enables monitoring of benefit and 
community development agreements, and can also be used to share the company’s environmental 
performance data.
Fourth, in order to ensure sustainability of the platform, it needs to be embedded in government systems. 
In DR Congo, MapX helped identify overlaps between mining concessions and protected areas, providing 
critical data points for the national Ministry of Planning. In addition to such embedding, stakeholders also 
require targeted and sustained capacity-building to ensure the long-term use of the platform.
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Last but not least, the information included in MapX may need to be interpreted, visualized and packaged 
in different formats to reach the intended audience. In order for all stakeholders to benefit from the 
information presented on the platform, going forward MapX will need to develop targeted outreach 
products in appropriate formats that take local capacity such as literacy rates into account. This could 
include translation into local languages or tailored offline products such as printed maps, for example. 
In summary, MapX was able to demonstrate in DR Congo that transparency in the extractive sector is 
not an end in itself. Customized tools are required to utilize transparency and access to information 
as effective instruments for stakeholder engagement.  In order for information to contribute to better 
dialogue, evidence-based decision-making and conflict prevention, the financial information needs to be 
related to data on the socioeconomic and environmental impacts of the sector. Information is most useful 
for local communities if the information is disaggregated to the level of individual projects and the key 
takeaway messages are relayed in appropriate formats both online and offline.  
Figure 9.3. Screenshots of MapX128 
128  Contributed by David Jensen and Inga Petersen. (More information on the MapX website is available at www.mapx.org)
Figure 9.3.1. MapX implementation of the data integrity framework (composite score for one of the data layers 
in DR Congo)
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Figure 9.3.2. Example of a heat map – The map shows how high concessions payments contrast with high 
poverty rates in Eastern DR Congo. (the example is for demonstration purposes only and does not show 
authenticated data)
Figure 9.3.3. Satellite image of Tenke Fungurume mining operations in DR Congo.
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Figure 9.3.4. Corresponding company specific performance dashboard of Tenke Fungurume mining.
Figure 9.3.5. Overlap analysis of protected areas and expired mining exploration licences in North Eastern DR 
Congo.
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9.8. Conclusion and way forward
The discussion in this chapter provides the context 
within which a governance framework must work. It 
outlines seven prerequisites that are crucial for an 
effective governance framework (holistic framework, 
decoupling economic growth from environmental 
and social impacts, respect for human rights, 
greater home country engagement, responsible 
business practices, balance between security of 
supply (global north) and sustainable development 
aspirations (global south) and data, information 
and knowledge).  Also, as discussed in previous 
chapters, there are several instruments that usefully 
address the challenges of governance from different 
perspectives. 
Lockwood et al. (2010; citing Howlett & Rayner, 
2006) point out that the term new governance has 
emerged to describe a mode of governing that 
shows a preference for collaborative approaches 
among government and non-government actors 
from the private sector and civil society. They 
indicate that this is crucial in policy areas that are 
informed by the discourse of sustainability. The 
authors also revealed that a new governance regime 
has an explicit ethical foundation in notions of 
participation, responsibility, stewardship and duty of 
care, which makes novel demands on institutions 
and policy.
Potential high-level approaches to a new natural 
resource governance framework have been put 
forward. The next two chapters seek to flesh out 
these approaches in much more detail. 
Aerial view of deforested area of the 
Amazon rainforest caused by illegal 
mining activities in Brazil. Photo: 
Paralaxis © Shutterstock
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Aerial view of an abandoned open pit mine. Photo: Wollertz © Shutterstock
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10 Towards a Sustainable Development Licence to Operate131
10.0. Introduction129
As pointed out in the earlier parts of this report, 
mineral wealth provides an opportunity for the 
transformation of livelihoods by leveraging resource 
earnings and other development opportunities130 
to transform economies and build new sources of 
competitiveness. This has been the case of some of 
the resource-rich OECD countries such as Sweden. 
Indeed, the resources sector can generate direct, 
indirect and induced multiplier effects (ICMM, 
2015: 35-40) as well as spawn new industries 
or through backward, forward, spatial and other 
linkages facilitate development in other sectors of 
the economy that can be more important than the 
mineral resources sector itself.  However, this is 
easier said than done. The resource curse remains a 
challenge for many resource-rich countries. 
In Chapters 2 and 6, we discussed that the extractive 
sector has failed to deliver promised benefits and 
indeed in some cases mineral wealth continues 
to fuel conflicts. Traditionally, the governance of 
the extractive sector has largely been defined by 
the relationship between mining companies and 
129  This chapter draws extensively and, in some places, 
verbatim from a publication by the authors (Pedro et al, 
2017). 
130  The transformative potential of the mineral resource 
sector does not derive solely from the effective use 
of resource rents. A point in case is trunk resource 
infrastructure (such as railways, and ports) which can 
be used to create opportunities in other sectors of 
the economy (such as agriculture) that cannot afford 
investments in such expensive infrastructure. Equally so, 
procurement of goods and services, which constitutes 
between 50-65 per cent of the production costs of a 
typical mining operation, can enable the emergence of a 
vibrant cluster of local suppliers with a significant impact 
to the domestic economic both in terms of job creation, 
acquisition of new skills and revenue flows (ICMM, 2015: 
35-40).
governments.131 This relationship has mainly been 
predicated on the sharing of revenues centred on 
regulations on how the extractive industries should 
be carried out. However, as pointed out previously, 
this relationship remains problematic mainly owing 
to: (i) a mismatch between expectations and reality 
as well as divergence of perceptions about what 
constitutes benefits and value (WEF 2013: 6-7); (ii) 
lack of trust, especially on tax transparency and 
corporate tax payments (PWC, 2015: 28); (iii) power/
information asymmetry between mining companies 
and governments with mining companies having 
an upper hand; and (iv) the tendency of a race to 
the bottom where governments tend to offer a lot 
of incentives as they compete to attract mining 
investments, especially when commodity prices fall 
(PWC 2015: 32-33). 
This gives mining companies an upper hand in 
negotiating contracts often resulting in mining 
companies’ interests superseding other interests, 
particularly those of local communities.  Even 
when governments succeed in obtaining a fair 
share of revenues, the adverse outcomes of mining 
such as environmental and social impacts and/
or other externalities of mining activities may not 
be adequately mitigated or compensated for.  It 
should also be noted that governments may 
squander whatever mineral rents they receive or 
may lack capacity to manage the rents effectively 
and transform them into sustainable development 
outcomes. It should be recognized that there have 
been recent efforts by resource-rich countries in 
Africa (Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Ghana, Nigeria, 
and Senegal, to name a few) to develop sovereign 
wealth funds (SWF) to ensure better use of mineral 
rents. Wills & Finch (2016) argue that the results 
131  The government can be national, local or even 
traditional authority. This depends on the laws of the 
countries and how they assigned authority over resources.
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have been mixed and the key motives for their 
establishment, namely (i) securing intergenerational 
transfers, (ii) sterilising or parking resources abroad 
to cool off the economy during commodity booms, 
and (iii) stabilizing the economy, might not equally 
apply in Africa, especially in countries facing other 
pressing priorities. 
10.1. The Social Licence to Operate
The first victims of insufficient regulation or lack 
of capacity to enforce regulations and manage 
the sector are local communities where mining 
activities are located since, they bear the brunt of 
social and environmental impacts of these activities. 
This fact has seen significant activism by civil 
society to advocate for better outcomes, and also 
conflicts have arisen between mining companies 
and the affected communities. These conflicts 
with communities have been shown to have high 
financial, opportunity and personal costs to mining 
companies and their personnel (Franks et al., 2014). 
In several cases, “protests and unrest at the mining 
site have delayed or stopped projects” (EY, 2015). 
The term Social Licence to Operate (SLO) was 
coined in the 1990s to capture the need for 
mining companies to receive acceptance by local 
communities where they operate.  SLO is thus 
defined as obtaining and maintaining community 
support and acceptance of extractive activities. In 
the broadest terms, SLO tends to be regarded as 
the ongoing acceptance or approval of extractive 
operations by those local community stakeholders 
who are affected by them and those stakeholders 
who can affect their profitability (Moffat et. al., 
2016). In essence, it is about managing risk of 
conflict at the local level, and reputational damage 
at the national and international levels. SLO is 
now the fourth most significant business risk for 
mining companies (EY, 2016). Invariably, for many 
successive years, securing and maintaining SLO 
has been considered amongst the top 10 biggest 
business risks for mining and metals companies 
(EY 2015; EY 2016). Today, mining companies 
consider community acceptance to be as crucial 
as the formal licenses and permits granted by 
governments. They have recognized “the value 
and necessity of embedding sustainability in their 
business models and operating in tandem with 
communities to create mutual value and retain their 
SLO” (EY, 2016). 
A critique of SLO
Since the introduction of the concept of the SLO 
in the late 1990s132, it has become the prevailing 
discourse for ensuring the broad, on-going 
acceptance of mining projects by local communities 
and society in general. It can be regarded as a largely 
intangible agreement (or a form of ‘social contract’) 
between mining companies and civil society, based 
on a growing common understanding of the need 
for greater public participation in decision-making, 
a fairer share of mining proceeds and benefits, 
and assurances that mineral development will be 
conducted safely and responsibly (Prno, 2013).  
Despite the term’s widespread uptake by industry 
and the aforesaid positive attributes, the notion of 
a Social Licence to Operate has been criticised on 
several grounds. These relate to both the social 
licence discourse and its practical implications 
(Owen & Kemp, 2013). 
Though intended as an abstract and unwritten 
construct, it is precisely its corresponding innate 
uncertainty that makes it problematic. The lack of 
clarity with respect to the substance and parameters 
of the social license and by whom and how it is 
enforced, are serious shortcomings hindering 
the establishment of a legitimate, structured and 
continuous approach to addressing public concerns 
in the extractive sector. The inherent ambiguity of 
the concept is linked to the fact that a social licence 
has no legal force or recognition. This has raised 
questions as to how it reconciles with assertions 
that a social license is a necessary condition to 
operate, and whether attempts to institutionalise it 
can erode existing legal processes and institutions 
(such as established formal environmental review 
regimes to inform legal permissions for mineral 
resource development ( BGS, 2015)). 
The use of the term ‘licence’ has been characterised 
as misleading, insofar as it suggests the granting of 
specific permission for, or public acceptance of, a 
mining project, even if the reality is one of reluctant 
tolerance or absence of overt opposition or conflict 
(BGS, 2015). This can be particularly problematic in 
certain political contexts where the public expression 
of dissent may be explicitly prohibited or otherwise 
punishable. 
132  Ibid.
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Moreover, the use of the term ‘social’ may serve to 
aggregate diverging opinions among a diverse or 
heterogeneous group of stakeholders, therefore 
masking some dissenting or marginalised views 
(Agrawal & Gibson, 1999; Owen & Kemp, 2013; 
Lesser et al., 2017). 
The Social Licence to Operate, as its name 
suggests, also focuses mainly on the social 
dimension of mining projects, with less attention 
paid to the environmental component. While some 
environmental concerns may be addressed, if raised 
by local communities and other actors, the SLO is 
far from a comprehensive means for protecting the 
environment from adverse impacts associated with 
mining. 
The fundamental critique of the Social Licence 
to Operate framework is that it was developed as 
industry’s pragmatic response to business risk. Its 
agenda is limited to accommodating community 
demands to the minimum extent necessary to 
avoid public opposition and social conflict, and 
the associated costs of reputational damage and 
operations delays or disruptions. Some argue 
that it has been opportunistically used to serve 
the particular objectives and goals of companies, 
activists and governments (Bice & Moffat, 2014; 
Owen & Kemp, 2013).
In summary, SLO has been a response to manage 
risk as opposed to a response to deliver sustainable 
development which for the society is the key 
expectation. Indeed, depending on the relationship 
between society and the mining companies, it has 
been found that where livelihoods are dependent on 
mining companies, local communities may accept 
many externalities of mining activities (Moffat et 
al., 2015). So, attribution and possession of the 
SLO does not necessarily mean that communities 
obtain improved outcomes in return. In essence, 
SLO defines the minimum of what a mining project 
can get away with in a particular location. In reality, 
a mining company can have varying practices in 
different locations as the local conditions dictate 
what they can get away with.  This narrow and 
business-driven agenda means that the SLO is 
an incomplete framework for establishing higher 
standards of social and environmental performance, 
and stakeholder engagement for long-term 
sustainable development. 
The dissatisfaction with the current regulatory 
framework largely defined by Mineral Development 
Agreements (MDAs) between central governments 
and mining companies and the social contracts 
between mining companies and impacted 
communities (the SLO) has seen a significant 
movement in the extractive resource governance 
landscape as new actors have pushed the 
boundaries on what is acceptable practice and 
defined expectations over and beyond what the 
MDAs133 and local communities can allow. The 
crucial developments include:
• The fact that mining companies can obtain 
SLO and still cause harm, has seen CSOs seek 
to expand what is acceptable and what is not 
acceptable.  It should be noted that SLO is 
granted by those impacted and those who can 
impact on the profitability of the company. The 
fact that CSOs have the potential to impact on 
mining companies has meant that they have 
expanded the stakeholder community that mining 
companies have to contend with. For example, the 
push for greater transparency such as the EITI has 
been the work of international CSOs
• At the national level, the contribution of mining 
activities to the broader economy has been 
questioned. There has been a growing clamor 
for a shift away from the enclave nature of the 
extractive sector to the promotion of greater value 
133  Getting the mining law right can indeed be a challenge. 
Bastida (2008) points that while there is a consensus on 
the need to articulate law and policy in ways that meet 
sustainable development objectives, the precise definition 
of these are much contested, are context specific and 
allow for much divergence in policy outcomes. This also 
means moving away from mineral laws as only governing 
and regulating minerals exploration and exploitation to a 
more comprehensive approach that conceives mineral 
law as a legal framework for acquisition and use of 
mineral resources in a sustainable manner. However, there 
are significant challenges.  Bastida (2018) points that 
there is need to work on the gaps in the design of legal 
and institutional frameworks, and on strengthening the 
capacities of the institutions and actors that participate 
in decision-making for the sustainable management of 
resources and for ensuring that mining contributes to 
sustainable development. Further while international 
frameworks can be a good starting, Bastida and Bustos 
(2017) warns that there are enormous challenges faced in 
seeking to effectively anchor the principles and concepts 
found in international normative frameworks within the 
legal and political contexts and trajectories of each country. 
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addition and linkages between the extractive 
sector and other sectors of the local and national 
economies. Many countries have been enacting 
local content and local participation policies. The 
Africa Mining Vision has produced a framework to 
forge greater linkage of mining activities to local 
economies (see Box 1.2)
• Crucially, consumers of final products are also 
increasingly concerned about how the products 
have been sourced. Sustainable consumption is 
becoming a global trend and mining companies, 
being part of the global supply chains, have to 
demonstrate sustainability of their practices.
• Home countries are also becoming more active 
in regulating mining companies as pressure for 
responsible sourcing by consumers /citizens 
increases. New laws and regulations that govern 
how companies behave and source abroad – for 
example, the Dodd-Franks Acts – are being put in 
place.
• Growing divestment or disinvestment trend 
among institutional investors who are removing 
stocks from companies, which they consider a 
high ethical risk134 because of their questionable 
human rights record, social concerns, health 
and safety practices, corruption and taxation 
scorecard, and/or environmental and climate 
change performance.
• At the international governance level, 
environmental issues have been elevated to 
the global level and increasingly regulated by 
Multilateral Environment Agreements (MEAs).
• Industry has also sought to raise the bar and 
make sustainable development a key outcome; an 
example being ICMM’s 10 principles (see Box 9.7).
It is now clear that it is no longer just the licence 
granted by governments and the acceptance of the 
local community that is needed. SLO has moved 
from the local community to also encompass 
national and international communities. In addition, 
companies do not only have to contend with national 
laws but also with international laws. 
134  See The Church of England-Extractive Industries: 
The policy of the National Industry Bodies of the 
Church of England and the Ethical Investment Advisory 
Group’s Advisory and Theological Papers, https://
www.churchofengland.org/sites/default/files/2018-3/
Extractive%20Industries%20Policy%20and%20Advice.pdf
The result of these developments has been 
the emergence of a plethora of instruments as 
discussed in Chapter 7. It was also shown in chapter 
8 that although these instruments have played a 
critical role in resolving certain problems, they have 
many challenges. Risk management still informs 
many of the instruments driven by industry. A few 
address broad sustainable development outcomes, 
however they are largely voluntary, meaning that 
compliance is not required. More crucially, the 
different instruments may not necessarily be aligned, 
as they are designed opportunistically to respond 
to a particular challenge such as conflict minerals, 
without consultation with other stakeholders. So, 
one instrument, while advancing the interest of one 
stakeholder, may harm another stakeholder. For 
instance, as discussed earlier, the enactment of the 
Dodd-Frank law, while satisfying the consumers’ 
interest in conflict mineral-free supply chains, it saw 
manufacturers shying away from ASM sources in 
DRC which served to impoverish people dependent 
on ASM and also escalate the violence driven by 
these supply chains (Atanasijevic, 2016).
As discussed also in chapter 6, the traditional 
governance challenges are being compounded. 
For instance, the financialization of commodities 
has decoupled commodity price formation from 
supply and demand dynamics, thus exposing 
producer countries further to external shocks and 
macroeconomic instability arising out of commodity 
price fluctuations. 
Therefore, effective governance of extractive 
resources so that they can deliver the sustainable 
development promise remains a challenge. There 
is a clear need for a better governance framework. 
Chapter 9 discussed the key perquisites for such a 
governance framework as:
i. the need for a more holistic framework;
ii. the need to decouple economic growth from 
environmental and social impacts;
iii.  the need to respect human rights;
iv.  the need for greater engagement with home 
countries; 
v.  the need for responsible business practices;
vi.  the need to balance security of supply 
concerns with sustainable development 
aspirations; and
vii.  the need for data information and knowledge.
Towards a multi-level, holistic and integrated governance framework
265 
In essence, a new framework that makes the delivery 
of sustainable development as the basic minimum 
for mining activities is required. 
10.2. Towards a multi-level, holistic and 
integrated governance framework
As indicated earlier, there have been significant 
efforts in developing instruments to address 
governance gaps in the extractive sector. However, 
most existing policy frameworks and instruments 
for governing the mining sector tend to be sectorial 
in nature and narrow in scope. Fundamentally, 
the explosion of governance approaches and 
instruments have not succeeded in promoting 
shared benefits, transformational change and 
bringing about a transition away from the 
‘extractivist’ and anthropocentric model widely 
prevalent in the developing world, whereby the 
extractive sector is an enclave with few linkages to 
the local economy135To achieve this, sustainable 
development approaches would need to be adopted 
based on new integrated metrics: the quadruple 
bottom line approach, where success is measured 
on the strength of economic outcomes, sound 
environmental management, the respect for 
social values and aspirations of a diverse group of 
stakeholders, and the observance of the highest 
governance and transparency standards. 
In order to articulate a broader and more 
collaborative agenda for the mining industry and 
align it more closely to the Sustainable Development 
135  ‘Extractivism’ is defined as “those activities which 
remove large quantities of natural resources that are 
not processed (or processed only to a limited degree), 
especially for export” (Acosta, 2013b, p. 62). A legacy that 
remains since colonial times, the extractivist mode of 
accumulation refers to the exploitation of raw materials 
needed primarily to fuel the development and growth of 
industrialised and emerging nations. It typically generates 
few benefits for the host country due to the resulting limited 
demand for domestic labour, goods and services; lack of 
value addition and linkages to the rest of the economy; 
depletion of finite resources; environmental destruction; 
and incentives for ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour which 
undermine effective and democratic governance. [Acosta 
A (2013b) Extractivism and Neoextractivism: Two Sides 
of the Same Curse, in Beyond Development: Alternative 
Visions from Latin America, ed. M. Lang and D. Mokrani. 6: 
1–86, Quito: Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and Amsterdam: 
Transnational Institute. https://www.tni.org/files/download/
beyonddevelopment_extractivism.pdf].
objectives, this report calls for a new model of 
governance to support the contribution of the 
sector towards the achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) and other international 
policy commitments. It argues for moving away 
from the amorphous and metaphorical nature of 
the Social License to Operate and the sectorial and 
one-dimensional nature of existing governance 
instruments. Instead, a much more holistic, 
integrated and inclusive governance approach 
should be adopted, premised on the need for positive 
economic, social and environmental outcomes, and 
appropriate governance mechanisms to achieve 
these. This framework is termed a “Sustainable 
Development Licence to Operate (SDLO)” and is 
applicable to governments, companies and the range 
of other stakeholders involved in the mining sector.  
Table 10.1 illustrates the difference between the 
existing orientation driven by SLO and the proposed 
SDLO framework.
[...] effective governance 
of extractive resources so 
that they can deliver the 
sustainable development 
promise remains a challenge 
[...]n order to articulate 
a broader and more 
collaborative agenda for 
the mining industry and 
align it more closely to the 
Sustainable Development 
objectives, this report 
calls for a new model of 
governance to support the 
contribution of the sector 
towards the achievement of 
the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs) and other 
international policy 
commitments. 
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The Sustainable Development Licence to Operate 
(SDLO) attempts to address both the inadequacy of 
the existing governance landscape and instruments 
for mining and the need to translate the complex 
array of post-2015 global commitments into a 
manageable set of principles and requirements 
that can be used by relevant stakeholders involved 
in extractive sector governance.  It situates mining 
within broader development objectives in recognition 
of its propulsive capacity to promote growth and 
industrial development, when well managed (UNECA 
and African Union, 2011). The SDLO advocates 
for fairer deals, equal share of benefits among 
stakeholders and a concerted consolidation of 
existing instruments and initiatives pertaining 
to the mining sector. This requires clarity on the 
pathways to shared views, greater alignment on 
what constitutes value and benefits, reducing 
inconsistencies and contradictions in goals and 
objectives of existing instruments and initiatives, 
and identifying commonalities and inter-linkages 
among them, with the view to, ultimately, ensuring 
greater alignment with the SDGs. This could result 
in a better understanding of the pathways to 
the SDGs; reduction of conflicts and grievances; 
greater simplification, clarity and a hierarchy of 
hard (mandatory) to soft policy and regulatory 
instruments, thus enabling greater understanding 
of the pathways to the SDGs; and the emergence 
of new integrated solutions and improvements in 
global and local development practice. If mining is to 
deliver sustainable development, then SDLO seeks to 
provide guidance on how to achieve this through an 
illustrative set of principles and policy options.
10.3. Operationalizing SDLO – key design 
principles and policy options
The contours of what constitutes the SDLO are still 
being defined and its supporting Theory of Change136 
136  A Theory of Change is a “results chain” which 
describes and illustrates “how and why a desired change 
is expected to occur under specific circumstances. It links 
what an organization does and how its activities lead to 
the desired goals. This requires first the identification of 
the goals and the steps that needed to achieve change. 
Through backward mapping it lists all the conditions and 
enablers that must be in place (and how these related to 
another casually) for the change to occur or the goals to be 
achieved”. http://www.theoryofchange.org/what-is-theory-
of-change/.
equally so. As indicated in Table 10.1 above and in 
the preceding discussions, the foundations of the 
SDLO lie in the unequivocal recognition of planetary 
boundaries and on the need to secure a lasting 
alignment of what constitutes value and benefits 
to stakeholders in host and home countries and 
deliver a fair share of the benefits to all. The SDLO 
framework is based on some key design principles 
to ensure that it is holistic and proactive in delivering 
the promise of extractive resources in enhancing 
sustainable development. The key principles and the 
policy implications are discussed below.
a) Alignment to national development plans and 
policy coherence grounded on robust laws and 
regulations
SDLO is not a substitute for laws and regulations but 
makes a strong case for ensuring that the policies, 
laws and regulations in the extractive sector respond 
to shared visions (e.g. Country Mining Visions) 
and are fully aligned with national development 
plans and aspirations as well as with other sectoral 
policies (e.g. industrial and trade policies, science 
and technology; and education policies) in a 
holistic and coherent manner (Pedro, 2016). This is 
important for maintaining a coherent strategy for the 
mining sector and the broader economy and thus 
contributing to the achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals.
The SDLO proposes governing extractive activities 
through robust and detailed laws and regulations 
as a means of limiting reliance on non-transparent 
negotiation of extensive and complex individual 
mining contracts. It seeks to standardize contracting 
laws through a generalized legislative framework 
that includes standardized forms that recognize 
that these aspects are related to the nature of 
the specific minerals, the level of knowledge of 
their occurrence, and the current capacity to 
manage their extraction in a manner that aligns 
with sustainable development. Unlike the award of 
petroleum exploration rights which is done through 
competitive tenders, the award of mining licenses 
in most jurisdictions is done on a first-come-first-
served basis and through other discretionary 
procedures. However, the use of auctioning (in the 
solid mineral sector) to achieve host country specific 
policy objectives have been advocated in specific 
contexts, namely in areas with very good geological 
information and knowledge of the mineral potential, 
when the costs associated with implementing an 
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Table 10.1. Social Licence to Operate vs Sustainable Development Licence to Operate 
Dimension SLO SDLO
Community 
targeted to grant 
licence
Local community • Local + National + Global Community




Risk management (mainly 
to avoid conflict and 
reputation damage).
• Clear and explicit recognition of planetary boundaries and need to 
decouple natural resource use, environmental and social impacts 
from economic growth, in a projected scenario of increased 
resource intensity till 2050. 
Issues Covered Highly dynamic and fluid. 
Defined by location and 
“community” demands. 
Highly opportunistic in 
issues addressed.
• Defined by a quadruple-bottom line approach and all the four 
dimensions of the sustainable development discourse, namely 
environment, social, economic and governance/transparency. 
Relatively unchanging though contextualized at local levels.
Basis of 
relationship
Trust, Leap-of-faith, threat 
of reputational damage.
• Quest to align views on what constitutes value and benefits; laid 
down agreements on sustainable development; and recognition 
that achieving sustainable development in the extractive sector 
is a joint responsible of several stakeholders in host and home 
countries. 
Areas covered Intangible. Based on 
unwritten expectations that 
evolve as needs change 
or community awareness 
rises.
• Based on well-known and agreed upon development goals, 
country mining visions (CMVs) and identified set of priorities 
resulting from credible multi-stakeholder consultative processes. 
Spatial coverage Local project level and to 
some extent governance of 
particular value chains.
• Global, local, macro, meso and micro as issues are interlinked 
through complex dynamics. Global, standards inform best 
practices for mining companies, governments, financiers, 
development partners, CSOs and all stakeholders.
Role of national 
government
Develop the local regulatory 
context with which SLO is 
granted.
• Define broad national development goals which mining activities 
must be aligned to;
• Formulate, CMVs, where relevant;
• Domestic international governance instruments (standards, 
codes,) in national legal and regulatory frameworks;
• Foster domestic accountability and appetite for good governance;
• Commit to judicious use of rents generated to support broad 
development goals and in particular shift mining from enclave 
production model to a model tied to local industry through local 
participation and local content;






Passive role of acquiescing 
in mining on promise of 
social safeguards.
• Ability to collaborate in local development planning, and 
negotiating tradeoffs between environmental, economic and 
social issues arising from mining operations.
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Little role though some 
international agreements on 
environment can translate to 
redefine SLO.
• Define the development goals, environmental and other standards 
that at the minimum must be met irrespective of national laws;
• Work towards the establishment of an interventional convention 
on extractives;
• Use G7, G20 and other global fora to foster dialogue and secure 
global/regional/bilateral agreements and actions on relevant 
extractive industry issues.
Home country Opportunistic, mainly 
responding to public 
concerns and pressure from 
activist e.g. need to curb 
trade in conflict minerals
• Develop regulatory context that defines what companies can do 
abroad;
• Take a proactive stand in balancing the need for their security of 
supply and the need for mining to deliver sustainable development 
in the host country, i.e. be a reliable partner in delivering SDGs.
Mining companies Manage risk of conflict and 
reputation damage
• Commit to sustainable development principle and partner with 
governments and other development partners in delivering this;
• Commit to responsible business practices.
Source: Authors’ analysis
auction process can be justified and the probability 
of securing a large enough number of interested 
participants is high (UNECA, 2011: 206-210). In 
such cases, it is particularly important to clarify 
the government policy objectives well in advance 
of the auction and make the information publicly 
available to all interested parties. In addition, the 
biddable factors need to be clearly articulated and 
the assessment criteria must be objective. The 
biddable factors can include level of resource rent 
tax, capacity to promote infrastructure investment 
for multiple use, degree of mining linkages and 
value addition, extent of local content, training 
opportunities, to name a few. Capacity to administer 
the auctioning process with transparency must not 
be in doubt.
Figure 10.1 gives an overview of the available 
options in specific contexts. The decision flowchart 
shows the parameters to be considered in making 
the decision to award mineral rights on an open 
access basis or via a tender award. It also displays 
options to be considered with regard to mining 
infrastructure development.
Mining can be a generator for national socio-
economic growth through planned investment of 
royalties and other mining revenues; it can also be 
an “engine of growth” for the economy, by facilitating 
and incentivizing the development of downstream 
value addition in metal making and manufacturing. 
Nations at different stages of development need to 
arrive at an optimum mix of the two approaches by 
appropriately devising the mineral development and 
regulation framework to address their needs. 
b) Systems thinking – integrated natural resource 
management and decoupling natural resource use, 
environmental and social impacts from economic 
growth 
As discussed in Chapter 5, extractive industries 
place large demands on natural resources such as 
land and water. Its activities can lead to polluting 
water resources, biodiversity loss and ecosystem 
destruction including land degradation and 
desertification. Therefore, there is a need to look 
at the dynamic relationships between mining, and 
land and water. This calls for a systems-thinking 
approach that accounts for the nexus between 
resources so as to steer policy efforts towards 
integrated natural resource management along the 
mining value chain.
 
Operationalizing SDLO – key design principles and policy options
269 
Figure 10.1. Decision flowchart for determining type of granting method to use
Source: Extracted from “Mineral Resource Tenders and Mining Infrastructure Projects: Guiding Principles”; By Michael Stanley 








Consider PPP option 














Is there sufficient geodata 






• other mines in the area
• alternative commercial 
activities (agriculture, 
forestry, light industry)
Government should maintain an 
option for future third-party 
use in the agreement with the 
investor
Likely an independent project with 
conditionality and obligations 
specified in the related mining 
auction documents
Can be a separate infrastructure 
package but with conditionality 
specified in the related mining 
auction
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Government policies need to continue to require 
the incorporation of environmental protection 
and reduction of the energy intensity of mining 
operations from the outset of the mining process in 
order to address the challenges of climate change, 
water stress and pollution, and loss of biodiversity. 
In this context, strategic environmental impact 
assessments and integrated spatial planning or 
landscape planning are crucial to ensuring that 
a mining project effectively contributes to local 
and national development and environmental 
sustainability. These instruments help protect local 
habitats, manage forests and water resources 
more sustainably, arbitrate between conflicting land 
use options and reduce poverty and improve the 
livelihoods of local communities (WEF, 2016).
Special attention should also be paid to better 
understanding and managing of the environmental 
and other impacts of mining in resource corridors 
(Adam Smith International, 2015)137  pristine 
and fragile environments, including biodiversity 
conservation areas and deep-sea beds. 
In addition to policy regulation, voluntary initiatives 
such as the Equator Principles can serve as 
reference frameworks for investors to mainstream 
standards of good practice and manage 
environmental and social risks in their projects 
and business models. As proposed in the previous 
chapter, consideration should be also given to the 
formulation and adoption of ‘UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and the Environment’ in a similar 
fashion to the existing UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (see Box 9.5). 
Efforts to mainstream natural resource accounting 
and new mineral resource assessments should 
be scaled up. Current assessments are rather 
narrow in scope for they are based on technical 
and economic variables without due account to 
other considerations including the need to decouple 
natural resource use, environmental and social 
impacts from economic growth. 
137  Adam Smith International defines resource corridors 
as a mine, oil or gas field (the anchor project) connected 
for export purposes to a gateway such as a seaport 
through a dedicated network of roads, railways or pipelines, 
supported by power and water supply networks.
c) Multi-level approach
The SDLO recognizes the links and divergence of 
interests between the different stakeholders across 
the global mineral value chains and how their actions 
or lack thereof can contribute or undermine the 
overall governance in the sector. A global multi-
level governance architecture will therefore need to 
address not only an agenda for resource security, 
resource efficiency and decoupling of resource use, 
environmental and social impacts from economic 
growth that is of particular importance to developed 
nations, but also the need for continuous economic 
development, structural transformation and 
economic diversification in resource exporting and 
other developing countries. The SDLO framework 
thus seeks to integrate local, national and 
international governance issues.
Local level (downstream value chain)
At the local level, the key policy considerations that 
need to be part of the framework include:
• people come first and therefore local people and in 
particular the indigenous people should be at the 
centre of decision making and should be making 
informed policy choices regarding activities on 
their lands and their human rights must never be 
violated;
• the need to protect the local environment 
and mitigate the negative impact of mining 
activities and this should be in line with national 
and international guidelines especially those 
clearly articulated in Multilateral Environment 
Agreements (MEAs);
• mine closure and rehabilitation of mine sites (post-
mining) policies should be in place from the onset 
and revised on a regular basis in full consultation 
with local communities through iterative dialogues 
that enable better management of tradeoff 
between environmental and social issues with a 
bias towards sustainable development;
• there is need to pay attention to the social impacts 
of mining and mitigating these - the proper 
approach should be driven by an Avoid, Mitigate, 
Restore principle,138
138  Avoid - Avoid creating impacts from the outset; 
Mitigate - measures taken to reduce the duration, intensity 
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• local development should seek to move away 
from charity driven Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) activities to exploring how people and 
local businesses can be more involved through 
inclusive business models139  such as enhancing 
the capacity of local suppliers to enable them to 
enter the procurement value chain and supply 
relevant goods and services (an example is 
Newmont’s Gold Ahafo Links program discussed 
in Box 6.2); 
• access to information and data to facilitate 
participation in project preparation and decision 
making should be granted in formats and 
language that can be understood by local people, 
in line with internationally agreed principles (e.g. 
Aarhaus Convention); and
• greater efforts should be made to empower 
communities to better use and consume as well 
as engage mining companies, local and national 
governments, international CSOs and other 
development partners including home countries 
so that actions taken on behalf of them are 
informed.
National level (policy value chain)
Interventions at the national level are equally 
important to improve the contribution of mining to 
sustainable development. National governments 
thus have a critical role to play in managing 
the sector, including awarding exploration and 
ownership rights; fashioning mineral concession 
agreements that ensure mining companies mine 
responsibly, contribute to the realisation of national 
development goals and aspirations (UNECA and 
African Union, 2011: 206-210); mainstreaming 
strategic environmental assessments and 
domesticating natural capital accounting, adequately 
incorporating social and environmental assessments 
in national and local development plans; designing 
and / or extent of impacts that cannot be completely 
avoided; Restore - measures taken to rehabilitate or restore 
ecosystems following exposure to impacts that cannot be 
completely avoided.
139  Inclusive business models (IB models) are intended 
to circumvent existing market failures and inefficiencies to 
successfully integrate the poor, either on the demand side 
as clients or on the supply side as distributors, suppliers 
of goods and services, or employees. An example is 
Newmont’s Gold Ahafo Links program discussed in Box 6.2
effective fiscal regimes; ensuring transparency and 
accountability; and channelling extractive rents into 
national and local public investment for broad-based 
development and inclusive growth. 
The full realization 
of the propulsive 
potential of the 
extractive industry 
as an engine for 
growth and structural 
transformation requires 
breaking away from 
the enclave nature 
and extractivist model 
prevalent in many 
jurisdictions.
The full realization of the propulsive potential of 
the extractive industry as an engine for growth and 
structural transformation requires breaking away 
from the enclave nature and extractivist model 
prevalent in many jurisdictions.
The Africa Mining Vision (AMV) presents one such 
comprehensive governance framework that extends 
beyond the narrow confines of the mining sector. 
The AMV seeks to integrate mining into industrial 
and trade policy and to extricate Africa from its 
historical role as an exporter of raw-materials 
to become a manufacturer and supplier of 
knowledge-based goods and services. It espouses 
a developmental approach meant to break mining 
enclaves by fostering economic and social linkages 
between the extractive sector and other sectors 
of the local economy, promoting resource-based 
industrialisation and economic diversification, 
developing socio-economic infrastructure for 
broader use and accelerating regional integration 
(African Union, 2009). The AMV Action Plan, which 
is structured around programme clusters, specific 
goals, outcomes and activities, was developed 
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in 2011 for the practical application of the vision 
for the continent. It is supported by a Country 
Mining Vision Guidebook aimed at facilitating the 
domestication of the AMV at the country level 
through multi-stakeholder consultations leading to 
the formulation of a shared vision, agreed objectives, 
clear accountability and joint responsibility on how 
the extractive sector can contribute to broad-based 
development and structural transformation of their 
respective countries (UNECA, 2014; UNSDN, 2014; 
Pedro, 2016).
The extractive policy value chain discussed in 
section 7.2 provided a further framework for 
countries to translate mineral wealth into sustainable 
development.
Home country level (downstream value chain)
Security of supply and protection of investments will 
remain central for home countries. This is perhaps 
where much revolution is needed as home states 
have much more power over domiciled mining 
companies and thus can mediate the significant 
power asymmetry between mining companies 
and host countries. Home countries are also 
key to affording developing countries sufficient 
policy space to achieve structural transformation 
and economic diversification (including through 
reform of the international trade and investment 
regimes that constrains the use of the full range 
of policy instruments to achieve resource-based 
industrialisation (RBI) at the local level) (Acosta, 
2013b; UNECA &  African Union, 2011). Creating 
jobs in developing countries is becoming a pressing 
necessity as a means to stemming increasing 
migratory flows to the West140. RBI offers an 
opportunity to achieve this goal given the superior 
job elasticity of the manufacturing sector as 
compared to the primary sector. The following 
actions will be needed:
• increased policy coherence for development 
between home countries and host countries’ 
policies (STRADE, 2017);
• better internal alignment of home countries’ 
development and cooperation strategies and 
coordination of their activities (STRADE, 2017);
140  See EU External Investment Plan, https://ec.europa.eu/
europeaid/eu-external-investment-plan-factsheet_en
• effective support to linkages development, the 
establishment of joint ventures, national suppliers’ 
development programmes and promotion of 
local entrepreneurship, capacity building and 
strengthening of R&D institutions (STRADE 2016; 
STRADE 2017; STRADE 2018);
• better regulation of activities of trans-national 
corporations (TNCs) to mitigate the power over 
host countries;
• making international investment laws fairer, 
especially reducing the over-protection of 
investors, including through increased recognition 
of local laws in handling disputes between 
investors and host countries;
• effective actions towards balanced and more 
durable contracts141 (OECD, 2018) tackling 
illicit financial flows, combating commodity 
price volatility and ensuring a fair deal for host 
countries through, amongst others, international 
transparency and accountability initiatives, as well 
as regulation of tax havens;
• greater attention to regulation of commodity 
trading hubs to ensure fairness in trading; and 
• better regulation of the financial sector to reduce 
the volatility that is being caused by increased 
financialization of commodities.
International level
The international community also has a crucial role 
in closing governance gaps. Already guidelines such 
as the UN Global Compact on Human Rights define 
the limits of acceptable behaviour, while various 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) are 
crucial in managing and mitigating environmental 
impacts. Global policy action is needed for setting 
global standards in the form of rules and regulations, 
voluntary instruments and reporting obligations in 
141  The OECD has produced an advanced draft of eight 
(8) Guiding Principles for Durable Extractive Contracts for 
public comment. The 8 principles are: (i) contracts must 
be aligned with long-term visions and strategies defined 
by the host government; (ii) contracts should be anchored 
in transparent and quality long-term relationships and 
partnerships between host governments, investors and 
communities; (iii) There should be a balance between the 
legitimate interests of host governments, investors and 
communities, including indigenous peoples where relevant: 
(iv) contracts should maximize overall value, including 
economic, social and environmental outcomes; (v
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areas that include:
• coordination of mining policies and instruments 
and agreement on international mining standards 
(including pressurizing transnational corporations 
(TNCs) to disclose information and adhere to 
global codes of conduct, and ensuring host 
countries receive a fair deal);
• influencing incentives and behaviour (e.g. 
eco-labelling of metals);
• technology transfer; and
• financial regulation (to regulate the financialisation 
of commodities and to curtail illicit financial 
transactions, transfer-pricing abuse, use of 
tax havens and other tax evasion or avoidance 
techniques).
It should be recognized that a number of proposals 
have been put forward for improving the governance 
of resources (including mineral resources) at the 
global level in support of sustainable development. 
These range from the creation of extended 
sustainable commodity agreements, to an 
International Convention on Sustainable Resource 
Management, an Integrated Resource Management 
Agency, and an international metals covenant (Ekins 
& O’Keefe, 2014; Bleischwitz & Bringezu, 2007; 
Bleischwitz et al., 2012); Wilts & Bleischwitz, 2012). 
Proposals for such global governance regimes 
for sustainable resource management should 
complement other related arrangements in the 
mining sector, and aim to promote mineral resource 
sufficiency and security of access, the decoupling 
of mineral resource use, environmental and social 
impacts from economic growth, and the contribution 
of mineral resources to the achievement of the 
Sustainable Development Goals.
Mining companies
Under the SDLO framework, mining companies are 
expected to operate responsibly including through 
better alignment of their work with national visons 
and development plans; respect human rights; 
contribute to the decoupling of natural resource use, 
environmental and social impacts from economic 
growth, including by reducing the energy intensity 
of their activities; proactively disclose information; 
producing integrated social and environmental 
impact assessments; participating in local area 
assessments and local area development plans,  
remediation of environmental damages and in 
particular making adequate plans for mine closure 
and rehabilitation; paying a fair share of taxes and 
royalties; trade their commodities fairly; and not 
engaging in corrupt and other illegal, criminal or illicit 
practices. 
Under the SDLO 
framework, mining 
companies are expected 
to operate responsibly 
including through better 
alignment of their work 
with national visons 
and development 
plans; respect human 
rights; contribute to 
the decoupling of 
natural resource use, 
environmental and 
social impacts from 
economic growth.
Local communities and civil society
Civil society organisations and local communities 
affected by the mining process can play 
an important role in the agreement on and 
implementation of mining practices and policies, 
including by exerting social pressure and shaping 
public opinion to ensure mining companies operate 
responsibly. 
a) Multi-stakeholder approach, 
Decisions concerning the mining industry are 
made with the involvement of all stakeholders. All 
relevant actors should be included through, amongst 
others, information exchange, media campaigns, 
and collaboration with institutions such as those 
with oversight roles. A community-orientated, 
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context-sensitive approach to engagement requires 
in-depth knowledge of local culture, circumstances 
and power dynamics, alongside a sophisticated 
approach to engaging diverse voices (including 
alternative and marginalised voices) within affected 
communities (Owen & Kemp, 2013). It is thereby 
important that industry engages in broad-based 
collaborative social dialogue regarding each mining 
project. In doing so, it needs to articulate an agenda 
which balances its own commercial needs with 
managing and meeting broader expectations 
about the contribution of mining to sustainable 
development (Ibid).
b) Transparency and accountability
A new governance approach must recognize that 
although appropriate legal, regulatory, and voluntary 
frameworks and instruments may, to a large extent, 
already be in place to govern the mining sector, the 
problem is all too often the uneven or outright lack 
of their enforcement, usually the result of a lack of 
technical and management capacity caused by low 
priority accorded by governments to these essential 
housekeeping tasks. In order to implement laws and 
policies governing the mining sector, technical and 
management capacity is an essential, even if not 
a sufficient, prerequisite. Strengthening domestic 
accountability is also equally important.
The key to all players at all levels being effective is 
access to information across the whole mining value 
chain. Information on contracts and licences, social 
and environmental impacts assessments, royalties 
and tax payments, revenues and expenditures 
should be easily accessible. Transparency helps 
share pubic auditors’ burden with others actors such 
as unions, civil society organizations, researchers 
and other stakeholders who can play an important 
role in analyzing data, reporting on findings and 
thus demanding on accountability across all levels. 
Transparency is also crucial to help combat ills 
associated with transfer mispricing and other forms 
of illicit financial flows.
c) Flexibility: ability to leverage existing instruments 
and also incorporate new instruments as needs arise
A plethora of instruments have been proposed 
and applied to improve governance with various 
degrees of success. At the same time, there has 
been exasperation with respect to the growing list of 
instruments. Actors are at a loss at what instrument 
to apply when and where.  The SDLO should not 
be considered as a new instrument but rather a 
framework that articulates governance issues 
across the whole mineral value-chain and assigns 
responsibilities to various parties. The fact is that no 
one instrument can be able to govern a mineral value 
chain from local level to consumer level as actors 
change and regulators also change in the globalized 
supply chains. The key is to ensure that instruments 
governing a particular value chain interact with, 
and do not contradict, one another. The SDLO 
evolving Theory of Change and outcome framework 
(Harries et al., 2014) achieves this by first making 
sure that the overall goal to achieve is sustainable 
development. It assumes that this goal is shared by 
all stakeholders in the value chain. Second, it notes 
the importance of identifying and clarifying how the 
instruments and related activities are related to each 
other casually for the goal to be achieved, equally 
ensuring that the instrument can be plugged into a 
larger framework in a transparent way142.By clarifying 
the pathways and articulating at each level what 
needs to be done it points to where an instrument 
can be plugged in.
10.4. Operationalizing the SDLO
10.4.1. Three pathways
The principles discussed above capture what an 
effective SDLO framework should look like. What still 
needs to be articulated is how such a framework 
can be operationalized. There are several pathways, 
namely: (i) the SDLO can be operationalized through 
a global international agreement that commits 
countries to a governance framework much like 
SDGs commit countries to sustainable development; 
(ii) a second pathway can be a global platform for 
continued dialogue and advocacy on cross cutting 
issues; and (iii) another approach can be through the 
use of regional platforms to engage host and home 
regions so that issues of sustainable development 
and security of supply are reconciled through 








(i) An international agreement or convention on 
extractives
Mineral value chains are global, yet the key parties 
involved - the host country and the home countries 
- have very different objectives. The home countries 
want minerals to support development, while the 
home countries are chiefly concerned about security 
of supply. While these two goals need not be at 
odds, when pursued independently they can be. For 
example, concern for sustainable development can 
give rise to resource nationalism, while concern 
for security of supply can lead to promoting the 
interests of investors above those of the host 
countries, further reinforcing the imbalance of 
power between the mining companies and host 
countries. Achieving alignment between the two 
goals so that they reinforce each other rather than 
work in conflict could arguably best be achieved 
through an international agreement that recognizes 
and balances the interests of both host and home 
countries. An international agreement is also 
attractive as it can substitute the lack of capacity 
of host countries for managing mining activities or 
negotiate in equal terms with mining companies and 
also overcome vested interest in home countries.
There are a number of compelling reasons for this 
pathway in operationalizing SDLO:
• There has been a recent trend towards global 
agreement on matters relating to sustainable 
development. The agreement on SDGs, the Paris 
Climate Change Agreement and the Aichi Targets 
on Biodiversity point to a growing appetite for 
global agreements on sustainable development 
issues. 
• Further, matters that are pertinent to the extractive 
sector are gaining traction in the global agenda. 
In particular, curbing illicit financial flows has 
become a global priority and some agreements 
such as on exchange of information by tax 
authorities are already in place.
• Resolving some issues that are critical for 
enhancing the contribution of the extractive 
sector to sustainable development can best be 
achieved through international action. There 
is a need for better regulation of commodity 
markets to reduce volatility and also achieve 
fair commodity pricing, which is key to address 
both sustainable development concerns and 
security of supply fears. There is need for greater 
transparency across the whole mineral supply 
chain: data on mineral reserves, production costs, 
marketing of commodities and other activities of 
the sector should be available and made easy to 
understand. Achieving these will require action 
and coordination across countries to improve 
information flow and thus reduce uncertainty. This 
could be ensured through international protocols 
and standards for reporting. Perhaps one way 
would be to improve and consolidate current 
reporting instruments (such as RMI, GRI, and EITI) 
and adopt them as part of a global standard.
• The proper valuation of mineral resources and 
reserves is also crucial for securing investments 
and planning for mine development and 
construction. This requires better geological 
data and, improved modelling. Beyond valuation, 
there is a need for new accounting methods 
to cater for the fact that mining impacts on 
the delivery of biodiversity services. New 
accounting standards are needed. Developing 
these will require international efforts to agree 
on new methodologies and, further, international 
agreements will be required so that they can be 
mainstreamed.
• Meeting the agreed SDG and climate change 
targets will substantially raise demand for 
materials, especially technology minerals and 
development minerals. Therefore, international 
treaties such as the Paris Agreement will need 
to pay greater attention to material needs and 
mechanisms for ensuring any embedded targets 
can be met. This could be achieved via an 
international agreement on extractives.
• Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are skewed 
towards investors. BITs have often been used 
abusively by foreign investors that have been 
taking governments to court for imposing 
environmental and social protection mechanisms 
(Ali et al., 2018). There is need to move towards 
a fairer framework that is anchored on an 
international treaty.
Thus, there is a strong case for an international 
agreement pathway. However, international 
agreements can take a long time to be negotiated. 
Furthermore, the number of countries that produce 
minerals and those that use them as industrial 
inputs are just a subset of the global community 
– as opposed to climate change which directly 
concerns all countries – which could dampen the 
enthusiasm for a global agreement.
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Nevertheless, some of the issues that have a 
direct bearing on the extractive sector are already 
subject to international conventions such as the 
Minamata Convention on Mercury. A piecemeal but 
well thought out approach premised on a series 
of international agreements on various key issues 
could be the way forward.  MEAs could serve as 
the starting point of a process to better govern the 
extractive sector through international conventions. 
Another approach that has been proposed is to use 
public-private partnership to improve coordination. 
Ali et al. (2018) have proposed a Smart Mineral 
Enterprise Development (SMED) approach which 
entails a partnership between public and private 
entities to consider pathways whereby public 
sector data sharing on geology can be coupled 
with research innovations in the private sector 
both upstream and downstream of mineral supply. 
SMED processes aim to address key technological 
bottlenecks in mineral supply and demand. Core 
to the “smart” element of SMED is the system 
of communication between supply and demand 
centres as well as the research and development 
community. The timing of the signals between 
technological demand and supply constraints can be 
much better coordinated to induce entrepreneurial 
activity in a more proactive way than is usually 
the case in ad-hoc entrepreneurial systems. The 
SMED approach also considers environmental and 
social risk safeguards linked to capital markets and 
stock exchanges to ensure that a more sustainable 
outcome from junior high risk/high reward firms can 
also be maintained. This can be undertaken through 
existing certification schemes that ensure that 
environmental and social risks are not compromised 
in the rush to encourage entrepreneurship.
ii) A global platform for agenda setting, continued 
dialogue and agreement 
SDLO can also be operationalized via a global 
platform for agenda setting, continued dialogue 
and agreement on cross-cutting issues, especially 
reconciling security of supply issues with aspirations 
to promote resource-driven development.  Again, 
given the fact that only a subset of countries is 
involved in the mineral supply chains means that an 
appropriate platform should be one that brings both 
host and home countries together without involving 
too many other countries. 
The G20 platform, which has a balance of both, can 
be an appropriate forum as both issues of security 
of supply and issues of sustainable development 
are pertinent. The G20 platform does also take on 
board some agendas, for example, the G20 has 
adopted Compact With Africa (CWA) in March 2017 
with the aim of using G20’s political backing to push 
African governments, international organizations, 
and bilateral partners to prepare comprehensive, 
country-specific investment compacts to encourage 
private-sector investment. Central to the CWA is the 
concept of mutual commitments to implementing 
measures and developing instruments to improve 
the framework conditions for private investment, 
including in infrastructure. This will be through 
country specific-specific reform compacts between 
individual African countries and international 
organizations such as the African Development 
Bank, International Monetary Fund and World Bank 
Group (collectively, the IOs), and the G20 members. 
Ten African countries—Benin, Côte D’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, Rwanda, 
Senegal, and Tunisia—are part of the compact. 
Participating G20-AAG members were Canada, the 
European Union, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States of America.
Like the CWA, the agenda undertaken by such a 
platform to operationalize the SDLO should seek to 
be comprehensive and seek to commit both host 
countries and home countries to specific reforms.
The G20 global dialogue platform approach has 
the attraction that, like the CWA, it can encourage 
specific agreements between countries and thus can 
be tailored to specific minerals and also between 
the countries that use them and those that produce 
them. This can be easier to implement than blanket 
international agreements.
iii. Bilateral regional agreement between host and 
home regions
SDLO can also be operationalized at a regional level 
when the negation between regions can achieve 
a compact that balances the key concerns of the 
need for sustainable development and security of 
supply. This will require, as a first step, host and 
home regions developing regional strategies, and 
then using these as the basic building blocks for the 
SDLO framework. Africa through its African Mining 
Vision (see Box 1.2) and Europe through EU Raw 
Materials Initiative (RMI) (Box 9.10) have already put 
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in place a strategy for sustainable development and 
for security of supply, respectively. Building on these 
two initiatives, the EU and Africa could implement 
an SDLO framework reconciling concerns, resolving 
contradictions and closing governance gaps. 
A bilateral pact is probably more likely to deliver 
faster results as countries’ commitments are likely 
to be stronger given that the extractive strategy 
document being used is a component part of the 
national development plans. For instance, the AMV 
is cascaded to Country Mining Visions (CMVs) that 
then feed into national development plans, industrial 
policies and other sectoral interventions through 
model Mineral Development Agreements (MDAs)/
laws, local content, national suppliers’ development 
programmes, and local participation policies, among 
others. 
10.4.2. Partnership (Holistic Framework)
The SDLO is, in essence, a partnership between 
key stakeholders; that is, a holistic framework 
in the extractive value chain to ensure mining is 
performed sustainably, while meeting the twin goals 
of sustainable development for exporting countries 
(host countries) and also security of supply for 
importing countries (home countries) (Figure 10.2). 
The key stakeholders have shared responsibilities 
in delivering the key pre-requisites of mining 
governance. This is shown in Table 10.2.
The G20 platform [...] 
can be an appropriate 
forum as both issues of 
security of supply and 
issues of sustainable 
development are 
pertinent.
Figure 10.2. Framework of the Sustainable Development Licence to Operate
Source: Pedro et al. (2017).
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Table 10.2. Stakeholder’s responsibilities








• Conduct impact assessment
• Build capacity to engage 
mining companies and 
government
• National laws and institutions and coordination 
mechanisms that are in line with global best practices
• Independent mine closure laws to deal with future and 
legacy mine closures
• Independent impact assessment management and 
regulation laws
• New mineral resource assessment methodologies
• Standards for due diligence 
on environment
• Push for domestication of 
MEAs
• Standards for natural 
capital accounting




• Regulation of mining in 
commons
• International agreement 
on investor guidelines e.g. 
Equator Principles
• Articulate and adopt Avoid, 
Mitigate Restore principles
• Mandatory Sustainability 
reporting
• New mineral 
resource assessment 
methodologies
• Advocacy and 





The need to protect 
human rights
• Education and information 
on rights 
Empower local communities 
in advocacy
• Support structures to exercise 
rights e.g. legal support
• -Develop conflict resolution 
mechanisms
• Domesticate UN Guidance on human rights in local 
laws
• Standards for due diligence 
of human rights
• Push for domestication 
(implementation) on 
human rights agreements
• Agreements on 
extraterritorial duties of 
states in regards to human 
rights
• Commit to human rights 
e.g. sign on to global 
compact on human rights 
• Strengthen compliance 
systems and develop 
appropriate corporate 
structures to guarantee 
human rights
• Research and 
advocacy with 
special attention to 
indigenous peoples
The need for greater 
engagement of home 
countries
• Empower local communities 
to better engage home 
countries for supportive laws
• Build shared responsibility into contract agreements • Acknowledgement of 
shared responsibilities 
• Cooperation on tax 
compliance to curb illicit 
financial flows
• Responsible business 
practices/laws
• Formalizing shared 
responsibility in 
international agreements
• Adopt practices of home 
countries in host countries 
i.e. best practices rather 
than minimum acceptable
• Mapping of value 
chains and mapping 
of causality to better 
assign responsibility
The need for 
responsible business 
practices
• Shift from charity-driven CSR 
to Inclusive Business (IB)
models
• Make IB part of the contracting agreements • Adoption of sustainable 
business practice e.g. 
ICMM’s 10 principles
• More research on 
Inclusive IB models
• Advocacy on IB 
models
Security of Supply 
+ Sustainable 
development
• Promote sustainable 
management of raw 
materials
• Develop SDG targets at local 
level
• Development plans around 
SDGs targets.
• Articulate long-term development policy and role of 
extractive sector
• Enact local content and local participation policy
• Establish national supplier development programmes to 
build local suppliers’ capacity to enter the minerals value 
chain (especially procurement of goods and services).
• Develop SDG targets for industry
• Support good governance 
and transparency in mining 
deals
• Promote sound investment 
climate
• Link raw material imports 
to broad development 
support
• Fair trading regulation
• Better regulation of 
commodity financialization
• Commit government 
to sustainability as key 
pre-requisite for engaging 
in mineral supply chains
• International agreement on 
taxation 
• Adoption of sustainable 
business practice e.g. 
ICMM’s 10 principles
• Paying fair share of taxes
• Benchmarking of 
prices to curb transfer 
mispricing




companies on tax 
justice
The need for data and 
knowledge
• Avail data in local languages 
and also tools to make sense 
out of data
• Create platforms for 
regular interaction between 
community, mining company 
and government
• Adopt prior and informed 
consent policy 
• Commit to transparency e.g. EITI
• Adopt open data policy
• Create platforms and process for public participation e.g. 
WEF Mineral Value Management (MVM) framework
• Join global initiatives of sharing and exchange of tax 
data
• Perform due diligence on politically exposed individuals 
and also on trading and banking partners
• Mandatory sustainability 
reporting
• Mandatory reporting 
on financial flows and 
beneficial ownership
• International agreement on 
reporting of financial flows
• International agreement on 
sustainability reporting
• Commit to transparency 
e.g. EITI
• Develop industry guidelines 
on reporting financial flows
• Make sustainability 
reporting a requirement
• Research and 












• Conduct impact assessment
• Build capacity to engage 
mining companies and 
government
• National laws and institutions and coordination 
mechanisms that are in line with global best practices
• Independent mine closure laws to deal with future and 
legacy mine closures
• Independent impact assessment management and 
regulation laws
• New mineral resource assessment methodologies
• Standards for due diligence 
on environment
• Push for domestication of 
MEAs
• Standards for natural 
capital accounting




• Regulation of mining in 
commons
• International agreement 
on investor guidelines e.g. 
Equator Principles
• Articulate and adopt Avoid, 
Mitigate Restore principles
• Mandatory Sustainability 
reporting
• New mineral 
resource assessment 
methodologies
• Advocacy and 





The need to protect 
human rights
• Education and information 
on rights 
Empower local communities 
in advocacy
• Support structures to exercise 
rights e.g. legal support
• -Develop conflict resolution 
mechanisms
• Domesticate UN Guidance on human rights in local 
laws
• Standards for due diligence 
of human rights
• Push for domestication 
(implementation) on 
human rights agreements
• Agreements on 
extraterritorial duties of 
states in regards to human 
rights
• Commit to human rights 
e.g. sign on to global 
compact on human rights 
• Strengthen compliance 
systems and develop 
appropriate corporate 
structures to guarantee 
human rights
• Research and 
advocacy with 
special attention to 
indigenous peoples
The need for greater 
engagement of home 
countries
• Empower local communities 
to better engage home 
countries for supportive laws
• Build shared responsibility into contract agreements • Acknowledgement of 
shared responsibilities 
• Cooperation on tax 
compliance to curb illicit 
financial flows
• Responsible business 
practices/laws
• Formalizing shared 
responsibility in 
international agreements
• Adopt practices of home 
countries in host countries 
i.e. best practices rather 
than minimum acceptable
• Mapping of value 
chains and mapping 
of causality to better 
assign responsibility
The need for 
responsible business 
practices
• Shift from charity-driven CSR 
to Inclusive Business (IB)
models
• Make IB part of the contracting agreements • Adoption of sustainable 
business practice e.g. 
ICMM’s 10 principles
• More research on 
Inclusive IB models
• Advocacy on IB 
models
Security of Supply 
+ Sustainable 
development
• Promote sustainable 
management of raw 
materials
• Develop SDG targets at local 
level
• Development plans around 
SDGs targets.
• Articulate long-term development policy and role of 
extractive sector
• Enact local content and local participation policy
• Establish national supplier development programmes to 
build local suppliers’ capacity to enter the minerals value 
chain (especially procurement of goods and services).
• Develop SDG targets for industry
• Support good governance 
and transparency in mining 
deals
• Promote sound investment 
climate
• Link raw material imports 
to broad development 
support
• Fair trading regulation
• Better regulation of 
commodity financialization
• Commit government 
to sustainability as key 
pre-requisite for engaging 
in mineral supply chains
• International agreement on 
taxation 
• Adoption of sustainable 
business practice e.g. 
ICMM’s 10 principles
• Paying fair share of taxes
• Benchmarking of 
prices to curb transfer 
mispricing




companies on tax 
justice
The need for data and 
knowledge
• Avail data in local languages 
and also tools to make sense 
out of data
• Create platforms for 
regular interaction between 
community, mining company 
and government
• Adopt prior and informed 
consent policy 
• Commit to transparency e.g. EITI
• Adopt open data policy
• Create platforms and process for public participation e.g. 
WEF Mineral Value Management (MVM) framework
• Join global initiatives of sharing and exchange of tax 
data
• Perform due diligence on politically exposed individuals 
and also on trading and banking partners
• Mandatory sustainability 
reporting
• Mandatory reporting 
on financial flows and 
beneficial ownership
• International agreement on 
reporting of financial flows
• International agreement on 
sustainability reporting
• Commit to transparency 
e.g. EITI
• Develop industry guidelines 
on reporting financial flows
• Make sustainability 
reporting a requirement
• Research and 
analysis to increase 
transparency
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10.5. SDLO and the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs)
Since sustainable development is a key impetus 
for the SDLO, the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) offer appropriate goals and targets that 
the SDLO should seek to support. Indeed, if well 
managed, the mining sector can play a positive 
role in promoting broad-based development and 
structural transformation in relevant countries. 
This includes an important contribution to the 
implementation of all 17 Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs); and in particular to those relating 
to poverty eradication, decent work and economic 
growth, clean water and sanitation, life on land, 
sustainable and affordable energy, climate action, 
industry and infrastructure, as well as peace and 
justice (UNSDSN, CCSI, UNDP and WEF, 2015).
Mining generates significant revenues through taxes, 
royalties and dividends for governments to invest in 
economic and social development (Goal 1). 
Mining can help drive economic development and 
diversification through direct and indirect economic 
benefits, the development of new technologies and 
by spurring the construction of new infrastructure 
for transport, communications, water and energy 
(Goal 9). It can alter the lives of local communities, 
offering opportunities for jobs and training, while 
contributing to economic and social inequities, 
if not appropriately managed (Goal 8). However, 
mining requires access to land and water, presenting 
significant and broad landscape impacts that must 
be responsibly managed (Goals 6 and 15). Mining 
activities are also energy- and emissions- intensive 
in both the production and downstream uses of 
mining products (Goals 7 and 13). Finally, mining 
can contribute to conflict and violations of human 
rights (including rights of indigenous peoples), if 
representative decision-making of citizens and 
communities in extractives development is not 
observed (Goal 16) (UNSDSN, CCSI, UNDP and WEF, 
2015). 
A preliminary analysis of synergies and trade-offs 
between mining activities and delivery of all 169 
Targets of SDGs was undertaken for the purposes 
of this report.143 The analysis identified synergies 
between mining and 108 of the 169 (64%) SDG 
Targets, and trade-offs between mining and 54 of the 
169 (32%) SDG Targets. These can be categorized 
broadly into three key domains, where decisions 
about mining contribute to, or undermine, humanity’s 
ability to: 
• realise individual and collective aspirations for 
wealth and well-being; 
• build social and physical infrastructures for 
sustainable development; and 
• achieve sustainable management of the 
environment and natural resources. 
The dominant theme, as far as trade-offs are 
concerned, was the potential adverse impacts of 
mining on local communities, health, and the natural 
environment including ecosystems and biodiversity. 
The analysis highlights how mining is a foundation 
of social and economic development, and affects 
delivery of outcomes across all SDGs. It also 
highlights how it is not possible to develop the 
mining sector without understanding how it affects 
and depends on well-being, infrastructure and the 
environment. Figure 10.3 provides some principles 
that could be taken forward to advance the SDGs 
(Appendix 10 provides a detailed analysis of 
policy options under each of these eight identified 
principles).
There is a growing body of industry, government 
and civil society practices that focus on maximising 
synergies of mining with sustainable development, 
while minimising trade-offs; for example, guidance 
published by the International Council of Mining and 
Metals (ICMM). There is also a growing appetite for 
consolidation of instruments by mining companies.
143  Methodology—for each Target, a keyword search was 
undertaken for published evidence of synergies or trade-
offs between mining and delivery of that Target. No attempt 
was made to weight this evidence—the process simply 
identified whether evidence was readily identifiable or not. 
For this approach, absence of evidence is not evidence of 
absence of a synergy or trade-off between mining and the 
relevant Target.
SDLO and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
281 
Figure 10.3. Illustrative principles for sustainable development of the extractive sector
Source: Authors’ illustration
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Some key gaps exist in these documented practices 
as illuminated by mapping them against the SDGs 
and Targets. First, there is a relative paucity of 
documented best practices for value addition and 
innovation hubs built around mining activity. Second, 
gaps also exist for best practices for transnational 
cooperation to safeguard and stabilise international 
flows of mining products in accordance with 
sustainable development standards. Moreover, 
there is currently a notable absence of international 
agreements regulating trade flows of mineral raw 
materials other than the general trade liberalisation 
framework established under WTO agreements. 
The financialisation of commodities has made this 
task urgent. Third, gaps also exist in the case of 
best practices for collaboration between different 
government agencies to manage nexus issues 
associated with mining, with integrated resource 
planning efforts remaining in their infancy in most 
countries.  Although considerable progress has 
been made at a site-specific level to minimise 
the environmental impacts of mining – as 
demonstrated, for example, by the ongoing work by 
the International Union for Conservation of Nature 
and ICMM to develop good practice guidance for 
mining and biodiversity144– there are still gaps 
in knowledge and practice in the analysis and 
managing of the cumulative environmental impacts 
in mining districts.
These gaps represent key opportunity areas for 
innovation for relevant mining sector stakeholders. 
Some implications for the design of laws concerning 
mining include the following:
• Vertical silos and the prevalent mode of mining 
regulation need to be structurally transformed, 
so that they pay adequate attention to wellbeing, 
infrastructure and the environment. The 
complexity of relationships identified in this 
analysis challenges conventional structures and 
processes of decision-making in government and 
private entities. Mining development decision-
makers, and environmental permit issuers, need 
to collaborate with colleagues in other portfolios 
and vice-versa, supported by legal frameworks 
that empower and sustain such coordination. 
Landscape planning and strategic environmental 
144  See, e.g.: https://www.iucn.org/content/good-practice-
guidance-mining-and-biodiversity
assessments need to be mainstreamed.
• Legal frameworks need to provide mechanisms 
for progressive implementation of best practices 
for managing synergies and trade-offs between 
mining and sustainable development, including 
incentives for innovation in this context.
• There is potentially a case to be made at an 
international level for legal frameworks (such 
as treaties) designed to secure sustainable 
supply of raw materials—including through price 
stabilisation, capacity building support to host 
countries, and more coherent application of 
ethical, environmental and other standards relating 
to international trade in mining products. 145
• Legal frameworks need to establish a basis for 
developing and entrenching national and local 
visions of how mining can contribute towards 
sustainable development (Pedro, 2016; Pedro, 
2017). The Africa Mining Vision (Box 1.2) and 
its supporting Country Mining Vision Guidebook 
(UNECA, 2014; Pedro, 2016) for instance, 
provides such informative reference point. 
Such vision statements perform the function of 
establishing a collective view on the appropriate 
balance between mining and other activities 
that contribute to (or undermine) sustainable 
development.  
10.6. Conclusion
This chapter discussed the need for a shift from the 
piecemeal efforts aimed at building a governance 
framework for natural resources towards a more 
holistic approach that assigns responsibility to all 
actors in the mineral value chain. The framework 
named the Sustainable Development Licence to 
Operate (SDLO) seeks to ensure that mining realizes 
the promise of delivering sustainable development 
for host countries, without compromising the 
security of supply for home countries. The SDLO 
framework does not seek to replace existing 
instruments but rather provides a way of organizing 
them so that one can determine which governance 
gap a given instrument fills and thus create a more 
coherent governance landscape that makes it easier 
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for stakeholders to select a parsimonious set of 
instruments that fit a particular mineral value chain. 
The framework can also point to areas where new 
instruments might be needed and how a particular 
instrument will interact with others instruments.
The chapter also points to how the SDLO can 
drive sustainable development by linking the SDLO 
to SDGs.  It points to the principles and policies 
that will be needed to make mining an enabler of 
SDGs. Illustrative policy options for sustainable 
development of mining are shown in the appendix.
Appendix 10. Illustrative policy options for 
sustainable development of mining
The principles outlined above would need to be 
operationalised in a wide range of policy domains, 
by different actors from the public, private and third 
sector. A holistic and integrated implementation 
of SDLO principles would also need to extend 
across the entirety of mineral value chains—from 
licensing of mineral terrains, geological mapping, 
mineral exploration, mine development, mining, 
mineral processing and refining, ore transportation, 
manufacturing of end-use products, to recycling 
and mine closure. In order to take a first step 
towards identifying policy options for sustainable 
development of the extractive sector, the Working 
Group reviewed existing literature and organised 
identified options under the principles discussed in 
Section 10.6 above. Key policy options are illustrated 
in the figure below (Figure 10.4) and explained in 
more detail below. Most of the options presented 
are primarily relevant to actors in the public sector. 
However, several are relevant to all actors. 
The policy actions capable of delivering a transition 
to sustainable development in the extractive sector 
are highly dependent on the specific context and 
organisation in which they are implemented. A range 
of actions, implementation options and illustrative 
examples that elaborate on the summary in Figure 
10.4 are set out below. These represent only a 
starting point to defining the normative content of 
the SDLO. In several cases, the SDLO policy options 
incorporate, acknowledge and connect influential 
policy assessment initiatives and standards (such as 
the African Mining Vision and the Natural Resources 
Charter) that focus on specific subsets of the very 
broad range of issues relevant to implementing the 
17 SDGs and 169 Targets in the extractive sector. 
Figure 10.4. Illustrative policy options for sustainable development of the extractive sector
Source: Authors’ illustration
Health and well-being for all: 
- Impacts I benefits assessment
- Impact management measures
- Social and health accounting
- Protection mechanisms for
disadvantaged groups
- Targetted resource rent invest.
Growth and innovation: 
- Transparent and equitable
allocation of resource rents
- Value-addition related to mining
- Knowledge and skill transfer
and development
- Trade, price, investment
stability
Ecosystems and biodiversity: 
- Impacts I benefits assessment
- Impact management measures
- Ecosystem and biodiversity
accounting
- Investment in ecosystems and
their services
Impacts on other resources: 
- Impacts/ benefits assessment
- Impact management measures
- Integrated resource planning
- Environmental-economic
accounting
Better Infrastructure: Policy coherence: 
Engagement and collaboration: 




- Coordination along value chains
Transparency & accountability: 
- Disclosure and reporting
- Dispute resolution mechanisms
- Independent scrutiny of
decision-making







- Visions and strategies
Health, wealth and 
wellbeing for all 
I 
Maintain the environment 
and other resources 
0 
Good governance 
Sustainable Development Goals and associated Targets 
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A10.1. Health and well-being for all
The following policies, implementation options and illustrative examples should be considered as part of 
efforts to ensure that decisions about mining maximise, and do not compromise, health and well-being 
benefits for people, recognising the special circumstances of marginalised groups (including but not limited to 
indigenous peoples, ethnic minorities, women, children, and others):
Policy Implementation options Illustrative examples
Fair contracts • Embed equity considerations in contractual 
instruments and relationships relevant to 
mining.
• OECD Guiding Principles for Durable Extractive 
Contracts (Draft).148
• Impact and Benefits Agreements (IBAs). 149
Assess impacts 
and benefits of 
mining for health 
and well-being
• Require Social Impact Assessments (SIA) 
to be undertaken and taken into account 
for proposed mining activities. 150
• Couple SIAs with related assessments: 
health, occupational risk, human rights, 
and other well-being factors. 151
• Ensure policies in relevant countries are 
informed by Social Lifecycle Assessments 
of extractive sector value chains.
• Ensure policies in host countries 
are informed by Sector-Wide Impact 
Assessments (SWIA) of mining. 152 
• Ensure policies and practices are informed 
by agreed UN principles concerning health 
and well-being.
• Development regulations in Australian States for 
SIA, and accompanying Guidelines. 153
• IFC Performance Standard 1 on Assessment 
and Management of Environmental and Social 
Risks and Impacts. 154
• UNEP Guidelines for Social Lifecycle 
Assessment of Products. 155
• ICMM Guidance on Health Impact Assessment 
and Occupational Risk Assessment. 156
• EU Raw Materials Information System. 157
• Myanmar Centre for Responsible Business 
SWIA for Myanmar. 158
• International Labour Organisation Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at Work. 159
Manage health and 
well-being impacts 
of mining
• Establish agreements with affected 
stakeholders concerning the long-term 
management of impacts and benefits
• Ensure that a mitigation-hierarchy 
approaches (avoid, mitigate, restore) are 
applied by relevant decision-makers..
• Ensure use and appropriate resourcing for 
health and safety management systems.
• Ensure that decision-making is consistent 
with international agreements concerning 
pollution and human rights.
• Impact and benefit agreements in Canada. 160
• ICMM Guidance on Health Impact Assessment 
and Occupational Risk Assessment. 161
• IFC Performance Standard 1 on Assessment 
and Management of Environmental and Social 
Risks and Impacts. 162
• Minamata Convention on mercury and UN 
Environment Global Mercury Partnership.








• Implement relevant components of the 
international standards concerning health 
and well-being statistics and accounts.
• Monitor activities of mining companies 
against health and well-being criteria
• WHO International Classification of Functioning, 
Disability and Health (ICF).163






• Including but not limited to the groups 
acknowledged in the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development and international 
human rights instruments: women, 
children, the poor, indigenous peoples. 
• Recognise and protect formal and informal 
land rights of communities.
• Impact and benefit agreements in Canada. 165 
• BSR Recommendations for the Mining Sector 
on Women’s Economic Empowerment in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 166
• ICMM Good Practice Guide on Indigenous 
Peoples and Mining. 167
Targeted 
investment of 
resource rents to 
address health and 
wellbeing impacts 
of mining
• Ring-fence appropriate share of mining 
revenues for social and health purposes 
including poverty reduction (e.g. social and 
health management funds).
• Mining community development agreements.168 
• Conduct and compensation agreements. 169
Illustrative policy options for sustainable development of mining
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A10.2. Growth and innovation
The following policies, implementation options and illustrative examples should be considered as part of 
efforts to ensure that mining is managed in a manner that delivers long-term, equitable and inclusive economic 
growth, leveraging innovation and value-addition opportunities associated with the extractive sector.
Policy Implementation options Illustrative examples
Allocate resource 
rents on a transparent 
and equitable basis
• Ensure that mining development 
contracts between governments and 
the private sector are compatible with 
international best practice guidance.
• Establish an appropriate Mineral Rights 
Cadastre and secure land and mineral 
rights (including recognition of informal 
rights).
• Establish an appropriate framework for 
formalisation of artisanal and small-
scale mining.
• Ensure publication and tracing (both 
within countries and internationally) 
of financial flows associated with the 
extractive sector. 
• Natural Resource Charter and Benchmarking 
Framework.170
• OECD Guiding Principles for Durable Extractive 
Contacts.171 
• World Bank Guidance on Promoting Transparent 
Access to Mineral Resources. 172
• Financial Action Task Force Recommendations. 
173 
• Publish What You Pay. 174
• Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. 175
• Formalisation programmes for artisanal and 
small-scale mining. 176
• International Financial Reporting Standards for 
the extractive sector.





• Establish strategies and policies 
concerning: industrial clustering, mineral 
‘beneficiation’, in-country spending, 
procurement of local goods and 
services, and local participation through 
equity and management. 177
• Establish strategies and policies for 
improving standardisation and quality 
control of support sectors for mining. 
• Local procurement initiatives. 178
• Mining Shared Value. 179
• Mineral Beneficiation Policies in South Africa, and 
Indonesia, 180 and elsewhere. 
• Small grants and equipment leasing schemes 
(e.g. in Tanzania) through World Bank SMMRP 
project. 181
Establish knowledge 
and skill transfer 
incentives and 
requirements
• Establish strategies and policies 
concerning: employment and training 
(locality and sector-based); small 
and medium enterprise development 
connected with mining activities.
• Indigenous employment initiatives in Australia. 182 
• Local Content Legislation in Ghana. 183
• Capacity building partnerships: ACP–EU 




trade, price and 
investment stability
• Establish national strategies and policies 
for trade and price stabilisation in the 
extractive sector (e.g. subsidies, variable 
taxation, and other fiscal measures). 
• Establish national legal and policy 
frameworks to secure long-term and 
responsible investment in mining.
• Establish frameworks for International 
collaboration concerning stabilisation of 
international commodity trade relating to 
the extractive sector.
• Natural Resource Charter and Benchmarking 
Framework. 184
• Investor protections in host countries.
• Incentives and requirements for responsible 
investment applied by home and host countries: 
Responsible Mining of Cobalt; Equator Principles; 
Responsible Raw Materials Initiative; Initiative for 
Responsible Mining Assurance; etc.
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A10.3. Better infrastructure
The following policies, implementation options and illustrative examples should be considered as part of 
efforts to ensure that decisions about mining maximise the development of (and minimise impacts on) social 
and physical infrastructures that can be leveraged to support a wider range of development objectives.
Policy Implementation options Illustrative examples
Establish 
strategies and 
policies for shared 
use of mining 
infrastructure.
• Establish strategies and policies for 
post-closure land use planning.
• Establish strategies and policies for 
shared use of mining infrastructure.
• Reforestation of Sapphire mines in Madagascar. 185
• Beria Corridor in Mozambique, Lamu Port-South 
Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor. 186
• African Mining Vision
• Integrated Resource Corridors Initiative (IRCI) 
Scoping & Business Plan. 187
Establish incentives 
and requirements 
for investment in 
social (e.g. health, 
education, public 
institutions) and 
physical (e.g. roads, 
ports) infrastructure
• Establish strategies and policies for 
managing interactions between mining 
activities and infrastructure in other 
sectors.
• Establish incentives and requirements 
for extractive sector investment in 
wider development infrastructure for: 
health and well-being (see 10.5.1), 
ecosystems and biodiversity (10.5.4), 
and other resources (10.5.5). 
• National legislative reforms in ~90 countries 
focused on boosting investment 188
• Programme for Infrastructure Development in 
Africa (PIDA). 189
• A Framework to Approach Shared Use of Mining-
related Infrastructure. 190
• District Mineral Funds in India, funded by mineral 
royalties. 191
Aerial photo of gold mining in the rainforest, Guyana, South America. Photo: kakteen © Shutterstock 
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A10.4. Ecosystems and biodiversity
The following policies, implementation options and illustrative examples should be considered as part of 
efforts to ensure that decisions about mining maintain or enhance ecosystems and biodiversity, including 
associated flows of valuable ecosystem goods and services:
Policy Implementation options Illustrative examples
Assess impacts and 
benefits of mining 
on ecosystems and 
biodiversity
• Require Environmental Impact Assessments 
(EIA) to be undertaken and taken into account for 
proposed mining activities.
• Couple EIAs with related assessments: strategic 
environmental assessment (including sector-wide 
impacts), assessment of relevant transboundary 
impacts, and assessment of ecosystem service 
flows.
• UNECE Environmental Performance 
Review Programme.
• See also 10.5.5 below (impacts on 
other resources).
Manage impacts 
of mining on 
ecosystems and 
biodiversity
• Ensure policies and practices are informed by 
relevant multi-lateral agreements concerning 
ecosystems and biodiversity (in particular the 
Convention on Biological Diversity).192
• Ensure that mitigation-hierarchy approaches (avoid, 
mitigate, restore, offset) are applied by relevant 
decision-makers.
• Ensure use and appropriate resourcing for 
environmental management systems.
• Ring-fence appropriate share of mining revenues for 
ecosystem and biodiversity management.
• Biodiversity offsetting policies for 
mining.193
• Guidance on developing biodiversity 
offsets in Andean ecosystems. 194
• ICMM Good Practice Guidance for 
Mining and Biodiversity.195
• Responsible Jewellery Guidance on 
Biodiversity. 196 
• ISO 14001: Environmental 
Management.197





of mining on 
ecosystems and 
biodiversity
• Ensure that all relevant data is organised and 
communicated in a manner compatible with 
international accounting standards and best 
practice.
• World Bank WAVES Partnership, and 
work by UN Economic Commissions 
(e.g. UNESCAP) on natural capital 
accounting.199
• UN Framework for Development of 
Environment Statistics.200
• UN System of Environmental-
Economic Accounting (Ecosystem 
Accounts).201
• Natural Capital Protocol.202 
Incentivise and 
require investment 
in ecosystems and 
their services
• Identify and implement ecological and other 
‘greener’ alternatives to conventional built mining 
infrastructure.
• Establish payment schemes for ecosystem services 
(PES).
• WWF/AECOM Review of Screening 
Tools for Sustainability and 
Climate Resilience of Infrastructure 
Development.
• The Nature Conservancy 
Development by Design approach, 
and green infrastructure pilots. 203
• Global Environment Facility 
investments in PES schemes. 204
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A10.5. Impacts on other resources
The following policies, implementation options and illustrative examples should be considered as part of 
efforts to ensure that decisions about mining minimise or avoid adverse impacts on other valuable resources 
that underpin development (e.g. land, water, food, energy, climate, infrastructure).
Policy Implementation options Illustrative examples
Assess impacts and 
benefits of mining for 
other resources
• Require Environmental Impact 
Assessments (EIA) to be undertaken and 
taken into account for proposed mining 
activities.
• Couple EIAs with related assessments: 
strategic environmental assessment 
(including sector-wide impacts), 
assessment of relevant transboundary 
impacts, and assessment of resource 
implications of mining including supply 
and criticality assessments.
• IFC / CAC Advisory on Participatory Water 
Monitoring. 205
• UNECE Convention on Environmental Impact 
Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 
and Protocol on SEA.
• European Commission Supply Risk 
Assessment (EU, 2015), Yale Study on 
Materials Criticality, BGS Risk List, etc.
• WEF, Blueprints for a Greener Footprint: 
Sustainable Development at a Landscape 
Scale. 206
Manage impacts 
of mining on other 
resources
• Ensure that policies and practice are 
consistent with relevant international 
agreements on pollution.
• Ensure that policies and practice are 
informed by development objectives and 
risks in other key sectors (e.g. agriculture, 
tourism, urban development, energy). 
• Ensure that mitigation-hierarchy 
approaches (avoid, mitigate, restore, 
offset) are applied by relevant decision-
makers.
• Establish, as appropriate, alternative 
livelihood programmes for artisanal and 
small-scale miners.
• See 10.5.3 above for options concerning 
infrastructure management. 
• EU Raw Materials Initiative. 207 
• EU Natura2000 Guidance 
concerningextractive industries. 208 
• UNECE Best Practice Guidance on Effective 
Methane Drainage and Use in Coal Mines.
• Minamata Convention on mercury and UN 
Environment Global Mercury Partnership.
• UNECA Compendium on Best Practices in 
Small-scale Mining in Africa (ECA, 2002).
Establish and 
implement integrated 
plans for resource 
management
• Including implementation of relevant 
components of the UN Framework 
Classification for Resources.
• Nordic common subregional guidelines for 
applying UNFC to the minerals sector.
• UNECA and African Minerals Development 
Centre adoption of UNFC as part of efforts 
to implement the Africa Mining Vision and 
SDGs.
• Land use planning legal and policy 
frameworks in Australia, China, the EU, South 
Africa, Mexico, and elsewhere.209
• Land use planning legal and policy 
frameworks in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru.210
• Integrated Resource Corridors Initiative 




• Ensure that relevant data is organised and 
communicated in a manner compatible 
with international standards.
• The UN System of Environmental-Economic 
Accounting (SEEA). 
• Natural Capital Protocol.
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A10.6. Engagement and collaboration
The following policies, implementation options and illustrative examples should be considered as part of 
efforts to ensure that all relevant stakeholders are included and involved in decision-making about mining.
Policy Implementation options Illustrative examples
Establish stakeholder 
consultation 
processes to inform 
decision-making
• Establish policies and requirements 
for consultation with local 
communities.
• Establish policies and requirements 
for multi-stakeholder consultation 
on strategic / sector-wide issues.
• Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus 
Convention)





• Establish frameworks that bring 
actors together from multiple levels 
of governance (local, national, 
regional).
• Include diverse stakeholders from 
the public sector, private sector, 
civil society, local communities and 
others.
• Establish participatory governance 
frameworks that formalise artisanal 
and small-scale mining.
• Informing dialogue processes for artisanal and 
small-scale mining in Tanzania and elsewhere. 213
• Participatory land use planning in the United 
Kingdom.





• Including but not limited to the 
groups acknowledged in the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and international 
human rights instruments: women, 
children, the poor, indigenous 
peoples.
• Legal requirements concerning free prior and 
informed consent in Colombia. 214
• Legal protections for indigenous rights in the 






• Establish institutions and standards 
for coordinated value chain 
governance.
• See 10.5.2 above and 10.5.7 
below concerning value chain 
transparency.
• OECD Standards for Mineral Supply Chains.215 
• Ethical mineral schemes and standards: Better 
Gold Initiative (BGI), Fairtrade Gold, Fairmined 
Gold, Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi), and 
Diamond Development Standards (DDS), Conflict-
Free Gold Standard (CFGS).
• Other commodity-specific standards and 
programmes: Aluminium Stewardship Initiative; 
BetterCoal Code; Conflict Free Sourcing Initiative; 
Chinese Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible 
Mineral Supply Chains; Certified Trading Chains; 
Diamond Development Standard; Kimberly 
Process Certification Scheme; etc.
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A10.7. Transparency and accountability
The following policies, implementation options and illustrative examples are part of efforts to ensure that 
(1) decisions about mining are made in a transparent manner based on the best available evidence, and (2) 







and reporting of 
mining activities and 
impacts.
• Including social, economic 
and environmental impacts 
(broadly defined).
• Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.216
• The Mining Local Procurement Reporting Mechanism. 217 
• OECD Base Erosion and Profit-Sharing project (home 
countries).218
• Responsible Mining Index.219
• Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) G4 Mining and Metals 
Sector Disclosures.220
• EU Non-Financial Reporting Directive.221
• EU Directives concerning Transparency and Accounting.222 
Establish institutions 




• Ensure that disputes 
concerning the extractive 
sector are justiciable and 
subject to the rule of law.
• Establish mechanisms for 
alternative (non-judicial) 
dispute settlement.
• Where relevant, establish 
institutional frameworks for 
settlement of transboundary 
disputes concerning mining.
• Natural Resource Charter Benchmarking Framework.223 
• Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aarhus Convention).
Establish institutions 




• Including separation of 
regulatory and development 
functions within 
government, and corporate 
governance regulation.
• Natural Resource Charter and Benchmarking 
Framework.224 
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A10.8 Policy coherence
The following policies, implementation options and illustrative examples should be considered as part of 
efforts to ensure that decisions about mining are not made in isolation from decisions concerning other 
development issues.
Policy Implementation options Illustrative examples
Establish long-, medium- and 
short -term visions and strategies 
concerning mining and sustainable 
development
• Including nested visions and 
strategies and nested levels of scale 
(local, national, regional, and across 
value chains).
• Durable contractual agreements 
between mining companies and 
governments.
• African Mining Vision (AMV, 2016).
• Indian Sustainable Development 
framework for Mining.225
• UN Economic Commission for 
Europe Pan-European Strategic 
Framework for Greening the 
Economy.226 
• Country Mining Vision (CMV) 
Guidebook.227
• OECD Guiding Principles for Durable 
Extractive Contacts.228
Establish integrated planning and 
reporting frameworks for mining 
and other sectors contributing to 
sustainable development
• Integrated spatial planning 
frameworks and processes, for 
surface and sub-surface resources.
• Land use planning in Sweden, 
including designation of mineral 
deposits of national interest.
• ICMM Guidance concerning mining 
and the SDGs.
• Global Reporting Initiative.
• Indicator framework of the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development.
• CMV Guidebook
• South African Mining Charter
Establish laws, policies and 
institutions for coordinating 
decision-making about mining with 
that about other sectors and issues
• Ensure recognition of the extractive 
sector in national laws and policies 
for sustainable development.
• Embed wider sustainable 
development considerations into 
legal and policy frameworks for the 
extractive sector.
• Discuss the merits of 
intergovernmental agreements 
concerning mining and sustainable 
development (e.g. a multi-lateral 
Convention on Extractives).
• Natural Resource Charter 
Benchmarking Framework.229
• Kenya Mining and Minerals Policy 
and Mining Act 2016.230
• CMV Guidebook
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A10.9 Policy gaps and opportunities
The tables presented above highlight the diverse 
range of policy options that are available to align 
decision-making in the extractive sector with 
sustainable development. However, several key gaps 
(and opportunities) are revealed when existing policy 
responses to mining are compared against the 
Sustainable Development Goals.231These include the 
following: 
Governance of development minerals (versus 
energy minerals and metals)
As discussed previously, development minerals 
include: Selenium, Iodine, Lithium, Kyanite, Bromine, 
Vermiculite; Wollastinite, Mica, Graphite, Garnet, 
Diatomite, Zeolites, Fullers Earth, Perlite, Flurospar, 
Barite, Silicon, Talc, Bentonite, Pumice, Feldspar, 
Kaolin, Potash, Soda Ash, Sulphur, Dimension Stone, 
Rock Salt, Phosphate, Gypsum, Lime, Cement and 
Sand and Gravel. Development minerals dominate 
global mineral production in terms of volume (USGS, 
2017), representing 84% of all mined commodities. 
Of the top ten most produced minerals and 
materials, eight are Development Minerals (28 of 
the top 40). Sand tops the list with an estimated 
production at 40 billion tonnes per year, making it 
arguably the most utilised natural resource after 
water. A recent conservative estimate for world 
consumption of aggregates (sand and gravel) 
exceeds 40 billion tonnes per year, representing 
twice the yearly amount of sediment carried by all 
rivers globally, making human activity the largest 
transforming agent with respect to aggregates 
(UNEP, 2014). 
Development minerals can be characterised 
generally by their low price as a function of weight, 
and their relatively low value on international 
commodity markets. Despite their importance for 
economic development, in many countries the legal 
and regulatory frameworks concerning development 
minerals is unclear. For example, they are often 
excluded from the scope of mining legislation. 
Further effort is needed to identify governance 
options for the development minerals sector, building 
on the current achievements of capacity building 
initiatives such as the ACP-EU Development Minerals 
Programme.232
Transparency and accountability233
Previous chapters emphasized how a lack of access 
to information about the socio-economic and 
environmental impacts of mining projects can be a 
major contributor to conflict. Obtaining trustworthy 
and impartial data can be all but impossible for 
project-affected communities. At the same time, 
we have entered the so-called ‘information age’ 
which is defined as ‘a time in which information 
has become a commodity that is quickly and widely 
disseminated and easily available through the use 
of computer and communication technologies’.234 
We are better connected than ever before. Even 
though women are still 14% less likely than men 
to own one, in total over 80% of citizens in the 
developing world now have mobile phones.235 With 
better connectivity also comes increasing scrutiny 
of the mining sector. Information about incidents of 
human rights violations or environmental pollution, 
for instance, can no longer be geographically 
contained and companies are increasingly vulnerable 
to reputational damage that can impact their 
operations globally. For many extractive companies, 
transparency has, therefore, become ‘the first line of 
defense’ and as a consequence many companies 
are moving towards integrated reporting or so-called 
ESG (environmental, social and governance) 
reporting which includes sustainability, social and 
environmental information alongside operational 
issues. 
For many extractive 
companies, 
transparency has, 
therefore, become ‘the 
first line of defense’ and 
as a consequence many 
companies are moving 
towards integrated 
reporting or so-called 
ESG (environmental, 
social and governance).
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Voluntary reporting initiatives aside, and despite 
the uncertainty surrounding the future of the Dodd 
Frank Act section 1502, the trend to increase mineral 
supply chain transparency has become irreversible. 
The recently passed European regulations on ‘supply 
chain due diligence obligations for Union importers 
of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold 
originating from conflict-affected and high-risk areas’ 
create mandatory supply chain due diligence for 
European importers of tin, tungsten, tantalum and 
gold.236 Expanding on the scope of Dodd-Frank and 
the OECD Due Diligence Guidance which focus 
primarily on the Great Lakes region, the European 
regulation takes a global perspective and will apply 
to gold produced in Colombia for example.237 
Responding to strong consumer demand, this 
trend is likely to include other commodities in the 
future. In order to prevent importers from turning 
their backs on high-risk and conflict affected areas 
to source materials elsewhere, reliable information 
and practical tools need to be made available which 
enable investors and importers to effectively assess 
and address risks in their supply chains. 
As a result of the increased emphasis on 
transparency, more information is being generated 
in the extractive sector than ever before. However, 
there are a number of issues related to the 
substance and form of the information. Regarding 
the former, transparency efforts in the mining 
sector have overwhelmingly focused on financial 
transparency but have stopped short of increasing 
environmental transparency (for example, the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative). 
Similarly, whereas the centrality of human rights 
in supply chain due diligence as mandated by the 
OECD and the EU is undisputed, both frameworks 
insufficiently address environmental impacts and 
environmental rights. Taking gold as an example, 
the use of mercury for amalgamation in artisanal 
and small-scale mining is widespread and poisons 
water sources, fish stock and communities with 
devastating and irreversible effects on human health 
and wellbeing. In order to promote sustainable 
development outcomes including sustainable 
livelihoods, increased emphasis and transparency 
related to the environmental impacts of the sector 
are essential.   
For other issues where data is being made 
available, such as socio-economic impacts, the 
data is often fragmented, not readily available, or 
outdated. In some cases, there is simply too much 
information to allow communities, investors or 
importers to discern what is important to them. In 
addition, information produced by the government, 
companies or non-governmental organizations 
working on the ground is not always trusted by 
affected communities and other concerned parties.  
Simply making more information available is not 
enough. Tools are needed to make the information 
useful for all stakeholders. Aggregating, verifying 
and interpreting the available information can play 
a critical role to improve stakeholder dialogue, 
enable inclusive decision-making and participatory 
monitoring. The best approaches involve multi-
stakeholder processes that focus on bottom-
up knowledge creation to build trust among 
stakeholders, rather than top-down models. In Peru, 
following the wave of conflicts in the extractive 
sector, the law now includes provisions to allow 
for participatory environmental monitoring of 
operations. Since 2008, over 40 groups have been 
registered with the Ministry of Energy and Mines to 
support monitoring efforts.238
Efforts to improve transparency play an important 
role in conflict prevention and enhanced sustainable 
development outcomes, given that information 
asymmetries between stakeholders are a major 
contributor to conflict in the sector. In order to 
effectively address underlying causes of conflict, 
efforts of improving transparency as a means 
for conflict prevention and more informed and 
inclusive decision making must extend to including 
environmental and social impacts of operations. This 
helps citizens better understand the distribution of 
costs and benefits across the project life cycle and 
build trust among stakeholders. In order to maximize 
the impact of the available information, dedicated 
tools are needed to consolidate, verify and analyze 
data, making it accessible for all stakeholders. 
The need for reliable information and related 
analytical instruments is not limited to upstream 
mining affected communities but extends to include 
all actors along the mining and metals supply chain, 
including importers and investors. In order to enable 
concerted efforts to address supply chain risks 
related to human rights violations, involvement 
of armed groups or environmental crime, supply 
chain actors require open access to authoritative 
and consolidated data. Considering the political 
economy of information, the task of aggregating, 
authenticating and publishing data provided from a 
variety of sources including academia, government, 
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the private sector and NGOs should ideally fall to 
impartial third parties. The emphasis on trustworthy 
data is not only required for risk management 
purposes but is equally important in order to 
track the effectiveness of policy, legislative and 
development efforts which promote responsible 
sourcing. 
Formal recognition of interests and rights 
concerning mining
This issue has been discussed at length in Part 
II of this Report.239 In summary, there is a need in 
many countries for legal recognition of the rights 
and activities of artisanal and small-scale mining, 
including the rights and interests of indigenous 





148  See, e.g.: https://www.iaia.org/uploads/pdf/SIA_
Guidance_Document_IAIA.pdf.
149  See, e.g.: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108
0/14615517.2013.782978.
150  See, e.g: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S0301420713000536.
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208  ELLA, Practical Action, DFID: Policy Brief: Land Use 














 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
296
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development




























229  For detailed discussion — see Columbia Center 
on Sustainable Investment, UNDP, UN Sustainable 
Development Solutions Network, World Economic Forum. 
Mapping Mining to the Sustainable Development Goals: An 




231  David Jensen and Inga Petersen — UN Environment, 
Post-Conflict and Disaster Management Branch
232  Definition of ‘Information Age’ https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Information%20Age
233 The World Bank ‘#GenderMatters: From digital divides 
to digital dividends’. January 13, 2016. http://blogs.
worldbank.org/developmenttalk/where-are-women
234  See: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2017/821/oj 
235  The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and 
High-Risk Areas is available here: http://www.oecd.org/
corporate/mne/mining.htm
236  In 2008 regulations on participatory committees 
created OEFA (Organismo de Evaluación y Fiscalización 
Ambiental  https://www.oefa.gob.pe ), a specialized 
technical agency ascribed to the Ministry of Environment, 
responsible for the assessment, supervision, enforcement 
237 238
and sanctions in environmental matters and licensing.
237  See also for example: Spiegel, S. J. (2012). 
Governance Institutions, Resource Rights Regimes, and 
the Informal Mining Sector: Regulatory Complexities in 
Indonesia. World Development, 40(1), 189–205. http://doi.
org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.05.015
238  For further discussion see IIED’s work on formalization 
of mining rights in Tanzania, Madagascar and elsewhere.
Big mining dumping truck. Photo: Rattanapon Ninlapoom © Shutterstock
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Conveyor loading the barge with black coal. Photo: hilmawan nurhatmadi © Shutterstock
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11 Implications and implementation of the SDLO
11.0. Introduction
In an era characterized by unprecedented 
governance complexity and an urgent imperative 
for sustainable development,239 current modes 
of governance for mining are not fit-for-purpose. 
The SDLO framework presented in chapter 10 is 
advocated as a flexible means of enabling different 
actors to highlight specific deficiencies of mineral 
resources governance in specific contexts, using 
the normative lens of the 2030 Agenda and other 
global commitments concerning the environment 
and sustainable development. It therefore provides 
an entry point and reference frame for navigating the 
complex nexus of issues and challenges associated 
with the extractive sector, in order to identify actions 
needed to realize the 2030 Agenda’s vision of a 
better future. 
This chapter discusses (1) key implications of 
the SDLO for different groups of actors involved 
in governance of the extractive sector, and (2) 
implementation options for embedding the SDLO 
in relevant governance processes. The discussion 
is prefaced with an overview of key relationships 
between different groups of actors involved in 
extractive sector governance, as well as priority 
areas for international cooperation to implement the 
SDLO. Particular attention is devoted to explaining 
the relevance and utility of the SDLO in a context 
where the proliferation of extractive sector initiatives 
(discussed in Part II of this report) has created a 
widespread sense of “initiative fatigue” (See Chapter 
8) and reluctance to focus limited resources on yet 
another contribution to the sector’s sustainability.240
239  See Jeffrey Sachs, The Age of Sustainable 
Development (Columbia University Press, 2015).
240  See Resolve Solutions Network and World Economic 
Forum, Voluntary Responsible Mining Initiatives, A Review, 
August 2015: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/Voluntary_
Responsible_Mining_Initiatives_2016.pdf.
11.1. The SDLO, global governance and the 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
Global mineral production and trading link together 
resource-exporting countries, hosts to international 
mining investment and industrialized resource-
intensive economies - many of them home to 
mining multinationals or international financial 
and commodity trading hubs that play key roles in 
global resource supply flows. While each of these 
groups have varying priorities in their national and 
international agendas, SDLO implementation opens 
new opportunities for international cooperation 
between host and home countries, and the 
international community at large. A clear mapping 
of these opportunities is necessary to implement 
SDLO within a global governance framework. Figure 
11.1 (below) illustrates the diverse international 
linkages and governance issues relevant to SDLO 
implementation within a global context. It highlights 
how (1) different actors’ issues are connected across 
local, national and international scales through flows 
of finance and information, and through shared 
concerns, and (2) SDLO implementation might 
emphasize different subsets of governance issues 
concerning mining.
Many of the policy implications of the SDLO are also 
analysed in the 2016 Atlas Mapping Mining to the 
SDGs241  published by the World Economic Forum 
and partners. Figure 11.2 below, reproduced from 
the Atlas, illustrates a series of SDGs implications 
for mining companies (emphasizing issues relevant 
to larger and/or transnational companies), and their 
connections to public policy agendas
241  Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, UNDP, 
UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, World 
Economic Forum. Mapping Mining to the Sustainable 
Development Goals: An Atlas. July 2016, unsdsn.org.
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11.2. Implications for host country 
governments
The SDLO highlights the extent to which sustainable 
development of mining can only be realized by 
‘transforming vertical silos and current modes of 
resource governance, and by paying appropriate 
attention to supporting infrastructure (social 
and physical) and the natural environment’.242 
It also reveals the tremendous complexity of 
inter-relationships between the extractive sector 
and sustainable development, which challenges 
conventional structures and processes of decision-
making in government entities. Decision makers 
who shape the extractive sector or whose work is 
affected by it can no longer operate in silos.  They 
242  For comparable observations in the energy sector—
see FF Nerini et al, (2018) Energy.
will need to find ways of widening participation, 
creative collective ownership and building 
consensus. In practice, this will require greater 
institutional cohesiveness and a transformation 
in the structure of decision-making, including the 
integration of vertical and horizontal planning and 
a long-term perspective. This requires strong local 
and national visions that are sensitive to the need 
for global collaboration (such as the Africa Mining 
Vision, discussed previously). Given the cross-
cutting relevance of mining for the SDGs, structured 
analyses such as the one presented in Chapter 10 
can help to ensure that actions concerning mining 
are compatible with wider local, national and 
international development priorities. In so doing, 
this type of analysis can help the design of policies 
that are more coherent to balance synergies and 
trade-offs across well-being, infrastructure and the 
environment in specific settings.
The SDLO, global governance and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
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Figure 11.2. Issues concerning mining and sustainable development. 
Source: 2016 Atlas Mapping Mining to the SDGs245
The SDLO principles — or others compatible with the 
holistic normative position of the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development — should be embedded as 
factors to consider in relevant regulatory processes, 
and should be justiciable where appropriate. In 
many legal frameworks relating to mining, there is a 
complete absence of priority setting concerning the 
merits of mining in the context of other activities and 
interests (although this broader perspective is often 
incorporated to varying degrees into planning laws 
and policies). Legal frameworks need to establish 
platforms and institutional spaces for stakeholder 
consultation and deliberation, including a wider 
range of actors than just government authorities and 
the relevant project developers. Such platforms and 
spaces are both a direct normative feature of the 
2030 Agenda (that is, they are stipulated by various 
Goals and Targets) and an important means to forge 
consensus and compromise concerning delivery of 
other Goals and Targets.243
Another significant implication is that, in many 
countries, impact assessment and permitting 
processes for mining need to change from 
siloed and specialized activities (such as EIA) to 
holistic and inclusive processes grounded in the 
aforementioned principles. In many countries, 
environmental impact assessment processes focus 
predominantly on site-specific biophysical impacts 
on the environment,244 without consideration of how 
such impacts might affect flows of valuable goods 
243  Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, UNDP, 
UN Sustainable Development Solutions Network, World 
Economic Forum. Mapping Mining to the Sustainable 
Development Goals: An Atlas. July 2016, unsdsn.org.
244  For example, habitat loss and site-specific pollution 
levels.
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and services beyond the site in question245The case 
for cumulative environmental impact assessments 
in large mining districts was made earlier. Box 
11.1 below provides examples of how legal and 
regulatory structures in India grapple with cross-
sectoral development impacts and opportunities of 
the extractive sector to incorporate the principle of 
“common good” into the private enterprise of mineral 
extraction; to ensure that the full impact of mining 
activities is adequately captured for purposes of 
accountability; and to ensure that local communities, 
especially those in vulnerable situations, are not 
exploited in the name of “development”.
245  For example, coastal mining might degrade areas of 
mangrove ecosystems that are not significant in terms of 
total areas lost, but are significant in terms of impacts on 
provisioning services for fishing (fish spawning grounds), 
and regulating and maintenance services for nearby 
communities (such as water filtration and protection from 
storms and flooding). In some cases the economic value 
of ecosystem services lost has been demonstrated to far 
exceed the economic returns associated with mining. For 
further discussion, see the Synthesis Reports of the TEEB 
Initiative.
Given the cross-cutting 
relevance of mining for 
the SDGs, structured 
analyses such as the 
one presented in 
Chapter 10 can help 
to ensure that actions 
concerning mining 
are compatible with 
wider local, national 
and international 
development priorities.
Open cast gold mining operation in remote Australia showing pit and spoil piles. Photo: Symbiosis Australia © Shutterstock
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Box 11.1. Mining and the SDLO: some legal perspectives from India246
India produces as many as 86 minerals, which include 4 fuels, 10 metallic, 46 non-metallic, 3 atomic and 23 
minor minerals (including building and other materials). The Indian mining sector is a mix of large-scale and 
small-scale mining, with several large companies (public and private) that have integrated operations to produce 
steel, aluminium, copper and so on. Most mineral production is for domestic consumption. Federal laws on 
granting concessions and regulating issues relating to environmental impacts, involuntary displacements and so 
on provide a comprehensive framework for mining. 
In India, approaches towards increasing sustainability in mining related operations have taken the form of 
creating a generic “Sustainable Development Framework”,247which aims at ensuring that mining “is socially 
responsible, environmentally, technically and scientifically sound; with a long-term view of development; with 
genuine, mutually beneficial partnerships between Governments, communities and mining companies; and 
based on integrity, transparency and cooperation”. 
However, the reality is far more complex, and cases before Indian Courts show how difficult it is, in practice, to 
strike the right balance. Below are three landmark cases that were ruled on by the Indian Supreme Court. In the 
first one, the Court points out that revenue maximization (mineral royalties) cannot be the only factor relevant to 
decision-making about mining; the public good doctrine mandates that the “public good” must be served. In the 
second case, the Court, realizing that mining has regional impacts beyond lease boundaries (particularly in the 
case of small and medium-scale operations), is tangibly involved in devising a framework to mitigate regional 
level impacts and develop physical and social infrastructure in mining regions by mandating contributions over 
and above the statutory payments on account of royalty and compensatory afforestation (Comprehensive 
Environment Plan for the Mining Impact Zone or CEPMIZ). In the third case, the Court is again mandating an 
additional payment of 20 per cent of profits for the socioeconomic development of indigenous populations on 
the basis of Constitutional principles. 
Case 1: The public trust doctrine in extraction of natural resources248 
The President of India had made Reference to the Supreme Court seeking its Opinion on the permissible 
methods for disposal of natural resources across all sectors (including minerals). The Court, via its Judgement 
dated 27 September 2012, discussed the matter in depth and underlined several principles that have recently 
emerged based on international conventions and conferences.
Reiterating that the State is the trustee of natural resources, which are by nature meant for public use and 
enjoyment, the Court invoked the Doctrine of Public Trust. The doctrine does not exactly prohibit the alienation 
of the property held as a public trust, but states that it is the duty of the Government to provide complete 
protection to the natural resources as a trustee of the people at large. The Court held that the courts must make 
a distinction between the Government’s general obligation to act for the public benefit, and the special, more 
demanding obligation that it may have as a trustee of certain public resources. “Common good” is the sole 
guiding principle for distribution of natural resources. 
The manner in which the common good is best sub-served would, however, depend on the economic and 
political philosophy of the government. Revenue maximization is not the only way in which the common 
good can be sub-served. Revenue considerations may assume secondary consideration to developmental 
considerations.
246  By S. Vijay Kumar, Distinguished Fellow TERI, New Delhi, India.
247 http://mines.nic.in/writereaddata/UploadFile/Sustainable_Development_Framework.pdf. 
248  Special Reference No.1 of 2012 under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India. Judgement dated September 27, 2012.
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The Supreme Court also cited the National Audubon Society Vs. Superior Court of Alpine Country (Mono Lake 
case) in the Supreme Court of California where the Court said: “Thus the public trust is more than an affirmation 
of State power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the State to protect 
the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and tidelands, surrendering the right only in those 
rare cases when the abandonment of the right is consistent with the purposes of the trust.”
Case 2: Karntaka Iron Ore Mining Case249
There are 266 iron ore mines in Karnataka, of which 134 are located in forest areas. In Bellary District, 148 mines 
(with 98 in forest areas) cover 10,598 hectares of land. In 2005, the Indian Bureau of Mines estimated the total 
iron ore mineral reserves in Karnataka to be about 1,148 million tonnes (with additional probable resources 
of about 8 billion tonnes). Iron ore mining in Bellary received a push in 2000 when the Karnataka State Mining 
Policy adopted “Export Oriented Development” and the State government de-reserved 11,620 square km for 
private mining that was earlier marked for mining by State entities alone. The changes in mining policy went 
hand in hand with increasing demand from China due to the Beijing Olympics.
An NGO, the Samaj Parivartana Samudaya, instituted a writ petition seeking the Supreme Court’s intervention on 
the grounds that the mining practices were environmentally damaging, requesting a halt to all mining and other 
related activities in forest areas of the State. The Court, besides other directions, ordered the establishment 
of a mechanism for the purpose of taking various ameliorative and mitigative measures. Resources were 
sequestered to be used exclusively for the socio-economic development of the area/local population, 
infrastructure development, conservation and protection of forest and common facilities for transportation 
of iron ore (such as maintenance and widening of existing road, construction of alternate road, conveyor belt, 
railway siding and improving communication systems). A detailed scheme in this regard was to be prepared 
and implemented. The Court also directed the formulation of a plan called “CEPMIZ” to be funded by the mining 
companies.
The CEPMIZ will provide for adequate mitigative measures to tackle the adverse impact of mining that have 
occurred in the past, as well as because of future mining operations. In addition, it should ensure the inclusive 
growth of the area surrounding the mining leases (mining impact zone) by providing adequate provisions/
projects for education, health, drinking water, infrastructure, afforestation, soil conservation and so on. Adequate 
provisions for the infrastructure facilities, medical facilities, schools, colleges and so on in the project area 
should also be made. 
Case 3: The Samatha Case250— protecting tribal rights and customs and ensuring sharing mining revenues with 
local tribal communities.
In the early 1990s, Samatha, an advocacy and social action group working on the rights of tribal (indigenous) 
communities and for the protection of the environment in Andhra Pradesh, was involved in supporting local 
tribes over leasing of tribal lands to private mining industries. The tribal community wished to regain control 
over their lands rather than work for wages in the mining operations on their own lands leased out to non-tribals. 
After losing the initial battle in the lower and High Court, Samatha filed a Special Leave Petition in the Supreme 
Court of India. The four-year legal battle led to a historic judgment in July 1997 by a three-judge Supreme Court 
bench. It was a landmark judgment in favour of tribal rights, based on Constitutional provisions that provided 
for the protection of tribal rights and customs, and which sought to provide for their planned development 
consistent with their culture. 
249  Supreme Court of India: Writ Petition (Civil) No.  562 of 2009; Samaj Parivartana Samudaya & Ors vs State Of Karnataka 
& Ors; Judgement of 18 April, 2013.
250  The case is titled: Samatha vs State Of Andhra Pradesh And Ors on 11 July, 1997 (Supreme Court case no.: Appeal 
(Civil)  4601-02 of 1997).
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One of the features of the Indian Constitution is the direction and philosophy to protect the tribes from 
exploitation and to preserve the valuable endowment of their land for their economic empowerment. The 
Constitution has directed the State to provide facilities and opportunities among the concerned people 
to remove social and economic inequality and to improve equality of status. Accordingly, the Supreme 
Court held that, since the State is bound to protect the social, economic and educational interest of the 
tribes when the State leases out the lands in the Scheduled Areas for exploitation of mineral resources, it 
transmits the attendant constitutional duties and obligations to those who undertake to exploit the natural 
resources to improve the social, economic and educational circumstances of the tribal communities. 
Accordingly, in a groundbreaking move, the Supreme Court held that when land is leased out for mining 
purposes, as a part of the administration of the project, the licensee or lessee should incur the expenditure 
for development of the tribal area.
The Supreme Court also mandated that at least 20 per cent of the net profits should be set aside as a 
permanent fund as part of an industrial/business activity for the establishment and maintenance of, inter 
alia, water resources, schools, hospitals, sanitation and transport facilities by laying roads so that the 
constitutional objectives of social, economic and human resource empowerment of the tribes could be 
achieved, as well as peace and good government in Scheduled Areas. This 20 per cent allocation would be 
over and above the expenditure for re-forestation and maintenance of ecology statutorily already required.
Regional political integration platforms have a role 
in establishing initiatives for harmonized policies, 
increasing host countries’ bargaining power to 
upgrade current regimes and investment conditions 
to their advantage. As well as preventing fiscal 
competition among host countries to attract 
investment through lax taxation and subpar 
standards relative to international benchmarks and 
best practice—see Box 11.2
Regional political 
integration platforms 
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Box 11.2. Latin America experience in 2003-2012 suggests upgrade in mining regimes251
State appropriation and efficient investment of resource rents is crucial for Latin American metal and oil 
exporting countries, especially in periods of high international prices. During the 2003-2012-price boom, 
mining sector rents252 more than tripled from 0.6 per cent to 2.0 per cent of regional GDP. Countries 
with a longer mining tradition (Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Mexico) succeeded in appropriating 
approximately 20-30 per cent share of these rents253annually during the period, whereas smaller countries 
with incipient mining sectors and weaker fiscal capacity (Guatemala and Honduras) appropriated only 10 
per cent or less. Lack of independent mechanisms to ensure that mining profits and costs are transparent 
throughout price cycles remains a pending issue. EITI implementation for disclosure of revenue payments 
is just beginning in the region.254 
251  Contribution from Jean Acquatella, Working Group Member.
252  Mining sector rent, refers to the World Bank WDI statistic: mineral rent (as percentage of GDP) calculated as the 
difference between the value of production for a stock of minerals at world prices and their total costs of production at mine 
head. Basket includes tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, silver, bauxite and phosphate.
253  States’ share in rent refers to the ratio of State mining revenues divided by the mineral rent WDI statistic.
254  Only Peru and Honduras have implemented EITI; Colombia and Guatemala are pending assessment; and Mexico, 
Guyana and Suriname signed up in 2017.
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The 2003 price hike caught major metal exporters, Chile and Peru, with low marginal tax rates on 
mining relative to international benchmarks. During the 1990s, Chile successfully used relatively lax 
fiscal treatment to attract major mining investments that multiplied its production capacity to become 
a top copper exporter. It realized only minor revenues from large private mining for over a decade, and 
consistently relied on State mining company CODELCO for the lion’s share of mining revenue. By 2000, 
Peru decided to follow suit with a similar strategy including extended fiscal stability clauses, just a few 
years prior to the boom. In both countries, private mining appropriated extraordinary windfall profits during 
the boom period (approximating 70 per cent of estimated total mining rent), to the extent that companies 
began making additional voluntary payments to the government in Peru. Both metal exporters, Chile and 
Peru, introduced new royalties in 2004 in an effort to supplement the corporate mining income tax and 
increase government take. Introduction of these new royalties was widely opposed by industry during the 
legislative process, and their revenue contribution turned out to be marginal.
In contrast, the same 2003-2012 period saw oil exporting countries with State-owned and mixed-
ownership enterprises (Brazil, Plurinational State of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico and the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela) appropriating 60-75 per cent share of hydrocarbon rents. This reflected the long 
tradition of oil tax/contract systems of including progressive instruments that ensure a rising national 
share of rents during price up-cycles.257
A lesson that emerges from this experience is the need to upgrade mining regimes to incorporate such 
instruments/clauses as contingency measures in preparation for future up-cycles. Regional political 
platforms are ideal means for host countries to join forces in pursuing the strengthening of their mining 
regimes, thereby increasing bargaining power to their advantage. Strengthened regional initiatives towards 
harmonized standards, tax/contract policies and fiscal treatment of mining investments in line with 
international best practice remain an untapped opportunity.
Data source:  ECLAC (2012, 2014).
11.3. Implications for home country 
governments
The comments made in section 11.2, concerning 
cross-sectoral connections and complexity of mining 
also apply to home country governments. See also 
the comments on international cooperation to 
deliver the SDLO in section 11.1. Some additional 
implications of the SDLO for home country 
governments include the following: 255
• The SDLO provides a normative reference point 
for international capacity-building partnerships 
255  Common practice in oil-exporters is the use of scaled 
royalties, windfall taxes (triggered above certain price 
thresholds) and the use of risk- or production-sharing 
contracts, to ensure a larger government take during oil 
price up-cycles. Direct participation of the State, either 
through public enterprises or through shareholdings, is also 
the general rule.
such as the EU Sustainable Development Fund,256 
supporting their alignment with the 2030 Agenda 
in holistic terms.
• The SDLO also provides a reference point for 
organizing and evolving the myriad of disclosure 
requirements imposed on mining companies as a 
result of the domicile in the relevant home country. 
SDLO implementation efforts focusing on 
governance issues in home countries might consider 
targeting the following priority areas:
256  See EU Regulation 2017/1601 establishing 
the European Fund for Sustainable Development 
(EFSD), the EFSD Guarantee and the EFSD Guarantee 
Fund. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L_.2017.249.01.0001.01.ENG. 
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Strengthening host countries’ fiscal, revenue 
management and public investment capacities
Sustainable mining initiatives (SLO, shared-value and 
so on) have so far focused mainly on improving the 
industry’s environmental and social performance at 
the local level in host countries. The SDLO’s focus 
on SDG outcomes addresses a broader scope of 
governance challenges faced by resource-exporting 
countries, with a view to turning mineral wealth 
into a driver for structural transformation and 
diversification.257 These governance challenges 
extend beyond mining industry actors, and concern 
host government capacity to perform core fiscal, 
budgetary and public investment functions to 
deliver positive outcomes from extractive sector 
development. 
At the national level, these functions include building 
the capacity of fiscal and budgetary institutions to 
ensure fair national appropriation of resource rents, 
and their efficient investment towards national 
development priorities; while minimizing rent 
dissipation in current expenditures, revenue leakage 
and capital flight. These core functions encompass 
all five stages in the extractive industry value 
chain described earlier, in addition to capacities 
for managing cyclical mineral revenue over price 
cycles. International cooperation to support SDLO 
implementation should target technical assistance 
and training in all these areas.
At the global level, international agendas on tax 
cooperation, control of evasion and illicit financial 
flows all reinforce each other to close loopholes 
and reduce revenue leakage away from resource-
exporting countries.258Implementation of these 
international efforts also demands strengthened 
fiscal capacities in resource-exporting countries. 
Coordinating both levels of intervention can 
potentially contribute to improved outcomes 
worldwide. 
257  As expressed in the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) 
and other international declarations. Please refer to: 
Antonio Pedro, Elias T. Ayuk, Christina Bodouroglou, Ben 
Milligan, Paul Ekins, Bruno Oberle. Towards a sustainable 
development licence to operate for the extractive sector. 
Mineral Econ (2017) 30: 153.
258  Refer to Figure 11.1, other countries SDLO relevant 
governance issues.
At the regional level, resource-exporting countries’ 
collective interest is best served by working towards 
harmonized foreign investment performance 
standards and common tax/contract and 
concession awarding policies. According to ECA 
(2016), African countries should consider regional 
approaches when developing a legal framework for 
foreign investment (rather than relying exclusively on 
Bilateral Investment Treaties). 
Coordinating implementation of transparency 
and accountability agendas at the national and 
international levels
International political attention to transparency and 
accountability agendas has grown to encompass 
an increasing number of issues. This ranges from 
financial information sharing and oversight aimed 
at curbing international tax evasion and illicit 
flows, to the monitoring of labour conditions and 
corporate sustainability performance measures 
across global value chains. The initial EITI coverage 
of resource revenue payments is now extending 
to beneficial ownership disclosure and commodity 
trading transparency.259As international pressures 
for transparency initiatives continue to extend 
their reach, they offer opportunities to strengthen 
parallel national initiatives for increased civil society 
oversight and democratic accountability of resource 
rent allocation and use by governments and industry 
in extractive regions.  For instance, an increasing 
trend towards more formal and periodic civil society 
monitoring of national government resource-revenue 
allocation and its local development impacts took 
hold in several Latin American countries during the 
last resource boom (Peru, Colombia, Ecuador and 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia). Another target 
area for international cooperation and training 
in support of SDLO is the strengthening of third 
sector monitoring and civil society capacity to use 
information disclosure for public accountability in 
resource-exporting countries. The need for increased 
technical assistance in this area has been identified 
by several international organizations and aid 
agencies like the World Bank, NRGI, EITI, GIZ and 
DFID, among others.
259  EITI 2017 work plan establishes disclosure of 
beneficial ownership and increased transparency of 
commodity trading as strategic areas for future work in 
addition to disclosure of revenue payments.
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Integrated planning for mineral and other 
resources
Mineral resources governance around the world at 
the national and sub-national levels is characterized 
by the widespread absence of planning of mining. 
This planning could be underpinned by a ‘nexus’ 
approach that attempts to optimize flows of benefits 
from both minerals and other stocks of natural 
capital (especially ecosystems and biodiversity). 
Institutional structures for deliberative dialogue 
among different stakeholders are an important 
component of such planning. These enable 
consensus-building on issues where views might 
diverge (such as appropriate or acceptable resource 
rents, development importance of mining versus 
other sectors and conceptions of development 
benefits), and place less reliance on the role of 
“strong government” as the top-down arbiter of 
planning decisions. 
There is also a need to establish frameworks to 
facilitate natural resource accounting, monitoring 
and reporting as inputs to more holistic and inclusive 
planning processes. In this context, policy reform 
can benefit from considerable technical progress 
over the last decade, in particular the statistical 
standards and approaches documented in the UN 
Framework for Development of Environmental 
Statistics and the UN System for Environmental-
Economic Accounting (SEEA).260 The structure and 
function of SEEA accounts for natural resources are 
shown in Figure 11.3 below. The figure illustrates 
how the System establishes a framework for 
integrating environmental and economic data and 
statistics concerning mineral resources and other 
environmental assets in a manner compatible with 
national accounts that follow the UN’s System of 
National Accounts standard.261These integrated 
accounts can then be used as an analytical basis 
for monitoring, reporting and policy development 
by governments, including international reporting 
260  See for example: United Nations, European 
Commission, FAO, OECD Group. (2015). System of 
Environmental-Economic Accounting 2012 Experimental 
Ecosystem Accounting (pp. 1–198); United Nations (2014), 
System of Environmental-Economic Accounting 2012 
Central Framework (pp. 1–378).
261  See https://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/sna.
asp.
efforts focused on the Sustainable Development 
Goals, Paris Agreement on Climate Change, Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets and other relevant international 
commitments. In collaboration with the World 
Bank WAVES Partnership and other international 
initiatives, a growing number of countries (including 
Australia, Botswana and Guatemala) have 
undertaken work to compile subsoil resources 
accounts in accordance with SEEA standards.262 
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Figure 11.3. Structure and uses of the System for 
Environmental-Economic Accounting
Exploring opportunities to bolster long-term 
resource supply stability through innovative 
cooperation between resource-exporters and the 262  See: https://www.wavespartnership.org/en/
knowledge-center
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international community
Source: United Nations, European Commission, FAO, OECD Group. (2015); United Nations (2014)
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International cooperation to bolster long-term global 
resource-supply security offers mutual benefit 
opportunities. Resource-intensive economies like 
OECD countries and China are paying increasing 
attention to long-term supply stability scenarios 
for key industrial metals, as well as other resource 
inputs currently sourced upstream from developing 
regions. Current stop-go investment cycles in 
international mining exploration and development 
driven by price cycles have direct negative 
consequences for long-term global mineral supply 
security (as they also hurt the development and 
SDG prospects of resource-exporting countries). 
This global governance challenge calls for renewed 
exploration of innovative cooperation options 
such as joint planning of long-run extractive 
investment commitments into resource-rich 
regions (in the interests of balanced global supply/
demand expansion with increased price stability). 
Options to stabilize investment flows for extractive 
exploration and development in host countries, 
strengthen global supply security and reduce the 
risks of volatility can only be explored through broad 
multilateral and regional-level platforms. Promoting 
renewed discussion of such options in line with 
the development aspirations resource-exporting 
countries and the long-term supply-security 
prerogatives of industrial economies, should form 
part of the aims of the SDLO. 
Resource supply security is closely linked with 
resource efficiency, recycling and re-use alongside 
other green and circular economy agendas gaining 
increased political attention in OECD countries, as 
well as the 2030 sustainable development agenda 
(SDGs 2030, climate change, biodiversity and so on). 
This international context provides fertile ground 
to implement the SDLO normative vision through 
coordinated action between resource-exporting and 
resource-intensive economies along global value 
chains, committing upstream and downstream 
actors while enabling each group to advance their 
respective priorities at the same time. A systemic 
learning approach should guide implementation of 
the global SDLO governance framework. 
11.4. Implications for other stakeholders
As mentioned previously, there is a wealth of useful 
governance instruments to regulate and help 
improve the contribution of the mining sector to 
sustainable development. Far from re-inventing the 
wheel, the SDLO seeks to build on the plethora of 
existing policy options and instruments, as much 
work has already been devoted in developing these, 
they are part of existing policy structures. This would 
also create synergies and avoid duplication. The 
paragraphs below consider specific implications 
of the SDLO for three broad sets of actors: 
policymakers at various levels, the private sector 
and third sector actors including non-governmental 
organizations and civil society.
11.4.1. Policymakers
There is a recognition of the danger of “initiative 
fatigue” as the “proliferation of instruments and 
lack of linkages make it challenging for mining 
companies to decide which ones to adopt and make 
a focus on sustainability costlier to implement” 
(Resolve & WEF, 2015, p. 6). Importantly, for many 
countries the challenge is less about the lack of 
appropriate constitutional provisions, legislation, 
regulations, contracts and licences, and more about 
the challenge of their enforcement. Therefore, an 
improved governance approach needs to focus 
on creating linkages and efficiencies between 
different governance instruments, as well as on 
their implementation (in order to better guide the 
sustainable development performance of mining 
industries worldwide). The SDLO principles and 
policy options (discussed in chapter 10) provide 
a linking structure for such efforts, which could in 
practice also benefit from the development and 
use of more holistic standardized protocols and 
indicators. Box 11.3 summarizes existing standards 
that could be supplemented to that end.
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Box 11.3. Towards a standard protocol for planning and monitoring of mining operations263
International guidelines on which features of exploration results, mineral resources and reserves to be 
considered for public reporting (CRIRSCO, 2013). They focus on geological and technical information, 
mentioning environmental aspects rather casually. A more detailed scheme of water reporting by the 
mining industry was provided by ICMM (2017). For the reporting of GHG emissions, standards still 
seem to be under development (ICMM, 2011). Data on mining operations are scattered among public 
and private institutions, often remain undisclosed and are mostly incomparable. What is needed is a 
standard protocol for assessing the compatibility of mining with sustainable development, which can 
then be applied worldwide for every industrial mining operation. This could be based on a minimum set 
of key performance indicators of planned, operated and closed mines.
The International Resource Panel suggests establishing such a standard protocol based on a minimum 
set of key performance indicators of planned, operated and closed mines:
• Geo-referenced location
• Total extraction of minerals (per annum and cumulative)
• Used extraction (run of mine) and unused extraction (waste rock, overburden)
• Total water extracted
• Withdrawal (pumped or diverted from natural water bodies, by source)
• Consumption (part of withdrawal that is evaporated, in other words not released back to the same 
catchment area)
• Total land used
• Whole area occupied for extraction and processing, disposal, transport and administration
• Area transformed by extraction and disposal
• Area reclaimed by rehabilitation (with type of after-use)
• Total energy used by type of energy carrier and per unit of total extraction.
The total extraction of minerals determines the three-dimensional order of magnitude of landscape 
change and related environmental pressure. The relation of used to unused extraction indicates the 
resource efficiency of the extraction process. The amount of water withdrawal and consumption 
determines potential conflicts from water use with neighbouring activities. The extent of total land use and 
transformation determines the pressure to natural ecosystems. The energy used for each unit extracted 
indicates the energy efficiency of the mining operation and, together with the type of energy carrier 
involved, may be used to calculate greenhouse gas emissions.
These four environmental footprints do not provide a comprehensive basis for assessing a mining 
operation’s environmental impacts. For example, they do not account for water abundance and/or 
scarcity at a site location, or the phase of the operation that will affect the amount of land rehabilitated, 
for example. They do, however, provide some insights concerning the broad magnitude of environmental 
pressure of resource extraction. Reporting these data in a standard format would be useful to assess 
environmental impacts; check potential conflicts in advance (such as on water and biodiversity); support 
the search for less burdensome options; prepare licenses to operate; and feed monitoring of resource 
flows at the regional and national levels.
263  Contribution from Stefan Bringezu (presentation at FORAM pilot event, 27 June 2018, Nancy, France).
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In addition, effective governance of the mining sector 
requires a legal system that is comprehensive, 
consistent and universally applicable to all projects. 
In addition to adopting policies/legislation, 
governments also need to build the institutional 
capacity to implement the rules and strengthen 
domestic accountability. Rules and institutions then 
need to be supported by a critical mass of citizen 
understanding and engagement (Collier, 2013).
As stated earlier, however, there are no universal 
solutions. Very different governance solutions 
may apply to countries featuring specific industry 
characteristics, particular challenges or varying 
stages of economic development. For instance, 
differentiated governance approaches are needed 
for countries where standards and guidelines can 
be easily implemented, compared to others where a 
large artisanal and small-scale mining sector, high 
levels of corruption or conflict and war are relevant. 
Governance strategies therefore need to be tailored 
to a particular country’s socioeconomic, geopolitical, 
historical and cultural background.
11.4.2. Private sector actors
As outlined elsewhere in this report, there are myriad 
private-sector initiatives focusing on mining and 
sustainable development. In this context, the main 
purpose of the SDLO is to operate as a ‘meta-
governance’ framework— that is, providing a lens 
through which private sector actors can:  
• Combat ‘initiative fatigue’ by mapping their 
engagement with, and participation in, external 
sustainability initiatives against the 2030 
Agenda to identify options, gaps and strategic 
opportunities. One example would be identifying 
the most relevant indicators from instruments 
including the Global Reporting Initiative; Global 
Compact; and the Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights.  
• Align internal activities with the SDGs and 
Targets in order to mitigate social, economic and 
environmental risks and capitalize on innovation 
opportunities associated with transitions to 
sustainable development.  
• Align business models with the national 
development aspirations of host countries and 
improve stakeholder engagement towards a 
shared understanding of what constitutes value. 
Many of the implications of the SDLO for private 
actors are analysed in the 2016 Atlas Mapping 
Mining to the SDGs,264 published by the World 
Economic Forum and partners (see Figure 11.2 and 
explanatory text above). The SDLO also builds on the 
achievements of the International Council for Mining 
and Metals (see Box 9.7 above) and other related 
initiatives, but is broader in scope (as it is intended 
to be relevant across organizations other than large 
mining companies). The SDLO is also intended to 
be relevant in contexts where formal governance of 
mining is either absent or minimally enforced, and/
or where governance processes are characterized 
by informality, complexity and decentralization (see 
discussion in Chapters 3 and 6). In such contexts, 
the SDLO could function either as a proxy for formal 
government regulation or as a basis for informal 
governance and self-assessment in light of the 
holistic global expectations concerning sustainable 
development. 
Governance strategies 
therefore need to be 
tailored to a particular 
country’s socioeconomic, 
geopolitical, historical 
and cultural background 
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11.4.3. Third sector actors
Third sector actors — including civil society 
organizations, research institutions and 
non-governmental organizations — can and must 
play crucial and influential roles in extractive sector 
governance. Key implications for such organizations 
264  C lumbia Center on Sust inable Investment, UNDP, 
UN Sustainable Development Solutio s Network, World 
Economic Forum. Mapping Mining to the Sustainable 
Development Goals: An Atlas. July 2016, unsdsn.org.
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include the following: 
• As discussed in Chapter 10, there are complex 
synergies and trade-offs between mining and 
sustainable development. Decisions about mining 
profoundly affect humanity’s ability to realize 
aspirations of greater welfare and well-being, 
build physical and social infrastructures for 
sustainable development and achieve sustainable 
management of the natural environment. There 
is an urgent need to better organize, connect and 
extend this evidence — and the SDLO provides 
an organizing framework for research-focused 
third sector organizations to address this need by 
working beyond disciplinary silos.
• The SDLO can also be operationalized by third 
sector organizations as a normative framework 
to support the representation of marginalized 
stakeholders in governance processes and to 
hold governments and the private sector to 
account for decision-making that either reinforces 
or undermines efforts to achieve sustainable 
development. An important aspect of the 
SDLO’s utility in this context is that it can use 
SDGs to combine diverse social, economic and 
environmental issues with national and global 
political commitments.   
• The investment decisions made by institutional 
investors and informed by issues considered in the 
SDLO can send signals to the market in a way that 
can help require or encourage mining companies 
to incorporate sustainable development principles 
and practices into their business models at a 
faster rate. 
Although global practice is varied, mining projects 
can be characterized by governments and project 
proponents as “inevitable” or “essential” for national 
development in the light of macro-level opportunity 
costs and wider benefits of not proceeding. In this 
context, dialogue with local communities can be 
shaped by the premise that it contains “an offer 
they cannot refuse”. Such an approach starts by 
disempowering local communities at the outset. 
However difficult to contemplate, the embedding 
of a “right of refusal” is essential to a constructive 
dialogue and for an outcome that all parties can 
accept (if not be happy about). Box 11.4 illustrates 
this point with a powerful narrative, which cannot be 
said to have ended conclusively.
Landscape caused by open pit coal mining activity in Sangatta, Indonesia. Photo hilmawan nurhatmadi © Shutterstock
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Box 11.4. Community consent to mining265 — Bauxite mining and the licence to mine in forest areas inhabited by 
indigenous communities 266 
M/s. Sterlite Industries India Ltd (SIIL) (parent company of Vedanta) filed an application for environmental 
clearance for the purpose of starting a 1 million tonne per annum capacity Alumina Refinery Project in 
Lanjigarh, District Kalahandi, Odisha State. However, an objection was raised to the grant of clearance 
sought by Vedanta on the grounds that the Refinery would be totally dependent on mining of bauxite from 
Niyamgiri Hills (situated in Lanjigarh), which was a vital wildlife habitat that included an elephant corridor, 
and also on the grounds that the project would disturb local tribes (indigenous peoples) like the Dongaria 
Kondh.
The case was heard by the Supreme Court. Although the state of Odisha had informed the Court the lack 
of basic infrastructure facilities in the Tribal areas of both districts, the abject poverty in which the local 
(including tribal) people were living in Lanjigarh, the lack of proper housing, hospitals and schools, and the 
likely positive employment and other benefits of the project, the Court did not agree to endorse the project 
in the manner proposed. Instead, it suggested that clearance could be given if a specific development 
framework was adopted, incorporating not only mitigating measures against adverse environmental 
impacts, but also an area development plan. The Court also suggested that M/s SIIL should deposit, every 
year, 5 per cent of its annual profits before tax and interest from the Lanjigarh Project to be spent on the 
development of health, education, communication, irrigation and agriculture of the scheduled area within a 
radius of 50 km.
Local opposition continued, however, and a Report of the Ministry of Environment and Forest projected the 
impact on ecological and biodiversity values of the Niyamgiri hills upon which the tribal groups, Dongaria 
Kondh and Kutia Kondh, depended. The Report also pointed out that the narrow definition of the “Project 
Affected People” adopted by the company for the purposes of compensation runs contrary to the letter 
and spirit of the Forest Rights Act, 2006. Simply because tribal groups did not live on the hills, this does 
not mean that they have no rights there, when in fact they were dependent on the usage of the area. It was 
also asserted that the local tribes and others have deeply held religious beliefs and rights concerning the 
Niyamgiri hills, in particular the hill top known as Niyam-Raja.
The Forest Rights Act was enacted by Parliament to recognize and vest the forest rights and occupational 
rights in forest dwelling tribal communities who have been residing in such forests for generations but 
whose rights could not be recorded. The Act recognized the role of the forest dwelling tribal people in 
the sustainable use of resources, conservation of bio-diversity, maintenance of ecological balance and 
strengthening of the forest conservation regime. The Act also noted that tribal rights to ancestral lands 
and their habitat were not adequately recognized in the consolidation of State forests during the colonial 
period, resulting in historical injustice to the tribal communities, who are integral to the very survival and 
sustainability of the forest ecosystem. Under the Forest Rights Act, power is conferred on the Gram Sabha 
(local village community) for determining the nature and the extent of individual or community rights. 
Much other legislation also gives a role to Gram Sabha, and the Gram Sabha is the nodal institution to 
safeguard and preserve the traditions, customs of the people, their cultural identity, community resources 
and community mode of dispute resolution.
265  Supreme Court Of India: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 180 of 2011; Judgment dated April 18, 2013. Orissa Mining Corporation 
Ltd. Versus Ministry of Environment & Forest & Others.
266  By S. Vijay Kumar, Distinguished Fellow TERI, New Delhi, India.
Implications for other stakeholders
315 
The Supreme Court held that the question of whether the tribal people have any religious rights – that is, 
rights of worship over the Niyamgiri hills – has to be considered by the Gram Sabha. The Supreme Court 
therefore gave a direction to the State of Odisha to place these issues before the Gram Sabhas. 
The outcome was that 2013 saw India’s first referendum on the development narrative that had been 
previously uncontested in the mainstream. People of small tribal hamlets in the Niyamgiri hills were asked 
to voice their opinion on bauxite mining in their habitat. Amid heavy security cover of central paramilitary 
and state forces, the forest dwellers—Dongria Kondh and Kutia Kondh tribals, and Gouda and non-tribals 
– spoke of a way of life embedded in the hills’ unique ecology. They told the District Judge, appointed 
observer to the meetings, that mining would destroy their god Niyam-Raja and their source of sustenance 
— over 100 perennial streams, as well as the local ecological balance and the source of their food and 
livelihood. All the 12 Gram Sabhas unanimously rejected mining.
All these cases had a deep impact on the approach of the Ministry of Mines to the management of 
the mineral concession framework. In 2011, the Ministry issued a “National Sustainable Development 
Framework”. It was clear, however, that a framework had only limited persuasive value. In 2015, the 
legislation governing the grant of concessions was amended to provide for the constitution of “District 
Mineral Foundations”,269  which are expected to develop and implement plans for the socioeconomic 
development of the local area, ensure maintenance and creation of community assets and to develop the 
skills and employment potential in the local area. The Foundations will receive an amount equal to a third 
of the royalty collected in the District. Since annual mineral royalties in India are of the order of $5 billion, 
the Foundations would receive roughly $1.6 billion annually for local area development.
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collaborative social dialogue regarding each mining 
project. This goes beyond what could currently be 
obtained through the short-term environmental and 
social impact assessments. In doing so, industry 
needs to articulate an agenda that balances its own 
commercial needs with managing and meeting 
broader expectations about the contribution of 
mining to sustainable development. In summary, 
each and every stakeholder has a role to play 
to ensure that the extractive sector supports 
sustainable development. 
Figure 11.4 below provides some illustrative 
process examples of how different actors might 
use the SDLO to align their activities with the 2030 
Sustainable Development Agenda. These include use 
of the SDLO principles to: 
• Map gaps, risks and opportunities relevant 
to sustainable development, and respond 
through implementation of SDLO policy 
options as appropriate (for example, a private 
sector organization’s review by a of its own 
engagement with sustainability initiatives, in 
order to strategically identify priority initiatives for 
engagement); 
• Identify options and opportunities for 
complementary action by different actors across 
multiple sectors, informed by SDLO policy options 
and best practice; and 
• Establish a common framework for negotiation 
and dispute resolution, informed by SDLO policy 
options and best practice. 
Appropriate governance 
of mineral resources, 
so as to enhance 
their contribution 
towards sustainable 
development, is a shared 
responsibility across 
nations and different 
actors along the mining 
value chain.
11.5. Conclusions267
Appropriate governance of mineral resources, so as 
to enhance their contribution towards sustainable 
development, is a shared responsibility across 
nations and different actors along the mining value 
chain. This is in line with the new era of international 
cooperation brought about by the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), which are universal 
to countries of the Global North and South (while 
acknowledging the diversity of circumstances 
and capabilities across countries). From an 
ethical standpoint, developed importing nations 
should share responsibility for the adverse social, 
economic and environmental impacts of mineral 
resource extraction occurring in mainly developing 
exporting countries. A global multi-level governance 
architecture will therefore need to address not only 
an agenda for resource security, resource efficiency 
and decoupling of resource use and environmental 
impacts from economic growth (that is of particular 
importance to developed nations), but also the need 
for continuous economic development, structural 
transformation, resource-based industrialization 
and economic diversification in resource exporting 
and other developing countries (as articulated in 
frameworks such as the Africa Mining Vision).
Aside from its universality, the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development was also revolutionary in 
terms of the inclusivity of discussion that led to the 
adoption of the Sustainable Development Goals. 
The Sustainable Development Licence to Operate 
similarly advocates for an inclusive multi-stakeholder 
approach, whereby decisions concerning the mining 
industry are made with the involvement of all 
relevant stakeholders. All relevant actors should be 
included through, inter alia, information exchange, 
media or other campaigns and collaboration with 
institutions such as those with oversight roles. A 
community-orientated, context-sensitive approach 
to engagement requires in-depth knowledge of 
local culture, circumstances and power dynamics, 
alongside a sophisticated approach to engaging 
diverse voices within affected communities 
(including alternative and marginalized voices) 
(Owen & Kemp, 2013). It is therefore important that 
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In practical terms, these examples of SDLO uses 
could be embedded into mining sector governance 
at multiple levels through a diverse range of activities 
including, but not limited to, the following: 
• Private sector benchmarking and certification — 
Establishment of a scheme and corresponding 
indicator framework that is structured around 
the SDLO Principles, for voluntary certification 
and benchmarking of mining companies or as a 
framework to assess investment risk. Box 11.3 
above has already discussed some relevant 
options focusing on environmental sustainability. 
To avoid duplication of existing initiatives and 
accommodate different levels of capability, this 
certification could be designed to operate at 
a ‘meta’ level, with performance that could be 
demonstrated by participation in other issue-
specific initiatives. The certification process 
should be clearly and explicitly interlinked with the 
Global Reporting Initiative, Natural Capital Protocol 
and other cross-sectoral standards focused on 
sustainable development.
• Public sector benchmarking and associated 
capacity building — Establishment of a scheme to 
monitor and benchmark a country’s performance 
in terms of implementing the SDLO into national 
legislative and policy frameworks, focusing 
on both mining specifically and holistic policy 
frameworks for natural resources management. 
This benchmarking should be interlinked with 
existing UN processes concerning sustainable 
development review and reporting by national 
governments, and could be used to structure and 
inform the wide range of international capacity-
building programmes relevant to the mining sector 
and sustainable development. For example, the 
SDLO could: 
 ○ Provide an analytical basis for structuring 
the activities of the EU Raw Materials 
Initiative that focus on implementation of the 
SDGs in non-energy extractive industries.268
 ○ Be adapted for use as part of the Mining 
Policy Framework (MPF) Assessment 
developed by the Intergovernmental Forum 
on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable 
268  See: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/
raw-materials/policy-strategy_en.
Development.269 As outlined in Chapter 10, 
there are considerable overlaps between 
the subject matter scope of the MPF 
Assessment and the SDLO, with the latter 
being broader (given its grounding in the full 
range of topics covered by the Sustainable 
Development Goals).
• International agreements to strengthen 
transnational governance of mining — The SDLO 
Principles and Policy Options could be used as the 
normative foundation of negotiations to establish 
new international agreements that address the 
wide range of governance gaps highlighted in this 
report. These could include but are not limited to:
 ○ Global commitments concerning extractives 
under the auspices of the UN Environment 
Assembly and other appropriate bodies.
 ○ Bilateral and plurilateral agreements 
designed to support sustainable and less 
volatile trade in mineral commodities 
between exporting and importing countries 
and regions. Specific policy responses that 
could be embedded in such agreements 
include: recognition of non-discriminatory 
SDLO-based standards for production; 
tariff and other trade incentives to support 
compliance with sustainability standards; 
and mechanisms such as long-term 
commodity pricing agreements to channel 
greater investment in sustainable mining 
and value addition activities. Such measures 
may prove crucial to the funding model for 
higher standards in extractive sector, which 
may in some cases entail increased short-
term costs. 
 ○ Non-binding model instruments published 
by UNEP, IGF or other appropriate entities, 
articulating SDLO-compatible commitments 
that can be embedded into national policy 
frameworks and transnational mining 
visions. There is a longstanding precedent 
for this approach in the agriculture and 
fisheries sectors, where FAO Voluntary 
Guidelines have played an instrumental role 
in strengthening global responses to a range 
of governance issues.  Examples include 
the Voluntary Guidelines on Responsible 
269  See: http://igfmining.org/mining-policy-assessment/.
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Governance of Tenure, which were finalized 
through intergovernmental negotiations 
including non-government participation, 
and serve as a reference point of relevant 
principles and internationally accepted 
standards that relate to tenure governance 
of land, fisheries and forestry in the context 
of national food security.270
Implementing these proposed options for SDLO 
implementation will depend on sustained and long-
term commitment from diverse actors, working 
amidst of the many governance challenges surveyed 
in Part II of this report. Several specific shorter-
term opportunities and pathways towards SDLO 
implementation are discussed in Chapter 12 below, 
which is set against the backdrop of key conclusions 
that emerge from the report as a whole.
270  See: http://www.fao.org/tenure/voluntary-guidelines/
en/.
Rainforest destruction. Gold mining place in Guyana, South America. Photo: kakteen © Shutterstock.
Appropriate governance 
of mineral resources, 
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towards sustainable 
development, is a 
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across nations and 
different actors along 
the mining value chain.
 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
Recultivated landscape after mining. Photo: Kletr © Shutterstock
321 
12 Summary and conclusions
12.0. Introduction
In this report, the International Resource Panel 
has sought to: (1) summarize current evidence on 
the technical, environmental, social and economic 
characteristics of the global extractive sector; (2) 
systematically analyse current evidence concerning 
governance challenges in the extractive sector; and 
(3) identify and describe governance options for the 
sector that are compatible with delivery of the 2030 
Agenda and other global and regional commitments 
to sustainable development. The Panel’s principal 
findings and recommendations on these points are 
summarized below. 
12.1. The challenge of the governance of 
resource extraction
The previous chapters have outlined many 
challenges for the governance of natural resources, 
as well as the various initiatives that have been 
established to address them. However, at present 
these initiatives remain too fragmented and 
inadequate to properly address the challenges in line 
with Agenda 2030.
Extraction of mineral resources has increased 
markedly in recent decades, and over the last decade 
this has risen at a faster rate than economic growth 
(Ekins et al., 2017). There is currently an oversupply 
of some mineral resources in world markets, but the 
supply/demand balance varies greatly over time (Ali 
et al., 2017). In addition, there is a significant long-
term challenge of how to meet the mineral resource 
needs of a growing global population that may reach 
8.5 billion by 2030, 9.8 billion by 2050 and 11.2 billion 
in 2100.
Although demand for minerals will follow economic 
cycles, the overall demand trajectory remains 
upward as economies grow, technological innovation 
continues and resource intensity deepens as 
developing countries catch up.271 In recent years, 
existing mining companies and investors have 
reduced exploration budgets in response to a cycle 
of declining commodity prices,272 which will delay 
responses to future increases in demand. Although 
the budget decline stopped in 2017, its level remains 
well below the 2012 exploration budget (as a 
result of growing risk aversion among investors). 
These trends do not bode well for future supplies 
of minerals and metals to the world economy. This 
makes it likely that, over the coming two to three 
decades when availability of metals for recycling 
is expected to remain low (Reuter et al., 2013), 
the mining sector will struggle to meet demand 
for several minerals (such as copper) for which 
substitutes are not readily available (Ali et al., 2017; 
Reuter et al., 2016; Graedel et al., 2015). 
In this context, there is a significant risk of price 
volatility, which could hamper the efforts of mineral-
rich countries to manage their endowments in a 
manner that delivers enduring benefits for societies, 
economies and governance. Major disasters - such 
as the Benito Rodrigues tailings dam collapse in 
Brazil (Hatje et al., 2017) which was just one of 140 
major tailing dam failures reported since 1960 - also 
highlight the need to carefully balance mining with 
stewardship of other valuable natural resources and 
the rights of local people and communities. 
Despite the extractive sector’s potential to act as a 
catalyst for development in mineral-rich countries, 
many challenges prevent this potential from being 
fully realized.273 274 
271  See Daniele La Porta Arrobas et al. The Growing Role 
of Minerals and Metals for a Low Carbon Future. World 
Bank Group, June 2017, documents.worldbank.org.
272  See S&P Global. Worldwide Mining Exploration Trends.  
March 2017, marketintelligence.spglobal.com.
273  See: Antonio Pedro et al. (2017).
274  See: African Union, ECA (2011).
 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
322
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
These include: the volatility of commodity prices that 
have left resource-exporting developing countries 
particularly exposed to external shocks (triggering 
macroeconomic instability) (Alba, 2009); illicit 
financial flows and other difficulties of managing 
large and volatile inflows of foreign capital;275 lack of 
transparency and accountability and the associated 
risk of corruption; technical complexities of large-
scale projects that exacerbate the management 
problems of the sector in jurisdictions with limited 
national capacities; enclave nature of mining with 
weak linkages to other economic sectors; lasting 
environmental damage of some mining projects; 
global asymmetries of power and conflicting 
stakeholder interests leading to social conflict; and 
redefinitions of resource nationalism in the absence 
of consensus on what would constitute shared value 
from mining.276
Extractive industries need to continue serving 
humanity’s development as they have done for 
millennia, but they now need to fully integrate the 
unprecedented challenges and constraints facing 
humanity. This makes it an absolute necessity 
to decouple economic growth from its negative 
impacts on the global and local ecosystems on 
which human well-being depends.
Technological advances in the extractive sector are 
likely to transform production and consumption 
dynamics with profound global implications, 
with possible negative impacts on job creation 
and local procurement of goods and services. 
These challenges are compounded by the uneven 
geological distribution of mineral deposits, which 
lend an inevitable geopolitical dimension to the 
future of the extractive sector.
Another important issue for several countries is the 
discrepancy between formally recognized rights 
to mineral resources, and the expectations and 
dependencies of local communities. Policies in some 
developing countries have facilitated large-scale 
acquisition of formal property rights by commercial 
275  See: Report of the High- Level Panel on illicit Financial 
Flows from Africa. AU and ECA Conference of Ministers of 
Finance, Planning and Economic Development, www.ECA.
org.
276  See: Africa Progress Panel. Africa Progress Report 
(2013):
sector actors (including transnational corporations), 
which can prove difficult to regulate, to enable 
mining (German et al., 2011). Negative outcomes of 
property acquisition by the extractive sector include 
‘expropriation without adequate compensation 
of rights held by individuals and communities; 
extinguishment of long-standing informal rights 
held by individuals and communities; dislocation of 
local communities from acquired areas; destruction 
of local livelihoods; and a development model that 
maximizes marketable private benefits’ (for example, 
mining) to the detriment of public benefits (for 
example, clean water) (MEA, 2015; Kareiva et al., 
2011). 
Finally, the extractive sector’s development benefits 
are impeded by incomplete accounting of sector 
impacts on wealth, which in comprehensive 
terms includes infrastructure and financial capital, 
institutions and communities and natural capital 
including biotic and abiotic components of the 
environment (World Bank, 2011).277 Many impacts on 
institutions and communities and on natural capital 
assets (including ecosystems) are not currently 
valued in markets, and represent well-documented 
externalities of the extractive sector.278 In this context 
there is a clear need for effective governance of 
the extractive sector across local, national, regional 
and global scales, to ensure that needs for minerals 
are met without undermining other development 
outcomes and the needs of future generations (Ekins 
et al., 2017; Ali et al., 2017; WEF, 2015).
12.2. The potential benefits of resource 
extraction 
There is substantial evidence that, if resource 
extraction is well governed, it can provide important 
development benefits. The ‘resource curse’ can be 
avoided and resource extraction turned into national 
and local prosperity. As shown by Ericsson and Olof 
(2017) mineral-rich countries experienced up to 70 
277  World Bank. 2011. The Changing Wealth of Nations: 
Measuring Sustainable Development in the New 
Millennium. Environment and Development. World Bank. 
© World Bank. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/
handle/10986/2252 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.
278  For an early example of efforts to internalize these 
externalities in commercial decision-making, see: Natural 
Capital Protocol: Case Study for Tata Group, 25 September 
2017, www.naturalcapitalcoalition.org. 
The essence and vision of the SDLO
323 
per cent improvement in their Human Development 
Index over non-mining countries based on data for 
the 1996-2014 period. The evidence also shows that 
mining countries exhibited relative improvements in 
governance indicators improvement. The centrality 
of good governance in unlocking the benefit of 
mineral wealth is therefore unambiguous. Minerals 
and metals industries can, if well governed to reduce 
to a minimum their negative impacts, provide lasting 
benefits including multiplier effects that create new 
jobs in other sectors of the economy, foster the 
development of a diversity of skills of importance to 
other sectors of an economy and/or create financial 
reserves for future generations (as it is the case with 
the Norwegian Government Pension Fund Global, 
currently worth over US$1 bn). 
The purpose of this report has been to describe 
efforts being made to improve the governance of 
resource extraction and combine them with other 
ideas, with a view to reaping the benefits of resource 
extraction in practice. In this report, the result is 
termed the Sustainable Development Licence to 
Operate (SDLO). 
12.3. The essence and vision of the SDLO 
Decision-making in the extractive sector is shaped 
by a complex array of governance frameworks 
and initiatives operating at multiple scales (Ekins 
et al., 2017; Lipschutz & Henstridge, 2013). This 
complexity is compounded by the highly globalized 
mineral value chains, which are characterized 
by the involvement of diverse stakeholders.  As 
discussed earlier in this report, the many initiatives 
to have adopted different approaches to certain 
resource governance challenges have undoubtedly 
brought benefits and improved resource governance 
over what it might otherwise be; yet they remain 
fragmented. Overall, as all countries strive to achieve 
sustainable development, there needs to be a 
framework that enables all actors at each level of 
globalized value chains to assess the compatibility 
of their decision-making with overarching global 
commitments to sustainable development (including 
efforts to address the specific above-mentioned 
governance challenges).
The impetus to reform and harmonize this 
governance landscape stems from the adoption of 
several landmark global commitments in 2015— a 
historic year for global efforts to meet humanity’s 
present needs without compromising the ability of 
future generations to fulfil their own needs.279These 
commitments include the 2030 Agenda for 
Sustainable Development, the Paris Agreement on 
Climate Change, the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on 
Finance for Sustainable Development and the Sendai 
Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. 
The ambitious post-2015 global commitments 
on sustainable development— plus the 2020 Aichi 
Targets for Biodiversity agreed in 2011— aspire to 
transformative change in a world facing grave social, 
economic, political and environmental challenges, 
and they have far-reaching normative implications 
for mining sector governance. For example, the 
global normative framework for effective governance 
of mining has become considerably more multi-
faceted than the conventional “resource nexus” 
issues domain (concerning energy, food and water) 
or the conventional three dimensions of sustainable 
development (society, economy and environment).  
As discussed, and illustrated in detail in Chapters 10 
and 11, sustainable development entails balancing 
of synergies and trade-offs between decision-making 
about mining and delivery of all 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals plus 169 Targets recognized in 
the 2030 Agenda. 
Recent analyses including the 2016 Atlas Mapping 
Mining to the SDGs (UNSDN, 2016) (see Chapter 
11), published by the World Economic Forum and 
partners, highlight how a well-managed mining 
sector can promote delivery of the SDGs and 
Targets, both in relevant countries and globally. The 
notion of sustainable development — integrating the 
multiple linkages between people, planet, prosperity, 
peace and partnership — has become the organizing 
framework for global development cooperation and 
is key to framing discussions about the extractive 
sector’s future. As already noted, a growing number 
of frameworks and initiatives focus on delivering 
overlapping subsets of this global development 
vision, but do not currently operate in a sufficiently 
coordinated or integrated manner.
279  This overarching definition of sustainable development 
was first proposed by the 1987 Report of the World 
Commission on Environment and Development, entitled 
Our Common Future. Text available at: http://www.
un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm.  
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As stated above, the need for a new internationally 
agreed governance framework arises from the 
inadequacy of the existing governance landscape 
for mining, as discussed in Parts II and III of 
this report, and from the need to translate the 
complex array of post-2015 global commitments 
into a manageable set of requirements that can 
be used by all stakeholders involved in extractive 
sector governance.  The Sustainable Development 
Licence to Operate (SDLO) attempts to address 
these two needs. It is similar to the Social Licence 
to Operate (SLO) in that it is designed to improve 
the societal net benefits of mining, and is not 
designed necessarily to function as a licence in 
the compulsory or regulatory sense. However, 
the proposed SDLO extends the SLO concept in 
several important ways, so that it can function as 
a framework oriented towards the achievement of 
sustainable development.
First, the SDLO addresses a broader subject matter, 
covering the nexus of all environmental, social and 
economic concerns that fall within the subject 
matter ambit of the SDGs and Targets. Second, the 
SDLO is designed to be relevant to all stakeholders 
in the mining sector — articulating a set of internally 
consistent principles and policy options that are 
compatible with the SDGs and Targets, plus other 
priorities, obligations and standards compatible with 
the 2030 Agenda. Finally, the SDLO is designed to 
set out not only minimum standards of behaviour as 
a basis for self-assessment or regulation, but also 
evidence-based best practice and opportunities for 
enhancing the extractive sector’s contributions to 
sustainable development. 
The SDLO is fundamentally different from the SLO 
in that it recognizes that all parties (governments, 
mining companies and local communities) have 
rights and responsibilities, and need to discharge 
them in a collaborative way to further sustainable 
development as a practical solution in local and 
global contexts.
The SDLO is an aspirational goal and a framework 
of rules and principles applicable to all stakeholders, 
rather than a mere “licence” to one or more of the 
parties. It requires all parties to continually take 
steps in a synergistic manner to improve social, 
environmental and economic outcomes generally, 
while ensuring better implementation of the 2030 
Agenda of Sustainable Development in particular. 
12.4. Making the SDLO operational
Operationalizing and mainstreaming the SDLO (and 
consequently the SDGs) throughout the complex 
and multilevel global governance architecture for 
the minerals and metals industry will depend on 
sustained and long-term commitment from various 
actors working amidst of the many governance 
challenges outlined in Part II of this report. As 
discussed in Chapter 11.7, key implementation 
pathways for the SDLO include: 
• Private-sector benchmarking and certification, 
including use of the SDLO to strategically review 
and map existing initiatives against the SDGs and 
internalize them in business models and practice; 
• Public-sector benchmarking and associated 
capacity building, using the SDLO as a means 
to carry out granular assessments of the 
compatibility of public policy, regulation and 
stakeholder engagement with the SDGs and 
update those instruments accordingly to deliver 
better development outcomes at the national, 
sub-national and local levels; and 
• International dialogue concerning options for 
new agreements to strengthen transnational 
governance of mining including mechanisms to 
foster transparency and quadruple bottom-line 
accountability; to address illicit financial flows, 
price volatility and security of mineral supply; and 
generate shared value to host and home nations 
in a way that is compatible with sustainable 
development.
The SDLO requires concrete action on a number of 
broad fronts. These include:
• Devising (or aligning) national mineral policies and 
strategies of host countries (and manufacturing 
policies of home countries) in line with the SDGs. 
This not only relates to SDG 12.2 (sustainable use 
and efficient management of natural resource), 
but also SDGs 8.2 (achieve higher levels of 
economic productivity through diversification, 
technological upgrading and innovation, including 
through a focus on high-value added and labour 
intensive sectors), SDG 8.4 (improve progressively, 
through 2030, global resource efficiency in 
consumption and production and endeavour to 
decouple economic growth from environmental 
degradation), SDG 9.2 (promote inclusive and 
sustainable industrialization) and SDGs of a 
cross-sectoral nature such as  removal of poverty, 
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gender equality, inclusivity, climate change actions 
and sustainable use of terrestrial and marine 
ecosystems.
• Framing (or amending) laws relating to economic 
development, management and regulation of 
minerals in line with the above policies and 
strategies. This not only relates to laws governing 
extraction of minerals, but also to other regulatory 
instruments applicable to the sector such as 
education, environmental protection, human 
health industrial policy, investment, labour, 
research and trade.
• Creating, empowering and capacitating national, 
sub-national and local institutions concerned 
with i) surveys and assessments of mineral 
resources; ii) management of the resources; iii) 
regulation of their exploration and extraction and 
iv) management and regulation of the social and 
environmental impacts. Assessments of mineral 
resources and decision-making based on verifiable 
feasibility studies, incorporating environmental 
and social baseline studies; auditable 
environmental and social impact assessment 
and strategic management plans; mine closure 
and post-mine management plans to enable 
better decision-making regarding sustainability 
of extraction, as well as inter-generational 
issues; management and regulation of extraction 
ensures that the public trust that responsibility 
for the management of the resources is properly 
discharged; and the capacity to ensure proper 
management and regulation of social and 
environmental impacts is essential to enforce the 
accountability of mining companies under the 
licence to operate.
• Integrating, on a continual basis, sectoral plans 
and operations with national, sub-national and 
local SDG plans. National, sub-national and local 
plans for implementing the SDGs generally need to 
take into account the positive as well as negative 
outcomes of mining projects in implementing 
targeted interventions. 
Within these general principles, there are a number 
of practical actions to be undertaken by specific 
stakeholders to further strengthen the contribution 
of the minerals and metals industries to the UN 
SDGs through the development and the global use of 
the SDLO framework. 
This summary is structured according to the life 
cycle of the minerals and metals industries, as 
shown in Figure 12.2, which builds upon Figures 2.1 
and 2.2. The boxes with a plain border represent the 
main stages of the life cycle of minerals and metals 
and of the related materials flows:
• Mineral exploration and mine planning
• Mining 
• Ore processing 
• Metallurgy/ Refining
• Manufacturing
• Use phase 
• End of life
This schematically describes the traditional, linear 
and unsustainable life cycle of minerals and metals. 
Several elements are added to this scheme, as they 
are very important in the SDLO context:
• Framework conditions that impact on the 
sustainability of the mines and metals industries,
• Mine closure and post-closure developments - 
shown in a box with dashed borders, as it is not 
part of the materials flows;
• Black boxes and arrows that show the key sources 
of environmental challenge that need to be 
addressed;
• Green arrows showing some of the key 
components that need to be fully operationalized, 
to turn the linear life cycle into a circular one. 
To keep the diagram as simple possible, some 
additional steps needed to foster a circular 
minerals and metals materials flow are not 
shown, such as eco-conception of manufactured 
goods to make them easier to maintain and to 
re-use or remanufacture specific components 
and/to recycle metals and minerals from end-of 
life products, or the fight against planned 
obsolescence. However, whichever developments 
towards a circular economy are most urgently 
needed, there will doubtlessly be a continued need 
for the extraction of minerals and metals into the 
foreseeable future.
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Figure 12.1. The main stages of the minerals and metals life cycle and their framework conditions
Further ideas for making the SDLO operational are 
now grouped according to the governance level 
at which they will need to be implemented. They 
need discussion at the broad international level, 
and the development of an international consensus 
to achieve in view of effective implementation. 
Individual countries and regions could take on 
important initiatives to help initiate the process. 
However, there are a number of themes that are 
important at all levels of government.
12.4.1. Transparency, accountability and reporting
Transparency and accountability principles should 
be enshrined in all the laws governing the mines 
and metals industries. Public authorities should 
make investors and operators agree to transparency 
and quadruple bottom-line accountability as 
a precondition for obtaining exploration and 
mining permits. The application of ISO 26000 
and GRI compliant reporting of the sustainability 
performance of individual operations should be 
actively promoted by all governments, as well as the 
commitment by companies to operate according to 
the Equator and the EITI principles, with simplified 
procedures for small-scale operations. Ecolabelling 
of minerals and metals should be introduced, 
widening the existing metal standards to integrate 
compliance with the SDLO framework conditions. 
Reports produced by mining companies for their 
shareholders and/or for banks that finance their 
activities should be subject to a national reporting 
standard similar to the Canadian NI 43-101 standard 
for projects up to the feasibility stage and to annual 
GRI compliant reporting for active mining/ore 
processing/metallurgical/refining operations. All 
these reports should be publicly disclosed.
The use of blockchain technologies280 to improve 
compliance and traceability towards better 
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12.4.2. Institutional capacities 
Governments need to ensure that they have the 
core institutions needed to promote and regulate 
the minerals and metals industry. These include 
a Geological Survey, a Mining Directorate and an 
Environmental Directorate/ Agency (see below for 
details on their respective roles. Such institutions 
need to be functional and equipped with proper 
staff, budgets and material resources, as well as 
having the authority to promote and regulate the 
development of the mines and metals industries in 
line with the SDLO concept. In the case of developing 
countries, governments should assess the 
possibility of sharing some key resources/expertise 
at the regional level with the support of regional 
institutions.
12.4.3. Skills development
Larger mining, ore processing, metallurgical or metal 
refining projects and operations are technically and 
managerially complex operations requiring a wide 
range of experienced professional skills in fields 
as diverse as accounting, geology, environmental, 
electrical, mechanical and mining engineering and 
management, health and safety management, 
communication (often intercultural), maintenance 
of electrical and mechanical equipment, internal 
auditing, laboratories, legal advice, operation of 
heavy complex machinery and training in all these 
skills. The local availability of such skills plays an 
important role in determining the returns of mines 
and metals industrial activities to the local economy 
and the development of value adding activities 
beyond the production of minerals and/or metals. 
This is likely to be an issue in numerous developing 
countries, where investment in the development of 
training facilities, possibly at the regional scale, is 
needed to progressively secure greater returns to 
national economies.
12.4.4. Research and innovation
Research and innovation are continuously needed to:
• Provide tools to explore more efficiently for 
mineral resources that will be more and more 
difficult to discover as high-grade outcropping 
deposits have mostly been discovered
• Produce minerals and metals using less energy, 
water and other inputs while at the same time 
generating less emissions and waste;
• Develop substitutes for scarce and/or costly 
minerals and metals;
• Develop recycling of minerals and metals from 
end-of-life products;
• Develop innovative materials requiring less 
minerals and metals for a similar service or 
providing more sustainable performances during 
the use phase and/or being easier to recycle.
Value-adding to minerals and metals much depends 
on the success of research and innovation and on 
the derived intellectual property that can be traded 
on the basis of innovations. This requires action 
over many years. Developing countries should be 
supported by mineral-importing nations in their 
efforts to engage in research and innovation.
12.4.5. Data and knowledge
Environmental, geological, market, life cycle, material 
science and technological data and information, 
as well as any resulting knowledge, are of critical 
importance to policymaking, investment decisions 
and to inform stakeholders on a reliable, factual, 
basis.
Therefore, public investment in data acquisition, 
conservation, management and modelling as a 
public good is also one of the framework conditions 
for developing and informing mineral resources 
governance. Public and unrestricted access 
to such data should be promoted. It is key to 
boosting mineral discovery, fostering sustainable 
environmental management and ensuring adequate 
supply of minerals and metals for the future.
12.4.6. Stakeholder engagement
If a government decides to foster the development 
of national/ regional minerals and metals industries, 
every effort should be undertaken to develop 
stakeholder understanding of the sustainability 
issues at stake and of the means to ensure that 
their development will provide a sound, sustainable 
development basis to benefit the impacted 
populations and the country’s development. 
Adequate platforms to narrow the perception gaps 
about what constitutes value in the minerals and 
metals industry should be established, while relevant 
collaborative strategies for shared value creation 
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should also be formulated.281 Active stakeholder 
engagement from the onset of a potential mining 
project is a key factor towards its success, 
potentially saving many resources that otherwise 
could be expended grappling with costly protracted 
conflicts. Trust among stakeholders is very easy to 
destroy.
Particular attention is required to overcome the 
complexity of intercultural dialogue, as investors 
are often from cultures that are very different of 
the cultures of the countries/regions where their 
intended investment will be made.  
As already noted, effective resource governance will 
require different mechanisms and initiatives at the 
local, national and international levels.
Local governance
Local governance mechanisms will need to include:
• Empowerment and capacity-building of local 
communities and community-level institutions 
to dialogue with mining companies at the 
pre-mining, mining and subsequent stages to 
iteratively optimize social and environmental 
impact management, including impact mitigation 
plans, environmental management plans, mine 
closure plans and so on. This will ensure that the 
transparency and accountability requirements 
placed on companies are adequately leveraged, 
while Social Audits will continually improve 
developmental outcomes.
• Internalization within mining companies of 
SDLO responsibilities, including adequate 
capacity to plan, manage, proactively disclose 
issues relating to the mining project, and 
address local community issues in a credible 
and appropriate manner. In large mining 
projects, mining companies should be able to 
participate in SDG-related planning activities of 
sub-national and local governments. Opening up 
procurement opportunities for the provision of 
goods and services by local small and medium-
scale enterprises (SMEs) could be of particular 




constitutes 60 per cent of a mining project’s 
operating costs. National suppliers’ development 
programmes282  jointly implemented by 
governments and mining companies would help 
improve the ability of the SMEs to benefit from 
such opportunities. National/regional professional 
training facilities should be set up at an early stage 
of mining development projects to ensure that the 
development of industry activities will benefit local 
employment.
• New relationships between the stakeholders 
based on co-responsibilities and transparent risk 
management, and strengthened by robust dispute 
management and resolution mechanisms.
National/State/Provincial governance
At a national level, the SDLO needs laws and 
regulations to foster:
• The emergence of a mining sector that is fully 
linked with the local economy and catalyzes 
greater local processing, value-addition and 
resource-driven industrialization;
• A positive interplay between mineral development 
and sound environmental management, so 
that solutions can be found to mitigate adverse 
environmental impacts through innovation and 
stakeholder involvement.
• Full development of geoscientific databases 
to facilitate location and estimation of mineral 
resources, thereby facilitating planned 
management of known mineral resources for 
optimal developmental outcomes.
• Capacity development of sectoral institutions to 
adequately address not only normal management 
tasks, but also to ensure incorporation of 
sustainable development practices into business 
processes.
• Development of sectoral funding mechanisms 
for activities such as database creation and 
regulatory capacity enhancement. This may 
include some form of taxation at national or 
sub-national levels to create a funding stream that 
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In order for this to happen, host countries may make 
a start by laying out a Strategic Plan and/or Country 
Mining Vision283 up to 2030 and 2050, respectively 
(as well as a Vision up to 2050) to identify targets, 
measurable indicators, milestones and the financial, 
human and material resources in terms of the above-
mentioned actions. The Vision and/or Strategic 
Plan would take into account the current status of 
the sector in the country, the sectoral and general 
governance situation and the capacity/ resources 
to move forward along the sustainability path. 
Ideally, it would be reviewed and updated every few 
years to assess the situation and capacity to move 
forward along the sustainability path. It would need 
to consist of proposed actions within the sector, as 
well as a set of actions in other sectors impacted by 
or impacting on mining, along with the stakeholders. 
Mapping the actions to the relevant SDG would 
ensure that the Plan is well aligned with Agenda 
2030. The Country Mining Vision Guidebook (UNECA, 
2015) offers step-by-step guidance on formulation 
and implementation. It may be advantageous to 
develop general Guidelines and Toolkits for the 
shared visions based on credible and well-informed 
multi-stakeholder consultative processes. Additional 
insights could be found in a review of the mineral 
resources’ strategies of the G-20 countries published 
in 2013, as this provides a detailed insight of the 
strategies of all G-20-member countries (Hilpert & 
Mildner, 2013). The recently adopted 2018South 
African Minerals Charter284 gazetted on 27 
September 2018 reveals how painfully difficult it is 
to narrow the perception gaps on what should be 
the core content of national Visions and/or Strategic 
Plans, especially where they include mandatory 
requirements.
The Vision and/or Strategic Plan should be a formal, 
public government paper developed by national/
regional governments with the close involvement 
of all stakeholders. It should be prepared and 
published under the authority of the highest level of 
the State (President or Prime Minister), in order to 
obtain the support of all relevant ministries (Mines, 
Trade and Industry, Public Works, Environment, 
Finance, Labour, Education and Research).  It should 




development of the mines and metals industries 
based on the SDLO framework. It should establish 
public reporting obligations of a standard similar or 
better than the Canadian NI 43-101 standard for all 
mine development projects, from the prospecting/
exploration stage to the feasibility (inclusive) 
stages, as well as making the formal consultations 
with populations impacted by mining projects 
compulsory and verifiable. These obligations should 
also be mandatory for private equity funded projects. 
Specific, reduced, obligations could be defined 
for small-scale mining and artisanal mining. The 
importance of skill development and research and 
innovation should be recognized, as well as the 
establishment of a sovereign wealth fund that could 
manage most of the public revenue from the mines 
and minerals industries with a long-term perspective. 
In line with the Aarhus Convention on “Access to 
Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters”,285 
an important element of the Strategic Plan should 
be a Mining Law that should describe and make 
the consultation of populations impacted by the 
development of new projects compulsory and 
verifiable. As such, relevant information on such 
consultations should be included in the reports 
prepared for exploration or mining projects for 
their shareholders or partners such as banks and 
institutions providing loans (including for projects 
financed out of private equity). These reports should 
be made publicly available according to a national 
standard comparable to or better than the Canadian 
NI 43-101 standard. 
Particular attention is 
required to overcome the 
complexity of intercultural 
dialogue, as investors are 
often from cultures that 
are very different of the 
cultures of the countries/
regions where their intended 
investment will be made.
285  https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/
documents/cep43e.pdf.
 www.unep.org | www.resourcepanel.org
330
Mineral Resource Governance  in the 21st Century : Gearing extractive industries towards sustainable development
Mining Law should 
also include explicit 
references to the UN 
SDGs, to the rights 
of local populations 
and to International 
Agreements and 
Standards such as the 
ISO family of standards.
The Mining Law should also include explicit 
references to the UN SDGs, to the rights of local 
populations and to International Agreements and 
Standards such as the ISO family of standards 
(especially the ISO 14001 and 26000 standards). It 
should stipulate that all applicants seeking a mining 
permit must prepare a bankable feasibility study as 
a core component of the documentation required 
by the Environmental and Mining Directorates 
for the mine permitting process. The Mining 
Law should also make annual reporting on the 
sustainability performance of mining and related 
processing/ metallurgical/ refining operations into 
a requirement. This should at least comply with the 
GRI reporting guidelines available for the Mines and 
Metals industries. Simplified obligations could be 
established for SMEs and artisanal mining.
The Strategic Plan should support the three core 
public institutions needed to promote and regulate 
the development of the mines and metals industries:
• Environmental Directorate/Agency: in charge 
of developing environmental policies, laws and 
regulations for consideration by the government, 
in close coordination with other ministerial 
departments, , and responsible for evaluating 
mandatory EIAs and EMPs, as well as mine 
closure and post-mining plans; in charge of 
monitoring compliance with the Environmental 
Law and any contractual obligations; in charge 
of acquisition, management, conservation and 
dissemination (in coordination with the two other 
institutions) of public environmental/natural 
resources/natural hazards data and statistics;
• Mining Directorate: in charge of developing 
mines and metals-related policies, laws and 
regulations for consideration by the government, 
in close coordination with other ministerial 
departments,  and responsible for promoting 
and regulating the mining sector, monitoring and 
supervising the development of the industries 
and their compliance with the Mining Law and 
any related contractual obligations; in charge 
of the preparation and analysis of statistics 
related to minerals and metals and of their 
public dissemination; in charge of economic 
studies on markets and their trends to inform the 
government’s policymaking process;
• Geological Survey: in charge of the acquisition, 
conserving, management, modelling and 
dissemination of geological, geophysical, 
geochemical and other data necessary to 
describe the national geology and the related 
natural resources (such as minerals, groundwater, 
geothermal energy, subsurface space), as well as 
related natural hazards.
Feasibility studies are an important part of any 
mine planning process. They should be prepared 
by independent, well-experienced engineering 
firms and signed off by Qualified Persons, as 
defined in the NI 43-101 Standard. They should 
include environmental and social baseline studies 
describing the initial conditions of air quality, fauna, 
flora, surface and groundwater (qualitative and 
quantitative assessment, hydrodynamic regime in 
the case of groundwater), of soil, natural hazards, 
cultural heritage and initial social conditions in the 
area that will be impacted by mining. They need also 
to include:
• A detailed Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
describing how the proposed mine and related 
facilities/infrastructure will impact on these initial 
conditions and how natural hazards may impact 
on the proposed project. Based on a precise 
characterization (major/trace elements and 
mineralogy) of the minerals/ ore to be extracted 
and the processes to extract and process the 
minerals/ore into marketable product(s), it will 
describe the expected emissions to air, soil and 
water, as well as the waste streams that would 
be generated annually and over the lifetime of the 
proposed project (and the impacts such emissions 
and waste streams may have on human and 
animal well-being and on the provision of local 
ecosystem services).
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• A detailed Environmental Management Plan (EMP) 
describing how the identified or potential impacts 
will be mitigated, how performance will be publicly 
reported with measurable/ verifiable indicators 
on at least an annual basis over the lifetime of the 
planned operations.
• A Mine Closure Plan (MCP) detailing how the 
mining and related operations will be terminated 
at the end of the mine life in a manner that 
provides an environmentally and socially sound 
opportunity for the later use of the land impacted 
by mining and related activities. It needs to 
include a financing plan showing how the costs of 
rehabilitation will be covered by the owner of the 
mine permit, and the conditions that will apply for 
the transfer of the land leased for mining activities 
back to its legal owners.
• A Post-Mining Plan (PMP) detailing all the 
precautionary, mitigating, monitoring and other 
measures that will apply for a duration of a 
specified number of years after mine closure. The 
monitoring is needed to ensure that there is, for 
instance, no leakage of metals or chemicals into 
the environment and that the remaining structures 
such as former tailing ponds and waste heaps 
are stable. These measures need to be at the 
cost of the company that operated the mine and 
related facilities, which will remain legally liable 
in case of non-compliance. It should provide for 
the production of a public annual report on the 
conditions observed at the past mining site/
related facilities. It should also detail how the cost 
of implementing the PMP will be covered by the 
applicant.
• Guarantees that the mining permit applicant will 
deliver to the national/regional government to 
ensure proper implementation of the MCP and 
PMP.
• A report that integrates the outcomes of public 
consultations held during their preparation, with 
detailed provisions for the resolution of conflicts 
with independent last-resort arbitration. The 
conflict-resolution process should include public 
hearings of representatives of local populations 
when these are part of the conflict
Special conditions could be defined by the regulatory 
authorities in the light of the size of the planned 
production rates and the potential impacts of 
the planned project and the local ecosystem 
characteristics/vulnerabilities. Simplified obligations 
could be envisaged for small-scale operations. 
A major consideration for countries with mining, 
especially developing countries, is how they can 
benefit from a fair share of the mining revenues. 
The OECD Guiding Principles for Durable Extractive 
Contracts286 articulate how best to achieve this 
outcome. Where these revenues derive from 
taxation, the taxation regime should be based 
on simple, stable and enforceable taxation rules, 
and should also have a number the following 
characteristics:
• Exclusion of the use of transfer pricing by 
companies or individuals investing in the 
development of mining and related activities, and 
of the use of tax havens to avoid national taxes;
• Practical measures to prevent taxation base 
erosion, alongside the guidance developed by 
OECD287 to prevent taxation base erosion and 
profit shifting practices;
• Transparency of the payments received by all 
public authorities (national, regional or local levels) 
from the mines and metals industries;
• Flexibility in the taxation regime, such that taxes 
may be reduced in periods of low profitability or 
loss-making of the mines and metals industries 
to ensure the continuity of existing operations, 
while they may be increased if the market price of 
the produced minerals/metals exceeds an agreed 
threshold, to provide a fair share of windfall profits;
• Mandatory public disclosure of the payments 
received by the authorities from the mines and 
metals industries.
International governance
The challenges facing humanity in the twenty-first 
century and the threats to our own future existence 
are such that a deep re-thinking of investment 
conditions, supply chain management and 
international trade framework conditions appear 
necessary. Business as usual driven by the search 
for short-term profits, with no responsibility for 
the related externalities, may just accelerate the 
problems this world is already facing and that will 
286  https://www.oecd.org/dev/Guiding-Principles-public-
consultation.pdf.
287  See http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/.
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be further aggravated due to global demographics, 
urbanization and rapid growth in the resource 
intensive global middle class described in Chapter 4.
Minerals and metals are unique resources of 
strategic importance to humanity and, as such, 
they need to be produced and used with care and 
stewardship. Therefore, an international mineral 
resources governance agreement should be 
established, ensuring that minerals and metals are 
produced and marketed within the SDLO and UN 
SDG frameworks, with pricing that fully integrates 
the externalities of their production and marketing.  
Supply chains should be traceable, auditable 
and non-conformity should be identifiable and 
remediated. The SDLO framework is essential to 
develop a new level international playing field for 
mineral resources extraction and use.
The SDLO would work most effectively when there 
is an international architecture that supports host 
countries in their journey towards sustainable 
development by:
• Maintaining knowledge repositories;
• Disseminating best practices and sharing 
experiences;
• Helping manage risks beyond the scope of the 
host country;
• Making available toolkits for evaluation of various 
aspects of the mining sector;
• Compiling Global “State of the Sector” reports 
from time to time, incorporating country visions 
and Strategic Plans for moving towards more 
sustainable sectoral practices; and.
• Creating and managing Guidelines and Toolkits for 
the development of Strategic Plans and Visions.
The work of the Committee for Mineral Reserves 
International Reporting Standards (CRIRSCO) 
and of the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Europe’s (UNECE) Expert Group on Resource 
Classification (EGRC), which operates the United 
Nations Framework Classification for Resources 
(UNFC), is of significant importance to mineral 
resources governance. The current UNFC version 
(2009) does not make disclosure of technical data 
compulsory, nor the use of Competent Persons 
as defined in NI 43-101. Jointly, they provide 
an international scheme for the classification, 
management and reporting of energy, mineral and 
raw material resources.  Both initiatives provide 
a compatible resources and reserves reporting 
framework, with NI 43-101 putting more stringent 
obligations on disclosure and the quality and 
transparency of what is disclosed. NI 43-101 and 
the national Australian reporting standard JORC 
are the most widely used reporting standards 
used worldwide as it can be seen from the weekly 
updated, freely accessible, online map of worldwide 
exploration and mine development projects 
provided by RSC Mining and Mineral Exploration 
Services.288The projects listed are only those that 
report their activities on a voluntary basis or further 
to national reporting obligations.
The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe’s (UNECE) Expert Group on Resource 
Classification (EGRC), which operates the United 
Nations Framework Classification for Resources 
(UNFC), is an international scheme for the 
classification, management and reporting of energy, 
mineral and raw material resources.  
Effective governance of mineral resources 
fundamentally requires better signalling between 
demand for particular emerging technologies 
that require minerals on the one hand, and the 
extractive enterprises that will supply them, on the 
other. Although a stakeholder-driven Geological 
Programme Board (including geological surveys, 
mining/recycling companies and public-private 
partnerships in relation to exploration) would 
address this issue, there is currently no effective 
international mechanism to facilitate such 
arrangements. The European Union has launched 
an initiative that may foster such a framework, 
the “Towards a World Forum on Raw Materials 
(FORAM)”289 and several NGOs such as the World 
Resources Forum290, the World Materials Forum291 
and the World Circular Economy Forum292  may play 
a role in fostering such an international mechanism. 
Currently, there are only ad-hoc arrangements 
and contracts between particular demand firms 
288  Online interactive map- based information service: 
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and suppliers, which are often economically and 
ecologically inefficient. Instead, an international 
coordination mechanism is needed, whereby data 
and knowledge are shared on economic geology, 
environmental conditions and issues as well as 
medium-/long-term mineral demand demand/supply 
balance scenarios, as well as mineral demand needs, 
alongside transparency on impacts and benefits.  
Building on the work of the EGRC and modelled on 
the International Energy Agency, the international 
coordination could be facilitated through the 
formation of an International Mineral Agency (in a 
modified version of the International Energy Agency) 
or an international agreement (either a separate 
treaty or a protocol that considers the mineral 
needs of complying with existing environmental 
agreements).
Through these institutions or others, continuous 
coordinated international effort would be required 
to develop the SDLO framework conditions with a 
special focus on developing countries on the one 
hand, and on the other on informal small-scale 
activities. Collecting available existing documented 
best practices and making them available via a 
single Internet portal would support capacity-
building. This web portal could also provide links 
to existing Massive Open Online Courses (MOOC) 
related to minerals, metals, materials, resources 
governance, research and innovation. Informal 
artisanal mining would need to be turned into formal 
small-scale operations providing its stakeholders 
with security of tenure and support to develop 
sustainable extraction practices. 
Human skills, material and financial resources 
are required for: capacity-building and training; 
institutional strengthening; data acquisition, 
conservation, management and modelling; research 
and innovation; the development of web-based 
multilingual access to data; and information, and 
knowledge (including above mentioned best practice 
reference documents and MOOCs) . Mobilizing 
these resources at the international level through a 
special Facility or Trust Fund of several US$ billion 
(to be managed by an international body such as UN 
Environment, the UN Development Programme or 
the World Bank) should not be beyond an industry 
that Reich et al. (2017) estimate had a total value in 
2015 of $US3.6 trillion. 
If managed by an international body such as UN 
Environment, the UN Development Programme or 
the World Bank, a financial resource of a few billion 
from the industry could do wonders to achieve 
the development of the framework conditions 
summarized here, without having a significant effect 
on minerals and metals prices.
The development of the conceptual framework 
presented in this report could be taken forward 
by several existing international initiatives such 
as the World Resources Forum and the World 
Materials Forum. With the support of regional/
international organizations such as the UN 
Regional Commissions, other UN bodies such 
as UN Environment and the UN Development 
Programme, the European Union, the African Union 
Commission, the ASEAN, OECD, the World Bank, 
the G20 UN bodies such as UN Environment and 
the UN Development Programme and progressive 
national governments, it is possible to imagine the 
development of the framework to the point where 
an international agreement on Mineral Resources 
Governance could be achieved and effectively 
implemented. 
In the shorter term, there are several specific 
opportunities that could be used to take the first 
steps towards refinement, implementation and use 
of the SDLO throughout global governance of the 
extractive sector. For example:
• The UN Environment Assembly, the 
Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, 
Metals and Sustainable Development and wider 
ongoing UN processes focused on reviewing 
progress towards the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable 
Development, could serve as fora for negotiation 
of an international consensus regarding both the 
normative content and structure of the SDLO, as 
well as specific policy options and programmes 
for its implementation.
• Ongoing bilateral and plurilateral discussions 
among governments on trade in security of 
supply of mineral raw materials and resource-
driven development (for example discussions 
between the European Union and the Africa 
Union, as well as between the European Union 
and Latin America, via MERCOSUR and/or the 
UN Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC). The dialogue could 
also be developed between the European Union 
and the 79 members of the Africa, Caribbean and 
Pacific Group of States, linked to the European 
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Union by the Cotonou Agreement.293 Africa, 
Europe and Latin America, under the auspices 
of the EU Raw Materials Initiative and Strategy, 
could utilize and refine the SDLO as a template 
for new international instruments to strengthen 
transnational governance of mining and 
associated trade flows.
• Mineral security has become an urgent policy 
priority for the United States. The United States 
Department of Commerce published a critical 
metals strategy for the first time in June, 2019, 
which lays forward 24 goals to safeguard access 
for crucial commodities. Pursuant to this effort 
the United States Department of State launched 
an effort to coordinate mineral supply governance 
particularly for crucial energy-related minerals 
through the “Energy Resource Governance 
Initiative” with founding partners Australia, 
Botswana and Peru. In September 2019, the State 
Department further announced that Argentina, 
Brazil, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia, 
the Philippines, the Holy See and Zambia were 
also participating in the initiative. The Holy See’s 
involvement in this effort is particularly focused on 
ensuring that minerals come from well-governed 
parts of the world with adequate protection of 
human rights, environmental conservation and 
social development. This initiative may lead to 
separate mineral supply coordination blocs led by 
China or Russia but there may be opportunities for 
convergence if common standards of governance 
and supply security are considered as put forward 
in this report.
• The 80+ existing standards and instruments 
relevant to specific aspects of mining 
sustainability (see Chapter II) could use the SDLO 
as a basis for benchmarking their own activities, 
or aligning their activities with wider political 
commitments on sustainable development — for 
example by embedding or adapting the SDLO 
Principles within documentation and standards, 
or by using the SDLO as a means to identifying 
opportunities for inter-standard collaboration. 
The relevant principals and other interested 
parties of bodies in charge of institutions and/
or initiatives such as the EITI, ICMM, Equator 
Principles Financial Institutions (EPFIs) GRI 
and the Responsible Mining Index, to name but 
293  www.acp.int.
a few, should jointly explore the opportunities 
for harmonization of global standards of good 
practices and consolidation of existing initiatives 
and instruments for ease of application, improved 
efficiency, greater enforcement and less 
duplication or redundancies.
• Relevant international communities of experts 
could consider options for forming a ‘High-
level Panel on Sustainable Development of 
Mining’, whose activities would build on the 
analysis presented in this report and develop 
an authoritative and standardized set of 
SDLO Principles and Policy Options, including 
recommendations for the design of transnational 
instruments to strengthen mining governance. 
Illustrative examples of this model from other 
sectors include the Global Ocean Commission,  
whose recommendations were influential in 
the decision to launch a new global round of 
negotiations concerning ocean areas beyond 
national jurisdiction, and the newly established 
High-Level Panel on Building a Sustainable Ocean 
Economy. 
• At the national, sub-national and local levels, 
it would be important to use the SDLO as an 
indicative framework to undertake a SDLO gap 
analysis with the view to formulating national 
SDLO paths, updating and adapting existing 
national visions, policies, strategies, laws, 
regulations and practice to the requirements 
of the Agenda 2030 and the quadruple bottom 
line principles articulated in this report. There 
is a vital need to reduce the perception gaps on 
what constitutes benefit in the extractive sector 
among relevant stakeholders, and to generate 
development outcomes based on the concept of 
shared value.  
Given the urgency and enormity of gearing the 
extractive sector towards sustainable development, 
we encourage all stakeholders to build on the 
foundation presented here in this report, to enable 
the metals and minerals sector to realize its 
contribution to sustainable development by 2030, 
and beyond. The Investing in Africa Mining Indaba 
(4-7 February 2019), the Prospectors and Developers 
Association of Canada (PDAC) Convention of 3-6 
March 2019 and the fourth session of the UN 
Environment Assembly (UNEA 4) in 11-15 March 
2019 offer unique and immediate platforms to keep 
up the momentum, disseminate the report and 
articulate further pathways to the operationalization 
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